

21

Second Series

Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru



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“ So the story of Jawaharlal Nehru is that of a man who evolved, who grew in storm and stress till he became the representative of much that was noble in his time. It is the story of a generous and gracious human being who summed up in himself the resurgence of the ‘third world’ as well as the humanism which transcends dogmas and is adapted to the contemporary context. His achievement, by its very nature and setting, was much greater than that of a Prime Minister. And it is with the conviction that the life of this man is of importance not only to scholars but to all, in India and elsewhere, who are interested in the valour and compassion of the human spirit that the Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund has decided to publish a series of volumes consisting of all that is significant in what Jawaharlal Nehru spoke and wrote....the whole corpus should help to remind us of the quality and endeavour of one who was not only a leader of men and a lover of mankind, but a completely integrated human being.”

Indira Gandhi







**Selected  
works of  
Jawaharlal  
Nehru**





AT THE PRESENTATION CEREMONY OF THE HONORARY DEGREE OF THE DOCTOR  
OF SCIENCE BY AGRA UNIVERSITY IN NEW DELHI, 7 FEBRUARY 1953

# **Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru**

**Second Series**

**Volume Twenty One**

**(1 January 1953–31 March 1953)**

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Jawaharlal Nehru  
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General Editor

S. Gopal



## FOREWORD

Jawaharlal Nehru is one of the key figures of the twentieth century. He symbolised some of the major forces which have transformed our age.

When Jawaharlal Nehru was young, history was still the privilege of the West; the rest of the world lay in deliberate darkness. The impression given was that the vast continents of Asia and Africa existed merely to sustain their masters in Europe and North America. Jawaharlal Nehru's own education in Britain could be interpreted, in a sense, as an attempt to secure for him a place within the pale. His letters of the time are evidence of his sensitivity, his interest in science and international affairs as well as of his pride in India and Asia. But his personality was veiled by his shyness and a facade of nonchalance, and perhaps outwardly there was not much to distinguish him from the ordinary run of men. Gradually there emerged the warm and universal being who became intensely involved with the problems of the poor and the oppressed in all lands. In doing so, Jawaharlal Nehru gave articulation and leadership to millions of people in his own country and in Asia and Africa.

That imperialism was a curse which should be lifted from the brows of men, that poverty was incompatible with civilisation, that nationalism should be poised on a sense of international community and that it was not sufficient to brood on these things when action was urgent and compelling—these were the principles which inspired and gave vitality to Jawaharlal Nehru's activities in the years of India's struggle for freedom and made him not only an intense nationalist but one of the leaders of humanism.


No particular ideological doctrine could claim Jawaharlal Nehru for its own. Long days in jail were spent in reading widely. He drew much from the thought of the East and West and from the philosophies of the past and the present. Never religious in the formal sense, yet he had a deep love for the culture and tradition of his own land. Never a rigid Marxist, yet he was deeply influenced by that theory and was particularly impressed by what he saw in the Soviet Union on his first visit in 1927. However, he realised that the world was too complex, and man had too many facets, to be encompassed by any single or total explanation. He himself was a socialist with an abhorrence of regimentation and a democrat who was anxious to reconcile his faith in civil liberty with the necessity of mitigating economic and social wretchedness. His struggles, both within himself and with the outside world, to adjust such seeming contradictions are what make his life and work significant and fascinating.

As a leader of free India, Jawaharlal Nehru recognised that his country could neither stay out of the world nor divest itself of its own interest in world affairs. But to the extent that it was possible, Jawaharlal Nehru sought to speak objectively



and to be a voice of sanity in the shrill phases of the 'cold war'. Whether his influence helped on certain occasions to maintain peace is for the future historian to assess. What we do know is that for a long stretch of time he commanded an international audience reaching far beyond governments, that he spoke for ordinary, sensitive, thinking men and women around the globe and that his was a constituency which extended far beyond India.

So the story of Jawaharlal Nehru is that of a man who evolved, who grew in storm and stress till he became the representative of much that was noble in his time. It is the story of a generous and gracious human being who summed up in himself the resurgence of the 'third world' as well as the humanism which transcends dogmas and is adapted to the contemporary context. His achievement, by its very nature and setting, was much greater than that of a Prime Minister. And it is with the conviction that the life of this man is of importance not only to scholars but to all, in India and elsewhere, who are interested in the valour and compassion of the human spirit that the Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund has decided to publish a series of volumes consisting of all that is significant in what Jawaharlal Nehru spoke and wrote. There is, as is to be expected in the speeches and writings of a man so engrossed in affairs and gifted with expression, much that is ephemeral; this will be omitted. The official letters and memoranda will also not find place here. But it is planned to include everything else and the whole corpus should help to remind us of the quality and endeavour of one who was not only a leader of men and a lover of mankind, but a completely integrated human being.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "Indira Gandhi". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long, sweeping line for the 'i' in 'Indira' and a distinct 'G' in 'Gandhi'.

New Delhi  
18 January 1972

Chairman  
Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund

## EDITORIAL NOTE

The first quarter of 1953, covered by this volume of the *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, witnessed several national and international developments with far-reaching implications for society and politics in India.

Within the country, the foundations were being laid at this juncture of a modern industrial economy. While striving in this direction, Jawaharlal Nehru repeatedly stressed the need for economic growth with social equity in a vigorous democratic polity. The Five Year Plans were thus the manifestoes of a new era of national reconstruction and social regeneration, which would rest upon the creative energies of a united nation. Indeed, the concept of a mixed economy, so Nehru believed, would draw equally upon the strengths of the public and the private sector for the common good of the people of India as a whole.

Addressing the question of social deprivation in rural India, Nehru emphasized the fact that backwardness was not confined to a few sections of Indian society. It was all pervasive; and the entire people had to be involved in the building of a new India. The community development programme, which was inaugurated on 2 October 1952, was to be among the principal instruments of such a transformation of Indian society.

In the task of transforming society in India, Nehru sought the cooperation of Jayaprakash Narayan and his socialist colleagues "at all levels". He wrote to Jayaprakash that "I am not satisfied with the rate of our progress... I want to hasten it and want your help." But the talks Nehru held with Jayaprakash, in March 1953, failed in achieving unity since the terms put forth by the socialist leadership were difficult to accept. As Nehru wrote to Jayaprakash, "any kind of formal step at the present moment would not be helpful. We have to grow into things, not bring them about artificially."

As in earlier years, foreign policy continued to be a major arena of interest for Jawaharlal Nehru in the period under review. India's efforts as a developing country, Nehru observed, were geared towards the preservation of world peace. His answer to the question as to how wars could be prevented was deeply principled and forthright. "There are only two ways of approaching the problem of international relations", he stated. "One is the conviction, that even though we try to avoid war, it is bound to come. Therefore, we should prepare for it, and when it comes, join this party or that. The other way starts with the feeling that war can be avoided." India could best serve peace by remaining independent of the two power blocs, yet seek to bring them closer to each other by suggesting ways in which contentious issues like Korea could be satisfactorily resolved.

Nehru's concern for peace was fully compatible with an activist policy towards potentially disturbing factors in the Asian Region, in particular. When



the U.S. changed its stance of neutrality towards Taiwan, and attempted to constitute a Middle East Defence Organization with Pakistan as a member, Nehru feared that the risk of a world war had moved "right up to our door." To meet this situation, Nehru proposed the formation of "an area of peace" for the non-aligned nations with South Asia as its central focus.

India's initiative in the U.N. for the solution of the Korean problem, and for the disposition of prisoners of war unwilling to return to their homelands, was rejected by China and the Soviet Union. They believed that this initiative was the product of a subtle American move to use India against China. However, Nehru did not permit this unwarranted suspicion to be a source of embarrassment. Indeed, he directed the Indian delegation not to abandon the resolution in question. His position was vindicated when slightly later, in March 1953, the Chinese on their own proposed a solution which was very close in spirit to the Indian resolution.

Despite Nehru's unhappiness at Britain's stance in the U.N. on the Kashmir issue, he defended India's association with the Commonwealth and was unwilling to take any sudden action against the enlistment of Gurkhas in the British Army on Indian soil. Yet Indo-British relations underwent a severe strain due to British policy in East Africa. While Nehru regretted needless violence, he also believed that in the face of grave British provocation, the Africans had no alternative to determined resistance. Moreover, he strongly resented the arrogant racial policies of the South African Government and asked the Indian delegation at the U.N. to raise the question of apartheid before the world forum.

Nehru assured Burma of India's support in her complaint to the U.N. about the presence of the Kuomintang troops in her territory. He was also prepared to help Nepal, where King Tribhuvan had temporarily taken over the administration, without directly interfering in her domestic affairs. Besides, Nehru denounced the continuance of colonial pockets in South Asia, and demanded the withdrawal of the French and the Portuguese from their territorial enclaves in this region.

The Nehru Memorial Library has, as before, assisted in the publication of this volume by granting access to the papers of Jawaharlal Nehru. Shrimati Sonia Gandhi has graciously permitted us to consult the collection of documents in her possession referred to as the JN Collection. The Cabinet Secretariat, the Secretariats of the President and the Prime Minister and the Ministries of Home Affairs, External Affairs and the Press Information Bureau, too, have allowed us the use of relevant material in their possession. Some classified material has necessarily been deleted.

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## ABBREVIATIONS

AICC	All India Congress Committee
AIR	All India Radio
CAG	Comptroller and Auditor-General
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
COMIND	Commissioner India
CP	Central Provinces
CPI	Communist Party of India
CS	Commonwealth Secretary/Cabinet Secretary
CWC	Congress Working Committee
DCC	District Congress Committee
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FS	Foreign Secretary
IAS	Indian Administrative Service
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICAR	Indian Council of Agricultural Research
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICS	Indian Civil Service
IG	Inspector General
INA	Indian National Army
KMP/KMPP	Kisan Mazdoor Praja Party
MEA	Ministry of External Affairs
MEDO	Middle East Defence Organization
MLA	Member of Legislative Assembly
NEFA	North-East Frontier Agency
NMML	Nehru Memorial Museum and Library
PCC	Provincial Congress Committee
Pepsu/PEPSU	Patiala and East Punjab States Union
PIB	Press Information Bureau
PMS	Prime Minister's Secretariat
PSP	Praja Socialist Party
PTI	Press Trust of India
RSS	Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
SG	Secretary General
UK	United Kingdom
UN/UNO	United Nations Organization
UNCIP	United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan
UNESCO	United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization
UP	Uttar Pradesh



UPSC	Union Public Service Commission
US/USA	United States of America
USIS	United States Information Service
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

## GENERAL PERSPECTIVES



## 1. The Gandhian Way of Relieving Tensions<sup>1</sup>

Mr Chairman and friends,

I confess to a feeling of great diffidence in having to address you on the subject of this seminar. When I first heard of this seminar some time ago, I could not quite make out how—and I speak with all respect—a number of people meeting together for a few days, a number of eminent people, could consider and come to any decisions about such topics.<sup>2</sup> Certainly I can throw very little light on them from that logical, philosophical point of view with which no doubt this seminar will approach this question...

I feel that in this distracted world of ours the Gandhian way does offer a good deal of light to us; at any rate it points in a certain direction which I think is the right direction. But more than that I cannot say. It is a feeling, it is an impression, if you like. It is a conviction which I cannot logically argue about and the conviction has been derived, certainly, I suppose, from thinking often on these subjects, but more so perhaps, from having indulged in a course of action, and most of all from having had the great privilege of coming into contact with Gandhiji.

And yet if you ask what is this Gandhian technique and what method did he pursue or did he recommend, I rather doubt if any of those who are best entitled to speak on this question will speak with one voice. I think they will give different pictures—not contradictory pictures, I mean—but different pictures, different emphasis, different aspects of that extraordinary personality and the way he functioned, and so you might get some light here and there, but you will find it difficult to form a full picture, and you might even end in being a good deal confused. Because he himself was, if you like, in the normal sense of the word, rather a confusing, a contradictory individual. Or perhaps

1. Inaugural address at the seminar on the "Contribution of Gandhian Outlook and Techniques to the Solution of Tensions between and within Nations", New Delhi, 5 January 1953. The seminar, organized by the Indian National Commission for Cooperation with the UNESCO, was held at New Delhi from 5 to 17 January 1953. The text of the address has been printed in *Gandhian Outlook and Techniques*, pp 9-18, published by the Ministry of Education, Government of India. Extracts.
2. Foreign participants in the seminar included Lord Boyd-Orr from Britain, Ralph Bunche from the US, G.T. Tucci, the well-known Italian orientalist, Cecilia Meriels, Brazilian poetess and educationist, Massingnon of the College de France, Mohammad Hussein Haikal, former President of the Egyptian Senate, and Yusuke Tsurumi, the well-known pacifist of Japan, Matin Daffri of Iran and S. Radhakrishnan, Narendra Deva, Zakir Hussain, J.B. Kripalani and Humayun Kabir were the Indian participants.



he was not contradictory at all; he was a very integrated individual, but we, with our contradictory approaches, could not quite understand what he was.

I have another difficulty and that is that, when I think of him, well, many ideas come into my mind. I hardly think of techniques of action and the rest of it; I think of him perhaps in a rather emotional way, as my leader, a great friend and a great comrade. And that rather confuses the mind, because cold-blooded logic is set aside. Then, again, during all these years—thirty years or so—during which many of us of a passing generation were associated with him—or rather those who were associated with him are of a passing generation—we were associated seldom in logical debate, argument, or philosophical discourse; we were associated in action, and certainly in discussions about the action occasionally, but much more so in action, in how to meet a particular situation—not philosophically but practically—and so you could derive perhaps some logical consequences from that action.

The action did not flow, if I may say so, from some definite set theory of action, at any rate, so far as many of us were concerned. But we learnt through that action itself, and gradually formed some idea of perhaps the basic principles underlying that action, because Gandhiji was very far from being a doctrinaire person and yet he was very firm and very unmoving in regard to certain basic matters and at the same time very flexible, very adaptable, very human. So what is one to make of all these rather contradictory things?

I remember once I was reading Plato's *Dialogues* and someone was describing the effect that Socrates had on him. As I read this *Dialogues*, I was astonished because it was almost a description of the effect that Gandhiji had on me, an effect, a curious effect, sometimes an irritating effect, sometimes a most mystifying effect, very often an inspiring effect, very often an effect that I felt ashamed of myself. I found when I read Plato that this was the effect that Socrates produced on some persons who used to come to him from time to time and I found a picture of my own mind reflected in that; I was astonished and it came as a surprise to me.

And so all these various effects come in; you may examine them when you sit in the seminar. I have no doubt that they are techniques but in that technique itself the most important things are imponderable which you cannot measure or weigh in a balance—how a human being behaves to another, how a group should behave to another group, how a nation should behave towards another nation. How do you measure, let us say anything, let us say goodness? How do you measure goodness? I know of no measure. How do you measure tolerance? How do you measure anything that is worthwhile, beauty or truth or anything else? You cannot measure them. You feel them. You may try to live up to them to the best of your ability, but there it is; through this you feel them certainly and when people feel them you know they are there. And in this world, especially today, which becomes more and more bereft and devoid

of the spirit of toleration, of the spirit of putting up with another person who does not agree with you, all these big words become rather meaningless.

Today if a person does not agree with you, he is wicked; there is no half-way; there are no shades or grades, but there is only black and white and therefore you come into conflict, and there are attempts to impose your will on others. Well, it is all very well for me to say so because the questions that a nation, a country, or any organized group, has to deal with are not so simply disposed of by some maxim or aphorism; they are difficult and the choice often is very difficult.

And then you come up against that basic difficulty, if I may call it so, of two ways of approaching a problem—the prophet's way, or if you like, of the man of truth wedded to truth whatever happens, and that of the politician or the statesman. The prophet usually meets his doom in crucifixion, and it was in the fitness of things that Gandhiji met his death in that way. That has been the role of men like Gandhiji through the ages and so both in life and in his death he served the cause he held dear. But we are not prophets. We are humbler folk and if we have responsibility cast upon us as politicians and the like, we have to deal with human material which is very far from perfect. And if we live in an age of democracy—and all praise to democracy—but democracy does not make fools wise men necessarily, nor does it follow that what the crowds say is the wise thing—and so the average is lowered often enough. It is better to stick to that average perhaps, than to take other risks. That is the virtue of democracy. But, anyhow, the politician has his tools in large numbers of human beings, even if that politician or statesman sees truth which he seldom does—but let us say he sees the truth and wants to stick to it—he has to function through other tools. He has to function not only through certain tools, but through the multitude who have made him what he is. Now that multitude—who are his tools—can only follow the truth insofar as they see it, and even when they see it, insofar as they have the strength to follow it.

So immediately difficulties arise in the way of the political leader—let us say, leader of any type, apart from the prophet. Because although he sees the truth and wants to go that way, how is he to carry others with him unless others see it also? How is he to make them receptive to that? And then he has to struggle and wrestle with the problem of what he is to do. Is he to walk alone or stay with his comrades? Sometimes he has to walk alone undoubtedly and he should; but then again is that all right for him? What about democracy? What about trying to take others to the next stage of the journey? So long as he remains the leader, he has to consider all the time how far he can take those that he leads. He is influenced by them of course, and he influences them and he can take them perhaps a little further than they might otherwise go, but there are limits and those limits are the limits of receptivity for the truth of those people.



So the leader has always to face this difficult problem: should he seek, should he adhere to the truth as he knows it completely, or should he compromise? When one compromises, it is a dangerous and slippery slope, and yet if one does not compromise, one loses touch; one is cut off from those one works for and works with; one is isolated; one can work for one's own personal perfection if you like, but the whole object of the leader is to lead others and to help others and to take them forward in the journey.

Of course, all this presumes that what is truth is clear, and it seldom is. That is another difficulty, but I was presuming that for the moment I am not talking about the ultimate truth but rather of the right step, the right direction in which to go, the right step to take, the truth for the present, whatever it may be. If that is clear, at any rate, the next step is clear whatever farther one may be. Now, that again is very seldom something abstract, because you are dealing with day-to-day problems of multitudes of people, of human society and the like, and it is not so easy to say that this is absolutely the right thing to do for that society. Ultimately we proceed by a process of trial and error. We try an experiment. If we make a mistake, we should be strong enough to go back, but anyhow one should aim in a certain direction. There should be some fixed principles, or call them what you like, which should govern your action, some touchstone by which you can judge whether a thing is right or wrong. You may not go fast, but you should go in a particular direction.

So there is always this conflict, if you like, in the leader's mind who cannot, and who is not capable of acting like a prophet or like the man of ultimate truth and who has always to think in terms either of compromises or of a choice of evils and he has to choose what he considers the lesser evil lest the greater overwhelm.

There are all these difficulties in the way of a man like Gandhi, who was of the prophetic mould and who was also very much a human being, and who was firm and inflexible and yet also flexible and adaptable. The things he said had been said before; the truth he uttered, or even the principles he proclaimed, had been said by the great men in earlier days also; but perhaps for the first time he applied them on a large scale—not on the individual scale as others had done—but on a large mass scale and in the political field. I speak, of course, with my limited knowledge of events during the past, but I do not know of any such attempt or experiment on a large mass scale of applying these various techniques, which themselves, I believe, came out of his mind, not as something complete but something which developed as he experimented with them. He calls, as you perhaps know, his autobiography, *My Experiments with Truth*. And there is in them, that quality of inflexibility, that is to say, not surrendering to what he considered basically evil, whatever the consequences; but having decided that, always to be friendly, always to be cooperative, always to stretch out your hand even

to your opponent and enemy, always to keep a door open for reconciliation.

No doubt, these two things are very difficult to have at the same time—to be firm and inflexible and to fight evil with all your might, and yet always to be prepared for reconciliation. The two do not normally go together. You work yourself up to a fury of hatred of your opponent as normally happens today with wars—whether they are shooting wars or cold wars or any other war—in fact, it is considered a necessary concomitant of war to rouse up this passion of hatred, and yet Gandhiji could combine the two, and of the many miracles he wrought in this country this was one, that he made us in India, poor stuff as we are—I lay no claims to special virtue for our people—he made us also somewhat receptive to that technique, to those ideas and even to that behaviour; so that, while we struggled, we did not have that much of bitterness and hatred in us which normally accompanies such struggles and which has accompanied struggles in other parts of the world—nationalist struggles or struggles for freedom.

Now, that was good, of course, but another virtue was also attached to that general line of approach, and that virtue was that when the time comes to end the struggle, it can be ended graciously, gracefully and with a minimum of bitterness. That is a very big thing, because the worst of the struggles of the world, whatever they are, whether by war—shooting war, cold war or any other war—they are bad enough, but what is worse is the trail of bitterness, and hatred that they leave behind the brutalization of humanity that they lead to. That is the terrible consequence.

Now, that consequence is largely avoided—not completely of course, because we are all, shall I say, poor folk; we are not trained up to these things. We have not as human beings—and it is true of any country—arrived at that high enough stage. Nevertheless, it means something if a deliberate attempt is made, a deliberate aim not to surrender to hatred. Hatred may creep in; it does creep in, but it makes all the difference in the world when on the one side you promote hatred, while on the other side you try to restrict it and lessen it as far as possible.

That was his attempt in India, and if you compare the struggle for Indian independence during all its various phases with any other struggles, you will find plenty of courage and heroism in every country, plenty of sacrifice, but the thing that probably will be missing elsewhere was this deliberate attempt to keep that struggle outside the scope of hatred. As I said, I do not mean to say that we succeeded completely. Of course, there was hatred, anger and all that in people's minds, but still that was limited tremendously by that continuous impress that Gandhiji gave to it and by the fact that others, to a much lesser extent, but desiring to convey the Master's teachings to others also repeated that all the time. In fact, indeed many possibly, who themselves were not at all devoid of hatred, had to repeat it because that was the lesson they had to



learn. They had to repeat what they felt about. It was the fashion to repeat it. But it was a good fashion even though it was not felt by every one, and it did produce a certain mass effect.

If you analyse that again, it comes back definitely to the same old question of means and ends—all different aspects of it—that means should never be subordinated to ends. Whatever your reasons, apart from moral or ethical reasons, from the very obvious practical reason that if you adopt any means you like, well, ends disappear; you don't arrive at the aim, because you have taken the wrong path and it leads you somewhere else.

When you consider Gandhian technique, it is a technique of struggle—to right a wrong whatever the wrong may be. It is a struggle carried on under certain very definite limitations of behaviour which prevent people from going astray or too far; which is limited too, to some extent in the sense that even a good thing might well develop into an evil thing if taken too far.

Let us take something; let us take nationalism which has been and is a very good thing. It has been a great liberating force in certain stages of a country's history. In our country it was a great liberating force, and yet it is well known that nationalism in many countries has during its later stages become aggressive nationalism trying to impose its will on others. Nationalism, which is a liberating force, becomes, or may become at a later stage, a limiting force, a narrowing force, a narrow nationalism.

So we see how the same thing may develop, the same thing which is good, may develop into something that is bad. The same thing, which is widening and liberating, becomes a narrowing thing. How are we to check all these various influences that work? A technique of action depends not so much on the suffering or distress or misery caused to the other party, but depends on what you suffer yourself, certain obvious checks and limiting factors operate, and you cannot normally overdo it, insofar as you are concerned. You can very well overdo it so far as the other party is concerned because there is no check except your own goodwill or feeling, and if you are full of hatred, you overdo it, but you cannot go on hitting yourself too much, or acting on yourself because of these inevitable checks. So that if the Gandhian technique is employed, while on the one hand you exercise pressure, even political pressure, or economic pressure, or much more so, moral and psychological pressure on the opponent, at the same time that pressure is limited by your own capacity to bear suffering and distress. All that pressure is something of the type of a direct pressure as I said.

One of the more important aspects of this technique is to undermine the morale of the other party, that is if you are right. If two persons, convinced of the right, come into conflict, they fight each other and try to suppress or eliminate each other, because they are utterly convinced that each is right. As in war each country is convinced partly through facts, but largely through

propaganda, that it is fighting for right, for liberty, for freedom, for democracy, for everything good, while the other country is the incarnation of the devil. That is the propaganda in war-time and so each fights to the utmost because each believes that defeat is not only loss of freedom but loss of everything each holds dear and it is the victory for the devil if the other party wins. Obviously, both are wrong, though one may be more in the wrong than the other; but neither party is very saintly and neither party is perhaps as devilish as it is painted.

When the approach is according to what might be called the Gandhian technique, first of all you are not supposed to paint the other party as the devil. You try as far as possible to adhere to the truth. You separate always the individual from the system. If I can give you an example, Gandhiji was always saying: "I am fighting British imperialism, I am not fighting the Britisher; I am not fighting the Englishman or anybody. They are my friends but I will fight British imperialism." There is always this distinction made between an evil thing, as he thought imperialism was which he fought, and the individuals with whom he wanted to be friendly. That itself of course rather toned down the opposition of the opponents.

Secondly, the whole approach was—it may be irritating to the other party—to undermine the moral defences of the other party. Of course, if those moral defences were sound absolutely, then they could not be undermined, but if the moral defences were superficial or based on propaganda or some such thing, but not on basic facts, then they were undermined. They were undermined, while at the same time you were prepared for conciliation, too. You see all these different things in motion at the same time. So, first there is the struggle and hitting out, in a non-violent way, but hitting out; and secondly there is the undermining of the other's moral defence—the moral defence as a party forms in wartime thinking that he was all good while the other party was all bad. Thirdly, the door is open for reconciliation all the time, but not by any compromise on any basic question or on what is considered wrong and evil.

I am merely placing before you some odd thoughts coming to my mind. I repeat that I am quite earnest about it. I am not talking like a scientific student of this matter or a philosopher but merely as a person who was a soldier in action for many long years under Gandhiji's inspiring leadership. Ultimately one may define and may analyse all these things, but the real thing will probably elude us, because it is not capable of analysis, because the real things cannot be analysed; you feel them, you look at them, you see them. Nevertheless, whether you arrive at any concrete result or philosophy as a result of your discussions, I have no doubt that the mere attempt to do so is worthwhile. It may give us some ideas. The mere attempt to draw the world's attention is worthwhile, attention to what Gandhiji stood for and did, more specially in the world today when people become more and more rigid in outlook, more



and more inflexible, more and more unmannerly, as if strength consists in shouting, unmannerliness and abuse. That is what international politics is coming to; and it is more and more devoid of the critical faculty and is presuming that anything that the other party opposed to us does must inevitably be wrong, suspecting it, fearing it. So we get tied up in this surrounded by this atmosphere of fear, suspicion and hatred. There seems to be no way of getting out of it because people's minds are closed, and become impervious. Perhaps even there it would be a little easier to open out those minds, by trying the rather ancient method of using a big club on the head which sometimes may have succeeded, but does not appear to succeed always. When everybody is clubbing each other, the result may be a very large number of broken heads, but not any conviction arising out of it.

There is another aspect because of this question of war. It seems to be patent to any intelligent person that war as it is today does not lead to the political results aimed at. I am leaving out the moral aspect, the humanitarian aspect. War may lead to victory, though even that becomes rather doubtful, but victory by itself does not mean that you have achieved the political results that you were aiming at. As we have seen in the last two great wars, they led to victory and complete victory; but the peace that followed was highly unsatisfactory and led to further trouble, friction and war. And if to our misfortune war occurs again on a big scale, nobody can say what it will lead to. But one can say with absolute confidence that it will not lead to anything that people want it to lead to. If that is so, one must proceed on the basis of trying to avoid that type of war and trying to avoid anything that leads to that war. Of course one person, or one group, or one nation cannot by itself avoid all these things, and no country, I fear, can take up the attitude which Gandhiji might have suggested. No leader—political leader—can possibly give that advice to his country. But a prophet can. If a political leader gave that advice, well, he would cease to be a political leader and become something else. But that apart, the question remains not of laying down your arms before anybody but aiming very deliberately, and consciously, at the avoidance of war.

Now I do think—I say so with all respect—that there is so much talk of peace everywhere, but very little of it is honest talk. The people in every country want peace; I am not referring to them, I am referring to the persons at the top, to politicians, statesmen, and all that crowd. And I have no doubt that at the back of their minds they also want peace. Nevertheless, either through fear or whatever it is, they do not work for peace even though they talk about it so much, and it all becomes a manoeuvring for position—even the talk of peace.

And so we see the world going step by step towards some tragic disaster—and everybody realizes the awfulness of that disaster and everybody would like to avoid it. I do not know what will happen but at any rate whether we

apply any scientific techniques or not—call them Gandhian techniques or by whatever name you might call them—I have not a shadow of doubt that the way of hatred is a bad way. It is a bad way in itself and it produces distemper all round, more especially in the person who employs that method even more so than in the other. And victory or defeat is important, one or the other; but far more important is the way you reach that end or else you will have missed everything that you valued in life.

I hope that the labours of this seminar will, I will not say, yield any very practical result immediately, but, nevertheless, help people to understand, help people to get out of that rut which makes them think that there is no other way to solve the problem but hit the man with a club, no other way to convince a person except by breaking his head. That is an extraordinary thought really and yet that is the basis of war. So if we can help in making people think about these problems in the right way, I am sure the seminar would have done good work...

## 2. Threat of Civil War<sup>1</sup>

The Communists talk about progress and equality of opportunity and the need to end the gulf between the rich and the poor. Although these aims are good, the method of violence which the Communists sometimes adopt to realize them is utterly wrong. I am of the firm opinion that if violence is adopted the country will be ruined. A civil war will follow and all progress will be stopped. Everybody is free to follow his economic principles. But if any group or party imports violence into its methods for fulfilling the end in view, it will lead to civil war, jeopardize freedom and ultimately bring the downfall of the country. This method of violence even in the past had always proved harmful. But in the present times it is even more so.

It is not enough that our aim is good. We have to see that the means we adopt to achieve the aim are also good. If you follow wrong means, you cannot reach the desired end. So it becomes very necessary to see that the means we follow to achieve our ends, whatever they may be, are also good.

1. Speech at the AICC Session, Hyderabad, 19 January 1953. From *The Hindu*, 20 January 1953. Extracts.



There is much in common between the methods of the Communists and most of the communalists, though the policies and principles of these two organizations are widely different. In some of their activities, these two organizations are widely different. Nevertheless, they follow the same method of disruption and violence. It is indeed strange how these two groups sometimes work together in North India. People have to beware of their methods. As India is passing through critical times these days, the greatest need is for people to work together to build up this country.

India can learn much from the achievement of the Soviet Union, although we are not following the Russian path. There are certain very good steps that have been taken there which India should follow. But we do not consider all their measures worthy of being adopted. What is important to remember is the time taken to achieve the progress. The Soviet Union took fifteen to twenty years to lay the foundation of a new economic structure. The enormous progress that we witness now there, is the result of this preparation. It is good to pass high-sounding resolutions. But what is more necessary is to see how long it will take to implement them. After the revolution, the Soviet leaders decided to introduce compulsory and free education for every child. Despite their best efforts and their control over the people they could not realize their aim for fourteen long years. This makes it clear to us that a particular objective cannot be fulfilled just by passing a resolution. It needs a certain length of time for the completion of a work.

There is much talk about the achievement in new China in a short period. We can learn from China. We should, however, remember that in India projects bigger than in China have been undertaken, but the trouble here is that we have too many critics, and whatever we do is criticized. In China nobody criticizes his Government.

If people say that during the last five years the Congress Governments did not do this and that, it should be viewed in proper perspective. It is true that we have not done all that we wanted to do. We might have made some mistakes also. But the progress that has been achieved during these five years is not of little significance. Leading foreigners who have come here have been greatly struck by our achievements during these five years.

Our present endeavour is to lay the economic foundations of the country. The Five Year Plan is a big step in this direction. I am sure that if the people's cooperation is forthcoming in its implementation, it will lead to lasting good for the country and the people.

If the protagonists of this evil force called communalism succeed in spreading the communal venom, the country will suffer a great setback. The agitation in Jammu is communal and it only seeks to weaken the hands of the

Government and sow disruption.<sup>2</sup> This will mean that India will once again go to pieces. All these forces have to be fought and a proper atmosphere for constructive and cooperative work has to be created.

Although Hyderabad, after the break-up of the Moghul Empire, had to suffer all the evils of feudalism, there has been one good feature. It is here, to some extent, that the cultures of the North and the Deccan have blended. This has strengthened the cultural heritage of the country. It is true that some compulsion was used to achieve this, and the regional cultural development was ignored. Yet, if there has been some gain out of the contact between the cultures of the North and Deccan, this contact should grow.

No doubt that there is a demand for the break up of Hyderabad on a linguistic basis.<sup>3</sup> But my advice to all concerned will be that Hyderabad should not be split at present. We cannot lay down that it will not be split up for ever. What will happen in the distant future, we cannot say. It is ultimately for the people of Hyderabad to decide.

However, in our opinion such a step will harm the whole country and the people of Hyderabad themselves. Their own progress will stop as their energies will be taken up by new problems. It is, therefore, not right to think now of breaking up Hyderabad into linguistic units.

The most important resolution passed in this session is on the Five Year Plan.<sup>4</sup> All people should try their best to implement it.

Because of our foreign policy, India's stature has gone very high in the world in recent years. But this has also created responsibility. The country has to become strong internally. If internally the country is weak, whatever has been achieved in foreign matters cannot be sustained....

2. The Jammu Praja Parishad agitation against the State administration commenced on 24 November 1952, on the occasion of the first official visit to Jammu of Sadar-i-Riyasat, with the Parishad workers shouting slogans and waving black flags. The arrest of Prem Nath Dogra, two days later, provoked widespread violence. The Parishad volunteers, at some places, helped the dispossessed landlords to forcibly take possession of their lands. In its eight-point programme, the Parishad demanded the abrogation of Article 370, full application of the Indian Constitution to the State, complete jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, removal of customs barriers between the State and the rest of India, fresh elections to the Kashmir Constituent Assembly and integration of Jammu and Ladakh with the Indian Union, if not of the whole State. Also see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 20, pp. 365-75.
3. The Communist Party of India and some Congressmen, including Ramanand Tirtha, advocated the division of Hyderabad on linguistic lines. On 17 August 1952, V.D. Deshpande, leader of the People's Democratic Front in the Hyderabad Assembly, speaking at the All India Linguistic Provinces Conference at Amravati, demanded that Hyderabad be divided linguistically so that parts of it could later merge in greater Maharashtra and Mahavidarbha.
4. See *post*, p. 102.



### 3. The State of the Union<sup>1</sup>

Members of Parliament,

Nine months ago, I welcomed you as Members of the first Parliament of the Republic of India, elected under our Constitution. Since then, you have had to shoulder heavy burdens and to face difficult problems, both domestic and international. As we meet here today, we bring with us faith in our country's destiny and the assurance that our people are advancing, through their labours, towards the goal that we have set before us. These nine months have seen advances on many fronts, industrial and agricultural, and the finalization of the Five Year Plan, which has mapped out the lines of our progress in the coming years. It is for us now to march along that path and to implement and fulfil the promise held out to our people. That is no easy task, for a multitude of old and new problems always tend to overwhelm us and our wishes often run faster than our capacity and resources.

2. At this moment, when we require all the wisdom and experience of our leaders, it is a misfortune that we have lost one of the most eminent and devoted of our elder statesmen. I learnt with deep sorrow of the death yesterday, in the early morning, of Shri N. Gopaldaswami Ayyangar,<sup>2</sup> who had filled, in the course of a full life, many high offices with rare distinction. To the end of his days, regardless of his health and the leisure he had so richly earned, he devoted his life to the service of his country and people. His colleagues in the Government, and I, relied on his ripe wisdom whenever any difficult problem confronted us. His death is a great loss to the country and to all of us.

3. While we labour in our own country to build up a new and prosperous India, bringing relief to the millions who have suffered so much in the past from the curse of poverty, the problems of the rest of the world thrust themselves upon us and we cannot avoid them or isolate ourselves from them. My Government has no desire to interfere with other countries, but it has to face the responsibility which has inevitably come with independence to India. We have endeavoured, as is well known, to pursue a policy of peace and of friendship with all the countries of the world. Gradually, that policy has been understood and appreciated, even by those who may not always agree with it, and it is recognized that India stands for peace among the nations and will

1. Address to Parliament by the President of India, 11 February 1953. File No 5(2)/53, President's Secretariat. The address was drafted by Nehru. See also *Parliamentary Debates (House of the People)*, *Official Report*, 1953, Vol. I, Pt II, cols 15-23. Extracts.
2. Gopaldaswami Ayyangar died on 10 February 1953. For Nehru's tribute to him, see *post*, pp. 612-14

avoid taking any step which might encourage the tendency to war. In pursuit of this policy, my Government put forward certain proposals which they hoped might lead to a settlement of the Korean war.<sup>3</sup> Those proposals met with a very large measure of support, but unfortunately some of the great countries, most intimately concerned, were unable to accept them. This war continues not only to the utter misery and ruin of the people of Korea, but also as a focus of danger for the rest of the world. Certain statements<sup>4</sup> recently made, and the consequences that might flow from them in extending the war in Korea, have caused considerable apprehension in the minds of people all over the world. My Government has viewed these developments with grave concern. I trust that any tendency towards an extension of the war which has already brought disaster in its train, will be checked and the minds of nations and peoples will be turned towards a peaceful approach to these problems. My Government will continue to work to this end and will pursue a policy of friendship with all countries without any alignment with one group of nations against another. The democratic processes to which we are so firmly committed in our own country involve methods of peaceful approach to problems. If democracy is to survive, the same climate of peace and spirit of reconciliation has to be extended to the international sphere.

4. The General Assembly of the United Nations will meet again in the near future and will consider these grave problems on which hangs the momentous issue of peace or war in the world. I earnestly hope that the great nations whose representatives will assemble there will address themselves to the promotion of a spirit of reconciliation and the fulfilment of the objectives embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.

5. In the continent of Africa, which continues to be the greatest sphere of colonialism today, events have taken a turn for the worse. In South Africa, the doctrine of racial domination is openly proclaimed and enforced by all the

3. India's Resolution, approved by UN General Assembly on 2 December 1952 by fifty-three votes to five with one abstention, while asserting the relevant provisions of the Geneva Convention, stated that "force shall not be used against prisoners of war to prevent or effect their return to their homelands", and proposed the creation of a neutral nations repatriation commission to take charge of all prisoners of war. If at the end of ninety days following the armistice, there remained any non-repatriated prisoners, their status would be determined by a political conference as envisaged in the draft Armistice Agreement. Those who refused to go home would become wards of the UN.
4. On 2 February 1953, President Eisenhower announced that the US Seventh Fleet which had been sent to the Formosan Straits when the Korean war broke out would no longer defend Formosa from attack and prevent Chiang Kai-shek's forces from carrying out operations against mainland China. On 6 February, Dewey Short, Republican Representative, called for a full naval blockade of China, and on 8 February, a Republican Senator, Robert Taft, said, "We are at war with the Chinese Reds now."



power of the State.<sup>5</sup> The efforts made by the United Nations to deal with this problem have been ignored by the Government of the Union of South Africa. A movement against racial discrimination, which was remarkable for its peaceful and disciplined character, is sought to be crushed by legislation and government action,<sup>6</sup> which are unique in their denial of democratic processes and the purpose which was proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations. In East Africa there is racial conflict<sup>7</sup> which, if not ended to the satisfaction of the people, is likely to extend and engulf vast areas of Africa. There are many people still who do not realize that racial domination and discrimination cannot be tolerated in the world today, and any attempt to perpetuate them can only lead to disaster.

6. Our relations with our neighbour countries in Western and South-Eastern Asia continue to be close and friendly and there is an increasing measure of cooperation between us. Even in regard to Pakistan, with which unfortunately our relations have been strained, there has been a certain improvement.<sup>8</sup> That improvement is not very great, but it is an indication which I welcome. Recent conference between representatives of the two countries have been held in a friendly atmosphere and will, I hope, yield results. The upheaval caused by the introduction of the passport system between the two countries has subsided and many of the difficulties that were created by this system are being gradually removed.<sup>9</sup> I trust that this effort will be continued and directed towards the removal of the basic problems that still confront the minorities in East Bengal.

5. About 8,000 people had been imprisoned during the passive resistance campaign against the segregation Acts in South Africa, between 26 June 1952, when the campaign began, and the end of 1952.
6. In February 1953, the South African Government introduced an anti-resistance Bill (i) to prevent public or newspaper criticism of any act of Parliament or administrative measures; and (ii) to empower the Government to open mail and parcels suspected of containing subversive material.
7. At this time the native Mau Mau secret society in Kenya directed its terrorism against the imperialism of the whites and the non-cooperating Africans.
8. A number of significant and hopeful developments took place at this time. Pakistan, for the time being, appeared to have shelved the proposal to join the proposed West Asia defence organization. A trade pact was signed. A conference on the working of the passports system had yielded results and demonstrated a noticeable spirit of accommodation. An agreement on air routes across West Pakistan to Afghanistan for Indian commercial flights, which Pakistan had earlier disallowed for security reasons, was arrived at. The Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nazimuddin, speaking at a function in Karachi on 26 January 1953, stressed the need for Indo-Pakistan amity and indicated the possibility of direct negotiations.
9. The important features of the Indo-Pakistan passport agreement of January 1953 were the opening of "sealed" areas and free movement over the entire territory of either country, establishment of two additional visa offices in each country, and the appointment of a high-level officer on each side to review the working of the agreement and to remove the complaints that might be noticed.

7. The canal waters issue is being considered at a technical level jointly by representatives of the two countries, assisted by the International Bank.<sup>10</sup> This issue is eminently one which ought to be considered objectively and dispassionately so that the maximum advantage can be derived by both countries from the waters that flow through them. A great proportion of these waters run waste to the sea. If they can be properly harnessed, they will bring relief and prosperity to vast numbers of human beings in both India and Pakistan. It is unfortunate that an issue like this should be treated in a spirit and atmosphere of rivalry and hostility. I trust that the new approach will yield fruitful and happy results to both countries. This approach can also be applied to the settlement of the evacuee property problem which affects the fortunes of millions of people both in India and Pakistan.<sup>11</sup>

8. Another vital issue between India and Pakistan has been the Jammu and Kashmir State. This matter is again being discussed by our representatives with the representative of the United Nations.<sup>12</sup> That issue, like others, has to be considered dispassionately, keeping always the welfare of the people of that State in view. It is not by war or threats of war that this, or any other outstanding problem between India and Pakistan, can be solved. My Government has declared repeatedly that it will not go to war unless it is attacked, and has

10. At the instance of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Governments of India and Pakistan set up an Indus basin working group to prepare a plan for the maximum utilization of the waters of the Indus system for irrigation in both India and Pakistan. The group met in Washington in May-June 1952, at Karachi in December 1952, and at Delhi in January 1953. It was finally to meet in Washington in September 1953 to work out the proposed plan.
11. In October 1952, a suggestion was made to the Government of Pakistan that as there was no possibility of the return of evacuees to their respective countries and the evacuee properties were fast deteriorating, the two Governments should take over the evacuee properties in their respective countries and compensate the owners according to principles mutually agreed upon. If direct negotiations failed, the method of valuation might be settled by an arbitration tribunal or an international court. The debtor country should then pay to the creditor country the difference in the value of evacuee property according to an agreed formula. The Government of Pakistan, however, did not agree to the proposal.
12. On 12 January 1953, Frank Graham met the representatives of India and Pakistan in New York to ascertain their attitude to a renewal of negotiations. Pakistan was ready to enter into negotiations on the basis of the UN resolution of 23 December 1952, while India was unable to accept it and would have negotiations only on the basis of the UNCIP resolutions. On 23 January 1953, the two governments agreed to negotiate at the ministerial level on the basis of the UNCIP resolutions, without prejudice to a further consideration of Graham's proposals. The ministerial-level conference took place in Geneva from 4 to 14 February 1953.



invited a like declaration by Pakistan.<sup>13</sup> If fear of war was eliminated, it would be much easier to consider all the issues that confront us today.

9. Internally, in the Jammu and Kashmir State, progress has been made in many ways. Our Constitution contains specific provisions about the relationship of India with the State, and by an agreement between the Government of India and the Jammu and Kashmir Government, the bonds that tie that State to India have been strengthened and made closer. A part of this agreement has been implemented and the remaining part should also come into operation soon.<sup>14</sup> Unfortunately a misconceived agitation was started in Jammu which, though aiming at a closer union with India, is likely to have exactly the opposite effect. I trust that this misguided agitation will cease and the people of Jammu and Kashmir will cooperate for the progress and advancement of the State in the larger Union of India. Where there are legitimate grievances, they will undoubtedly be enquired into and every effort made to remove them.

10. The question of linguistic provinces has often agitated the people in various parts of the country. While language and culture are important considerations in the formation of States, it has to be remembered that the States are administrative units in the Union of India and that other considerations also have to be kept in mind. Above all, the unity of India and national security have always to be given the first priority. Financial and administrative aspects, as well as economic progress, are also important. Keeping all these factors in view, there is no reason why the question of the reorganization of States should not be considered fully and dispassionately so as to meet the wishes of the people and help in their economic and cultural progress. I am glad that my Government has taken steps in the matter of the formation of a separate Andhra

13. In a speech at Bangalore on 16 July 1951, Nehru said that "we shall commit no aggression on Pakistan on any account, but if Pakistan attacks any part of the Indian territory we shall repel this attack with all our strength." See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 14 Pt. II, p. 313. Again, in a cable on 24 July 1951 to Liaquat Ali Khan, Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nehru stated that "India has no intention whatever of attacking Pakistan, or seeking solution of any problem by force, but if Indian territory, including Kashmir, is invaded by Pakistan, then India will take armed measures in self-defence." See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 14 Pt. II, p. 238.

14. Under the July 1952 Delhi Agreement between Nehru and Shaikh Abdullah, the Kashmir State had accepted the supremacy of the National Flag, the restricted jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and the limited applicability of fundamental rights in order to implement its pre-1947 agenda of land reforms without compensation. The agreement recognized common citizenship, Head of the State to be an elective office and President's powers to reprieve and commute death sentences and to declare external emergency and, in consultation with the State, the internal emergency. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 19, pp. 211-17. Although immediate action had been taken on the election of the Head of the State and the National Flag, implementation of the other proposals had not been done yet.

State,<sup>15</sup> and I hope that there will be no great delay in establishing this new State. Any such change as the establishment of a new State demands the fullest cooperation of all those concerned with it, and I trust that this will be forthcoming.

11. The Planning Commission has completed the first part of its labours by finalizing its report on the Five Year Plan. The other and the more difficult part, of implementing this Plan, now faces the country and to that we must address ourselves. I am glad to find that this Plan and the fifty-five community projects that have been started in the country are evoking a considerable degree of enthusiasm among our people. In the course of a few months, hundreds of miles of roads have been built, tanks dug, school buildings constructed and many other minor projects undertaken, almost entirely by the voluntary labour of our people. That is a sign of hope and promise, for it lies with our people ultimately what they make of their future.

12. The general economic situation in the country shows distinct signs of improvement, although there are still unfortunately areas where, owing to lack of rain, near-famine conditions prevail. The State Governments are doing their utmost to give relief by utility works or otherwise in these areas. The problem, however, has to be tackled in a more basic way so as to avoid recurrence of famine conditions and a complete dependence upon the vagaries of the monsoon.

13. The Finance Commission, constituted towards the end of 1951 under the provisions of Article 20 of the Constitution, have submitted their report. The Commission's recommendations have been accepted by my Government and necessary action will be taken for implementing them.<sup>16</sup> The recommendations of the Commission will be laid on the table of both Houses of Parliament in the current session.

14. There has been a steady improvement in the food situation and the closing stock for 1952 was 19 lakh tons, which is the highest on record so far. One of the factors in building up this stock was the wheat loan from the

15. On 19 December 1952, Nehru announced in the House of the People the decision to establish Andhra State consisting of the Telugu speaking areas of Madras State excluding the city of Madras. The Government also appointed a Commission headed by Justice K.N. Wanchoo to examine and report on financial and other implications of the Government decision. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 20, pp. 256-57.

16. The Finance Commission, appointed on 30 November 1951, submitted its report on 31 December 1952. The main recommendations of the Commission were: (i) increase in the percentage, from 50 to 55 of the net proceeds of the income tax to be assigned to the States; (ii) increase in the grants-in-aid by the Centre to Assam, Bihar, Orissa and West Bengal because of their share of the export duty on jute and jute products; (iii) allocation to the States of a share in certain Union excise duties; (iv) increased and additional grants to certain States which were in need of assistance; and (v) grants to certain less developed States for expansion of primary education.



USA.<sup>17</sup> The prospects of foodgrains for 1952-53 are better than in the two preceding years. Owing mainly to the drought in parts of Bombay, Madras and Mysore, caused by an inadequate monsoon, foodgrains will have to be imported, but their quantity will be less than in the last two years. It is of the highest importance that we should gain self-sufficiency in food, and I hope that this might be possible within the three remaining years of the Five Year Plan. For the first time we start this year with a considerable stock of foodgrains. We should endeavour to build this up so that we can meet any contingency. Prices of foodgrains have shown a downward trend in recent months. Controls have been relaxed in many parts of India and there is greater freedom of movement. The Government, however, intend to retain control at strategic points so that no untoward results may affect prices or procurement.

15. The production of sugar during 1951-52 reached the record figure of 15 lakh tons and for the first time production exceeded internal requirements. This made it possible to relax control over the prices, movement and distribution of sugar, as well as on *gur* and *khandsari*. With the easing of the supply position of groundnut oil, controls on prices of hydrogenated oils have also been lifted, except those intended to ensure quality.

16. Very considerable progress has been made in cotton and jute production. In 1948-49 cotton production amounted to 17.7 lakh bales and jute 20.7 lakh bales. In 1951-52 cotton had increased to 31.3 lakh bales and jute to 46.8 lakh bales.

17. In order to add to the country's food production, special attention is being paid to the construction of more than 2,000 tube-wells and for an accelerated programme of minor irrigation works. Crop competitions are becoming increasingly popular all over the country and have yielded very remarkable results. Large-scale experiments are being made to introduce what is called the Japanese method of rice cultivation which promises substantial results in increase of yield. A large mechanized farm has been set up in Jammu Province. Vigorous attempts are being made for the extensive application of fertilizers and other manure and for the use of improved seeds. The community centres are specially aiming at increasing the yield of foodgrains by various methods, including a rural extension service.

18. For the improvement of cattle, 92 key farm centres were started in 1951-52. In addition, it is proposed to provide one key village unit in each community project area. Sheep-breeding schemes have been reorganized to provide for the production of fine wool. A Board for the preservation of wild

17. The Government of India received a Rs 902.5 million loan in June 1951 for the purchase of two million tons of wheat from the US. The loan was repayable in half-yearly instalments over a period of 30 years commencing from June 1957.

life has been set up.<sup>18</sup> At Jodhpur a Desert Afforestation Research Station is being established. This will undertake work for the reclamation of arid areas.

19. The Sindri Fertilizer Factory produced 1,80,000 tons of ammonium sulphate during 1952. This is expected to be increased to three lakh tons in 1953. The pool price has been reduced from Rs. 365 per ton to Rs. 335.

20. The production of cotton textiles, which amounted to 4,600 million yards during 1952, was highly satisfactory and the prospects for the next year are good. The lower prices of mill-made cloth, though welcome, led to a fall in the off-take of handloom cloth and the handloom industry, which provides livelihood to millions of people in the country, was faced with serious difficulties. My Government attaches great importance to this and other cottage industries both because vast numbers of people are employed in them and because they are the most effective methods of removing unemployment. An All-India Khadi and Village Industries Board has been established<sup>19</sup> and legislation undertaken to raise funds for technical development and research for village and cottage industries. In order to help the handloom industry, the production of *dhotis* by mill industry was curtailed to sixty per cent of the 1951-52 production.

21. The tea industry was badly affected by the fall in international prices. The Government have taken measures to assist tea gardens to secure better credit facilities and propose to set up an expert committee to enquire into all aspects of the tea industry, including marketing.<sup>20</sup> The price of tea is now showing some signs of improvement.

22. The readjustment of world prices affected foreign trade and exports fell in value and, to a lesser extent, in quantity. The balance of payments position, however, continued to be satisfactory, as imports also declined.

23. My Government has been paying special attention to the tribal areas in the north-east and other parts of India and help is being given for their development. A Commission to consider the problems of backward classes has

18. A Central Board for Wild Life was formed in April 1952 to ensure protection, conservation and control of wild life.

19. An All-India Handloom Board and an All-India Khadi and Village Industries Board were set up on 2 February 1953 to assist these industries to improve their techniques of production and to facilitate the marketing of their products at home and abroad. A legislation was introduced to levy a cess of three pies per yard on mill-made cloth to provide funds for the development of handloom and khadi industries.

20. The Government of India had introduced in the House of the People a Tea Bill which provided for the control by the Union Government of the tea industry, and setting up for that purpose a Tea Board and imposing a levy of a customs duty on tea exported from India.



been appointed.<sup>21</sup> A Press Commission has also been appointed<sup>22</sup> to consider problems of the newspaper press in India.

24. The great multi-purpose river valley projects have made good progress and in some of them the operational phase will begin soon. Work on other projects has made steady progress.

25. Steps are being taken to improve the efficiency of the Hindustan Shipyard at Visakhapatnam and for the expansion of the iron and steel industry.<sup>23</sup> Production of coal, steel, cement, salt and fertilizers has reached higher levels than in the previous year.

26. Scientific research has made further progress by the establishment of new National Laboratories and Research Institutes. A Central Electro-Chemical Research Institute was opened at Karaikudi<sup>24</sup> and the Central Leather Research Institute at Madras.<sup>25</sup> The Building Research Institute at Roorkee will be opened soon.<sup>26</sup> A factory for processing monazite sands has been set up at Alwaye in Travancore-Cochin<sup>27</sup> and a Machine Tool Prototype Factory was recently opened at Ambernath<sup>28</sup> in Bombay State. The Hindustan Aircraft Factory at Bangalore has produced, from its own designs, a number of trainer aircraft which are being used now.<sup>29</sup> A defence factory near Jubbulpore is nearing completion.

27. My Government has decided to take under State control the existing air companies and to operate the scheduled air services.<sup>30</sup> It is proposed to establish two State Corporations for this purpose, one for internal services and the other for external services.

28. Indian Railways are celebrating their centenary next month. This great State undertaking belonging to the community is continuing its progress and extending its operations.

21. The Commission was appointed on 29 January 1953 with Kaka Kalelkar as Chairman.

22. It was formed in October 1952 with Rajadhyaksha, Zakir Hussain and M. Chalapati Rau as members.

23. The shipyard at Visakhapatnam, started by the Scindias, was acquired by the Government on 21 January 1952 with this object in view.

24. Opened by S. Radhakrishnan, the Vice-President of India, on 14 January 1953.

25. Opened on 15 January 1953 by T.T. Krishnamachari, Minister for Industries and Commerce.

26. Opened on 12 April 1953.

27. Opened by Nehru on 24 December 1952.

28. On 13 January 1953 by Nehru.

29. The first six single-engined monoplanes designed for use as IAF basic trainers, and manufactured at the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, arrived in Delhi from Bangalore on 14 January 1953 to take part in the Republic Day parade.

30. Air Corporations Bill was passed on 8 May 1953 and a sum of Rs 5 crores provided for (i) the payment of compensation to companies whose assets were acquired, and for (ii) the purchase of thirteen new aircraft of which ten were to be used for international air services. On 1 August, Nehru inaugurated the State Air Corporation.



29. The progress of a people and of a nation ultimately depends upon education. My Government views with much concern the present state of education in the country which suffers in many ways, both in quality and quantity, and too much attention is paid to the granting of diplomas and degrees and not to the real improvement of the individual in cultural, scientific and technical matters and, above all, in the training for good citizenship. Basic education has been adopted as the model, but progress in this has thus far been unfortunately slow. Many schemes for the improvement of basic, secondary and social education are under consideration, and a Commission on Secondary Education has been appointed.<sup>31</sup>

30. An overall view of the situation in India indicates all-round general progress at an increasing pace. This is a matter for satisfaction. But the goal we have set before us is still far and requires greater and continuous effort and an increasing pace of change. We aim at a Welfare State in which all the people of this country are partners, sharing alike the benefits and the obligations. So long as there is poverty and unemployment, a section of the community derives no benefit from this partnership. It is, therefore, necessary for us to aim at full and productive employment....

31. A Commission on Secondary Education, with A. Lakshmanaswami Mudaliar, Vice-Chancellor of Madras University, as Chairman, was appointed to make a comprehensive survey of secondary education in India and to make recommendations for its improvement. The Commission was touring the country and collecting evidence at this time.

#### 4. National and International Problems<sup>1</sup>

...The President's Address covers a large field rather briefly. The President's Address, of course, represents the policy of Government. Sometimes, may be not in this House or in the other House but the outside public and sometimes in the press, criticism is made that the President's Address has merely repeated Government's policies—as if the President is going to launch on some new policy in the country. The President's Address is, of course, a repetition of

1. Speech in the Council of States on the motion of thanks on the President's Address, 16 February 1953, *Parliamentary Debates (Council of States)*, *Official Report*, 1953, Vol. III, cols 360-93. Extracts.

Government's policy and it can be nothing else. It may not be a complete repetition of everything that the Government does; naturally, it gives or tries to give a broad survey of the foreign and domestic field and it does so, naturally, as is becoming of the Head of the State, in becoming language. I say so, because, some honourable Members object to the language being not quite so aggressive as they would like to be.<sup>2</sup> The Head of the State speaks always with dignity, becoming the high position, and does not use the language which, perhaps, some of us may use on other occasions.

When any address deals with the world at large and with this country—with the foreign affairs and with the domestic affairs of this country—it covers a vast field. It is true that any Government should have some kind of integrated outlook which fits in with the foreign and the domestic policy. Nevertheless, it is not particularly easy to have that integrated outlook because, we are not incharge of the world and the many other countries in the world do not carry out our dictates or follow our wishes. We have to take things as they are, and things, as they are, are in a very difficult state. Looking at the world as it is today, one sees vast changes taking place; one sees large parts of it in a tortured state, some smaller parts in a state actually of war, but, infinitely larger parts in a state of fear of war and all that it produces. We see enormous technological changes taking place from day to day; they do not perhaps come to our notice day to day, but the fact is that they do take place and as everyone knows now, the whole economic and social structure of the world is changed by these technological changes. They change the structure of society; they change, therefore, man's thinking.

Therefore, often enough, a policy which seemed good yesterday, may not be completely in the fitness of things today. A policy which may have been good enough in the nineteenth century and may have been an idealistic and advanced policy may be out of date today. Because, all of us, whether we want to or not, have been hurled suddenly in the middle of the twentieth century. We have been hurled, but, very often, the minds of many of us—I am not referring to honourable Members here, I am thinking in a larger sense—and the minds of many others lag behind somewhere in past centuries. They talk in those terms. They discuss problems, even economic problems or social problems, and therefore, naturally there is a lag, there is a difficulty. Here, we are taking the world as a whole, having seen these enormous political changes which are obvious enough, say, as a result of the last two great world wars,

2. Referring to the remarks in the President's Address about India's concern at US statements on extending the war in Korea, Sucheta Kripalani of the Socialist Party said on 16 February: "We wonder why it was necessary for the President to use such circumspect language. Why could he not have condemned it in very clear terms, condemned the raising of the spectre of war by any nation?"



and, we saw, at the end of the last war, two mighty giants rising up among the nations, the United States of America and the Soviet Union. The others are far behind—I am talking in terms of power and technological growth. That has created a peculiar situation in the world and all the old balances have been upset and, therefore, the theory based on those balances and the policies based on those balances have also been upset; yet, I find often enough people talking in those old terms, not realizing or appreciating this enormous upset that has taken place and is taking place from day to day.

In the Far East again, great changes took place only two or three years ago, again bringing about a completely new situation.<sup>3</sup> And yet we talk in old terms. I merely mention this because all this makes it incumbent on us to be completely alert, if I may say so, about these changing conditions. Of course, we must have some principles; we must have some ideals and objectives. That is true. But it is not enough to have principles and ideals. The application of them, the implementation of them, the working out of them, depends on other circumstances. And those other circumstances are hardly ever wholly in our control. We have to accept them as they are. Whether it is the outside world, or whether it is this great country of ours—all kinds of social groups, all kinds of people living in every century: not only in the twentieth century, but in the nineteenth, in the eighteenth, in the fourteenth, in the thirteenth—you go back—we have to accept that.

No doubt every one here would like to build a new world according to his heart's desire. We try to go in a particular direction. But we cannot do so. We cannot ignore these factors. Much less can we ignore these factors in a democratic society. It is not possible. It may be more possible for a while in a structure of government, political and economic, where absolutely supreme power is controlled by a group. It is conceivable that they can bring about certain changes more rapidly, ignoring for the moment, if necessary, the wishes of considerable numbers of people. But in a democratic society that is not possible. You cannot ignore large groups. Certainly sometimes a majority has its will, as it must. Therefore, all these difficulties arise. And when some honourable Members accuse us or warn us of complacency, even of smugness, I feel that they have little realization of how my mind or the minds of my colleagues function, because even if we were so foolish as to be complacent,

3. The emergence of People's Republic of China and its treaty with the Soviet Union to prevent the recurrence of Japanese imperialism, the conflict between North Korea and South Korea, bombing of Shanghai by the Kuomintang Government of Formosa to weaken the Communist regime in China, the presence of Kuomintang forces on Burmese borders and the policy pursued by the US of not intervening in the Chinese affairs, but at the same time supporting the Nationalist Government in Formosa, were some of the major developments.



the very circumstances that we have to face from day to day make it impossible for any person in a responsible position to be complacent.<sup>4</sup>

I cannot speak of those responsible for the governance of other countries. I do not know how they function, or how they feel. But I can speak for my colleagues and for myself, and I want to say that we approach these problems in all humility of spirit and with something which is utterly removed from complacency, from smugness, because we feel that however small men we might be, the problems are big, they are tremendous problems, both in our country and in the larger world, and we can only approach them with such wisdom as we possess, with such experience as we have, taking counsel with others wherever possible, and trying to advance step by step, and always constantly, alert wherever necessary, to change our step, and in the background, as I said, of a certain humility of spirit. Persons have to deal with these great responsibilities, and not be, but I rather doubt if any person is fully capable of dealing with them with all the wisdom that a person should possess who has to deal with such problems.

I should like the House to remember this background, and I am eager and anxious in any important matter that comes up before this House to be guided and to be helped in our thinking and in our action. Naturally, we have a background of thought, of approach to problems. We have been conditioned, as every Member in this House has been conditioned, by the past. Most of us have been conditioned, apart from our reading of history of our country or of other countries, apart from such knowledge as we possess of the changes that have taken place in the world, most of us have been conditioned by the national movement of this country, in which we grew up and in which we were privileged to take part. Many of those who were conditioned in that way subsequently changed courses or took to different paths, because they thought differently. Subsequently they were forced to take to different paths because they thought differently. They were perfectly entitled to do that. It was not necessary that all of us should think alike. We are not all regimented to think in that way. Nevertheless, most of us have been conditioned to think so because of the background of the national movement in the last thirty or forty years. We have grown up in that way and we view our problems, as well as the

4. P. Sundarayya of the Communist Party stated on 13 February 1953 in the Council of States that "it is our duty to voice the protest of millions of our people against the dangerous and complacent policies which the Government of India proposes to follow." Bhupesh Gupta of the Communist Party said on 14 February: "Complacency, thy name is Congress." Narendra Deva of the Socialist Party said on 16 February: "I see no reason why we should be optimistic about the future, why we should feel self-complacent. We are not yet out of the woods. We are still under the shadow of an overwhelming crisis."

world's problems, with that background. Also, we have to adapt that background to the new condition that we have to face. Because, having been in the nationalist movement, negative functioning cannot suggest itself. Negative functioning is the oppositionist's function which had its virtue and inevitably at that time. Positive functioning is more difficult.

Fortunately, honourable Members who belong to various opposition groups do not have to share the burden of the positive functioning. They can function; they are right because negative functioning is naturally correct; the positive functioning, if it goes wrong, is dangerous. With the background of this national movement we have got independence. We have suddenly been hurled to face the positive problems of our country, as well as those of the world. Not that we wanted to interfere with the problems of the world, but there is a certain inevitability in a country like India when it becomes free to carry out that burden to some extent; it can't be helped; it can't be avoided; and so we had to face a multitude of political, economic and social problems which were hurled together, which we had to decide. Large numbers of these problems were suppressed from generations past under foreign rule: and, as soon as that foreign rule was removed, and suppressed new problems came up and the country is supposed to solve the whole lot of them. It is a difficult proposition and it applies not only to our country but other countries as well. But we will have to deal with our country. I want you to think and remember that we cannot consider this great question in a vacuum and decide as to what is right and wrong. Right and wrong are important but the application of the right is never an easy matter. For that, you have to have full control of the situation if not the control of the world's situation. It is very well for friends to say that this and that must be done in the world. It is difficult for us to manage even our own household. Rival forces are at work and in this world it is difficult.

Now, I propose to deal with two or three aspects of this problem. I intend saying a few words about our foreign policy, and then something about the general economic background and thirdly, because that matter has been referred to in a number of speeches, I understand, about the Jammu Parishad agitation.

So far as our foreign policy is concerned, we have been criticized from various points of view: one is that it is not a policy at all and it is too vague. Honourable Members opposite have said—I was not here then—but I have no doubt they have said, that we are tied up with the so-called Anglo-American bloc because of various reasons;<sup>5</sup> we expect their help or are in anticipation of

5. P. Sundarayya said on 13 February 1953 in the Council of States that the Government of India had been following "a policy of alignment with American and British imperialists and it is this that encourages the American imperialists today to openly come out against the People's Republic of China."



their help to come. Other honourable Members talk frequently about building up a 'third force' or 'third bloc' whatever it is called.<sup>6</sup>

The honourable Member who thinks that we are tied up with the Anglo-American bloc wants us—he says so—that we should tie ourselves up with the other bloc. He is not against tying up; he is all for tying up but with the other bloc. Well, I do not think it needs much argument for me in this House or indeed, if I may say so, anywhere in the country—barring perhaps a few people—to justify our not being tied up with any bloc. I think I can say with some confidence that the general consensus of opinion in this country is that we should follow an independent policy in this matter, because what does this business of tying up with this or that bloc mean? Obviously it means—you may have sympathy with this or that bloc that is another matter—it means that you give up your sovereign independent right of having a policy, that you follow somebody else's policy—however good or bad that may be.

Surely, it is not a thing which, if I may say so with all respect, any self-respecting person would like to say about this great country, that it should just follow somebody else's dictates. That does not mean that we should not cooperate with others in so far as we can. So that we have to follow what is called an independent policy, which simply means that we consider matters in consultation with others and decide what we should do with regard to a particular question. It is perfectly true that even there no country functions in a vacuum. It has to take matters into consideration. If it has to achieve a certain result, it has to see how others are functioning, what it can do, what it cannot do. A country's foreign policy depends certainly on a certain outlook as ours is. Our foreign policy, generally speaking, is a continuation of what we thought when we were struggling for independence. It has to be varied according to circumstances but that is the origin of it.

A country's foreign policy—although we may call it a foreign policy—again is really a collection of foreign policies apart from the common outlook. It is very difficult to refer to it as one foreign policy. In dealing with America, England, Russia, Japan, China and Egypt or Indonesia—with each country—we have to deal with the peculiar circumstances that exist between us as well

6. B.C. Ghose of the Kisan Mazdoor Party said on 13 February 1953: "While we must not get ourselves entangled in any blocs that exist today in the world, we must pursue a positive policy and also get together other countries with a similar bent of mind, and try to create a force which will act as a stabilizing and effective force between the two warring blocs." C.G.K. Reddy of the Socialist Party said on 13 February 1953 that all those countries who "think like us, who are convinced that alignment with one bloc or the other is not going to do any good to peace in the world or to themselves, we could see we develop more contacts, cement our friendship and develop a very strong belt for peace and for what I might call a third force."



as in the world. We cannot lay down a broad rule that this is our relationship with the rest of the world because it varies with each country. You may put down as a rule that we want to be friendly with all countries. But we cannot ignore the realities of the situation. Therefore, the foreign policy is a broad outlook, and a broad objective plus a collection of foreign policies of other countries.

Finally, a foreign policy is not just a declaration, just laying down fine principles, though it is possible and feasible; it is not telling the world to behave. It is conditioned and controlled by the strength of the country. If it goes too far beyond the strength of the country, then it cannot be followed up; it is empty; it becomes tall talk which has no meaning and you lose all credit. So there are all these conditioning factors. It is easy for me or for any honourable Member here to state or to lay down beautiful maxims of what the world should do. But if that is laid down by a government, or, let us say, resolutions are proposed in the United Nations to that effect, they fall flat. What do we achieve except to get the satisfaction of having made a fine speech?

Therefore, ultimately the foreign policy of every country is limited by the strength which that country possesses. Strength may be military or financial or may be also, if I may use the word, moral. Obviously, India has not military or financial strength to go about interfering with other people, not that we want to. We have no desire to—and we cannot—impose our will on others. We have a strong desire to prevent catastrophes happening in the world, to prevent wars happening in the world and, where possible, to help in the general progress of humanity, we express our opinion and work to that end with the limited strength that we have. If we adopt a policy much in advance of what we can actually do, that would simply ultimately discredit us in the eyes of the nations and we will become rather irresponsible. So, these are the facts which I should like honourable Members to remember about our foreign policy.

It is rather difficult for me to defend or to say anything in praise of the foreign policy that we are pursuing. It is true that in some measure, in a large measure, I have been connected with it, and I think—forgetting the fact that it might offend my modesty—if I may say so the policy that we have pursued has indeed, first of all, kept us the friendship of all manner of countries. We can say with confidence today that there is no country which is really hostile to us. Some may be more friendly, some a little less friendly; some countries may be occasionally angry with us, but nevertheless their anger passes and we again become friendly.

Why is that so? That perhaps may be partly due to the policy we pursue and partly to the manner of our pursuing it. That is to say, we have tried not to join in the new diplomatic game of maligning, defaming and cursing other countries. That does not mean that we agree with what they say or do; we do

not agree, but merely shouting loudly against them does not help. Apart from its being rather indecorous, we feel that it will not help at all. We have to deal today not only with material considerations, political and economic, but we have to deal today even more with a large number of imponderables, fear and the like. The way fear is gripping some of the largest and biggest countries of the world is amazing. I say with some confidence that we cannot be compared in terms of power with the great countries of the world but yet I think it is true, if I may say, that we as a people are less influenced by the fear psychosis that grips some of the greatest countries of the world. Maybe, of course, some people say that it is due to our ignorance, not realizing what facts are, whatever the reason may be.

Therefore, we have to deal with these imponderables which come in the way whether they are great world problems or the problems affecting India and Pakistan—they are facts of course—which come in the way but apart from these facts, it is these imponderable things that come in the way and in order to deal with this matter, at least the manner should be such as helps and does not hinder; that is to say, we should not go about merely running down other countries even though we may think that other countries are in the wrong. We express our opinion about it when necessity arises, that we do not agree with it or that we think this is right or this is wrong but we don't go further than that.

There has been mention of what is called a third force. I have not been able to understand exactly what it means. If it means something in the nature of a power bloc, military or other things, apart from the fact that I do not consider it desirable, I do not think it is possible. There is no such thing today. Even the biggest countries are small today compared to the giants—two giants—and for a number of countries of Asia to come together and call themselves a third force or third power in the military or other sense has no meaning whatsoever. But in another sense it may have a meaning. Do not call it a third force or a third bloc but a third area, an area which, let us put it negatively first, does not want war and, positively, works for peace and cooperates with each other. I can understand that and I should like my country to work for that and we do. We have tried to work for that. But even working for that, if you put this idea of third bloc or third force, it hinders our work for that. It frightens people—not us—it frightens the people whom we want to approach. The odd thing is the very people whom you wish to approach are frightened, circumstanced as they are. Therefore, let us by all means work to get as large an area, as many countries as possible who do not wish to encourage any tendency to war, who wish to work for peace and who do not wish to



align themselves with these great blocs in that particular close way. We can keep friendly with them—that is our general policy.<sup>7</sup>

...I am glad that the honourable Member has clarified this point. Then there is no difference on that point.

Again, even following that policy, one has to do it, if I may say so, without too much shouting about it—not because I am afraid of shouting but because I want to achieve something and I embarrass other countries whom I approach.

Then I should like to refer briefly to the Korean Resolution which we sponsored in the United Nations. In another ten days or so, the United Nations are going to meet again—a continuation of the last session—and they have before them again this Far Eastern problem and other big problems. I cannot say now what our representatives may have to do then except that they will try to follow this broad policy we are pursuing, because so much depends on other circumstances which may develop in the course of the next two weeks or so. But coming to that Resolution, ever since this Korean war started we have been very much concerned with it, not in the sense that we wanted to interfere or we thought ourselves big enough to tell others to behave—that has not been our approach to it—but because it so happened that, apart from our desire to help if possible, we were placed in a very peculiar position which enabled us, perhaps, to help more than any other country. The peculiar position was this, that we were in friendly contact with the main countries on either side, while the others were not and it was difficult for them to do anything. We realized that responsibility, and we also had a feeling, naturally, that it is bad that this thing should continue, to the utter ruination and damnation of the poor people of Korea.<sup>8</sup>

I need not go into past history. Several things were done by us, several steps taken, which did not then yield results but which were subsequently realized to have been the right steps. The very first thing we agreed in regard to the Far Eastern situation is this—the unreality of dealing with it, without dealing with the great country China. Therefore, right from the beginning, we have ourselves recognized the People's Republic of China and we urged other

7. C.G.K. Reddy interrupted to point out that the third bloc or third force proposed by him would not have any military potential, and it would not be the purpose of this force to develop any military potential.
8. There was a likelihood of the intensification of the war in Korea which had already taken a toll of more than two million lives.



countries to do so, in the UN or elsewhere.<sup>9</sup> And that quite apart whether any of us or any of the honourable Members here liked the policies of China or not. That is another matter.

But the fact of China is patent enough, the fact of this great country, and not to recognize it was and is, I think, a fundamental breach—I do not know if “breach” is the right word—but anyhow it was contrary to the whole spirit of the Charter of the United Nations. The United Nations Organization was formed with all principal countries, including countries which were diametrically opposed to each other in policies. Nobody can say the UN was supposed to have represented countries belonging to one policy. But unfortunately, gradually, this trend has come into existence there, and it has resulted in this very fact, that here is a tremendous country of China, not recognized by many other countries as if it did not exist; and the small island off the coast of China is supposed to represent China. That is very extraordinary.

I put it to this House that this basic fact is central to the situation that has arisen in the Far East, because the non-recognition of realities leads to artificial policies and programmes. That is happening.

Apart from that, many things that we suggested in the course of the last two and a half years were not accepted by others. But soon after, it was generally recognized that what we had suggested would have been the right thing to do. Well, that is poor consolation, but it was not done.

In regard to this Korean Resolution, some months before this was put forward, we were in continuous touch, in frequent touch, with the Chinese Government, with the UK Government and sometimes with the US Government, as well as some other governments. We were very anxious not to take any step which would embarrass us or any party, because that would make it difficult for us to help.

We occasionally informed one party or the other, rather generally, rather vaguely, of what the other party was thinking to do or was prepared to do. Naturally, our Heads of Missions abroad kept, usually, informal touch to find out. I am saying this because the Resolution that was proposed by us was framed by us, as we thought, to represent very largely the Chinese viewpoint. I do not say, hundred per cent, but, it was an attempt to represent that viewpoint;

9. The People's Republic of China was given formal recognition by the Communist countries, Britain, India, Pakistan, Indonesia and Burma. The Government of India established diplomatic relations with China and consistently championed her right to be represented in the UN. Nehru said: “China has taken a new shape and a new form. But whether we like that shape and form or not, we have to recognize that a great nation has been reborn and is conscious of her new strength.”

that was, in the main, that the Geneva Convention<sup>10</sup> should be followed in this matter of exchange of prisoners.

I am not saying that, because from time to time representatives of the Chinese Government said something to our representative, they were bound down and, that at a later stage, we were committed to it. I am not saying this, but now we tried to find out how they would like it to happen. Naturally, it is impossible for any party, however big, to have 100 per cent its own way and, that Resolution, therefore, was fashioned accordingly....

We had no idea till then what the reaction of the Chinese Government would be, or what the reaction of the Soviet Government would be. Every time we had been told that they were considering it carefully. Then came information to us from them that they did not approve of it.

We were naturally disappointed. What were we to do then? Some people suggest that we should have withdrawn that Resolution. It is true that the passing of that Resolution, or any other Resolution, has no great meaning when a settlement is sought, because the settlement has to be an agreed settlement. We realized that. But, on the other hand, what were the alternatives? There were two or three other Resolutions there.<sup>11</sup> In fact, before we had put in our Resolution, there were some others also, all of which were, if I may say so, aggressive Resolutions which would have worsened the situation very much. We did not approve of them. If they had come up for voting, we would have voted against them.

Another Resolution came up at a later stage. It was proposed by the Soviet Union or by some other country of Eastern Europe. It laid stress on ceasefire immediately and a number of nations, eleven or thirteen, were then to consider the other problems.<sup>12</sup>

So far as we are concerned we welcome a ceasefire immediately any day but a difficulty arose. It was absolutely clear that Resolution could not be

10. Article 118 of the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 stated that prisoners of war should be released immediately after the hostilities had ceased and that, in the absence of provisions to the contrary in the agreements concluded by the parties in conflict, each of the Powers holding war prisoners should immediately implement a repatriation plan in conformity with the principles set out in Article 7 which provided that war prisoners could in no case waive the rights secured to them by the Convention.
11. Mexico and Peru had tabled Resolutions, each suggesting provisions for the disposal of prisoners of war who were unwilling to return. The Resolution sponsored by Poland demanded the return of all prisoners "in accordance with international practice."
12. The USSR Resolution submitted to the UN General Assembly on 29 October proposed a commission of eleven countries to take steps for the settlement of the Korean question on the basis of the unification of Korea, to be effected by the Koreans themselves under its supervision. The commission should extend assistance in the repatriation of all prisoners of war by both sides.



passed, and I will tell you the reason why. Not because we were against it. The reason was this, that if the prisoners of war issue could not be resolved after a whole year's argument, when there was the pressure of a war going on, then, if a ceasefire took place without that issue being resolved, it would never be resolved. I am not giving my reason; I am saying that this was the feeling of many countries. The feeling was that it would be hung up completely because there was no pressure. In effect that is very unfortunate. The whole issue becomes so amazing. The prisoners of war issue is a simple issue. Almost one feels that these poor prisoners of war on either side come to be looked upon more and more as hostages. It is very unfortunate.

So, this feeling in the minds of some countries that if there is a ceasefire now the prisoners of war issue would never be resolved for years, prevented them from separating this from the ceasefire. They said: "We shall have both." That was the real difficulty, and we were put in this position here, that there was a Resolution of ours which had been very largely supported but which unfortunately had not been agreed to by some of the principal parties concerned. Were we to withdraw it and leave matters to drift? As a matter of fact the Resolution was a Resolution of the House, not ours. We had to adopt a realistic course. The Resolution was in the nature of a proposal. It was not a mandate. In future, possibly it might help further consideration of the subject.

If you will permit, Sir, for facility of reference I would like to place the statement<sup>13</sup> I made in the other House during the last session, giving some dates, etc. I thought Members would like to see it. I need not take your time about it here.

In this connection, may I say one other thing? I understand that some Members have disapproved of our having sent a medical unit to Korea.<sup>14</sup>

As far as I remember, two very minor amendments<sup>15</sup> were accepted.<sup>16</sup> A large number of amendments were proposed on behalf of other countries,

13. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 20, pp. 460-63.

14. On 13 February, P. Sundarayya stated that it was true that the Government did not send the army to Korea to fight North Korea, but to keep on good terms with the United States, they had sent a medical mission.

15. P. Sundarayya asked whether the later modifications made by India in the original Resolution were accepted because of American pressure. He also asked whether due to this reason China, which had shown favourable reaction to the original Resolution, rejected the modified Resolution.

16. Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, who was his country's delegate to the UN, supported the Indian Resolution with the following amendments: (1) in the interests of effective and impartial operation, the "umpire" should be made a full member and President of the Repatriation Commission; and (2) more explicit provision should be made for the welfare of non-repatriated prisoners. The Indian delegation accepted these suggestions and moved amendments to its own Resolution to that effect.



notably, I think, the United States. Every major amendment was negatived by us. They could not be accepted. Two minor amendments were accepted. And I would beg the House to see if there is any major change.

Naturally, it was our desire to amend it here and there if we could get as much support as possible. But not a single vital point was changed. What I am interested in is this charge that is sometimes made that we are connected with somebody in bringing forward this Resolution or pursuing this as an agent of somebody else or in a spirit of hostility to any one country.<sup>17</sup> That idea is completely unfounded.

I do not understand why this criticism is made because we sent our medical unit to Korea, purely for medical relief work and the medical unit has done remarkably well in its own way and has gained very fine experience too. It is one of the best units in the world today. It has not indulged in any warfare or anything; it was perfectly fair and impartial. We are prepared to give medical succour. We have nothing to do with the war as such.

I am afraid I have taken a long time over this matter. There are a few words I would like to say about the economic background. I am told that my friend, Acharya Narendra Deva, whose opinion I value very greatly, expressed himself in rather despondent tones about the economic situation in the country and said that the Five Year Plan was not likely to succeed.<sup>18</sup> Now, it is not very easy for me or for any one to take an overall view and speak in a few sentences in respect of the economic situation in the country. And as I said, to begin with, nobody can take a complacent view of that. The point is how we are to face those difficulties, whether it is in regard to food or land or industry or ultimately better production and better distribution. The whole problem was considered at great length in formulating the Five Year Plan and there is an argument there which honourable Members may have read or can read. I do not say that argument is a final argument. The main virtue of that Five Year Plan is that for the first time, if I may say so, we have come to grips with the

17. The Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China had both levelled the criticism that India had acted under the pressure of the US. The Soviet delegate objected to the appointment of an umpire by the UN on the ground that it was one of the belligerents. He pointed out that the draft Resolution did not provide for a ceasefire and thus contributed to the prolongation of the conflict. On 15 December 1952, China rejected the Resolution accusing India of acting as a partner with the West in "hostile actions" against China. China also contested the legality of the Resolution on the ground that it had been adopted in the absence of the representatives of China and North Korea and demanded that there should be an armistice as the first step.

18. Narendra Deva had earlier said that the Five Year Plan had failed "to create popular enthusiasm, encourage local initiative and enthuse the people with a new hope and a new faith" and "in spite of the labour that has been put during the last two years, it will be a still-born child."

subject apart from the theoretical approaches. Theoretical approaches are good; they are essential. But, nevertheless, a theoretical approach has to be tempered with reality and with our own resources. We cannot go far beyond our own resources. And I think that in that Five Year Plan we have come to realistic conclusions, not forgetting our objectives. I should like the pace to be faster. I should be very glad to confer with Members here, not in the academic sense but in the practical sense, on how we can make our pace faster. The honourable Member<sup>19</sup> referred to the land problem. As far as I know, and from the reports I have seen, there is not much difference in my personal viewpoint or even our Government's viewpoint and the honourable Member's. Maybe, it is the question of working out something—not any radical difference in our viewpoint. In dealing with the land problem, we must remember that our country is very varying. It is very difficult to regiment. There is constitutional provincial autonomy in different provinces. So one has to proceed in a very cautious way. But I do not see any vital difference in our approach to this problem.

In regard to food, I believe that it is perfectly true that the food situation has improved because of various factors among which certainly I should say Government policy is one. People refer to the famine or near-famine conditions—say in Rayalaseema last year or in parts of Karnataka or Bombay State this year. That is perfectly true. I would like the House to remember that though we use the word 'famine' today—I do not like using the word—we use it in an entirely different context from the old days when the British Government was here. When the British Government was here, a famine meant hundreds and thousands or millions of people dying. Today we receive complaints sometimes of some death by hunger having taken place. Maybe or may not be. Please see the contrast. There is at the present moment a political consciousness. So that if one person somewhere unfortunately by hunger or otherwise dies, there is an outcry. I am glad about that. Previously tens of thousands died and we accepted it as famine. In the Bengal famine thirty-five lakhs of persons died in 1942 or 1943. That was a famine. And I do suggest that there is a vast change now. I mention this because a person from a foreign country, who had ideas of famine of the old British time, came here the other day and went to the very areas. He said: "You talk about famine in these areas. I do not find any people dead or dying." He said: "This is not famine." So you will appreciate that it is not a small matter.<sup>20</sup>

19. Narendra Deva said that nothing had been done to check the pressure on land and fragmentation of land holdings. The landless labourer had been left to "the mercies of the well-disposed and charitable men of the countryside."
20. Bhupesh Gupta drew the attention of Nehru to the famine code which did not specify that hundreds and thousands of people had to die of starvation before the declaration of the famine.



...I am not justifying anything. I am merely pointing out that it is no small matter that in spite of tremendous natural calamities, failure of rains, drought, etc. affecting vast areas, the State Governments with the cooperation of the Central Government have prevented—they could not prevent unfortunately misery and hunger occasionally—the situation from deteriorating and have controlled it by works, by doles, call them what you will... I think it may be possible—I dare not give any promise—that in the course of another three years we should be more or less self-sufficient in food. That, I think, is important.

Some people say that we are neglecting industry—we are always talking about agriculture—well, I attach the greatest importance to the development of industry but I do not think that real industrial development could take place in India till we have a sound agricultural economy. Of course, we have to go ahead on all fronts. We have a difficult problem in considering the nation's advance or economic growth; that is, how far we can save or how far we can invest for future generations. Saving for investment means exerting a certain pressure on the present generation. It means, if I may say so, a certain austerity.

It is all very well for a country, if I may use the word without any offence, an authoritarian country, to dictate a certain policy which they consider good for the country's future. It is not so easy for a democratic country to do it, because it is difficult to ask the people to suffer in the present for jam tomorrow. It is difficult. In the past, other factors prevailed. If great countries grew up like the USA in 150 years or the United Kingdom, they built it up. How did they do it? Those honourable Members who know history know that they built it on the extreme suffering of the working classes there. The proprietors were not men who liked luxury and all that. They were rather austere people, but they were intent on saving and saving so as to make their industrial apparatus grow. They did it then at a terrible cost. You cannot duplicate that in a democratic set-up. It was all very well for England then. England had a Parliament then but that Parliament was controlled by a small group of propertied classes. They did it, and out of the suffering of a large number of people they built up the industrial apparatus of England. Conditions in America were different. America had vast areas.

We are differently situated, apart from the fact that we have an enormous population which grows year by year and which requires to be sustained year by year. We have got adult suffrage and all that, and we have to function under a democratic set-up which from the adult suffrage point of view is rather a novel thing in the world, which is novel in the last twenty or thirty years. It is a fairly novel thing because the previous Parliaments had been elected in other countries under a narrow suffrage.

So the problem before us is how to save for investment. Some people may say: "Let us have a capital levy and let us get more money." That is a



different matter—we will consider it. Let us change and assimilate the standard of living. But out of that you don't get very much. Psychologically it may be good—that is a different approach—but practically you don't gain much. Practically what counts is the production year by year: how can you increase that in land and in industries? Therefore the question of resources comes in. It is the most vital matter that we have to consider and I would beg this House and honourable Members of this House for the moment to forget in particular the dogmatic creed or policy—whether from the capitalist, socialist or the communist point of view. For the moment you forget those words because they have associations.

But the main thing is how to increase our production, how to build up the production apparatus for tomorrow. For building up the production apparatus tomorrow you naturally have to control the saving today. Where are they to come from? Of course, you know the normal sources. By what industrial policy, financial policy or land policy is the problem and there should be some kind of rule or method. Therefore we have put up the Five Year Plan, and I think that the great virtue of it is that it has made people generally plan-conscious, which is a very good thing.

Secondly, it has made all of us realize certain basic realities—the existing situation, our resources, etc. They have been collected; they were not there previously. We know it is put in a certain way. That is not the final word. We can vary it when we like. We can divert it in slightly this or that direction, although, of course, constantly thinking of changing it is dangerous. It is bad but we can vary it here and there when we are convinced of it, when we want to make the pace faster but I do appeal to the House to look at this problem in this way and not merely to criticize the defects of something of which we may ourselves be aware but more positively how to improve it.

The House will remember that in the President's Address there is reference to a Welfare State.<sup>21</sup> There is also reference to unemployment, or rather employment, that is to say, the real test of progress ultimately lies in the growth of employment or the lessening of unemployment and the final ending of unemployment. I completely accept that ideal because there can be no Welfare State if there is unemployment. Anyhow the unemployed are not parties to that Welfare State, they are just outside its pale. But having accepted that, to realize it obviously requires hard work. It is not an easy matter. It requires tremendous effort and cooperation of all of us and I do again appeal to this House and to the country to give us that cooperation, not necessarily agreeing in every odd thing that is said, but there are certain matters on which, I do submit, agreement is inevitable; and we have to go ahead.

21. See *ante*, p. 23.

Finally I may say a few words about this Praja Parishad agitation. I find that my honourable friend Acharya Narendra Deva referred to this in his speech and referred to it in rather strong terms and said that it was, in this opinion, a completely communal agitation, primarily started by those who had been supporters of the old Maharaja's rule and the landed gentry and others.<sup>22</sup> That is perfectly true. He also said that it should be investigated why this agitation which was primarily a class agitation, should have affected other people.<sup>23</sup> I entirely agree with him. But we must always remember that some of these factors are well known, but others may not be. In fact, because of this, if I may say so, we have to separate the two aspects of this question completely. One is the economic aspect; the other is the purely political, constitutional or even international aspect of it.

So far as the economic aspect is concerned, there has been, as the House knows, a commission appointed for the purpose.<sup>24</sup> Sometimes it is said that this commission is an official commission. It is true it is a purely official commission, presided over by the Chief Justice of the State—a very responsible and able officer. If it had been a non-official commission, immediately the criticism would have been made that the non-officials put there are not representatives. It was hardly possible, I submit to the House, for the Kashmir Government to appoint a commission of the very persons who want to upset the Kashmir Government. If they had appointed non-officials, other non-officials might have said: "They are your party men." I think they very wisely appointed a purely official commission to deal with these economic matters with regard to which the Kashmir Government has no firm opinion. They may accept the findings and give effect to them.

22. Narendra Deva described the Praja Parishad agitation as communal which opposed the land reforms and supported the "Maharaja in the days of old, and when the RSS was banned, it overnight assumed the new name and is masquerading in the name of Praja Parishad."
23. Narendra Deva felt that "repression is no remedy for a disease of this kind. It is deep-seated. Otherwise the masses could never have joined the movement and therefore it behoves us to be careful and to see what is the reason why these people's hearts were stirred and why they joined the movement."
24. On 2 February 1953, the Kashmir Government appointed a four-man committee headed by the Chief Justice of the High Court, Janki Nath Wazir, to report on: (a) the working of land reforms in the *kandi* (dry) areas of the State; (b) the system of price and other controls prevalent in the State; (c) the progress of the work on rehabilitation of the displaced persons; and (d) the means to be adopted for rehabilitation of the ex-servicemen in the State.



Then there are the other matters which are of a political nature. Many things are said about these. The honourable Member who spoke before me said something about the National Flag.<sup>25</sup> Of course, the Kashmir Government has repeatedly stated—their Constituent Assembly has stated—that the Union Flag is the supreme flag of the Kashmir State as of the whole of India, and from time to time they have displayed it all over the place. But it is an interesting thing to note that many of the persons who talk so much about the National Flag and respect for the National Flag in Jammu as well as in Delhi, have in the past, openly declared that they will replace the National Flag by their own party flag, which may be some yellow flag or some other coloured flag. Some of the communal organizations have seldom shown respect to our flag. Now, they exploit our flag in order to gain other peoples' goodwill in this agitation;<sup>26</sup> it has nothing to do with it and, that is my chief grievance and my sorrow that in this matter, how some rightful things had been exploited for bad objectives....<sup>27</sup>

...I might deal with them if I had time.

...Please let me go on.

There is nobody here who obviously does not want the closest association of the Jammu and Kashmir State with India. It is obvious. There is no difference of opinion about that. Taking that as a right objective and putting it forward in the way it has been done and, in the manner this thing has been pursued, I will submit, that a person of even moderate intelligence will say that this objective has been made very difficult of realization because, we want the closest union with Jammu and Kashmir State. That union can be based only on the wishes of the people of Jammu and Kashmir; we are not going to have that union at the point of the bayonet. Therefore, the policy to be pursued is to win them over to our side and not to make them frightened as to the results of this union. The policy to be pursued is not to disturb the Jammu and Kashmir State, but, to try to keep it as an entity and as a partner in the Union of India.

The policy of the Jammu agitation is this: they have talked about the whole State being closely integrated with India. I have no objection. How can I? But, remember this, that, first of all, the accession of the Jammu and Kashmir State was identical as of any other State in India: there was no difference, the

25. Devaprasad Ghosh of the Jan Sangh said that it was curious that a movement, launched under the Indian flag, showing its complete faith and loyalty to the Indian Constitution and the President, was termed anti-national whereas a movement which "seeks to take Kashmir more and more away from India with a separate flag, constitution and assembly, was looked upon as a national movement par excellence."
26. So long as the Maharaja's flag was the recognized flag of the Jammu and Kashmir State, the slogan of "one flag" was not raised. Only when it was replaced by the flag symbolic of sacrifice and struggle, did the Praja Parishad raise the slogan.
27. D.P. Ghosh interrupted to ask Nehru to spell out the bad objectives.



three subjects and no more. At that time, it was thought that there might be a variety in future integration of States with India. We wanted to, but we did not think it certainly possible, that integration of all the States of India would be to the same degree. I am talking about 1947 or, may be early 1948. So when the Jammu and Kashmir State came in, it came in exactly the same way as any other State—full accession. There is no question of partial accession.

Remember this, because, when some people talk about the reference to the United Nations on the possibility of a plebiscite, it is not lessening the accession in any way. There may be something which upsets accession; that is a different matter as any extraordinary thing, but it is not lessening accession. It is hundred per cent accession. Accession has to be kept apart from integration. It was accession previously and, later, when other States integrated, this State integrated in the same degree as other States. However, the late Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel wisely followed a policy of much further and fuller integration in regard to the other States. Good thing; but, in the nature of things, we could not follow that policy in Kashmir. War was going on and there were other considerations. It had become an international problem and all that. We could not do it and we have not done it.

Then, last year, the question arose, not in the sense of further integration, but rather of other arrangements which led to some measure of further integration; and the agreement between the Government of India and the Government of Kashmir related to a number of topics which were placed before this House and to which this House agreed and which were tantamount to a further degree of integration.<sup>28</sup>

It is asked: Why has that agreement not been fully implemented yet? Why should one part of it be implemented? The question is justified obviously. But look at the facts. I should prefer the whole of it to be taken together. But, then, after all, like every State Government, and slightly more than others, the Jammu and Kashmir Government is an autonomous Government, and we have to leave it to them to judge of a particular situation which they have to face. They have to shoulder the responsibility. If something happens in Bengal, in Bombay, in Madras, we give them advice; but they have autonomy, and they have to deal with the local situation. In Kashmir they have to deal also with a local situation. We cannot order them about with a time-table when to do this or that. We leave it to them. We advise them. But the point to be remembered is this, that because of these various factors, while accession was complete, and integration of the previous kind was also complete, there was no immediate rush to add to it. We wanted to wait and see it come gradually in the normal way, not just in a constitutional way...<sup>29</sup> Please let me go on.

28. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 19, pp. 262-82.

29. D.P. Ghosh tried to interrupt but was overruled by the Chairman.

I cannot be stopped this way. I am sorry, Sir, but it interrupts my train of thought.

As regards that part of the agreement, there can be no doubt that Kashmir, in view of these facts which have made it an international question of significance, where war had taken place, had to be treated as a special case. It is no good our trying to talk about uniformity and regimentation. We cannot regiment. First of all, we do not want to regiment people. It is for the people to decide for themselves.

The very first day that part of this agreement was given effect to in Kashmir—the agreement between the Jammu and Kashmir Government and the Government of India—the new Head of the State, Sadar-i-Riyasat, elected and approved by our President—the day he arrived in Jammu, this Jammu Praja Parishad agitation started that very day.<sup>30</sup> There is no gap period left. It starts by trying to interfere with the welcome given to the Yuvaraj, Sadar-i-Riyasat, tearing up the triumphal arch, etc., etc. And since then it has continued with its ups and downs. Even if the Kashmir Government was anxious to go ahead with the rest of the implementation, it has to deal with the existing situation first. Its hands were to some extent taken up by it.

I would like this House to consider again the background of this agitation. Acharya Narendra Deva. I think, talked about certain regional considerations.<sup>31</sup> The past history of Kashmir, going back a little over a hundred years, shows how the State was formed in the old way—by conquest, by transfer, by purchase, and all that—and the Jammu province of the State was the dominant province from many points of view, political and others, just as Hyderabad in the old days. In Hyderabad a certain group was the dominant group—a certain communal group. Muslim group was the dominant group in Hyderabad. It had the feeling of dominance, and that was actual to some extent. Now that is completely upset, and Hyderabad has changed, naturally. In Hyderabad, a completely feudal order existed, and that was upset. The old big jagirs and others went—that was inevitable—leading, undoubtedly, and unfortunately, to considerable distress among those who depended on that feudal order, those who depended on certain armed forces which were disbanded later, and the like.

I cannot compare the two; there are very great differences. But there is a comparison too, dominant group, a dominant clan, not liking the changes that

30. The agitation in Jammu started on 23 November 1952 when black flag demonstrations against the Sadar-i-Riyasat took place. The agitation took the form of raids on Government offices and educational institutions and assault on police personnel.

31. Narendra Deva had pointed out that the Jammu agitation might have been caused by the uncertainties of the situation due to controversies on the Kashmir issue between Pakistan and India and the UN representatives and the "clash of two regional nationalisms of Kashmir and Jammu."



were taking place, both political and in regard to land reforms and wanting to resist them, trying to do some thing; and in the background were certain economic difficulties too. All these things are there.

These facts have to be recognized and dealt with undoubtedly. This agitation very soon became a rather violent agitation and I would like to tell the House that I have with me here full details and particulars of over a hundred officers of the Jammu and Kashmir Government—Deputy Commissioners, Superintendents of Police, some schoolmasters and constables, who have been injured more or less....<sup>32</sup>

I do not know, but I have heard reports... I could not give the exact figures; probably fifteen to twenty. Here is this aggressive agitation which has resulted in injury to a hundred persons, in numerous school buildings being ransacked, furniture and other things destroyed and small Government offices and treasury being looted and so on. This is a curious kind of peaceful satyagraha.

However, there is the Kashmir Government to deal with the situation and the House will realize the reaction this will have in India and on the other side of the Kashmir Government. By this agitation, the reaction is going to be contrary and very unfortunate.

Their demand is: "Let us have the full integration of Jammu." It means the disruption of the State; Jammu having her wishes carried out and Kashmir being left out of the picture, to others. This is an extraordinary position; an extraordinary attitude to take up. Here is something which can aid and comfort the enemies of India. I can understand some of the people of Jammu may be excited and be doing something. I am amused when responsible people in the rest of India should support this agitation which will have only one result and which will create injury to the rest of India and to the people of Jammu inevitably.<sup>33</sup> If the agitation succeeds, it will be the people of Jammu who would have to suffer. If honourable Members have had the chance to listen to the speeches sometimes made in the course of this agitation, some made recently in Delhi city—I was not present there, but I have had occasion to read the reports of these speeches—there was something said of Jammu, of course, but the whole attack was on the Government of India, on a different basis and the

32. D.P. Ghosh wanted to know about the figures on the other side.

33. The campaign launched throughout the country demanded complete integration of the Jammu and Kashmir State with India and full application of the Indian Constitution. The slogan raised was, "One President, One Constitution, One Flag." On 31 December 1952, speaking at Kanpur, S.P. Mookerjee called upon the Governments of India and Kashmir to try to find out the real cause of the trouble in Jammu and "set matters right according to the will of the people." He said the Jan Sangh believed in one nation and one culture. There could not be two cultures in one country and people could not afford to have extra-territorial loyalty while calling themselves the citizens of India.



whole appeal was—"Subvert this Government, put an end to this so that we can have an entirely different Government and different policy." Everybody has a right to ask for his own government; but the whole background becomes something very different from the Jammu Parishad agitation. It merely becomes a base for something bigger; whether it is feasible is a different matter. Consultation is going on in Geneva on this subject. We are anxious, naturally, for this conflict to end and normalcy to return and for legitimate grievances to be enquired into.

So I would submit we are anxious—exceedingly anxious—naturally for this matter, this conflict, etc. to end, for normality to return, for legitimate grievances to be enquired into and removed wherever possible and all that. I am quite certain that the Kashmir Government is as anxious as we are—both of us are—but how are we to go about discussing not the legitimate grievances but high constitutional and international problems? Some are discussed in Geneva. It is difficult for us to discuss them with other people. We have to consult so many parties—the Kashmir Government is concerned, the defence part of it is there and others—and we are supposed to discuss these problems in the market-place with the Praja Parishad people. I just do not understand how this could be done....<sup>34</sup>

So I discussed with the leaders of the Jan Sangh how to get rid of the aggressors. I do submit, Sir, this is a fantastic proposition. Here is something involving military matters, political matters, constitutional and national matters. I am prepared to discuss with any Member of this House and get ideas but I don't like this compulsion being exercised and the threat of an all-India agitation. Now, how to get rid of the aggressors? Well, the aggressors are Pakistan. Therefore, it involves the entire problem of war and peace as between India and Pakistan. Imagine the extent of the depth of the problem. Let us discuss the problem dispassionately. But this is being connected with the Jammu Parishad agitation. It is being given a communal outlook. I think, that is a fatal outlook and that approach is fatal for the entire country. It will disrupt the country and will put an end to our freedom. There is such a gap between these two approaches that you cannot, normally speaking, in these basic matters, come to an agreement....<sup>35</sup>

The honourable Member is perfectly right. The original complaint was that there had been an incursion into the Kashmir State territory. As I said in the beginning, we have been struggling against this problem. It has given us no pleasure to be caught in tangles. We must remember that the foreign policy of a country ultimately depends on its strength and not merely on declarations.

34. D.P. Ghosh said that the discussion in Geneva should be how to get rid of the aggressors and not on plebiscite.

35. Ghosh said that the original complaint of India before the UN related to the question of aggression and not that of plebiscite.

Now, one thing more. I am told that my honourable friend Dr Kunzru expressed his grave discontent and his disapproval of the fact that certain persons have been arrested and detained in the Punjab in the course of the last week or ten days.<sup>36</sup> I believe about a dozen or so persons have been arrested. I do not know if Dr Kunzru meant by that that under no circumstances, whatever happens, should a person be so arrested and detained, or whether he thought that in the peculiar circumstances now prevailing in the Punjab this should not have been done.<sup>37</sup>

If it is the first proposition that he advances I would submit that it is difficult to agree to it and I cannot agree to it, and no country can agree to it in any final sense. Of course, it is a thing which should not normally be done and I hope it is not normally done; it is done in extreme stress, under special circumstances. If I may say so, then it becomes a question of the circumstances in which this is done.

The whole background of this Praja Parishad agitation was that when the Punjab became a source of supply of various kinds of Jammu, they adopted all kinds of techniques to excite the people and to create trouble on communal lines. These techniques are being employed even in Delhi and some of the cities of Western UP, taking out processions and shouting all sorts of exciting slogans.<sup>38</sup> Surely that will lead to a very grave situation.

Some of the trouble, some of this stone-throwing and attacks occurred almost within a stone's throw of the ceasefire line, where there are Pakistan forces on the other side of the line. We were concerned that our army should keep completely out of this, but these people were deliberately doing this where our army is, presumably to excite the army. I know that the Punjab Government, for weeks beforehand, was gravely concerned. It did not want to do anything, but ultimately the responsibility was theirs. They wrote to us

36. On 14 February 1953, speaking on the Motion in the Council of States, Hriday Nath Kunzru referred to the arrests of Jan Sangh and Hindu Mahasabha members in the Punjab under the Preventive Detention Act and questioned "whether we can just stand by and see the liberties of the people, with whom we do not agree, taken away without trial or without explanation being given for action taken by Government."
37. When it was discovered that Punjab had become the base of the Praja Parishad agitation and many Parishad leaders, who had disappeared from the State, went freely about their business in the State, the Government of India declared a state of emergency in Punjab on 6 February 1953, and some Jan Sangh and Mahasabha leaders were arrested.
38. Batches of volunteers, mostly Jan Sangh members from the northern and central parts of India, travelled to Jammu to participate in the Parishad agitation and were arrested for entering the State without an entry permit. The police dealt harshly with the protesters and several of them were killed. Their ashes were brought to Delhi and a pro-Praja Parishad group's plan to take these ashes in a procession before immersion in the Yamuna river was thwarted by a ban imposed on public meetings. Jammu agitation continued in Delhi with twenty volunteers courting arrest every day.



saying: "There is a very grave situation and we propose to take some such action." We said: "It is your responsibility and if you consider it right and proper, you should do it."

I am sorry I have taken so much of the time of the House, but the subjects before the House in connection with the President's Address cover not only India but the world, and the responsibility largely falls upon us, not as a Government, but upon Parliament here to deal with them with dignity, restraint, and keeping always our principles before us, and always in a spirit of humility.

## 5. The Fear Psychosis and a Positive Policy<sup>1</sup>

For four days,<sup>2</sup> this House has been debating this motion and we have covered many subjects, big and small. We have ranged all over the world and considered problems of India. But I find a little difficulty in this maze of subjects that have been raised, to deal with many of them in the course of my reply. The House will permit me therefore, if I may say so, to pick and choose and deal with what I think are the more important things that have been raised in this debate. I would have preferred, if I may say so with all respect, that attention was directed to those important aspects, national or international, rather than diverted to a maze of minor subjects, which, important in themselves no doubt, nevertheless, if looked at in a proper perspective, are unimportant in the scheme of things today.

Before I proceed further, I should like to say that I have endeavoured with a large measure of success, but sometimes with lack of success, to consider these matters as dispassionately as possible, as objectively as possible, and tried to profit by the comments and criticisms which honourable Members have made. One thing, if I may say so, I would repudiate, if that is not too strong a word to use: the accusation that my colleagues and I are complacent or smug.<sup>3</sup> Well, I am not judge of whether I am smug or not. But, I cannot imagine any person charged with responsibility being complacent today in this world. Even if he were so inclined, he cannot be so. Certainly I have no

1. Speech in the House of the People, on the motion of thanks on President's Address, 18 February 1953. From *Parliamentary Debates (House of the People)*, Official Report, 1953, Vol. 1, Part II, cols. 444-76. Extracts.
2. The debate was held from 13 to 17 February.
3. H.N. Mukerjee of the Communist Party of India said on 13 February 1953 in the House of the People that the President's Address painted a smug and self-complacent picture unrelated to the facts.



sensation of complacency when I view the problems of this country or the world. I have sometimes a feeling, if you like to call it, of excitement at this tremendous drama that is taking place in the world, or a sense of high adventure at what we are endeavouring to do in this country, and also a sense of the tremendous difficulties that confront us all the time. Nobody can afford to be complacent. If honourable Members ever take the trouble to read what I sometimes say outside this House, they will find that I am always warning my colleagues outside, people outside, against complacency. So we are not complacent. We do not think in the slightest that we have all the wisdom, that we know everything about everything in the world today. Any person who is dogmatic, if I may say so, is complacent. Complacency comes from some kind of a closed mind accepting a dogmatic phase, whatever it may be. It is a narrowness of outlook in a changing world. None of us is complacent. Therefore I have listened to the criticisms and comments in this House as in the other, with a view to understand, with a view to learn, how we can better what we are doing, or change what we are doing.

I can also assure the House that in this matter there is no question of pride or prestige involved. We are all in this House, not the Government only, charged with a heavy and great responsibility, and we would be small men indeed if we stick in small matters on prestige or consider matters from any narrow point of view of party or group. So I have endeavoured to consider these matters dispassionately. I would like, Sir, to express to you and to the House and to the honourable Member opposite, Dr Mookerjee, my regret that I was not quite so dispassionate for a moment yesterday and I felt myself provoked into intemperance.<sup>4</sup>

Before I proceed further, I should just like to deal with the point which was raised by another honourable Member opposite which at that time also provoked me into an interruption of amazement....<sup>5</sup>

4. S.P. Mookerjee said in his speech on 17 February 1953 that the three victories of the Jan Sangh and the Hindu Mahasabha in Delhi by-elections had been achieved in spite of "wine and money" used by the Congress. Nehru demanded instant withdrawal of the allegation. Mookerjee considered this "display of anger" proof of Nehru's incapacity to rule the country. Nehru retorted that Mookerjee was irresponsible in his utterances. In the end it became clear that there was a misunderstanding as Nehru had thought that Mookerjee had said "wine and women". He, however, still demanded proof from Mookerjee.
5. H.N. Mukerjee had alleged that in one single month of October 1952, there had been 3,250 military landings at Dum Dum airport and of these 1,200 were by American military aircraft. He also said that a US Superfortress landed at Agra in December 1952. Nehru answering these charges said that in the whole of 1952, and not in one month of October only, 459 military aircraft, both foreign and Indian, had landed at Dum Dum. Of these, 118 belonged to the US Air Force. None of these American aircraft carried arms, ammunition or personnel in uniform. Also, no Superfortress had landed in Agra in December.

...Now we are faced with two major problems, or two major categories of problems. There is the international situation, and there is the domestic situation. Practically everything falls within those two categories. And although we may consider them separately, they are to some extent connected together and have their reactions on each other. So far as we are concerned, our natural interest is in the domestic situation because we have to face those problems, because it is our desire to raise the level of our country in the sense of improving the lot of our people here, their standard of living, etc., to put an end to the curse of poverty, to go as far as we can in the ideal of the Welfare State that we have put forward, and to which the President made reference.<sup>6</sup>

I do not suppose anybody in this House will differ in that ideal. The question, therefore, is how to attain it. And certainly, there might be differences of opinion in regard to that. There is no reason why there should not be or, if you like, placing greater emphasis on one aspect or the other. Anyhow, here in this tremendous adventure of building up a new India, a new Welfare State in this great country whereby we raise the level of hundreds of millions of people. Can there be anything more exciting than this adventure? And yet, we all know the great difficulties that we have to face—difficulties, partly because we faced a situation after a fairly long period of suppressed growth, when the country did not grow naturally as it might have done. And so when we face this question, we have to face a number of problems, all together. We have to face, if you take the whole of India, a number of centuries all jostled up together suddenly hurled into the middle of the twentieth century. It is not an easy matter for an academic debate to decide. There are vast regions in India, different stages of economic growth, industrial condition, agricultural condition, and we are trying to raise all of them up, and if we do not bring about some changes by magic to all these people, well, we can hardly be blamed. Therefore, while we are engaged in this tremendous adventure full of difficulties, we have little time to spare, and little energy to give, to international affairs. But there is little choice left to us because international affairs hit us in the face all the time, because they might very well affect our individual lives intimately, because it is the inevitability of destiny that India should take her part in these affairs like other countries. Therefore, whether we wish it or not, we have to take part in them. We are part of the international community, and no country, much less a great big country like India, can be isolated from that, or keep herself away from it. So we play a part in these international affairs which grow more and more complicated from day to day.

The United Nations came into existence seven or eight years ago, and it represented the old urge of humanity for peace and cooperation in this world. It tried to profit by the failures of the old League of Nations... The old League

6. See *ante*, p. 23.



of Nations, even at its commencement, was not what might be called a universal organization, an international organization with a universal background. Great countries kept out of it and were kept out of it.<sup>7</sup> The United Nations started at least with the assumption of universality; and countries differing from each other entirely in their structure of Government, economic or political policy, all came together under that common umbrella of the United Nations.

So one attribute of the United Nations—supposed attribute—was universality. The other, of course the main objective, was the maintenance of peace, and the growth of cooperative effort among the nations, and the solution of disputes by peaceful means as far as possible. The United Nations, the House will remember, laid down a rule about the veto of certain so-called great Powers. Now, it is very easy to criticize that rule as illogical, undemocratic and all that, but, as a matter of fact, it represented the reality of the moment. It meant ultimately that the United Nations could not adopt sanctions against one of the great Powers, because that Power could veto it, because having sanctions against one of those great Powers itself meant a world war. That may not be logical, but it was a fact that it meant a world war. If the United Nations was to avoid a world war, it had to bring in some such clause. It may appear illogical. Let us see how this has developed.

First of all, we find that that principle of universality, with which the United Nations started, has been departed from. The most patent departure is the fact that a great country like China is not there, and is not recognized by some great countries. This is not a question of any one of us liking or disliking the present Government in China or approving or disapproving of China's revolution, but it is a question of one of the biggest countries in the world not being represented there, not being recognized there. Therefore, it comes in the way of that basic principle of universality, and, in fact, the United Nations, to that extent, goes back to something which made the League of Nations fail.

That, I think, is one of the grave difficulties that face us, and much has flown from that, many new, fresh problems have come from that. And it is not a question of my saying or any country saying, "Let us agree that China should be there", or some saying, "Let it not be there". It is not a question of expressing an academic opinion, but realizing that one of the basic facts of the world situation is this—that the United Nations, which presumes to be a universal organization in this world, has ceased to be that because of this first major fact that a great country, which is obviously a running country, obviously a stable and strong country, is not represented there. Then again, a difficulty has arisen. For the moment, I am not blaming anybody. But this great

7. When the League of Nations was formed the US kept out of the organization. Germany and the Soviet Union were not associated with the League in its formative stages.



organization built up for peace is itself today engaged in war-sponsoring—however small it may be does not matter—and to the extent that it is a sponsor of war and it is connected with it, naturally its functions of peace-making become less. It is difficult to exercise that function adequately, if you yourself are a party to war. Now that is a great difficulty; the difficulty may have arisen because of nobody's fault or somebody's fault. That does not matter. We are trying to analyse the situation as objectively as possible without casting blame on anybody. And the problem arises whether we have grown up, whether the world has grown up, adequately enough to have an international organization of the type aimed at.

I do not know people talk about one world, about world federalism and the like, and many wise and intelligent and ardent people agree with that ideal. I think most Members in this House will agree. But it is one thing to agree with that, and quite another thing to give effect to it, and we see, far from this kind of world government, even the United Nations, as it was started, continually coming into difficulties because of various factors, because of a sovereign State still thinking of a sovereign State and because of other factors and conflicts. The question arises: Is it a fact, is it a possibility that countries entirely different from each other in their political, economic and other policies, can cooperate in a new organization, or must they remain apart? In the old days, centuries ago, it did not much matter, because they kept apart, they did not come in contact; but today that has become impossible, because they are continuously in contact. If there is continuous contact, that contact may be a friendly contact; if not, a hostile contact, and the question arises: Can an international organization exist which can contain within its core countries aiming entirely differently?

Well, I suppose, one could answer it. There is no reason why it should not function with all those countries in it. That was the ideal. After all, when the United Nations was started, countries like the United States of America and the USSR entirely different in outlook and ways did cooperate and came together, and did function for a period, till they gradually drifted apart. For my part, I do not see why they should not function in an organization, provided, of course, that each one of them did not, if I may say so, interfere with the others, and so long as each could carry on any policy it chose for itself. But difficulties come in, where there are attempts at interfering with others. Then, of course there is conflict, and one party or both interfere, or one begins interfering and the other starts also interfering. Then again, as the House knows, it is very difficult to know, in such a matter, who started. Charges and counter-charges are made. I am merely placing all these problems before the House so that it might be able to look at this international picture in broad historical perspective.

There is another matter, of course, which is most important in our

understanding of things today, and that is the pace of technological development, which is tremendous, which we who live in this technological world do not wholly realize, but which is making all the difference to this world, most particularly in regard to the development of communications, in the development of the art of warfare and all that, which throw us into each other's laps all the time, and which has resulted in creating a situation when any real major conflict or a world war would be of such tremendous significance and destruction that no objective for which that war is fought can ever be realized through it. That is the basic fact too. You may have the best of objectives, but war has become such that you will not realize that objective, and you will get something which, well, you do not like, in spite of a so-called victory.

Here are certain broad aspects which I should like the House to keep in mind. Therefore, what can a country like India do? We cannot influence other countries by force of arms or pressure of money; we can negatively do something, we can positively do also a little occasionally, but to imagine that we are going to shake the world or control international affairs according to our thinking, as sometimes honourable Members seem to hint, that we should issue something in the nature of an ultimatum to this country or that country, or demand from this country or that country, or express our views in strong language to the world at large, has little meaning, unless you can do something afterwards.

Honourable Members opposite have repeatedly said in their comments that the President had used weak language, circumspect language, and why not come out strongly in favour of this or that. I would beg of them to remember that in the modern world, strength does not reside in strong language at all. In the problems of modern world and international affairs, strength does not reside in strong language at all. Strength resides somewhere else. Nor does it reside in slogans. We must have strength somewhere before we take to any step. Otherwise, we make ourselves ridiculous. Apart from strength, a nation—and I hope India is a mature nation, with all our failings, and we have a few thousand years of growth in restraint and all that—a mature nation does not and should not shout too much. Strength does not come from shouting. It is not a sign of maturity. I regret that there is far too much shouting and cursing in the world today. It may or may not be justified. But it is not good all the same. You have come up against all these problems of, apart from the other countries, two giant countries disliking each other, trying to undermine each other, and yet terribly afraid of each other. It is a most extraordinary situation, and we live in this psychosis of fear, of fear and hatred, and there can be no worse companions for a country than fear and hatred.

Therefore, one of the approaches at least in which we can help is to try to lessen this atmosphere of fear and hatred. But how far? We cannot do very much about it. But at least we can, negatively, first of all, we may not do



anything or say anything which increases that. That is within our power certainly. At least we should not indulge in that shouting and cursing and slandering match which seems to have taken the place of old-time diplomacy. That is something though it does not or may not achieve much result. At least, we have not added to the illness of the world.

Positively, where we can help also, we should help, although in taking any positive step, there are always certain risks involved that it may fail. We had been very cautious about our positive steps. Negatively, we have endeavoured, I think, with a great deal of success, not to take part in these controversies, by merely running other nations down. We do not agree with a great deal of what some other countries say or do. But when the time comes we try to point that out in as friendly a language as possible, because we are quite certain that by using stronger language we do not help anybody, not the cause of peace certainly. So the positive steps we have taken, we have also taken as cautiously as possible. We have tried not to, and no step of ours has been taken just to put this party in the right or the other party in the wrong. We may have failed—that is a different matter—in the step we took. But we have tried always to do something in the hope of success and tried to find out, as far as we could, the opinions of the other parties concerned.

There was this Korean Resolution. I do not wish to take the time of the House on this occasion as I have spoken about this in the past. We tried our utmost in that matter to find out what the other countries concerned were prepared to accept or to do. It is impossible to find out everything. One may make a mistake, but we did proceed on a sound enough basis of finding out a good deal and about 90 or 95 per cent of what we put forward in that Resolution was, if I may say so, taken down sentence by sentence from what had been said to us by the parties concerned, not in a joint form, but separately; we had to put it together. My point is this. I am not justifying anything except to say that the earnest attempt we have always made was to try to compose differences and put one party's viewpoint before the other without compromising anything. Well, we failed: we must suffer for that failure. But I do submit to the House that it is grossly unfair for any person to accuse us of partiality and the like in this matter.

Some honourable Members on the other side are constantly repeating like some *mantra* which they have learnt without understanding what it means, that we are stooges of the Americans, we are a part of the Anglo-American bloc. etc.<sup>8</sup> Of course, that kind of statement normally in the case of persons who are less restrained than I am, might lead to a retort in kind. But I do not

8. For example, H.N. Mukerjee said on 13 February 1953 in the House of the People that "we are aligned, definitely tied up in a most subordinate and disgusting manner to the Anglo-American combination."



wish to say that. I should like them and others to try to keep out of the habit of learning some slogans and phrases and repeating them again and again. It becomes rather stale work. It is not interesting or exciting to hear the same phrase repeated again and again, whether it has any relevance or meaning or not.

My point is that if we or any country seeks for peace, peace requires peaceful methods. The House will remember a thing which Gandhiji laid stress on always, of means and ends. I am not entering into a metaphysical argument, but surely if you demand peace, you must work for it peacefully. It is quite absurd to work for peace in a warlike manner... (Interruption). I am not referring to any particular group, but unfortunately some people seem to think I am talking about them. Because the fact is that today—and I say with respect—quite a large number of countries, big and small, talk about peace in the most aggressive and warlike manner. This does not apply to one group or another; it applies to everybody almost. In fact, one might almost say that peace is now spelt WAR.

We are becoming enveloped, all of us, not so much in this country—I am talking about other countries—by a mentality which might be called the military mentality. That is, statesmanship is taking a second place and is governed more by military factors than the normal factors which statesmen consider. That is a dangerous thing.

A soldier is a very excellent person in his own domain, but as somebody, I think a French statesman, once said, war—even war is too serious a thing to be handed over to a soldier to control, much less peace. Now, this intrusion of the military mentality in the chancellories of the world is a dangerous development of today. And how are we to meet it? Frankly, I confess that we in India cannot make too much of a difference. I do not wish this House to imagine that we can take this on our shoulders and remodel it to our heart's desire; we just cannot do it. But we can do something; we can cooperate with others, we can help in creating a climate of peace and thereby, possibly, help in going some way towards our objective. We try; if we fail, well, the world itself fails. There the matter ends.

Another factor is that we talk about peace and war, and there are many causes, no doubt, of this war, some often discussed, others rather hidden. But surely one should realize that owing to a number of factors in this world, chiefly technological developments, political developments and the like, nationalist movements and the like, people all over the world, vast masses of people, have ceased to be quiescent. It is a good thing. They are not prepared to suffer, to put up with their condition; people in colonial countries are not prepared to put up with what had been done in the past. Therefore, they look at anything that appears to them as a liberating force; they are attracted by it. It is a patent thing. Maybe that liberating force may not liberate; maybe it

might be worse—that is immaterial. But the point is that the whole world is in a fluid condition and men's minds have been moved and perturbed and they seek something to support them and to guide them ahead.

In this state of affairs one would have thought that one of the earliest steps to be taken is to remove certain patent grievances and certain patent structures of government which put down masses of people. In other words, the problem of colonialism in the world which has been certainly tackled to a considerable extent in the past few years since the war ended, should be tackled still further, and thus at least one cause of making large numbers of people utterly dissatisfied should be removed. Well, it has not been removed. There is another thing also which is slightly allied to it, though not the same, and that is, a way of looking at the countries of Asia as if they were an outer fringe, a distant outer fringe, which should fall in line with the others.

One of the most important developments of the age has been what has taken place in Asia and what is likely to take place in Asia. There is no doubt about it, whether for good or ill. The whole of Asia is very wide awake, resurgent, active and somewhat rebellious.

How are you going to deal with it? All these problems are problems ultimately not of military might but of men's minds. They cannot be dealt with by guns; sometimes guns may be necessary. I do not know. But certainly they are problems of psychological approach to vast numbers of human beings, whether it is in Asia or whether it is in Africa. The approach that is being made in Africa, in large parts of Africa, whatever its virtue in the minds of those who are doing it may be for the present, one thing is dead certain that it is bound to fail ultimately, tomorrow or the day after. There is no shadow of doubt about it. It does not require a prophet to say that this approach will lead to the most dangerous consequences in racial conflicts. Take the question of the steps that are being taken in South Africa.<sup>9</sup> These are basic facts which may not be related to the circumstances in the Far East or in Central Europe and Germany but they are basic facts which may do much to shape the world of tomorrow.

Therefore, what policy can India pursue in this matter? As I said, whatever policy it pursues, it should talk in a quiet voice, it should not shout. It should talk in terms of peace, not of threats or cursing or war. I would like others to

9. Before 1952, the UN General Assembly made many recommendations to the Union of South Africa to end racial discrimination and racial conflicts. The Union Government, questioning the competency of the world body to encroach on the domestic jurisdiction of a member State, not only ignored them but even extended the scope and application of racial segregation and discrimination in its territory. Its latest act was the enactment of an anti-resistance Bill in February 1953 which prohibited any public criticism of an act of Parliament or the administrative order.



do so, too. Anyhow, we should try to do so. We should not merely show our temper to other nations even though we may feel strongly. Let us convert our feelings into strength, not into temper, and that applies in the world at large. That applies to our relations with Pakistan. We have endeavoured to do that with more or less success. It does not matter what temper the other party shows.

Obviously, we have to protect our interests, we must protect them, and we will protect them. But even in trying to protect them it does not help to show temper. There are two ways of approaching this question. One is the conviction that war must come. We try to avoid it but it is bound to come. Therefore, we should prepare for it. And, well, when it comes, join it this way or that way. The other way is trying our utmost to avoid it, feeling that it can be avoided.

There is a great difference in those two approaches. If mentally you are convinced that it is bound to come, well, you accustom yourself to that idea, and you work to that end, even though you may not like it. You are not working for peace but you are convinced absolutely that war is coming; it is inevitable and therefore let us work for war. On the other hand, in trying to work for avoidance of war you must believe in it. A phrase here and there is not enough because otherwise you are always working to the other end. People work for it. Naturally no country can forget the possibility of being entangled in war—that is a different matter—and taking such precautions as it ought to. There is, I think, a great deal of difference in these two approaches. I have a sensation that many great countries today apparently have come to the conclusion that war is inevitable—not that they want it. I do not think people anywhere want it. I hardly think that many statesmen want it but still somehow they have come to that conclusion. So far as we are concerned, we believe that war is not inevitable, it is a dangerous possibility—sometimes it becomes a probability—but it is not inevitable and therefore to the utmost end, one should work for its avoidance. One can work for avoidance, apart from the political or diplomatic field, essentially in the human, psychological field, in so far as we can. Naturally, we cannot do much, but we try to do what we can in this matter.

The House knows that certain recent developments have taken place. Certain statements have been made in the United States of America by the highest authorities in regard to the Far East which have caused grave concern not only to us here but in many countries all over the world. I confess that it is not clear to me even now exactly what the full consequences of those statements are. But, whatever the meaning behind them, there is no doubt of the impression they have created and the reactions produced. From the point of view of psychosis of fear and world psychology, they have had a bad effect apart from anything else. All this talk of the blockade of China or other such



steps obviously is not talk that leads to peace or settlement, whatever else it might lead to.<sup>10</sup> It is easy for any party to justify what it says by arguments and by what the other party said. Are we to remain silent? That may be done. But it is too serious a matter for this kind of justification of statesmen and politicians, much too serious a matter affecting the world. I do confess that we as a government and, I am sure, as a people, view these developments with the greatest concern.

Again what can we do about them? It is no good my using strong language. That will not impress anybody more than the more quiet statements that we might make. Insofar as our opinion is concerned, it is conveyed quite clearly. Our test is always this. Does this help in lessening the tensions of today or does it add to those tensions? That is our major test. If it adds to these tensions we are against it. If it worsens the situation, we are against it. If it somehow helps, if it goes far, that is all the better. So that is the test that we apply whether in the United Nations or elsewhere.

Now, coming to our domestic policy, I do not wish to go into details. But honourable Members opposite have talked a great deal about hunger and starvation in India and the economic condition and the like.<sup>11</sup> I believe there is an amendment to the effect that the economic situation has deteriorated.<sup>12</sup> That is a question, to some extent, of facts and figures. It is completely easy in this great land of India to make a list of suffering and distress and poverty. That is our misfortune. It is there. Nobody can doubt it. There are these 360 million people. But may I beg the House to consider: Is that the test? The test is whether we are getting over these difficulties: how far we have gone; how far we are likely to go; and what steps we are taking. I think that, objectively considered, there is no doubt that the economic situation has improved

10. While the new US policy on Korea was in shaping after Eisenhower took over, it was suggested in Congressional circles that a naval blockade of the Chinese mainland must be imposed if the Chinese and North Koreans persisted in rejecting UN armistice plans. Also, the report of the Collective Measures Committee (established under the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution of 1950) which was before the UN General Assembly for discussion, had provided lists of strategic items upon which an embargo might be placed as part of economic sanctions against aggressors.
11. On 13 February 1953, H.N. Mukerjee, said that "fantastic" statements had been made in the President's Address about the general progress of the nation at an increasing pace when "the spectre of famine, of retrenchment, of mass starvation are not merely haunting shadows, but have actually gripped our land all over its area." Sucheta Kripalani contended that "even in ration shops, the off-take has fallen" because people did not have the money to buy rations and were "half-starving."
12. Harindranath Chattopadhyaya, an Independent Member of the House of the People, had tabled the following amendment which was later negatived: "The failure to take note of the deteriorating economic condition of the country specially in the rural areas" be added at the end of the motion.

considerably. It is a matter of judgement...<sup>13</sup> It is a matter of facts and figures. I think the peasantry in this country—I am not for the moment talking of the landless labourer—has improved greatly, not slightly. This country is a great big country, and it is very difficult to make generalization about it, because there can always be exceptions. But subject to this statement, I think it is correct to say that the peasantry of this country is a good deal better off today than it has been for generations past.

As I said, I exclude the landless labourer from my statement. He is very important and we should do our utmost for him. In some cases, the landless labourer has also done well; in others, he has not. The industrial population certainly is not worse. It is, if anything better—not too much better, but if anything better during the last few years. We add to our numbers largely and in spite of the fact of a growing population, the general condition of the people is, I think, better. That does not mean very much, I admit—because we start from a low standard.

Honourable Members opposite—some of them—are greatly impressed by the strides in economic progress made by the Soviet Union.<sup>14</sup> I agree. The Soviet Union has made great progress. Nevertheless, in spite of that great progress, standards of living, say, in the Soviet Union and in America, are very different. That is no condemnation of the Soviet Union at all. The fact is that the standards of living in the United States are the highest in the world...<sup>15</sup>

No. For everybody, I say, barring a few...<sup>16</sup> If honourable Members will listen to the end of my argument, then they will perhaps grasp more of what I say. I will put it in another way. The Russian Revolution took place in November 1917. Ten years later, let us say, in 1927 what was the state in Russia? What was the progress made? Certainly, they had civil wars and tremendous difficulties. I admire the progress that they have made, but what I am pointing out is that when you look at the progress made by the Soviet Union you should not go and compare it with America's. You should compare it from where it started at the time of the Revolution. Then it is a fair comparison. Say, in 1917 it was this: in 1927 it was that and in 1937 or 1947 it was this—that is a fair comparison to judge the pace of growth. It is no good saying that the American standards of living are higher. It has no particular meaning in this context, because America had other reasons for growth. She has had 150 years for growth. Therefore, you have always to consider the

13. One Member interrupted: "And famine also."

14. For example, T. Subrahmanyam of the Socialist Party said during the debate that Russia made economic progress by securing one billion and 400 million dollars from foreign countries for its First Five Year Plan.

15. Harindranath Chattopadhyaya said here: "For the few."

16. Chattopadhyaya interrupted and was overruled by the Deputy Speaker.



starting point. In the same way, it is no good comparing the India of today after five years of Independence and all this business of Partition...<sup>17</sup> So, it seems to me that to compare India today with the Soviet Union would not be proper. Somebody said: "See China". I am very happy about that, because I should like to be compared to China. I want to be compared to China—in every way—all along the scale. I want to lay down that comparison for the future. I do not mean to imply that we are cleverer than China, or that we go ahead faster than China. They may go ahead faster, but I say that it is a right thing for us to see what China is doing and to profit by it whatever we can. Conditions are different, and remember one thing—there is a very major difference.<sup>18</sup>

The honourable Member's history is rather out of date. I am not challenging this comparison to China. I do not mean that. But I do think that it is fair for us to consider what China is doing, and to learn by it so far as we can. There is a certain basic difference. The Chinese are an amazing people—amazing in the sense of their capacity for hard work, for cooperative work. I doubt if there are any other people quite equal to them in that respect. But there is a very big difference. Remember that. History will show as to the effects of that difference. The difference is that we are trying to function in a democratic set-up. It is no good, therefore, saying that we are better or more virtuous than others. There is no question of virtue involved in this.

Ultimately, it is a question of which set-up and which structure of government—political or economic—pays the highest dividends for the country or for the world, and when I say the "highest dividends", I do not mean merely material dividends although they are important, but others, cultural, spiritual—or whatever you may call them—dividends. That is to say, it is an important fact that whether an individual or a group or a country grows in an atmosphere of intellectual or other freedom or not. Anyhow, the future will show. But it is a democratic set-up which we have deliberately chosen and which we feel in the ultimate analysis is good for our people and for our country. We do not dictate to others. It is open to them to do what they like. Nevertheless, it sometimes makes the pace of growth slow, for always—apart from other things—you have to weigh the demands of tomorrow with the needs of today, in building up a country.

Here we are in the days of, if I may say so, phased national reconstruction or development in this country. I speak of course without accurate knowledge, but I should say that there is no comparison whatever between India and China as to the building activities of great works that we are undertaking. They are

17. Here, Balkrishna Sharma and S.P. Mookerjee interrupted.

18. N.B. Khare of the Hindu Mahasabha said: "I think the Prime Minister means China minus Chiang Kai-shek."



far greater than China's. They are doing other great things—that is a different matter—but in this respect there is no comparison. In fact, India today is putting up some great works which in their totality and separately can compare with anything that is being done in any part of the world...<sup>19</sup>

The honourable Member lives in a sea of wastage and his mind also does not see what is being done. If there is waste, stop it by all means. But the point is: do you see what is being done?

The difficulty comes in always between the needs of today and the demands of tomorrow. A poor country, poor in resources, has not got large resources for investment for building up for tomorrow. And if you want a surplus, well, you have to be strict with yourself in the present generation. And democracy does not like stinting in the present—not usually. In times of great crisis it might. Democracy wants the good things of today, today, as far as it can get them. And that is a tremendous advantage, from that limited point of view, which an authoritarian Government has, which can build for tomorrow, not paying too much attention to things of today—of course satisfying them to some extent, but not paying too much attention. You cannot do it. How many honourable Members here or in the State Government, dare do something for the obvious reason that if they do it, they might not get elected at the next elections—some tax put on, some tax taken off, things which might otherwise be justified. So there is that difficulty of democracy.

Of course, we all talk about democracy a great deal. But it is a relatively new thing in its present shape and form. That is to say, the old-time democracy was a limited one, with limited franchise, limited people, certain ruling classes, etc. Now we have got adult suffrage and here in India the biggest electorate in the world.<sup>20</sup> And with all my admiration and love for democracy I am not prepared to accept the statement that the largest number of people are always right.<sup>21</sup>

The honourable Member who made this interjection is himself a patent example. He is never right whatever happens.

So that, we know how people can be excited, their passions roused in a moment. Is this House going to submit to the passion of the moment or even of a democratic crowd, if I may say so? Five and a half years ago here in this city of Delhi, apart from Punjab and the whole of Pakistan, what was happening? Was that democracy functioning?—when people were killing each other and driving each other and doing all kinds of atrocities, in Pakistan and in this part of India, when millions went from this side to that and from that

19. One Member remarked: "What about the wastage?"

20. In the general elections held between 25 October 1951 and 21 February 1952, the total electorate numbered 174,470,000; of these 107,000,000 actually voted.

21. Ramnarayan Singh of the Jan Sangh: "Hear, hear."

side to this? Democracy functioning! People were functioning! I do not blame those poor people. But I am saying that democracy goes mad; democracy can be excited to do the wrong things. Democracy, in fact, perhaps sometimes, is more war-like, even than the others, than individuals. Individuals after all have some training. But that very democracy of yours can be excited to do all things, their passions excited, and then it is more difficult to control a democracy in war than perhaps it was for a statesman of olden days.

So we have to function. Here are these mighty experiments going on, and we have to build India according to democratic methods. That we have decided, because ultimately we feel that democracy has something of the highest values, highest human values. We believe that.

Again we talk of human values. It is true. Many honourable Members must have thought of the effect on human values of war itself. People say that democracy has human values. Of course. But then war puts an end to those very values that democracy cherishes. Democracy, in fact, is, if not a casualty of war, at any rate a partial casualty of war. It does not function properly. Then all standards of human values that we cherish go down in war. In fact, the tragedy of the situation is this: that we go to war to protect democracy, to protect human values and standards, but because we have adopted a wrong method to protect them, we achieve wrong ends. We do not achieve what we are aiming at. That has been the tragedy of the last two world wars and something infinitely worse is likely to happen if there is another war.

So, in judging the economic condition of the country, I would beg honourable Members to take this fact into consideration. I have no objection to their criticizing the Government, or even condemning it. We are all engaged in this task of building up this country. And it is too serious a matter for any of us merely to take a negative line and help in creating an atmosphere of depression in the country. Atmosphere counts. The psychology of the people is more important than any decree of Government.

In that connection I am glad to say this. I am giving my own impression of this country and that cannot be hundred per cent true of the whole country. But I know something of my people. I go about and understand them, and it has been my high privilege to have their affection and confidence also. I have found during the last five or six months people in their enthusiasm undertaking, often with voluntary labour, almost all the plans that we have put forward. The few hundreds of miles of road they have made, or the tanks they have dug, are important in themselves. But infinitely most important was the spirit, the crusading spirit which went into this work. It is that spirit which we count on and it is that spirit which will make our Five Year Plan or other Plans a success. If that is not there, I admit that no kind of Government decree, or Government organization will take us too far.

So I would beg honourable Members in every section of the House to



realize this that they can help in creating this spirit in this country or hinder it. And this constant attempt to produce an atmosphere of frustration and depression in the country, surely cannot achieve any objective which anyone in this House has at heart.

I referred just now to the Five Year Plan. Most honourable Members by now would have read it. Many have criticized it. As I have said before, there is nothing sacrosanct about that Plan. I think the mere making of that Plan itself is a great effort. It was an inevitable and right thing, for without that foundation, without that investigation, that basis of calculation of resources, etc. and of priorities, we could not get going. We may talk academically as in a school-boys' debate. It is essential. We have laid down some policies about land, food, etc. I think they are good policies. Convince us—we will vary them. There is no difficulty about it. It is not a law which cannot be touched. We want to go as fast as we can. But it is not good enough to tell us to do something which is beyond our resources. We want to stretch our resources: we are prepared to take risks, but intelligent risks.

After all the responsibility of carrying out this Plan is a heavy responsibility. We cannot gamble with it. We cannot take undue risks. Every legitimate risk has to be taken, for we realize that the policy of being too cautious is the greatest risk of all. Therefore, look at this Five Year Plan in that spirit. I am quite sure that nobody in this House can disagree with, let us say, eighty per cent or ninety per cent of that Plan. They may disagree with some policy. Well, when the time comes, talk about it, discuss it, improve it, do what you like but get going. Let us get going with it.

Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee referred yesterday briefly to the community projects.<sup>22</sup> Well, I have got a list of community projects...<sup>23</sup> I will just say a few sentences. We believe that it is essential for India to be industrialized. We believe, secondly, that the industrial policy should be based on the development of basic industries—steel, etc., etc. But we also believe that any industrial development will have a weak foundation without a strong agricultural economy. Therefore, we cannot develop industry without considering and strengthening agriculture. The food part of it is important enough: if we have no food in the country and if we depend on other countries it would be an ill day for us. We must make our country self-sufficient in food, and make our agricultural economy good. Otherwise, any industrial structure that we build up in the present day may topple over, because of the weakness of our agricultural

22. S.P. Mookerjee, referring to the working of the community projects, said during the debate on 17 February 1953, that in some places, some good work had been done, but something was lacking which prevented the people from appreciating that these measures were really intended to relieve their suffering.

23. Anandan Nambiar of the Communist Party interjected: "What about the industrial policy?"



economy. I cannot go into this question at the moment. But let no one here imagine that we do not attach enough importance to industrial development. We do. It may be that the honourable Member can make some bright suggestions to us, which will make us go ahead in respect of both functions with speed; we shall gladly accept them....

...Community projects. I was just saying this, that these projects have been in existence for the last two or three months, may be a little more, in some places only a month, in some places three months. And I think they vary greatly. Some are functioning extraordinarily well, some moderately well, some not well. It is true. On the whole—I am merely informing the House of my own reactions to the reports we have received—on the whole I think we are doing very well.<sup>24</sup> It is true that some projects are behind hand. Little has been done. But taking the whole of India I think we are doing very well. It is a new experiment, it is difficult. But the test of it really is the type of workers who got there. On the whole, again, I think that we have got a fairly good number of workers there.

Now, may I say a few words in regard to the subject which occupied the honourable Member opposite, Dr Mookerjee's speech, practically the whole of his speech, yesterday, that is, the Praja Parishad agitation in Jammu. The honourable Member spoke on this subject most of the time yesterday, and I have no doubt that in the context of things it is a matter of importance to be dealt with. Nevertheless, I think we should always remember the relative importance of things. When we draw up a plan, the Five Year Plan, we consider priorities. That is important. But ultimately everything is a question of priority in this world. We cannot do everything. An eminent person said long ago: it makes all the difference in the world whether you put truth in the first place or in the second place. You do not discard truth: it is there. But the point is whether it has the top place or a second place.

So also in considering a problem, whether it is a political problem or an economic problem. It is most important what order of priority you give to it. It is important for this House, which has to shoulder the burden of the governance of India, to have some order of priority in its mind—all-India priority. Of course, we have to think of the details too. But if once we lose

24. The first quarterly report on the progress made in the community projects inaugurated in October 1952 mentioned scores of miles of village roads laid, dozens of cooperative societies, panchayats, a number of schools and health centres started and thousands of compost pits dug and additional veterinary services opened. During this period, 23 centres for training village level workers were started and 362 persons trained and posted while 1,196 persons were undergoing training. There were eighty-one development blocks in fifty-five project areas all over the country and of the budget estimate of Rs 11.8 crores for three years in these blocks, Rs 44.5 lakhs had been spent.

sight of that, then we get lost in a maze, and in the trees we forget the wood. There is always that danger.

I said that because in considering this Jammu problem and in the context that the honourable Member put it, one would imagine that of all the great national and international problems that was the dominant problem of the day. Well, I recognize its importance in its sphere. But, surely, let us see it in its proper perspective and not get unduly excited about something and forget the more important things.

Here is a situation, which the honourable Member himself realizes, when the world is, I will not say (because I do think it is) on the brink of war<sup>25</sup>—it is not correct. So far as I can judge of the situation, but certainly it hovers about over the brink of all kinds of precipices all the time. One does not know at what moment something may happen. Look at the international situation. Look at those mighty things that are happening in India, that we are trying to build up. In that context let us look at this Jammu problem. I think to do anything else is to upset all our priority and all our perspective.

The honourable Member was very indignant at what he said were the abuses hurled at him or his colleagues.<sup>26</sup> The main abuse that he took exception to was being called communal.<sup>27</sup> First of all, let me express my pleasure at the fact that he considers communalism as something to be disliked and an abusive term, because it is a bad thing. I hope gradually he will convert his colleague on his left to this viewpoint...because I seem to remember that he takes pride for being communal.<sup>28</sup>

May I improve that phrase? Of the rightest type...<sup>29</sup> as right as possible, in fact so right that it has terrible reaction.

The honourable Member suggested: What is this business of communalism? Who is communal? Let us sit round a table and thrash it out. Let us by all means sit round a table, whenever we can, and thrash things out. But I was taken aback by the statement, because many of us have lived through the last thirty years of India's history—if not thirty, twenty—and seen and participated in the ups and downs of the national movement. We have seen how organizations which have been called communal have functioned, whether they have been Muslim, Hindu or Sikh. We have all got that past history before us.

25. Expressing concern over Eisenhower's decision to withdraw the Seventh Fleet from the Formosan Straits, S.P. Mookerjee said that he did not "want that there should be an extension of the theatre of war, and everything should be done to avert a catastrophe which may not only destroy portions of Asia but may affect the entire world."

26. Pleading for a dispassionate examination of the Kashmir issue, S.P. Mookerjee asked everyone "not to hurl abuses at each other."

27. He said that "the Prime Minister levels the charge of communalism on all of us."

28. N.B. Khare said "never, never."

29. Khare again intervened to say "righteous type, Sir."



We have got before us also something to which I referred a little while ago, the occurrences in August, September, October 1947. And finally we remember the 30th January also when the greatest of us was shot down by a foolish youth. I do not quite know what interpretation of India's thirty years history and all those events that took place my honourable friend gives but the normal analysis has been that there are in India all kinds of forces—to use the terms of Europe, some rightists, some leftists, some central, whatever it is—and among them, the normal rightist groups, gradually finding that they cannot well have much influence purely in the social plane, have taken advantage of the cloak of religion to cover up their other reactionary policies and have exploited the name of religion in politics and have excited people's passions in that name. That was done, as we all know, with a tremendous degree by the Muslim League...<sup>30</sup>

That was done by other organizations of Hindus and Sikhs. I am not concerned with it. It is no good for me to be told that this evil is the reaction of any other evil. I am concerned with my own evil, not other's evil. Apart from this, there is a basic—I say so with all respect—weakness in us as a community, the national community I am referring to. We have had many virtues which have kept us going through the ages but we have had failings too which have made us stumble and all through many times and among the failings is our living in compartments, our caste system, our provincialism, our regionalism, all these things. We are going out of them. I am glad to say. Nevertheless, they are here. People can exploit them and they have exploited them in the name of religion or caste, etc. because many of our folk, whether he is a peasant or a worker, can be excited in the name of religion. Certainly they get excited wrongly and repent afterwards. All this is communalism which is something utterly bad. I have no doubt that if there had been no communalism, there would have been no Partition of India. I have no doubt that many other things would not have happened.

Take the Punjab or take any other place in India. It is this narrow outlook always trying to gain a favour for this group or that community forgetting the larger good that has weakened us in the past. It was only in the measure that we got over it—and we got over it in the past on account of our national movement—that we gained our freedom but we did not get over it adequately and sufficiently to prevent the Partition, to affect certain groups in India which were affected by the Muslim League. So, we suffered in the Partition and it is not a question as honourable Members might say of my agreeing to it. Agreeing to it is a minor matter. You have to deal with strong forces, with imponderables, people's minds, and wishes. In the modern world today, you cannot in any part of India or in Kashmir or in Jammu, deal with people by force. You

30. Khare remarked that "this was only his usual *mantra* and nothing else."



cannot hold them by the bayonet. You hold their minds, hold their hearts. They may be excited at any moment. In the long run, unless you win their goodwill, it is no good to you. They are a burden to you.

So, how can I go into this question of communalism? It surprises me. It is not a question. It is an approach. Some people who are franker than others talk about it but apart from talking, it is a mental approach, a narrow approach which considers that India is the property of this group or that group. That group may be in seventy per cent or eighty per cent majority. I say even if it is 99.9 per cent in the country, that 1 per cent has as much right as the 99.9 per cent. One should be made to feel, if he has a sense of feeling, that he is not getting a square deal, that he is not on a level with others, that he will not be discriminated against and so on and so forth. You have to win his mind. That is the problem.

We have in India 40 million Muslims, as big a number as any other Muslim country has excepting Pakistan and Indonesia, and Pakistan is split up into two: neither Pakistan has as many Muslims as India has. Any propaganda, any mental approach, which makes those people feel that they are not completely at home here, they are not completely safe, they have not got the same opportunities for development and progress, etc. is an anti-national thing and a communal thing. I do submit that there is such a propaganda going on often enough, there are organizations in the country whose almost sole purpose is to do that....

Here, in the city of Delhi which is gradually becoming a kind of microcosm of India in regard to various forces, etc.—you can see it in the bazar, you need not go far—you can hear cries of certain organizations of praise for Godse who killed Gandhiji. What is that?....<sup>31</sup>

I am not accusing any honourable Member here. I say that here in Delhi, I can give you two or three specific instances of these cries being raised. I am not making any honourable Member here responsible for it. I say an atmosphere is created where people's passions are roused and they say these things...<sup>32</sup> May I continue? I was not relying, if the honourable Member thought so, on any, what might be called, police or intelligence reports. In this matter, I was relying on what honourable colleagues here in Parliament have told me...<sup>33</sup>

I am sorry, the mind of the House is diverted. I was talking about a certain atmosphere of hatred and dislike that has produced all this communal approach and outlook. That I think is a dangerous atmosphere, a bad one.

31. S.P. Mookerjee felt that it was a serious allegation which they had never heard before.

32. Mookerjee asked Nehru not to trust all his informers. Similar feeling was expressed by Raghunath Singh, C.N. Malaviya, N.C. Chatterjee and V.G. Deshpande.

33. Interruptions by V.G. Deshpande and C.K. Nair.

The honourable Member opposite<sup>34</sup> talked a great deal about the full integration of the Jammu and Kashmir State to India. I think that is the major task for us in India and I give that the highest priority, and I would give, compared to this, the second priority to the Five Year Plan or anything else. The major task in India is the proper integration of India....<sup>35</sup>

May I explain the proper integration of India, meaning, not just the constitutional and the legal—the map shows integrated India—but the integration of the people of India in their minds and hearts. It is not enough merely to talk it out. We have inherited a strong tendency, I am glad to say, of unity, largely built on two contradictory factors, opposed factors: (i) subjection to British rule and the British imposed unity of India and (ii) the unity of the national movement contending against the British rule....<sup>36</sup>

The honourable Member is mistaken. What he is saying is important in another context, not in this, because that did not lead to political unity, but led to cultural unity, which is a different thing. We are talking about political unity now. We have inherited because of this national movement, etc., a political tendency to unity. Naturally, it is there. But we have also inherited strong tendencies to disunity and disruptiveness, which come into play often enough in many shapes and forms, whether it is communalism, provincialism, or casteism, or parochialism and regional feelings and the like. They are tremendous. It is a question whether the unifying influence is stronger than the disruptive influence. I think the unifying influence is strong. But the danger is that the people who do not give full thought, feel secure that they are united. That is all right. They pursue the disruptive tendencies till they go far and then they cannot check them. Therefore, the great problem is the real integration of the minds and hearts of the people of India. That is not a matter of law or Constitution. The law and the Constitution come in their place, of course, to register the decrees of the mind and the heart when they are properly done. It is from that point of view that this question of Jammu and Kashmir has to be approached also, and no other.

I should like just to remind the House of a little past history. When the Jammu and Kashmir state acceded to India, they acceded in an identical manner like any other state in India had acceded. There was no difference in the quantum of accession—it was full—or in the manner of accession. The Governor General, then Lord Mountbatten, signed the paper and the Maharaja on the other side signed the paper. It was just like any other state. Immediately, there was war in Kashmir and naturally it became a special case, because of that and other reasons. A little later, it was referred to the United Nations. Our policy had been, even before all this happened and before this accession took

34. S.P. Mookerjee.

35. Mookerjee said here: "Including Kashmir."

36. V.G. Deshpande said: "And the Hindu culture, the third."



place, declared formally by the Government, by Sardar Patel and by me, that if any state which wants to accede naturally, the formal way is for the Ruler of the state to accede, but where there is any doubt or challenge, the people of the state can decide. That was the policy stated, regardless of Kashmir.<sup>37</sup> We did not even think of Kashmir. It was an independent policy.

Naturally, when the question of Kashmir came, we had to apply the policy which we had stated. It was patent there were other circumstances too. So, I stated on behalf of our Government, when I announced the accession of Kashmir to India that the accession is complete and whole.<sup>38</sup> There is no lacuna in it. But, in accordance with our own policy it is for the people of Kashmir to decide otherwise if they so chose. Even in accepting the accession, although it was good enough for the Maharaja to agree, and for us to accept his signature, we took care to have the approval of the largest popular organization, the national organization there, and then we accepted it.<sup>39</sup> This was the background.

A year later or more, the question of the other states was considered as to how far we should go and what further steps should be taken in regard to their integration. May I beg the House to remember the difference between accession and integration? Accession is complete. Accession makes the territory completely a part of the territory of India. From accession, therefore, Indian citizenship, etc., whatever flows from being Indian territory follow. Integration is the degree of relationship on autonomy enjoyed by that State. You may say

37. When the States Department was set up on 5 July 1947, Vallabhbhai Patel, who was in charge of it, defined the policy of the Government of India in his inaugural speech. He invited the states to accede to the Dominion of India on three subjects—Defence, Foreign Affairs and Communications—after paramountcy lapsed. “In other matters”, he stated, “we would scrupulously respect their autonomous existence. It was not the desire of the Congress Administration to interfere in any manner whatsoever with the domestic affairs of the states.” Where there was any doubt, the people of that state could decide.
38. Lord Mountbatten, while accepting the Instrument of Accession on 27 October 1947, wrote to the Maharaja of Kashmir: “Consistent with their policy that, in the case of any state where the issue of accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the state, it is my Government’s wish that, as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared of the invader, the question of the state’s accession should be settled by a reference to the people.” In a statement in Parliament on 25 November 1947, Nehru said that “when the people of Kashmir are given the chance to decide their future this should be done under the supervision of an impartial tribunal such as the United Nations Organization.” For the text of the statement, see *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 4, pp. 340-45.
39. In October 1947, the National Conference appealed to the Indian Government for armed help to meet the tribal invasion and as a condition of this help it decided that the state should provisionally accede to India. In October 1948, the National Conference adopted a resolution in favour of accession. The manifesto of the National Conference issued before the elections to the State Constituent Assembly acknowledged the unconditional acceptance of the state’s accession to India.



that a Part A State is integrated in a particular degree, a Part B State in another degree. A Part C State is integrated even more than a Part A State. It is a bit of the Government of India stretched out. There are degrees of integration and degrees of autonomy in each State. It was an open question for a long time, what shall be the position of a Part B State and what position they should occupy in our Constitution, and what shall be the degree of their autonomy. It was a doubtful question whether they should all enjoy the same uniform measure or in varying degrees. Because the situation was not alike. It differed from place to place.

But, fortunately for us these matters came up when we were rather fresh. I mean to say things were going with a certain momentum, a certain rush, and much could be done which cannot be done now easily, and Sardar Patel, therefore, brought this about with his great energy and ability—this closer integration of the other states, and a certain uniformity in the other states in somewhat of a rush.

Now, I put it to honourable Members if we have to face this problem of the other big states today, it would not be such an easy matter. I do not mean to say that they are against any basic principle of ours—not that—but it would be a much more difficult matter. It is all very well—for a sub-committee to be appointed to consider financial matters and then have the whole thing put down quickly in the first year or so, but now if we did it, it would take a much longer time, and much longer argument with each state. In fact, my colleague, the Finance Minister, has to face argument now in spite of all that, because fresh things come to light. So that, if this argument applies to all the other states which have no basic question involved as Kashmir has, we should remember that to talk of deciding of additional subjects and financial matters and financial integration and all that—is no simple matter; it is a very complicated matter, apart from any differences of opinion, even if you start with the same opinion....

The honourable Member said repeatedly that I had refused to meet the Praja Parishad people and that I treated them as political untouchables.<sup>40</sup> Now, what are the facts? About a year ago—may be a little more—as a matter of fact, I did meet the President of the Praja Parishad, Pandit Premnath Dogra.<sup>41</sup>

40. S.P. Mookerjee remarked on 17 February: "You have removed social untouchability under your Constitution but you are creating political untouchability because you cannot see eye to eye with certain people whose politics you do not approve."

41. On 27 April 1951, Nehru gave an interview to Premnath Dogra at his request. He made it clear to Dogra that he considered the activities of the Praja Parishad in Jammu as misconceived and harmful. It was the duty of the Parishad to support the State Government and to cooperate with the National Conference. Dogra promised that he would carry out any directions that Nehru gave him. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 16, Pt. I, p. 374 and Vol. 16 Pt. II, p. 240.

I did meet him here in Delhi and had a long talk with him. Of course, this present agitation was not there. We talked about other basic matters affecting Jammu and Kashmir, because there was some kind of agitation then.<sup>42</sup> And after my talk, he, I felt, accepted my viewpoint and agreed to what I said. And what I told him was the method he was pursuing was bad not only for the Jammu and Kashmir State, but for Jammu specially and for the very objective that he was seeking to achieve. I thought he had appreciated my argument. He said "yes". Two days later, I saw a statement in the press issued by him which to my amazement said the opposite. It, in fact, said that practically I had accepted his argument, which was a most amazing thing—not exactly that, I mean, but it created that impression. Well, needless to say, it rather upset me. Letters were sent to him that it was very wrong of him to do that. That did make me feel that he was not a safe person to see very often, because every meeting would be exploited, and then I have to go about explaining what has happened. Once soon after—by "soon after" I mean about two months after that—again nothing to do with this present agitation—he did ask to see me and I sent word to him that our last interview was not a great success, and, in fact, it created difficulties—and also I was very busy with Parliament—"I am sorry. I can't see you now." These are the two occasions. There has been no third occasion when the question has even arisen....

...I do not wish to go into this Praja Parishad movement. First of all, I entirely recognize that repression does not do; secondly, the grievances of the people concerned—I am talking about the larger number of people, the masses and when I say grievances, I am referring to economic and like grievances at the moment—should be met, and to use the words of Acharya Narendra Deva, they should be separated from the wrong leadership that has misled them...<sup>43</sup> I cannot decide it.<sup>44</sup> They will decide of course. The decision has to come from them, not from me. That is true.

There are two parts of this problem, the economic, etc., dealing with land reforms and the rest, and the other which is purely political and constitutional. It seems to me an extraordinary thing that the agitation of a group in Jammu—a large group, if you like, wants to affect the Constitution of India, wants to affect all kinds of problems, not only as between the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and India, but affecting our relations with Pakistan or our relations with the United Nations and everything else. It is an extraordinary thing that

42. During December 1951 and January 1952, the Jammu Praja Parishad had launched an agitation against the Shaikh Abdullah Government and demanded that the ex-Maharaja Hari Singh should be reinstated.

43. On 16 February 1953, Narendra Deva remarked in the Council of States that he was anxious "that the communalist leaders should be isolated from the masses."

44. S.P. Mookerjee asked: "Who is right and who is wrong?"



we should be called upon, or that a demand should be made upon us to do something, or if not to do something, to give assurances that we will do something which has all these powerful and far-reaching consequences.

It is a matter which five or six months back was carefully considered here between the Government of India and the representatives of the Government of Kashmir; certain agreements were arrived at, which we thought in the circumstances, good and adequate. Many of us wanted something more. That is a different matter. But in the balance, having discussed everything, we found that that was adequate, and that it increased much more the old quantum of integration than previously. In fact there is no doubt about it, that whatever financial or other integration might be necessary will have to take place. There is no lessening of the bond between Kashmir and India. In every way they are tied up to us.

But then again, we are asked about the United Nations and the rest. I am placed in a difficulty here. I do not want to go into the question of the rightness or wrongness of some actions taken some four or five years ago. But here we are at the present moment. I want the Government of India to keep its face. I do not want to undo anything or withdraw anything that I have said at any time. We have a reputation, and a high reputation, and I do not think it does any good to a country to behave in a way which might discredit that reputation in the slightest. We gave our pledge in regard to Kashmir, to the United Nations.<sup>45</sup> Well, it is true, if I may say so, that we have not had what I consider a very fair deal from them, and some very great countries particularly have seemed to take a particular delight in putting forward propositions to which we cannot agree, because the basis of their thought is different. But there it is. My honourable friend asked me to send for the Praja Parishad leaders to discuss these matters of international and national concern.<sup>46</sup> How can I discuss these matters with any person? What we are going to do is an intricate matter... As I have said, I am perfectly prepared to do it. I have done that once, as I said.<sup>47</sup> I am perfectly prepared to explain things, to any person and to dispel fears, insofar as I can.

45. B.N. Rau, India's Representative at the UN, stated before the Security Council on 21 March 1951 that Kashmir was an autonomous State in a federation and had every right to have its own Constitution. The Constituent Assembly it had proposed to set up could express an opinion on the issue of accession, but this would not prejudice the issues before the Security Council.

46. On 17 February 1953, S.P. Mookerjee suggested that Nehru and Shaikh Abdullah should send for the Praja Parishad leaders to listen to their grievances and discuss the matter in a friendly atmosphere.

47. Mookerjee remarked: "Not even to discuss and to explain to them, so as to dispel their fears?"



Then again, may I point out that every State in India has a large measure of autonomy? If Uttar Pradesh or West Bengal or any other State had trouble, we will advise them. But we do not jump and interfere. It will be amazing if we send for the Opposition of Dr. Bidhan Chandra Roy's Government in Bengal, to Delhi, to deal with it here. It is fantastic. How can any Government in any State carry on, when the Central Government starts dealing with the Opposition in that State, an Opposition not even in the Assembly there, but an Opposition outside? These are difficult things. It is not a question of prestige at all, let me assure the House. There is no prestige involved, and if any, it must be pretty fickle, and pretty fragile. So, to talk of these matters, it is not a question of prestige at all. But it is certainly a matter of doing it efficiently and in the right way, not by bypassing the Government there. We cannot deal with that in that manner....

## 6. Commitment to Integration<sup>1</sup>

The world, and more so India, is passing through a crucial period and it is very difficult to judge how long this critical period of the world will last, and whether it will gradually adjust itself without a major war breaking out. The main problem now before India is how to stabilize itself in this crisis, especially economically. The coming ten years are of crucial importance to India from this point of view because it is within these ten years that the foundations of a sound economy have to be laid.

But unlike many other countries in the world India has to face a problem, which has not been faced by any other country, viz., economically backward country rapidly advancing, and at the same time maintaining a democratic apparatus of government. Independence has unleashed many forces, good as well as bad, and these forces have to be directed into constructive channels. The question really is: how far we can control these forces, direct them into right channels and maintain our democratic apparatus of government. If we can do that and yet advance economically, then, undoubtedly in the next eight or ten years we shall achieve something which will be rather unique in history.

1. Address to senior members of the Civil Services, New Delhi, 13 March 1953. File No 9 (169)/53-PMS. The press did not cover this speech. Extracts.

Now look at China. China is not functioning in a democratic way but in an authoritarian way. This method has some advantages from the point of view of getting things done; but it is harmful in many other ways. Ultimately, the success or failure of the Chinese experiment or the Indian experiment is not going to depend on the police power of the State, or even on the military power of the State, although these things count; but it will depend on how far either of these delivers the goods to the people. Delivering the goods means how far it ultimately satisfies the urgent and primary demands of the people, betters them, and raises their standards of living.

There are two aspects of the governmental activity. Sometimes you may do very little and yet create a sentiment—that of advancement; if so, you are in a fortunate position. Sometimes you may do a great deal and not be able to create that sentiment and so the people remain dissatisfied and disgruntled. However, in India, today we face this enormous problem of trying to raise a country which is, relatively speaking, economically backward. That is a relative term, because there are many countries more backward than India. Even from the point of view of industrial growth, we are more advanced than China—much more, undoubtedly. Can we do this in a democratic way or shall we break down; or because of democracy breaking down, have we to resort to less democratic ways? Ultimately all these things do not depend on a theoretical approach to the problem but as to what system delivers the goods. That is the question which can only be answered a few years hence. We may begin to answer it five or six years hence; but I think ten years is a good period of time to judge, not finally but generally. I put this to you because I want all of you, and indeed every person in a responsible position, to have before his mind this large picture of what is happening and how. It is not a matter how hard we work and how good our intentions may be if we as a government or we, as a country, do not deliver the goods to our own people and we fail because we do not satisfy those forces unleashed by independence.

Normally, the country goes ahead or does not go ahead, stumbles forwards and backwards, and from time to time creates a certain kind of equilibrium. Sometimes that equilibrium is upset. In our case, for a long period of time under the British rule, some developments did happen even for the good of the country, but, generally speaking, various forces in the country were restricted and a somewhat artificial state of equilibrium continued....

We are too apt to judge an event which we dislike as bad without trying to understand what it is. There is a scientific way of looking at things. Suppose you go out for a walk and stumble on a stone and if you curse the stone, you are a very foolish person. Similarly, if you go out in rain without a raincoat and you get wet, you have to blame yourself and not the rain. These are natural phenomena which we have to deal with. Similarly there are forces at work in the nation which one has to understand as almost natural phenomena



and to utilize them by diverting them to right channels. There are forces of various kinds. There are what I call real forces, and when I say real forces they represent some kind of an urge—social urge. Then there are other forces which do not represent the social urge but sentimental feelings—religious or communal feelings and the like. They are very powerful, as you know, although basically they do not solve any problem. The real social force aims at the solution of a problem. Other forces may be very strong for the moment; but because they do not solve any problem they are artificial, however strong they may be. They may create a revolution.

Now, take what is happening in West Punjab—the anti-Quadiani movement.<sup>2</sup> It is a very powerful force and has completely paralysed the whole structure of West Punjab and Lahore. By the time the army came into Lahore, the whole structure of West Punjab had nearly collapsed. Our information is that if the army had come after another six hours, it would have been too late. But nobody can name the anti-Quadiani force as a social force. It is just bigotry and nothing more; but bigotry can be very dangerous. One has to distinguish between these two types of forces—social force which may give a lot of trouble but which has its basis in a certain reality and which tries to solve a social problem of a community or a country; and the other force which may be very strong for the moment or very dangerous but which has no basis in the solution of any problem.

Now just as I refer to the anti-Quadiani movement—I have no sympathy for the Quadianis or Mr Zafrullah Khan<sup>3</sup>—but whole movement shows a very backward humanity, that is, which can be roused on a question like this on a big scale and lead to arson and murder. It shows a kind of medieval mentality which exists in a large number of people and which can be roused in an agitation like this.

It is exactly the same mentality which exists in what may be called the communal organizations in our own country; a type of mind, a bigoted mind, which does not think in terms of major social problems but which is founded on strong hatreds and dislikes, and apparently thinks that it can realize its aims by knocking down somebody else. It is identical with that medieval mind which functions in a communal organization, whether Muslim, Hindu, Sikh or any other. It may have justification occasionally, some grouse or ill-treatment—that is a different matter—but basically it represents a backward mind. So I want you to distinguish between these two tendencies.

2. On 27 February 1953, the All-Muslim Party Convention in Lahore launched "direct action" for declaring the Quadianis as a non-Muslim minority and for the removal of all Ahmediyas, including Zafrullah Khan, from key posts. The agitation led to the imposition of martial law in Lahore on 6 March and in Lyallpur on 15 March.
3. He was the Foreign Minister of Pakistan at this time and was an Ahmediya.



Now the Communists represent a social force. They want to divert the social force in a particular way to their advantage or disadvantage whatever it may be—but they do represent a social force. Maybe our Government also represents a social force to some extent in our Five Year Plan which is an attempt to understand the social forces in the country and to divert them into a right channel. Every government these days has to do that, but the previous governments did not think in these terms. They were not social governments in the present meaning of the term. They were called Police States. In a Police State, the State's function is merely a police function, that is, of maintaining law and order, of gathering revenue, and of defence. But today a State has social functions also though the police function remains—because we cannot make progress unless there is law and order. That remains, but that cannot be a substitute for the social functions of a State. This is very important, and, therefore, governments today have to interest themselves with all types of social activities.

You hear arguments, let us say, between socialism and capitalism. There is much in the argument but not so much as people think. The capitalist and private enterprise States are excellent in their own way. As a matter of fact, even in the United States the intrusion of the State in the social domain is tremendous—unthinkable about twenty or thirty years ago, when no American would have accepted it, but they have accepted it now. In England they go much farther—it has gone into a socialist channel. All over Europe the conception of the socialist State is completely accepted. In a sense in the Communist countries, that is accepted, of course, but in a particular way. It is a special type of State.

Every intelligent person has to understand the broad aspects of the basic situation—and to remember that in the final analysis the system that pays dividends will win—which not all the armies in the world can win—in the sense of producing human welfare, in the sense of satisfying the people's wants.

There is one aspect that I would like you to bear in mind whatever situation you have to deal with. Though the purely law and order approach to a problem would be the same whoever commits the breach of the law—whether a Communist or a communalist, a Congressman or anybody else—yet in understanding the situation you must recognize the difference, and you must bear in mind the social forces that may be at work.

Suppose you are dealing with a crowd, you are dealing with their psychology; you must not merely think of the strength of the government behind you. It is true that every government has to deal with this phenomenon, excepting perhaps a very authoritarian government. But certainly every democratic government has to understand psychological situations—psychology of the crowd—how to meet it and that can only be understood, apart from any

local factors involved, by a deeper appreciation of the situation. It is a dangerous thing if we have certain hard and fast rules in our mind to judge everybody by them. When a person belongs to a social movement, he is to be judged and dealt with in a different way. He would not be dealt with in terms of an ordinary criminal as his mind functions in a different way.

Now take communism. The major fact is that a very big part of the world is communistic—call it one-third—whatever it may be, and runs big governments. It is not some kind of outlawed government—but it is a government in one-third of the world, and one-third which is governmentally very powerful and grows in power. We have to deal with it as a friendly nation. Our ambassadors are there; they send their ambassadors here, and so far as governmental relations are concerned, we have to treat them just like any other government; but if that government interferes in our internal affairs, it becomes a different thing.

Now a very peculiar situation is created by the fact that an internal party like the Communist Party has got extra-territorial affiliations with parties in Russia which are under government patronage. An extraordinary situation is created there. Our plans are to maintain good relations with Russia and China and at the same time we do not wish to tolerate the type of activities which the Communist Party indulges in here and for which they get secret help from China and Russia. These are difficulties of the time we live in.

The main thing is that in dealing with communism the problem before us becomes two-fold. One is that it is almost an agent of a foreign power—maybe not exactly in the same sense as spies, etc.—but nevertheless, mentally speaking, the Communists seek the advancement of a foreign power more than the advancement of their own country. They think that the defence of our country is something dependent on the balance of power in favour of the other country. That is one aspect of it. The other aspect is that they seem to think that the more difficulties and confusion they create the more it will be advantageous for them to attain a certain goal. They think the more complications there are, the more it will help them to break down the structure they dislike. Now that, of course, is only, even from their point of view, partially true.

People get misled by the Russian Revolution or by the Chinese Revolution. Each of these had a long history behind it and these were individual and peculiar things, which cannot be duplicated elsewhere. In the final analysis, in Russia, the Communists succeeded because of the presence of outstanding men like Lenin at a very critical moment—it was touch and go—in a defeated country in war and frustration and at the point of collapse, and these men had a well-trained group of persons, had competence and ability to control the situation. It was a chance in a million that occurred.



In China it was different. My point is that this kind of thing, even from the Communist point of view or socialist, that by creating disorder they achieve something is rather an immature thinking, and rather childish in the modern world now. Whatever be the reasons, you cannot reproduce these very peculiar circumstances that existed at the time of the Russian or Chinese revolutions.

In Germany, their attempt to create disorder and conflict led not to communism but to Hitler. Nobody knows what the attempts in India may lead to; but the real fact of the matter is that the revolutionary ideology and technique is still rather based on a period when modern States were not quite so powerful as they are today and modern weapons were not so powerful as they are today.

At the time of the French Revolution, practically speaking, the rebel armies could face the government more or less on equal terms; but the changes are so great today that no State can be overwhelmed by a rebel. It may be overthrown if the rebels can build up an army or if the State army itself goes over. But the old revolutionary tactics cannot be successful today with any Government which has got an army which is more or less faithful to it. Of course, much can be done to upset things, to create disorder and much especially can be done in a democratic set-up—that is true. That is why I said in the beginning that big problems of the future are not only for India but also for the rest of the world.

How far democratic India can face the situation? India may face the situation by ceasing to be wholly democratic because I am quite sure India will not fade away or surrender. If in the ultimate analysis we feel that something is happening which we cannot control with the structure we have, then the structure will have to be changed. That will be a pity; it will be a failure of democracy.

India is an example to the rest of the world also because of the sheer extent and the bigness of the problem. Probably a small country can do this. It is all very well with a small democratic apparatus, but for a big country to try this on a big scale is something which has not been done before. It is of high importance to the future of the world.

Coming back to another aspect of it—the most important thing for India is what I call real integration. You can call it by any other name you like i.e., holding together of various and varied factors that go to make up India. We do hold together politically. There are other unifying forces also. Nevertheless, the disruptive forces are also strong, and for the moment I am not referring to any organizational forces. The disruptive forces are in our minds—our nature, our caste system, our social habits and things that separate. We have now a



heated controversy over the Andhra State between the Andhras and Tamilians.<sup>4</sup> All these show how easy it is for the differences to exist among us—whether religious or of caste or of anything else, how we can be passionate about them and forget the factors that unify us, and how easy it is for these factors to grow beyond control completely and upset the whole structure of unity.

Therefore, it is of high importance to integrate in the real sense. In fact, the whole purpose of the national movement in India was to integrate, but it integrated negatively—negatively in the sense that it was integrated as opposed to the alien power. It was relatively easy to do that, but it is a little more difficult to integrate it without having to oppose somebody else. I have no doubt that in case of the challenge to India from outside we shall all unite, but even when there is no challenge we must hold together to gain strength. When we are weak we can benefit by holding together.

This, of course, is a political problem—the question of integration—but it is in relation to this that this whole communal approach to the problem comes in, which, whatever its basic urges may be, and sometimes there may be some justification, is a strong disruptive force, a force which emphasizes and encourages the wrong tendencies in our people, a force which separates although it talks of uniting. The RSS people may talk about making India strong, a strong Hindu *rashtra*, and all Hindus uniting, but the fact of the matter is that if you proceed on those lines you make India not strong but weak and disunited. Mind you, you begin with Hindus versus non-Hindus; but immediately that will spread among Hindus themselves; the separatist outlook gets the better of people and later on you cannot stop it anywhere.

Therefore, from the larger point of view, this communal ideology or mentality undermines the very basic thing that we should aim at, that is, the integration of India. Other things, provincialism, casteism, etc. are also on the same lines and have to be met on every plane, of course, mostly on the governmental law and order plane, but much more so on other planes; and one of the most painful factors today is the way in which this ideology is encouraged and spread by many of our newspapers, more especially Hindi and Urdu

4. T. Prakasam, one of the members of the Partition Committee, had not accepted the Committee's recommendation making agreement on Madras City between the Tamils and the Telugus a condition necessary for the separation of Andhra State. While the people of Tamilnadu would not give up Madras City in favour of an Andhra State, the people of Rayalaseema were opposed to the formation of such a State unless Madras City was included in it. Meanwhile, the Andhra Pradesh Congress Committee, urging the Government of India to form the Andhra State with the undisputed twelve districts of the Telugu region, wanted Madras City to be made a separate city-State.

newspapers, as well as some English newspapers. You notice that whenever this is done it is not only encouraging the wrong thing but it is encouraging it in a vulgar way; the whole approach is vulgar—bringing down the level of public life, public standards and all that and, therefore, harming the community in many ways.

After all, we are going to become a big nation; people with petty minds, vulgar minds, do not form a big nation. The real test of the people is what is the method of thinking, big or small. Whether it is the mind of a country, a group or a community, we have to decide what does it think of: is it thinking of what may be called bigger things, the most important things for a nation, or is it what is called the parochial mind—a mind which fails to realize things beyond the next door? Suppose a villager quarrels with his neighbour. That absorbs his mind. He is thinking of none but the next door, whatever it may be. He may even commit murder. That is a small mind. You may make it a little bigger but it continues thinking in a small way.

Possibly the big deed we have done, or we are doing now, is to make the people to think in larger terms—in terms of our Five Year Plan, regardless of the merits and demerits of each individual item of that plan; the very fact that we are making people, in increasing numbers, think of it, think of India as a whole, think of the progress of India as a whole, think of the future, is itself a tremendous thing. Of course, mere thinking is not enough unless we act up to it.

Now I shall refer to the international situation as it is. Generally speaking, I think it will be correct to say that the danger of world war is not as near as one thought sometime ago. The real thing, of course, is that there is fear of war. One thing is perfectly clear and that is that Russia does not want a world war. That is almost an admitted fact in foreign affairs. Therefore, so far as Russia is concerned they will not start a world war. At the same time, it seems to be fairly clear that Russia does not particularly desire the end of the Korean War. They are quite happy with the situation as it is. It does not harm them in any way. It drains the resources of America and what is much more so, psychologically speaking, it makes the American people more and more jittery, more and more frustrated because the American outlook is essentially an engineer's outlook. They want to do a job and finish it this way or that way. This 'hanging on' business gets on their nerves. The average American says: Let us have peace in Korea or let us have war by all means. Having war by all means does not solve the problem either, but will create difficulties.

Generally speaking, there will be no war, that is, no big war, started either by Russia or by China. If there is the danger of a big war it is rather on the side of America; not deliberately, but by taking steps which accidentally may lead to a war. I think it is true there are groups in America, not very big, but



powerful groups, which want war.<sup>5</sup> There are, of course, big groups which do not want war and the people generally do not want war there. Whether there is war or peace depends a little more on America than on any other country, because the European countries do not want war.

The differences between the UK and America have become more and more acute.<sup>6</sup> They have to hang together because there is no other way; but the differences do become acute and in this Korean Resolution that we put forward in the United Nations, America rejected it right at the beginning with great gusto. England, on the other hand, supported it and so did Canada and other countries. In fact, America found that she was completely isolated. There was almost a complete break between England and America privately on this issue.

It so happened that the Soviets rejected it and then America said that they were prepared to accept it. A tug of war has been taking place between the UK and the USA on that issue. It was not only on this occasion but there has always been this pull. It is there even in Mr. Churchill's Conservative Government though it might have been stronger when there was Labour Government in England. There are two pulls—one obviously is the necessity of pulling together against the Communist Powers and the other is the feeling in European countries including UK that the American policy is completely lacking in wisdom and may land them in tremendous difficulties. I don't think there will be a war but this business of cold war is terrible.

So far as our relations with Pakistan are concerned, they continue much as before, but I do not think there is much chance of war between India and Pakistan in the near future. Of course, one can never rule out something of this type, and there is always the danger of a weak and discredited government taking to war to protect itself: Pakistan Government is a thoroughly weak and discredited Government. It is fighting for its life against its own people. A strong government attempts to lay down what to do or what not to do. There is so much intrigue in Pakistan Government and even in the Pakistan Cabinet each person is trying to pull against the other. Even the Pakistan newspapers

5. Some strong statements were made early in March 1953 by senior American army officers. General Omar N. Bradley, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, was reported to have stated that there were four courses open to the US, one of which could be the use of the atom bomb. General Van Fleet told the Committee on the Armed Forces of the House of Representatives that "victory was the only solution to the long conflict" in Korea. General MacArthur made a suggestion to the same effect at a meeting of the National Association of Manufacturers. "My solution is to drop an atom bomb after full notification to the North Koreans of our purposes," he said.
6. Britain and the US differed on rearmament of Germany, the recognition of People's China, the new US policy on Formosa, the policy to be adopted with regard to Iran and Egypt, the ANZUS and the Pacific security.



are giving sensational news about the crises in the Pakistan Cabinet.<sup>7</sup> We can never be sure what a discredited government may not do just to cover up its own sense of weakness and so we have to be careful. Pakistan will soon be in a pretty bad way—economically as well as politically. They have suddenly realized, to their horror, that they are heavily deficit in food. It is not a temporary phenomenon but it is something more basic and they have to import a million tonnes of wheat. They think they can get a free gift or loan from America and that is why they think in terms of joining the Middle East Defence Organization so that they can get loans as well as arms.<sup>8</sup>

Pakistan has never been so weak as it is today. I am not talking in military terms but in economic and political terms, and there lies the danger of the situation. There are two different feelings prevailing in Pakistan. On the one hand there is a good deal of anti-Indian feeling encouraged by the press and public speeches. If there is food shortage they say that India has stopped the canal waters and occupied Kashmir. But, there is a contrary feeling also, a certain reaction caused by the disgust of their own government that is not exactly a liking for India but still looking towards India with certain respect, a certain feeling that India is getting on with progress, that is, making good.

Of course, the general elections influenced them greatly. Now the thing is that whatever is being done in India—the Five Year Plan, the big industries, river valley schemes, big laboratories—impresses them. They are impressed, and as a result they desire to do the same sort of things. In the final analysis that draws them towards India—not consciously, not deliberately but still they do it. There was a Science Congress in Lahore.<sup>9</sup> Much of the address of the President was devoted to the progress made in India in science and cursing his government for not doing likewise.

Therefore, in our approach to Pakistan, we should always remember and distinguish between the Government of Pakistan and the people of Pakistan. That is to say, if we have to say hard things about the Government, we say them; but it is never a good thing to say hard things about the people generally, even from the strictly narrow and opportunist point of view. Suppose we are

7. On 8 February 1953, the *Dawn* spoke about "Cracks in the Cabinet", "wars of succession" and the "disloyalty" of the Muslim League of Pakistan.
8. A plan for defence of West Asia against Soviet Union was proposed by Britain, France, Turkey and the USA in October 1951 and it got the support of Australia, New Zealand and South Africa the next month. The membership of Pakistan was considered necessary due to its strategic importance in the Gulf region, its military and political potential and Islamic identity.
9. The Pakistan Academy of Science, inaugurated by the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Khwaja Nazimuddin, met in Lahore from 16 to 21 February 1953.

at war with Pakistan—the object of psychological propaganda would be to win the Pakistan people, at any rate, to weaken their hostility against us but not to enrage them against us. That applies in peace time also. Some people say there should be no distinction between the government and the people. This is ignorance of the highest degree. It is politically unsound, apart from the facts of the case.

Here in Delhi and elsewhere, at the present moment, there is this Jan Sangh agitation going on about Kashmir. The whole thing is fantastic—extremely fantastic—from many points of view. What are the demands of the Jan Sangh? They are talking about Jammu and Kashmir being more closely associated with India. There is no difference with our point of view about that. But the question is how to do it. We have been trying to do it for the last five years and a host of difficulties have arisen. There are no two viewpoints about certain objectives. The difficulties are national, international, United Nations, Dr Graham and one thousand and one.

Even if I agree hundred per cent with the Jan Sangh leaders, I cannot do it because one can do things only within one's own country. I cannot do things in which Pakistan is involved. I can either approach Pakistan diplomatically or declare war, but I cannot order Pakistan to do something. Our Parliament's law will be obeyed in India and not in Pakistan, United Nations, America and elsewhere. Therefore, it is quite absurd for demands to be made which involve us and foreign countries in international situations.

Here is America, the strongest power in the world today; well, all its financial and military strength does not enable the Congress of the United States to pass a law to end the Korean War. It has got itself stuck in war. So it is an extraordinarily childish approach to this question, as if we can, by a mere speech or by a resolution of Parliament or even by an act of Parliament, put an end to it.

Suppose we say: "To hell with United Nations" and we withdraw the Kashmir question from the Security Council. First of all, it is very doubtful if the issue can be withdrawn, unless both parties agree to it. One party cannot do it because the other party will say: "We are going to carry on with it even if you withdraw." That involves not only withdrawing from the Kashmir issue but breaking with the United Nations, and thereby obviously giving a tremendous advantage or handle to our enemies and making all our friends dissatisfied with us or even hostile to us. In other words, we will be isolating ourselves in the world. I would not put India in that position just to please Syama Prasad Mookerjee.

I should like the people to understand that this whole agitation is fantastic in the extreme. Shaikh Abdullah may act rightly or wrongly. It should be considered separately. He may not have done something which the people of Jammu would have liked. This whole agitation which is meant to bring Jammu



and Kashmir State nearer to India has the effect of making it more and more distant.

In the last five years, since this trouble began in Kashmir, for the first time, I have begun to doubt the future of Kashmir since this agitation started. I do not care what the UNO is going to do, or Pakistan or war or peace or the Security Council. I can face them. But I feel completely helpless in the face of the situation when things are done which will alienate the people of Jammu and Kashmir. Kashmir can be kept only with the consent of the people of Kashmir. We cannot conquer them; we cannot do it.

This whole agitation has had the most powerful reaction on the Muslim mind in Kashmir, obviously. This is a very big question before us, that is, if India is represented by Dr S.P. Mookerjee or Chatterjee<sup>10</sup> then what face have we to tell the people there to join India; they are doing everything in their power to drive away Kashmir.

Then again they say: Take Jammu. Let Jammu be closely associated with India. The moment you say that you mean to hand over Kashmir to Pakistan. If Jammu comes here, Kashmir State is divided on the Hindu-Muslim basis. That argument goes in favour of Pakistan, so that this very argument, the demand of the Jan Sangh and other people, has the effect of ruining the very thing they stand for.

Apart from that, the only explanation I have had of this strange move is a rather unkind and uncharitable explanation. And it is that they deliberately want to sacrifice Jammu and Kashmir and everything if thereby they can discredit the Government and get in there. This is uncharitable. They are doing everything to bring that about. They want to pull the Government down and hope to get into it by creating this crisis; so that if Kashmir has to go out the responsibility for that will be on our own Government. Therefore, they are prepared to sacrifice Kashmir. That is hurting our national interests. In this way, they gain some kind of local advantage. Once you allow this type of force to function, you are putting an end to all organized political activity, of public life, and democracy cannot function. It cannot be permitted certainly.

One thing I would like to say in the end. I talked about Jan Sangh and its agitation because I want you to understand it properly. The problem is simple but most of the people do not understand it properly. The method the Jan Sangh is following is all wrong. I want you not only to understand it yourself but to explain to your officers and give them the intellectual appreciation of the situation. They should themselves realize it and understand it and explain it to others too.

10. N.C. Chatterjee was the President of the Hindu Mahasabha.

## 7. Yardstick to Measure Backwardness<sup>1</sup>

Rashtrapatiji, Kaka Saheb,<sup>2</sup> brothers and sisters. First of all, I would like to say that I do not like the name of this Commission itself—the Backward Classes Commission.<sup>3</sup> It is as if we are first branding them and then, from our superior position, we shall try to uplift them. The whole approach seems fundamentally wrong to me, even if in fact they are backward. There is no necessity to publicize the fact. But I often doubt whether it is after all a fact and how far we are indeed superior, those of us who claim to do them good. It is obvious that there are certain differences. Perhaps there are differences in our lifestyle, our clothes may be better, all these things may be there.

But ultimately what is the yardstick to measure a man's culture? There can be many methods but ultimately I think it cannot be measured in terms of dress the people wear, or the houses they live in. There are other factors in the lives of the people and when I consider them, I doubt as to who is superior and who is inferior. Yes, some people are superior, even at first sight. But I am not talking of individuals but of classes. Therefore, if we were to go to any people in this huge country with the feeling that they are inferior or downtrodden and that we are going to uplift them, I think we would have messed up the job right at the beginning, instead of doing any good, because the method is all wrong.

If anyone were to come to me with the intention of uplifting me, I will not like it though there are many weaknesses in me. If anybody looks at me patronisingly, I will emotionally feel hostile to him, whoever he may be.

We must think a little, because I myself feel that we are not quite honest in our thinking. We are so irrevocably bound by the view that our way of life is superior to the others and that we are qualified to teach others. This is a wrong step right from the start. For one thing, this view is in itself wrong and it has a bad effect.

I often wonder why our brethren call themselves backward classes or depressed classes. They must make an effort not to associate themselves with such names. After all, superiority or inferiority of an individual depends on his mind and heart. It is not a matter of dress or lifestyle. This is specially true of India and does not have to be spelt out because India is a country

1. Address to the Backward Classes Commission, 18 March 1953. AIR tapes, NMML.
2. D.B. Kalelkar was Chairman of the Backward Classes Commission.
3. On 29 January 1953, a Backward Classes Commission was appointed to investigate into the conditions of the socially and educationally backward classes and to make recommendations to the Centre and the States to remove their difficulties.



where the greatest man of our times did not live in a palace or wear beautiful clothes. So I shall with due respect warn the members of the Commission<sup>4</sup> advising anyone. They should understand and learn a little and then try to help by a process of mutual cooperation. A nation ultimately has to stand on its own feet. Others can help a little, but if there is no strength within ourselves, we cannot rise. Therefore, whatever approach is adopted it should enable them to stand on their own feet. We must give them all possible help, educational, economic, etc.

It is my feeling that you will not find any group of people more eager and enthusiastic to learn and be educated than the tribal and backward classes. They are eager to go ahead by their own efforts. They merely need a little help and the opportunity to progress. There is no need to push them. Let them grow according to their own capacity. You do not have to stamp their progress with your views and ways of doing things. I want the Commission to think about these methods.

What are these backward classes? Is there an economic yardstick to measure backwardness? If that is so, perhaps 90 per cent of India's population will qualify as backward classes. Perhaps the number may be more. Where do you draw the line? Economically the majority of Indians are not well off. Most of them are very poor. The really well off people are a mere handful. Then whom are we going to uplift? The conclusion to be drawn is that we must find a way by which the whole country progresses, and not a few or a hundred or a thousand. These are difficult questions and the Commission can help us in finding a solution which I hope they will.

But ultimately the solution does not lie in legal remedies but in somehow trying to reach out to them emotionally, by doing service to them—no, even service is the wrong word, and I do not like it. We must cooperate with them and work as equals because even the idea of serving denotes superiority. Therefore I do not like the word though it is a nice word. I prefer cooperation and working together as equals. We are all equals. We must be prepared to live with them as equals and to teach and to learn from them, as two brothers would teach each other. This is how we must reach out to them so that they may recognize us as their brethren and that we do not consider ourselves superior to them but treat them as equals. Only by cooperating in big tasks, can we reach out to them.

After all, these matters cannot be solved by a Commission which is here for a few days. It can show us the way to go about these things. It is true that there are many evils, and once they are pin-pointed, our way will perhaps

4. Bheekha Bhai, N.S. Kajrolkar, Shivdayal Singh Chaurasia, Rajeshwar Patel, Abdul Qayum Ansari, Lala Jagan Nath, T. Mariappa, Atma Singh Namdhari and N.R. M. Swamy were the members of the Commission.

become clear. But ultimately there is no other way except for the people to go among them and work unobtrusively with them. There have not been many people like that. There have been some great men. One of them was Thakkar Bapa<sup>5</sup> who worked among them. Why did he succeed? It is because he could establish an emotional bond with them. There have been others too, but looking to the magnitude of the problem, there have not been enough social workers. So long as our young men and women do not throw themselves heart and soul into the matter, laws cannot take us very far.

These are some of the problems the Commission can go into, and perhaps clear the way as to how the work should be done. Otherwise, the work will get done only where there are sincere workers and not in other places. We had to appoint a Commission according to the terms of the Constitution. It was necessary and proper too. But ultimately we come back to who its members are, because nothing is achieved by the Commission's name alone. Anyhow, who are the members of the Commission? First of all, its chairman is Kaka Saheb Kalelkar. His being in the Commission puts a stamp on the type of work that will be done and at least I am confident that the work will not be done, as it is often seen, by city folk going to the rural areas and treating them as inferiors.

So this is a very great task that we are starting today and it will affect many people in India, if it is well done. We must not think that the whole burden now rests with the Commission. On the contrary, the Commission is merely an emissary of ours and the burden has to be borne by all of us.

5. A close associate of Mahatma Gandhi who worked for the abolition of untouchability and for the uplift of tribals.

## 8. The Task Ahead<sup>1</sup>

I have been a neighbour of yours for a long time now, as Delhi is not very far from Meerut. And yet I have not come here for a very long time. I was here fourteen months ago<sup>2</sup> in connection with the elections and I think I stayed here for an hour or hour and a half. I travel a great deal all over the country

1. Address at a public meeting at Meerut, 20 March 1953. AIR tapes, NMML and from *The Statesman*, 21 March 1953. (Original in Hindi). Extracts.
2. Nehru addressed a meeting in Meerut on 19 January 1952.



in spite of the work and other preoccupations in Delhi. But generally I go to the far-flung areas—the places close by do not need me so much. I have a desire to understand this huge country of ours. I had toured a great deal in the districts of UP years ago. Now I want to learn about the far-flung areas of India. I am going to Manipur after a week.<sup>3</sup>

I do not know how many of you are aware of where Manipur is. It is on the extreme eastern borders of India, adjoining Burma. Manipur has become famous. Manipuri dance is very famous. You should visit Imphal in Manipur. The men in Manipur are extremely lazy and all the work is done by women. You will find the men walking behind their womenfolk with a swaggering gait. There is a very large market in Manipur where all the shops are run by women. Men have no place in it at all. Perhaps the market is called Women's Bazaar.

Well, anyhow, I am going to Manipur which is a very nice place. The people are very nice. You can learn a great deal from them. For one thing, they are extremely clean. You will never find anyone in dirty clothes. The rich and the poor alike wear clean clothes.

In Manipur, the Prime Minister of Burma will come to visit us and after inspecting a few places with me, he and I will go to Burma, just across the border, not to Rangoon. After a couple of days' tour of the tribal areas with him, I shall come back.<sup>4</sup> You must have heard about the tribals who live in those areas, the Nagas, the Khasis and the Lushai, etc. You may have been thinking of them as uncivilized people and yourselves as civilized. If so, you are very much mistaken. The people who live on our borders are extremely beautiful and strong, hard-working, clean and good people, and as I said, women in that region work very hard unstintingly. Let me give you an example of the Khasi hills. A young woman was walking down with a heavy load on her back and when she was questioned, she spoke English fluently. It seems she was studying in college doing her B.A. or M.A.—I do not remember—and she said she was helping her parents by earning some money during the holidays. Just think, how many people would do this. Instead of moaning about her fate, she was doing manual labour and carrying loads of firewood on her back during the holidays in order to help her parents. That is a sign of a strong community, a civilized community. She was a very well educated woman.

I am very much interested in these people because they are very much a part of India. They have been rather aloof from us in the past. For one thing,

3. On being invited by U Nu, the Prime Minister of Burma, to undertake a joint tour of tribal areas on both sides of Indo-Burma border and to discuss measures relating to welfare of the tribals, Nehru arrived at Imphal on 28 March.
4. Nehru and U Nu visited Imphal and Naga areas on the Indian side from 29 to 31 March 1952 and the Naga areas on the Burma side till 2 April.

the British did not want them to get close to us and generally speaking, Indians could not go over to their side. Only British officers used to go and they would instil feelings of hatred against Indians in them. Therefore they do not have a history of fighting for freedom like all of us do. They played no role in the freedom struggle. In fact, they were almost completely unaware of it. They heard Gandhiji's name from afar and revered him.

You must bear in mind that these are all large regions—the North East Frontier Agency, large tracts of Assam, the Lushai and the Khasi hills,—etc., and they lie on our borders and therefore it is a sensitive area; so it has become extremely necessary that we should help the people of this area and draw them closer. You should visit those areas. I have been there. There is a vociferous demand for two things—for roads and schools. There is an obsession with schools and roads. They build roads. I read yesterday that the community centre there has built a 125 mile-road in two and a half months with their own labour and for free. They were interested and got a little bit of help regarding tools, etc. In another place which was deep in the heart of impenetrable forest inhabited by wild elephants and what not, they cut through twenty miles of jungle growth to build a road. And they are building innumerable schools with their own labour, at their own expense. All these are the signs of vitality. They don't sit around bemoaning their fate. I am going there again specially because the Prime Minister of Burma wants to meet me and then I shall go across the border because the people on both sides are pretty much alike, particularly the tribe called the Nagas—they are a rough, capable people. Yes, they are somewhat cantankerous too, and it is not in the least easy to make them do anything against their wishes. That too is a good sign. They have joined our armed forces and formed the crack battalions....

I would like all of you, especially the youth, to travel to different parts of the country so that you can understand your country in its myriad forms. Otherwise you begin to think of your own part of the country as being India. You and I are India but so are others who live here, with different life styles, speaking different languages, following different religions. Ours is an extraordinary country, with a history going back thousands of years during which there have been ups and downs, and sharp twists and turns. All that is part of our heritage, the thousands of years of history. You must understand that history, our past and our present, in order to get a true picture of what this country of ours is all about. Otherwise you will be narrow in your outlook and far from understanding the world you live in, you will fail to understand even the country you live in.

So you must travel whenever you get an opportunity. I have requested Lal Bahadur Shastriji, who is our Railway Minister, to give some concessions to our students to travel in India. As you know, I wrote a book in English in the Ahmednagar prison about six or seven years ago called *The Discovery of India*.



I have had this idea for a long time to try and discover what this India is for whom we toil and raise cries of victory. So I delved into our history, thousands of years of our past. I read our ancient literature, and philosophy, and discovered that vast streams of humanity poured into the ocean that is India and were assimilated. I read about the times when India was at the pinnacle of her glory and of the times when she was down and out. But all the time I was trying to understand India's present, for after all, what we are today will pave the way for our future. We have not descended from the sky. The India that we see today has been moulded by thousands of years of history. Our strengths and weaknesses have to be understood in that light. We can learn a great deal from books but ultimately it is human beings who make a country what it is.

Anyhow, I have had a great deal of opportunities to roam all over India, to meet people from different walks of life, and gradually a picture of India began to form in my mind; not one picture but thousands of little pictures in a never-ending stream and now there are new images in my mind because India is a country of myriad hues. I want that you too should have an image in your mind of this great, vast country, of its history, its strengths and weaknesses. India is not merely the Himalayas or Kanya Kumari after all, it is the thirty-five or thirty-six crores of human beings, men, women and children too who make India. And when you say hail to *Bharat Mata*, who is that? It is not some beautiful lady sitting somewhere. *Bharat Mata* is her citizens, the millions who live in this country. We are all small parts of India but there are others too. If you think you alone are India, then you think wrong.

So you must have the entire picture in your mind because the most dangerous thing is narrow-mindedness. To think only of one's city or district or village and regard all others as outsiders as perhaps some of our kisan brethren who have not been anywhere tend to think, will not do. People who belong to a big country must be broad-minded, large-hearted, because after all, we have to face grave challenges and tackle large issues. We have to take this country far—I mean the thirty-five to thirty-six crores of human beings in this country. I am not talking about brandishing a sword or conquering a territory. Those days are gone—we have no desire to commit aggression against anyone. Such things are not tolerated in the modern world and we have never had such a policy. However we do want India to be a great country, in every way to become prosperous, eradicate poverty and unemployment. We want India to progress in every way and do good to itself and to the world. It is not a trivial matter to ensure the progress of thirty-six crores of human beings. Our goals will have an impact on the whole world because we are one-fifth of the world in size.

We must grow in stature, in mind and heart. Human beings with narrow minds and narrow vision cannot achieve great things. You have done me the honour of making me the President of the Congress and the Prime Minister of

this great country and so I am counted among men of stature. It is not a question of my strength and weaknesses. The fact is that people of my generation have had glorious opportunities. The most important of them has been the opportunity to serve under a great general like Mahatma Gandhi. We were weak but we grew in his shadow and learnt something from his precepts. We grew in stature. Secondly, we were engaged in a great struggle and took up the task of freeing India oblivious of our domestic burdens and daily lives. Millions of us were engaged in this task. Those who are immersed in petty struggles remain small in stature. It is only by doing something big that people grow in stature.

Are we not facing grave challenges today? In fact, we have much greater tasks before us today than freeing India from the yoke of British rule. We have to work for the progress of thirty-six crores of human beings, to remove their poverty and unemployment and to knit them together into a society which can serve the whole of humanity. Can there be a greater adventure than this for any nation or human beings? You will be making a big mistake if you think that now that we have got freedom we can sit back and relax. Our youth are engaged in petty squabbles because to them the struggle for independence is just a matter of hearsay, a historic event which they have not experienced at first hand. It took place thirty or thirty five years ago in a sense. They have heard tales of those times but they have no personal experience. So perhaps they feel that it was child's play, that we had held some marches and rallies. But please remember that it was not easy....

Our youth would be deluding themselves if they thought that freedom had come easily. An individual can find solutions to a problem only when he understands it. Today everyone is ready with pet answers without understanding what the problem is. Everyone is prepared to suggest an outline as to what needs to be done. They shout slogans, make demands, but if you were to ask them what really are India's problems, they will not find it easy to give an answer.

It is easy for everyone to say that India must become strong, eradicate poverty and unemployment. But it is not enough merely to express a wish. We must be aware of what India is all about, where her strength lies, how we can improve our stature. We have to find the way to level the disparities and bring about equality. These are large issues which have to be looked at from a broad perspective. Only if you do that do you get the right to suggest prescriptions. There can be various ways of solving a problem. But today there is very little thinking and too much din. People feel that solutions to problems can be found by making a noise about them. Making a noise or shouting slogans may sometimes generate enthusiasm but nothing more than that. You cannot build bridges by shouting slogans, that can be done only if you have the skill to do so.



Similarly, the problems of this vast country cannot be solved by shouting slogans nor will these be solved by mere chance because it is not merely a question of breaking up something or defeating an enemy. What we are trying to do is to build the edifice of a new India which is possible only through hard work, effort, cooperation. There is no other way and it takes time. There is no magic formula. You cannot do it by consulting astrologers. One of my colleagues,<sup>5</sup> a Minister from UP got annoyed with me for something I said about astrologers. I am sorry about that. My views however remain unchanged. I do not have the time but those who do may consult astrologers. But what I feel is that even if the astrologers are right in their predictions it would be a waste of time. First of all I cannot understand why the stars and planets must take an interest in you and me. Anyhow, it is a defeatist attitude for an individual or a nation to ascribe everything to destiny. The moment you think like that, you lose your ability to do something constructive. You should have the strength and the determination to change that destiny. So it is futile to keep running to astrologers. The problems before us can be solved only by hard work and physical and mental strength, cooperation, etc.

We have the example of big countries before us. Big powers have risen and fallen in the last twenty or thirty years. I have seen big empires falling, revolutions taking place, wars between nations and the world turning completely topsy-turvy during the last thirty to forty years. It continues to change at a rapid rate. You have to understand the underlying causes of these changes. What was at the root of these changes which started occurring about one hundred fifty to two hundred years ago? It is science, and its offshoots, electricity, aeroplanes, radio, all the new inventions and discoveries that you see around which have changed the world.

Let me give you one example. We are celebrating one hundred years of the railways in India. You must go and see the Railway Centenary Exhibition.<sup>6</sup> Before the coming of the railways, the fastest mode of transport was on horseback. This was so a hundred, five hundred or even thousand years ago and during the time of the Buddha and Chandragupta and Akbar too. There was no change. And then it was during the British rule that the means of communication became revolutionized. The railways, telegraph, telephone, electricity, steamship, motor car, aeroplanes have all made the world as we knew in just two or three generations ago completely unrecognizable. The rest of the world has changed even more rapidly than India.

When there are such revolutionary changes taking place all around, then obviously they would have a tremendous impact on the lifestyle of a society. A changing society faces new challenges, new problems, which need to be

5. Sampurnanand.

6. The Exhibition was inaugurated in New Delhi by Nehru on 7 March 1953.

faced with a fresh outlook. You have to get out of the mental rut. You read about the nuclear weapons being produced in the United States and the Soviet Union. They are all the products of science. Science has good offshoots and evil ones too. We are living in the modern world which has changed so rapidly in a hundred years as it has not done in thousands of years, and it continues to change constantly and with it the problems that confront us. That is why I said that all of you are ready to prescribe solutions without understanding what the problem is, whether it is political, economic or whatever in nature. We must understand that the entire structure of society has changed, its problems have changed and the method of solving them has changed; and we must understand it quickly. We must understand the character of the modern world. I am amazed at many of our organizations and political parties which raise slogans and make demands which have nothing to do with the world we live in. I do not know in which age and what world they live in—it seems to have no relation to here and now.

I have often, and for different reasons, raised my voice against communalism. Communalism breaks up the nation, though it vociferously advocates an *akhand Bharat*. There is nothing more divisive than communalism. But, apart from everything else, in the present context, communalism is totally unrelated to the present-day world. It is more in tune with the world that existed five hundred years ago. It is obvious that people with mental outlook which belongs to the Middle Ages cannot succeed in solving the problems of the modern world. This is the dilemma that we face in India today. First of all, are we trying to understand the problems of modern India now or not? Even if we understand the broad picture, we will get the strength to find the solution. Otherwise, we will merely fritter away our energies.

You must have heard about the Five Year Plan of which the first two years are over;<sup>7</sup> three years remain. Some of you may have seen the document. It is a serious document, not very easy to read and yet an extremely interesting one. I want all of you to understand it because it gives you a broad picture of the problems before India. It will help you understand what India is today and what needs to be done. That does not mean that you have to accept everything in the document blindly though I feel that 90 per cent of it will have to be accepted by everyone. There can be no argument about it. Five or ten per cent may be open to debate, and we should certainly have a debate.

7. The First Five Year Plan presented in the final form in December 1952 differed from the Draft Outline presented sixteen months earlier in respect of agricultural development. The outlay had been stepped up from about Rs 474 crores on agriculture and irrigation alone, to over Rs 750 crores. Out of Rs 2,069 crores, the estimated cost of the Plan, Rs 630 crores had already been spent and only Rs 1,439 crores were still to be spent in the remaining three years, i.e., upto March 1956.



In short, what I am saying is that we must change our mental outlook and understand what modern India is. Only then can we find prescription to its ills. The stupidity and childishness of communal organizations are utterly amazing. Therefore, I want you to look at the problems from the perspective that the next five or six years are extremely critical for us and for the world. I cannot assure you that there will be peace in the world in the coming years. If there is a major war, we will try to remain outside but we are bound to be affected because modern warfare is so dangerous and destructive that it will shake up the entire world and perhaps destroy more than half of it. Nobody has quite realized the full implications of nuclear war. So we live in a dangerous world and nobody can save a country which shows the slightest weakness or remains embroiled in petty quarrels.

Therefore, it becomes essential that we should forge unity and strength as quickly as possible so that we can face any enemy or crisis. We must keep up the process by which we achieved independence i.e., through unity, cooperation and marching in step. We must do away with provincialism and everything else that is divisive. There are so many barriers which divide us. We are soon going to have a new province called Andhra Pradesh. It is going to be carved out of the present State of Madras. I congratulate the people of Andhra—they are brave people, good people. But even little things like this create problems. It is extremely unfortunate that there is a terrible tendency towards divisiveness in the country. That is what has led to our downfall again and again. Enemies came from outside, but one ruler would not help another though all of them were very brave and fought with great valour. This has been our history from the beginning. That is how we lost our freedom to the British. Should we not learn a lesson from this? If we don't, then we will certainly fall.

India's greatest weakness has been the tendency to create barriers among ourselves, barriers of religion, province, caste and language. People fight over petty matters. They get into a frenzy over religion. Then Indian society is divided into innumerable castes. Three days ago a Commission called the Backward Classes Commission<sup>8</sup> for the uplift of the backward classes was inaugurated by our President Rajendra Babu. But you must bear in mind that this will not include the Scheduled Castes, the Harijans or the Scheduled Tribes. Now, if you take into account the downtrodden people of the country, at least 80 per cent of them are backward and poor. The Government is planning to

8. The President of India in terms of Article 340 of the Constitution appointed the Backward Classes Commission on 29 January with Kakasaheb Kalelkar as Chairman. The Commission was to determine the tests by which any particular class or group of people could be described as backward, to prepare a list of such backward communities for the whole of India, and to examine the difficulties faced by them and suggest steps for their amelioration.

give scholarships to children of the backward classes. You will perhaps be amazed to know that there are more than 1,100 castes already in the list which has been compiled, and who deserve scholarships! There are all kinds of do's and don'ts about who can eat with whom and what not. How can a country progress with so many divisions in society? This is what has weakened us in the past. We will have to break down these barriers and knit the society into one strong entity.

That does not mean that everyone has to be exactly alike. You are all welcome to believe in any religion, have your own distinct lifestyle, etc. But the spirit of nationalism must be fostered by breaking down the barriers of caste and religion. Otherwise, the country will once again witness a downfall. I want all of you to think about this, look at India's history from the perspective of the modern world and decide for yourselves whether I am right or not. I want to make an impression on your minds. I don't want you to become "yes" men. The majority of you are young with your entire life before you. You can serve for years. You will see vast changes in your lifetime, because India and the world are in a state of flux. You will see good things as well as bad, but one thing you will most certainly not see is that the *status quo* remains. The modern world is moving at a rapid pace and when I say rapid, I do not merely mean a political revolution somewhere. Actually, the rapid pace of change is due to science. The innumerable scientific inventions and discoveries and the technological growth of the modern age are shaking up the whole world. It will continue, for the momentum cannot be slowed down. All this will affect all of us, and you will find the world changing very rapidly.

Therefore, in a rapidly changing world, unless you are ready and completely prepared to change and to build a strong nation, you and your country will flounder. Your slogans will be of no avail. The world is witnessing revolutionary changes. Your entire life is before you, and you can serve the country for the next thirty, forty or fifty years. I do not have many years left to me but I have no apprehension that I will collapse suddenly. I have a great deal of spirit left in me. But it is obvious that in the twilight of one's life, one's span of active life is diminished. I want to work with all my might in the few years left to me, to try to fulfil the innumerable dreams that we had dreamt, and the many desires we have felt for our country. Forty years ago we had dreamt of a free India and it is our good fortune that we have seen that dream come true, which is given to very few people. But there is much that remains to be done.

A nation's growth is a continuous process. Men may come and men may go but the life of a nation goes on. But one wants to accomplish as much as one can in one's own lifetime, to see one's efforts come to fruition. All of us would want that. That is the call of the time too. Unless we get a grip over ourselves, we will be submerged under the onslaught of external forces. Therefore, it is a necessity, not merely a desire, to change, to progress. And



progress is possible only by fostering unity and by understanding the problems of the nation.

I gave you the example of the Five Year Plan. That is a first step in this direction which is where its importance lies. It is extremely important that we should improve upon it. We must learn from America, Russia, China and at the same time bear in mind that a country cannot go very far by merely imitating others. We cannot progress only by holding on firmly to our roots. A tree does not flourish well if it is transplanted from another soil. However the fresh wind of change should be allowed to blow through our country too. We must open the windows of our minds wide to imbibe new knowledge, scientific ideas, and thoughts from other parts of the world. Otherwise, we shall lag behind.

You hear about the progress in the Soviet Union and in China. But there is a great deal of difference between China and the Soviet Union and us. We have tried to follow the democratic path. You must remember that though the Soviet Union and China have made rapid strides, there is no democracy there. I agree that an effort has been made to improve the living standard of the people but at a tremendous cost. They have paid a terrible price for their progress. The people have had to bow to the dictates of the party and those who failed to obey orders faced grave danger.

In India we are trying something on a scale which is unheard of anywhere else in the world. There is democracy in Europe but they are all small countries. India is a vast country with tremendous diversity. We have given franchise to every adult, man and woman, which means about seventeen to eighteen crore voters. We are trying to progress at a rapid pace too. There has been no parallel till today for such an experiment on so large a scale. The question is whether we can progress rapidly under democracy or not. I have full faith in democracy though it means delay and slackness in getting things done. But a nation can progress only by having confidence in itself.

So the crucial issue is whether a people or a nation are worthy of democracy, whether they are evolved or not, whether they have ideals and the ability to work together or they are immersed in petty squabbles. Taking all these things into account, there is no parallel to what is happening in India. The eyes of the world are upon us. Big things are happening in China too, but they are not following the democratic path. They are entitled to their ways. There is no competition, but we are doing things differently because we feel that our way is beneficial to us, and to the world also I feel. However, nobody can predict with any confidence what the picture will be in India, China or in any other country.

Therefore, you, especially the youth, must understand that we are standing at a crucial point today when all the nations are in the dock. We have jumped into the fray dreaming of great adventures and trying to do things in a

democratic way. We are trying to eradicate poverty which is in itself a great task. Anyone who engages in such big tasks grows in stature. If we realize the importance of what we are trying to do, all our petty squabbles and problems will fade into insignificance. We must therefore, put all our strength and energy into fostering unity.

I am just coming from Delhi where for the last fortnight, there has been a big hue and cry about the Praja Parishad in Jammu. But the people of Delhi are not participating in the movement. Some volunteers are being brought in for a so-called satyagraha. The entire thing is a farce. First of all, if their demands are met, the State of Jammu and Kashmir will be divided into two. If that happens, we will lose control over Kashmir—it will probably go to Pakistan. This movement demands that India's relations with the State of Jammu and Kashmir must be strengthened. Now, is there anyone among us who does not want this? We have been trying for years, we have fought a war over this, and our armed forces have shed their blood. After all, there can be no two views about this. But there are obstacles in our path, perhaps we made mistakes and the whole issue has been taken to the United Nations. It has now become an international issue involving another country, Pakistan. Are these obstacles going to be removed by a few men from Gorakhpur doing satyagraha in Delhi?

What I mean to say is that there are certain things which are in one's control while others are not. The United States, the most powerful country in the world, has got stuck in a war in Korea. You may think America is happy about it. But actually they are very keen to get out of it as quickly as possible. But the end is not in sight. The American Congress cannot call a halt to the war by merely passing a Bill. In spite of its power, it is unable to call a halt to the Korean war. In international affairs, where other countries are also involved America cannot dictate. Either they will have to come to a mutual agreement or the war will go on.

It is childish to think that a few boys and some men from Gorakhpur can by offering satyagraha here hope to resolve the Jammu and Kashmir tangle. I am amazed at their stupidity. Parties like the Jan Sangh, Ram Rajya Parishad and Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh are aiding and abetting these agitations. There is a wide divergence of views between them and me. In my opinion, what they are saying will only aggravate India's ancient malady of divisiveness and the result will be India's fragmentation. If this kind of demand is allowed to go on, the north, south, east and west will all be divided and pitted against one another and religions will be warring with one another. Disunity is in our blood and we must eradicate it.

Anyhow, as far as the Jammu and Kashmir affair is concerned, we are being asked to do the impossible, to do something which even powerful countries like the United States cannot do. We can only keep trying through



diplomatic efforts. It is obvious that the people of Jammu and Kashmir are with India in any case. Jammu does not cease to be part of the State. If we try to rock the boat we may lose both Jammu and Kashmir, apart from the bad name that it will give us, especially when the matter is before the UNO.

Pakistan has certainly benefited from this movement. They are very happy about what the Jan Sangh is doing. After all, some sense must prevail. I am really amazed. The movement or satyagraha is not important if it takes place in Pathankot. But there are sixty or seventy ambassadors of various countries living in Delhi apart from innumerable foreign correspondents. So every little development like this is blown out of proportion. Let me tell you what the result will be. You must have heard about the recent turmoil in Pakistan—especially in West Punjab—in places like Lahore, Gujrat, Gujranwala and elsewhere. It was directed against the Quadianis there. I do not have any authority nor any desire to pass any opinion in this matter.

The primary school teachers of UP have started a movement for higher pay.<sup>9</sup> It is unfortunate that teachers who play such a vital role in moulding the minds of the young should themselves suffer. I agree that their salaries are not what they should be. The Government has during the past five years increased the salaries of teachers several times, but even then they are not what they should be. But teachers should not start an agitation. They must realize that they can get more only when the country produces more wealth and there is more to distribute.

9. Schools in Uttar Pradesh were closed on 20 and 21 March 1953 when 85,000 teachers observed a token strike demanding higher pay, allowances, and timely payment of salaries.

## 9. The Bhoodan Movement<sup>1</sup>

I attach the greatest importance to *Bhoodan Yagna* and it is our duty that we should fully understand the movement and give all help in making it a success. This movement is not a one-party movement, and all people, irrespective of party affiliations, should take part in it.

1. Address to a conference of Congress, Praja Socialist and some independent Members of Parliament, called to popularize the Bhoodan movement, New Delhi, 27 March 1953. From the *National Herald*, 28 March 1953. Extracts.

I have not the slightest doubt about the immense good that the movement is doing by creating an atmosphere in which a peaceful solution of India's paramount problem can be possible.

The land is India's problem number one, and for the past three decades it has been attracting the attention of the Congress and the country. A solution of the land problem is of utmost importance.

Mahatma Gandhi used to put forward what appeared to be extraordinary solutions of various problems. What he suggested usually appeared to the people somewhat unusual; and many a time people even doubted the efficacy of the remedies suggested by him. But in due course he was proved to be correct and his critics were confounded.

Life is far too complex to be completely comprehended by the laws of economics or anything else and, therefore, there is always the possibility of some unusual, and extraordinary remedy proving successful. This fact has been demonstrated by Acharya Vinoba Bhave's movement which has grown during the last two years.

Acharya Vinoba's movement is undoubtedly a rather unusual way of solving a great and complicated problem. It has two very important implications which must be borne in mind. First, it must not be forgotten that this movement does not absolve those in power at the Centre and in the States from their responsibility to solve the land problem through legislation.

If those in authority think that the land problem is being solved by Acharya Vinoba and all that is expected of them is to praise the great Acharya from time to time, it will be a grievous mistake.

Secondly, it must be remembered that the movement is essentially revolutionary—revolutionary not in the sense of violent outbursts but in the sense that it brings about basic changes in the society. It creates an atmosphere wherein the solution of India's paramount problem becomes possible. This is a method which the learned economists cannot explain or possibly cannot even understand.

While it is true that the Bhoodan movement tremendously affects the land problem as well as other problems by creating a healthy atmosphere of cooperation and peaceful change, the necessity of law and legislation cannot be obviated. It is clear that the atmosphere created by the movement will be very conducive to successful implementation of the laws.

This is an unusual thing, based essentially on Indian traditions, and therefore, it has something new in it, something which has not been found in other countries. Obviously, a change in people's hearts cannot be brought about overnight. Human weaknesses take time to disappear and, therefore, the change is bound to be slow. Nevertheless, the change is steady and certain and therefore of considerable importance.



Bhoodan is not a movement of the Congress alone, but of the nation as a whole. Other parties are also working it, with more zeal than Congressmen. Mr Jayaprakash Narayan is devoting all his time to the movement. It will, therefore, be a mistake to participate in the movement with the hope that their party will gain something by it....

## NATIONAL PROGRESS





## I. THE ECONOMY

### 1. To Mohanlal Saksena<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
January 5, 1953

My dear Mohanlal,<sup>2</sup>

...You referred to the way the Planning Commission worked.<sup>3</sup> I do not quite understand when you say that the Plan has not been made by the people. How do the people make the Plan except by drafts being placed before them for consideration and criticism and consultations taking place? There was a very great deal of consultation as well as criticism in the press. There might have been more, of course.

You referred to the big schemes. Nearly all our big schemes have been all in for a long time past and we could not give them up. In fact, our future depends on some of them. The whole stress now is on small schemes.

We have had a number of very expert and experienced observers from various countries abroad. They have spent weeks here in examining what we have done and what we are doing. They have compared it with other countries. Their reaction almost always has been extraordinarily in favour of what we are doing here. In fact, they have said that India, from the point of view of the work being done, is one of the most exciting countries in the world today.

Many of your criticisms in regard to the administration, etc., are justified. We should try our best to remove defects but, as you know, it is a terrific business to change a complicated machine.

Yours affectionately,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. Mohanlal Saksena Papers, NMML. Extracts.
2. He was a Congress Member of Parliament at this time.
3. In his letter of 16 December 1952, Saksena wrote that the people would understand a plan which "they have to make or which is directed to contribute to their well-being and progress in some palpable manner. In the present case the plan cannot be said to have been made by the people." He pointed out that the expenditure on the river valley schemes had been deliberately under-estimated and the yield over-estimated to secure Government approval. He also said that the administrative set-up was not oriented towards working for a Welfare State.



## 2. Faith in the Five Year Plan<sup>1</sup>

The most important and urgent task before the country is to ensure economic advance for the nation and to raise the living standards of the people with a view to ending poverty and unemployment by greater production and equitable distribution, and thus realize the objective of social justice and equality laid down in the Constitution. To this end all the resources of the nation must be directed in a planned manner, aiming more particularly at providing productive employment for all, so that everyone becomes a partner in the Welfare State, sharing in its burdens and benefits alike.

The Congress welcomes the First Five Year Plan, the adoption of which is an event of great significance and promise for the people of India, as it initiates a process of planned economic development of the country with the purpose of realizing progressively the objectives aimed at. The Plan is a realistic and flexible approach to this great problem and its full implementation will lay the sound foundation of rapid progress in the future.

The Congress agrees that the programme for rural development and increase in agricultural production in respect of both foodgrains and industrial raw materials is of the first importance, and food self-sufficiency must be realized at the earliest possible date. The Congress welcomes the recommendations in the Plan in regard to land policy more especially the acceptance of a ceiling on land holding and the emphasis laid on the expansion and strengthening of village and small-scale industries, and the building of the community on cooperative lines.

The Congress views the Plan as a first planned and important step designed to prepare the way for much more rapid advance on all fronts of national activity, and welcomes it as the promise of the progressive fulfilment of its aims and objectives. The Plan depends for its success on the cooperation of the people in the largest measure in every phase and at every stage of the process of implementation. It is a call to the country and an invitation for leadership at all levels to mobilize this cooperation and voluntary effort of the people. To this great enterprise and magnificent adventure of building up New India, the Congress invites all the people of the country.<sup>2</sup>

1. Resolution on the Five Year Plan for the Hyderabad Congress Session and adopted by the Steering Committee of the AICC on 16 January 1953. JN Collection.
2. The resolution was moved in the Congress Subjects Committee by Gulzarilal Nanda, Union Planning Minister, on 15 January 1953. Nehru, in his opening remarks in Hindi, said that the Five Year Plan was flexible and not rigid. If it was found necessary to include anything in the Plan which would take the country forward, it would be done. After discussions on 15 and 16 January, Nanda wound up the deliberations and all the seventeen proposed amendments were either withdrawn or rejected before the resolution was passed.

3. To T.T. Krishnamachari<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
March 5, 1953

My dear T.T.,

I find that there is some distress among Congressmen, both in Parliament and outside, over the recently announced import policy of Government.<sup>2</sup> I have not gone into the details of it and, therefore, am hardly in a position to express a final opinion about any particular matter. But I confess that I feel rather unhappy about the trend of this import policy. Some time back when we discussed this in Cabinet, great stress was laid on stopping all foreign imports except those that were absolutely necessary. This was not merely a question of foreign exchange, but to produce a certain psychological atmosphere in the country which we desire to encourage and which was in keeping with our old policy of swadeshi. In fact, before I knew anything about this import policy, I drafted my last fortnightly letter to Chief Ministers and mentioned something about the fading away of the swadeshi sentiment<sup>3</sup> in the country. I urged them to encourage this sentiment which I consider very important from every point of view, political, economic and psychological. If we encourage foreign imports, we may fill somewhat the wants of some middle class people. But we do so at a cost of drifting away from what we have so often proclaimed and believed in. Personally I think it would be a very good thing if people suffered from lack of things which are not absolutely necessary. I would rather feel that we should think more in terms of our rural classes and their necessities than our urban people and their semi-luxuries.

The encouragement of Indian industry would also only take place if there was this urge and a vacuum to be filled. If there is no vacuum, the urge grows less.

There is another aspect. We have at present very fine factories belonging to Defence. Many of these can be utilized for the production of civilian goods. But little attention is paid to that and we are therefore not utilizing these factories fully. The question of employment comes in. It may take a little time to organize this, but it can be done and would undoubtedly be done if circumstances compelled us. But we take the easier course.

1. File No 44/48-PMS.
2. The import policy for January-June 1953, announced on 31 December 1952, removed restrictions which were imposed on some 50 items in the current policy period. The Government granted licence to newcomers in respect of some 50 items. It also enabled the importers to obtain import licences for a large number of items.
3. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 20, p. 589.



As this matter raises the question of our whole approach to these problems, would it not be better for us to discuss it fully in Cabinet?

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

#### 4. The Inevitability of Mixed Economy<sup>1</sup>

President<sup>2</sup> and friends,

As you know, we have drawn up a Five Year Plan after a great deal of deliberation. That does not mean that it is something sacrosanct that cannot be criticized or altered. We shall make changes, whenever it is necessary. We shall be within our rights to expand it or cut down something. But for the first time, an effort has been made to draw up a plan, keeping the entire country's interests before us. We can go only so far as our strength will permit. It is certainly possible for us to increase our strength because the people of India are an ocean of humanity. But it is not so easy to harness that entire strength. It is not a small matter to have induced the common people to become plan-conscious. The problems of the country have to be seen in their entirety against the available resources. There is no point in merely expressing a pious hope. If things could be achieved merely by expressing a desire, we could change the world in no time at all.

We have drawn up the plan after taking into account all our resources, and certain needs have been given priority. It is something that you can add to or reduce and make changes. But more than that a certain base has been laid down for us to think about and work upon. Of course, the plan is ultimately not merely the product of a thinking exercise alone, but is directly related to facts. We can regulate our activities according to our resources and strength. Everybody may not agree with us about everything, but I think any individual who looks at it honestly will have to accept that at least 90 per cent or 95 per cent of it is absolutely right. We may have to make alterations to the extent of about 5 per cent. It is difficult to make a complete change in the economic system of the country or draw up a new plan. Often people say that they want to start with a clean slate. But the fact is that no country or individual can ever

1. Address to the annual session of the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, New Delhi, 7 March 1953. From AIR tapes, NMML. Nehru spoke first in Hindi and then in English. Extracts.
2. R.G. Saraiya.

have a clean slate to work upon. Even when there have been mighty revolutions, and the attempt was to have a clean slate, it could not be achieved. The price for it was so high that it was thought later that it would have been better to have retained the old slate.

Therefore, whichever way you look at it, it would be necessary to accept at least 90 per cent of it, with a few minor changes here and there. As we learn by experience, we can add to it or make alterations. But it is very important to create an atmosphere in the country in which it is possible to work in this direction and grow. You have the right to do it or not, but you will have to accept the fundamental principles. I am amazed that our colleagues in the opposition parties, in Parliament, and elsewhere, who seem to criticize everything, the Five Year Plan and other things, do so merely for the sake of criticism. It is really a peculiar phenomenon. It is understandable if they argue about a few things here and there, but what they do is that they oppose everything fundamentally. The result is that at a time when it is absolutely essential to create a proper atmosphere of harmony and understanding, they create obstacles and bad blood, and induce people to think that nothing can be done unless we start with a clean slate.

Now, I cannot understand how it can benefit the country if such ideas are spread or everything is opposed blindly. They are certainly welcome to oppose anything which they feel should be opposed. But to oppose it fundamentally is wrong. We have to create an atmosphere of cooperative effort on a large scale in the country. I have no doubt in my mind that this can be done, and it is being done to some extent. Wherever we have tried, we have had excellent response. I have no complaints against the people of our country. They are very good and capable of doing hard work. It is another matter that they sometimes get carried away at others' instigation. But I feel sad that at a critical time in the history of the world and our country, when our entire energy should be devoted to laying a strong foundation for our future progress, people are frittering away their time and energy in useless pursuits, and lead others also astray.

The coming five or ten years will be very critical for our country and the world. Everything will depend on how the next five to ten years are utilized in India, politically and economically, when it will be decided as to what this country counts for in the world. We have to devote all our energies to strengthening our foundation. If we get through the next five to ten years successfully, India will progress very far. This is why I get perturbed when I see people, who should have more sense, raise issues and create tensions, which have no relevance to issues which truly count. They want to take India back to the Middle Ages which have no relation to the modern world.<sup>3</sup>

I was listening to the President's Address, and there was hardly anything

3. Upto here Nehru spoke in Hindi.



in it—I am not referring to the details—with which there is any disagreement, I might say, in the principal approach. But it is one thing to be in agreement with things and another thing to lay emphasis on the right things. And it is very important—this business of emphasis, and this business of putting first things first and second things second.

I am not referring to the President's Address, but generally, for the moment, it is highly important, and I drew your attention to this fact—as to what was the first thing for us in India to do. Everybody will agree that we have got to do a hundred things in India, which are all desirable. We want them. But what are we going to do first and what second, is highly important....

First things first are always important, but they become even more important when you have to do things quickly, when time is limited, when problems encompass you. You have not got a long period to think it over and do what you like—those things that should come first and those things that should come second. You have to achieve results quickly, relatively quickly. We live today in India and in the world at a very critical period, when all kinds of problems encompass us and the world.

So far as we in India are concerned, we achieved independence five and a half years ago. The achievement of that independence has released all kinds of forces that had been suppressed for a long time—forces, urges, desires, passions all released, and without the necessary discipline. We cannot ignore those forces that have been suppressed for generations past by foreign domination. They look forward to big things happening; so we cannot suppress those forces. We ought not to. They are living, dynamic forces in the country. We want to take advantage of them. We have to utilize them, throw them into right channels, because they can do good, but, not going into the right channel, they can do much harm.

We have, therefore, to solve some of these basic problems, and essentially the basic problem ultimately is one of raising the level of the millions of our people definitely and precisely. That is the problem now if you look at it from any other way, production, all this and that, that is all perfectly true—millions of our people. It becomes a dynamic problem with a social purpose behind it.

What is our social purpose? The social purpose is again to raise the level of our people, the whole of them,—and not of any particular section or group or the community only—to bring about a progressive measure of equality or rather, to lessen the inequalities that exist, not suddenly, not absolutely, but progressively, as far as we can. Because apart from the fact that it is the trend of the modern world, it is a desirable object, and if, as we say, we aim at a Welfare State, well, the Welfare State means the partnership of the people in their State. And a partner means a person who shares the benefits and obligations of that partnership. If he does not get the benefits he is no partner; and if he has only obligations, he resents this, and rightly so.

A person who is unemployed, let us say, has no sense of partnership. He is out of it and is, therefore, socially, individually and as a group, a danger to the State—quite apart from the humanitarian aspect of it. Therefore, if we aim at a Welfare State, as we do, we must always keep that in mind and judge all our policies from that point of view.

Perhaps the most important aspect of this approach is this question of unemployment, that is, unemployment being eliminated ultimately. It is not an easy matter in this huge country; but, whether difficult or easy, one has to face that question. We are going in that direction, and all our planning, etc. is meant for that. But we have to fight all the time as to how to hasten that progress. Because, if we do not, it comes in our way and it prevents our progressing at all.

We want obviously greater production of wealth in our country. We are not going to get wealth pouring in from other countries, and in fact, we do not want that to happen. I have no objection to external help, but we have to stand on our own feet, and depend, if we do, upon our brain, and not other people's labour. We become weak and helpless. So, if we have to go ahead, we have to produce wealth, with all kinds of our resources, including our man-power resources. As an algebraical formula, I put it down: here is our unemployed man-power which should be given work; work leads to greater production. So, why cannot we do that and put an end to unemployment and have more production too? It is simple. Yet, it is not quite so simple as it seems, but it should be simpler than people think. I will not say it is so frightfully difficult.

In this matter, of course, the old 19th century way of looking at things, *laissez faire*, and all that is considered quite out of date. If we have got a certain social purpose in view, and if we want to advance to it, then we want to direct, as far as possible, all the national effort to that end, to coordinate it and direct it. Whatever it may be, whether public sector or private sector, we cannot possibly follow that policy of *laissez faire* in leaving it to chance. No country in the world really follows that, and even some which talked about it cannot wholly follow it. It is a principle which is totally opposed to the idea of the Welfare State. Most others have rejected that completely. So it comes to this, we have a kind of planned economy, which, essentially is controlled economy.

I may make clear what I mean by controlled economy. By controlled economy, I do not mean a multitude of controls all over the place, but I do mean that the whole object of that economy, the whole basis of it is to lay down certain broad channels so that it can go in a certain direction provided with effective controls, but not a multitude of controls. Because, otherwise, you cannot direct all your energies to one end.

Take again the talk about the private sector and public sector. We call this a mixed economy. It is not a very happy word—this mixed economy—but we use it for want of a better word. It clearly indicates, on the one hand, that you



are not taking any extreme line to what might be called the right or the left. The line to the right means, of course, what is called free private enterprise to do what it chooses. The line to the left would mean elimination of private enterprise completely.

We are functioning under a democratic system, not only a democratic Constitution, but generally speaking, with certain democratic objectives in view, and we do not want to shed them. Therefore, howsoever much we may socialize our economy, we do want to keep democracy there. There is an obvious tendency in too much collectivism for democracy to go by the wall. Therefore, when one values that background of democracy, one wants to retain it with the result you have got what is called a mixed economy. In fact, every economy is a mixed economy. It may be ninety-nine and one per cent or 50-50 or 60-40. Certainly it is mixed economy, whether you call it mixed economy or not. Mixed economy should not mean two rival conflicting economies working against each other. That would be absurd. It means that there is a public sector, which is presumably run hundred per cent for the benefit of the social purpose laid down by the State, and there is a private sector which should, broadly speaking, also run for that social purpose. But the private sector has its own way of functioning. To try to maintain a private sector and hamstring it all over the place and try to ask it to behave otherwise than it is capable of behaving, means that the private sector is not functioning satisfactorily. Therefore, within the broad controlled economy, the direction and the plan, etc., one should have the largest measure of cooperation no doubt, but one should allow within those limits a certain freedom of action to the private sector to function according to its own ways. It is better for something to be done whether in the public sector or the private sector with some knowledge of that broad process than to mess up the two.

However, my main point is that we have to keep this major thing in view, the removal of unemployment, and make that the test of our future progress. And that depends not only on our creating the right policy but creating certain public opinion, and enthusiasm in the public. It is obvious that there are many methods, but the main thing is to make the unemployed do something, because, fundamentally, seen from a social or personal angle, it is extremely harmful for people to be without work, and they cannot be full-fledged members of our society. They cannot be taken into account economically. Therefore, it is extremely important to remove unemployment.

You have shown that the number of unemployed has gone down by three lakhs which is a good thing. I would say that everything that we do in this country should be measured by the yardstick of how far it reduces unemployment. It is a good yardstick for it affects many other things as well. So the question is whether the method by which we have reduced unemployment by three lakhs is adequate or whether we must do something else. This is a

matter to be seriously considered. It is a simple matter that on the one hand, we have to increase production and, on the other, we have to reduce unemployment. So if the unemployed were harnessed into the task of production, production goes up and unemployment goes down. It is a broad fact that it may be a little difficult to begin with, to marry up the two, for it involves a great deal of expenditure which we cannot afford to undertake at once.

It is obvious that there are bound to be difficulties. But ultimately the only way is to give work to the unemployed and to increase production in the country, by proper methods—not by making people break stones to lay roads, as in jails. They must produce essential goods. The modern thinking of economics runs in this direction. The old way of thinking was good too, but it is changing now, and there is no reason for unemployment in the country. I do not mean that it will disappear overnight by some magic, for these things take time. The old system of gradually putting up factories, etc., was all right, but it is no longer adequate. The responsibilities of the government are increasing because of the Five Year Plan, etc. So you must consider these complicated problems carefully.

My own experience has been that the reaction in the public has been good wherever any attempt has been made to approach it. It is a most satisfying reaction. I want to tell you that we are undertaking some very big projects in the country, I am amazed at the song or hymn of depression of many of our friends because somehow they seem to have a passion for running down their own country and its activities, simply because they find themselves opposed to us politically. I just do not see why they should consider it to their interest to run down their country and their people. The fact of the matter is that we—I am not talking about my party or Government—we, as a country, have undertaken very big projects which are often astonishing to the countries outside. We have taken up these very big tasks, and we are gradually realizing them, translating those visions we had into action. And, it is a most exciting adventure for those who can see this process at work....

I was recently in Ambarnath near Bombay to inaugurate a defence production factory for machine tools, etc.<sup>4</sup> I have heard that something that I had said there has been misunderstood.<sup>5</sup> I was trying to emphasize that unless

4. He inaugurated the Machine Tools Prototype Factory at Ambarnath on 13 January 1953. For his speech, see *post*, pp. 114-15.
5. *The Eastern Economist*, for example, stated on 16 January 1953: "Can it be that the Prime Minister actually allowed himself to emit three whole red herrings in a single sentence? For an occasion not suitable for an ex-cathedra statement on the working of private enterprise the interjection of the offending sentence follows on no reason, good or otherwise. Can it be that the Chairman of the Planning Commission, flatly violating the precepts on small-scale industries piously set out in Chapter 12 of the Draft Outline Plan is now assuming cross-purposes of his own?"



we make progress in the basic sectors, there cannot industrially be any meaningful progress in India. By the basic sectors I mean the key industries like the steel industry, machine-making industry, etc. I was trying to show that it would be a good thing for us to pay attention to the sector, and was also expressing my happiness at the fact that we are concentrating on it. I was talking specially about the factory in Ambernath. I said that it was one of the fundamental things. I do not attach importance to isolated industries and factories. That does not mean that I do not want them to come up. That is absurd. I want every kind of progress, but what I meant really was that for industrial growth in India we need a strong foundation and not merely small factories here and there.

There is a debate in our country about big industries and cottage industries. I cannot understand the necessity for this debate. We can progress only by coordinating both, by making full use of them. One must not stand in the way of the other. I doubt if our country can even remain independent if we do not develop big industries here. If we do not develop our major industries, then either we will have to depend upon others or throw out all the products of the modern world, like the railways, aeroplanes, guns and canons because these things cannot be produced by cottage industries. The only alternative is to import them which means we would be dependent on others. How can we be free when they can strangle us or capture our industries any time they like? Therefore, it becomes very important to develop our big industries to maintain our freedom, and for our progress.

But however much we may expand them in our own lifetime, they cannot cover the whole country, nor provide employment to everyone. Therefore, there are innumerable possibilities—not only possibility, but a necessity for developing cottage industries. An argument is advanced that there should be no competition between the two, and that certain sectors should be helped to grow. But we must understand the fact that the picture—of the country's freedom, economic growth, etc.—has to be seen in its entirety in order to find a proper solution.

But apart from these big issues, there is one other very big task that we have undertaken, namely, the establishment of the community centres in India. Make no mistake about it, it is a very big task. We have started off well. I do not mean to say that all the fifty-five centres are flourishing; some are not. But, generally speaking, they are full of promise. They have only been in existence for two or three months, but during this short period, they have shown enough promise. Basically, what they are supposed to do? They are meant to enrich millions of our people, individually. It is not a question of starting a factory here and there. That is good in its own way, but these centres are meant to enrich directly some millions of people, and if all goes well with our Five Year Plan we are supposed to reach over a hundred million people of India, almost directly and more indirectly. In terms of any revolutionary ethics,

just if we succeed it will be the biggest revolution that the world has ever seen.

And yet people, who were so far our friends, are running everything down, and they say we are going to the dogs. It really amazes me how, these men, our people who were in the front ranks of our revolutionary movements, have turned now into what they call in England, as Colonel Blimp<sup>6</sup>, running down everything, not appreciating what the people are doing, especially running themselves down when it is necessary to arouse enthusiasm. An extraordinary thing is, we all complain that there is no enthusiasm in the country. Having done their best to depress everyone round about them, they say we see no enthusiasm. Naturally not, because they themselves feel they are depressed, and they see others, in a sense, through their own reflected feelings.

Here we are engaged in these mighty undertakings and the next five or ten years are vital for this country—vital, if you like for the world. No man knows what is going to happen, but only those who work hard, and those who do not get lost in the small things of life, are going to survive in this race and trials that are going on all over the world and in India.

We have therefore to look at these big things, and pull ourselves up to our full height, and try to realize them. In that, naturally all of you—all of you as a group, as individuals, and as representing a certain very important section of the community—can play an important part. But remember always that our social purpose is not to advance your group or your community. Our social purpose is to advance the thirty-six crores of people of India. You can help in that. In doing that, you become—if I may say so—a part of that vital current that is going through India. Those who do not do so simply become one of the backwaters without the living element in them.

Swadeshi and cottage industries are very important. I feel a little sad that it is being mentioned less often in India now, and some people seem to think that now that we are free, we need not look in that direction any more. I feel that it is extremely important from every angle, economically as well as intellectually.

As you know, I would not consent to India isolating herself from the world. No nation can afford to do so. We must have trade and diplomatic relations with other countries and let fresh ideas flow in from outside. But I feel that especially in the situation that exists today, we are not firmly rooted in our soil and so long as our roots are not in our own country, there can be no proper physical, mental or industrial progress. I therefore attach great importance to swadeshi. I do not mean that we will not import anything. We have to import a great many things from outside, but it is obvious that these will be essential

6. The famous character, Colonel Blimp, representing the fatuous "die-hard" imperial citizen, was adopted by cartoonist David Low in 1934.



goods like machines, etc. But it will be better if the thinking is that we should do without things which are not essential. A certain atmosphere has to be created for such thinking to develop an atmosphere of austerity. If we cannot get something we must not get it from outside unless it is absolutely essential. I am entirely in agreement with this thinking.

How are we to implement this idea? Different things become essential at different times. So we must consider this carefully. I need not repeat it. I do feel about this swadeshi business very strongly. I am no believer in what is called autocracy or isolation. I believe in the fullest cooperation with the other countries of the world in every sphere. That is one thing, but I do not believe in dependence on others—inter-dependence, yes, occasionally; but not dependence.

Also, I do not believe in any individual or group or nation going soft. We all have a tendency to go soft—"We", meaning those who can afford to go soft—I am not talking about the millions of our people. They have no chance of going soft. I believe it would do us good for our own selves, if we had a little more austerity in our own lives and a little less vulgar display, which is really most displeasing whether it is our special functions, weddings or other such occasions. I do not understand why our tastes have gone down so much that we indulge in these vulgar displays so often. Encourage art. Encourage so many other things in India which are deserving of encouragement if you have money to spare; but why encourage vulgarity? I cannot understand this, because display of money without art is vulgarity....

So I want the swadeshi spirit to be introduced. It is good for us. It imposes self-reliance, and in this world, what is most necessary for the individual and for the group is self-reliance. One never knows, one may be deprived even of the opportunity of relying on some other person. Therefore, it is best not to rely. That does not mean—I repeat—isolation. Of course not. We have to depend, but self-reliance does mean having faith in ourselves, our country, and in working for it.

## II. INDUSTRY

### 1. To K.C. Reddy<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

January 1, 1953

My dear Reddy,<sup>2</sup>

...I understand that the Sindri Fertilizer Company has got at present 50,000

1. File No 17 (198)/50-PMS. Extracts. A copy of this letter was sent to Finance Minister and Minister for Food and Agriculture also.

2. He was Minister of Production at this time.

tons in stock. They are producing 850 tons daily and stocking most of this, because consumption seems to have slowed down very much. After another two or three months, I am told there will be no more room left for stocking, unless the outflow is much greater than it is at present. The result then might well be that the factory has to slow down production greatly or even stop working.

This information has surprised me greatly, because I was under the impression that our demand for fertilizer was so great that we could not meet it even if the Sindri plant was working at full pressure. Only a year or two ago, we were importing fertilizers worth crores from abroad. What has happened now? Why is the consumption less? One would have expected the consumption to increase as more and more areas begin to use fertilizers. Apparently, even those areas that were using it do not take as much as they used to. At the same time, presumably, no special efforts are being made to take it to new areas.

I do not know if the price has anything to do with it. I understand that the price till yesterday was Rs. 360/- per ton, but is being reduced from today to Rs 300 per ton. The fertilizer that the Americans are bringing to us from Japan, under the Technical Aid Scheme,<sup>3</sup> is I understand priced at about Rs 240 per ton. This is pooled with our own fertilizer and then supplied to the consumers.

All this should be enquired into. Perhaps the Food Conference that we are having on the 8th January might consider this also.

It seems rather odd that we cannot utilize the fertilizer we have got already with us and still think of increasing our production.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. On 1 May 1952, an agreement for the supply of about 108,000 tons of fertilizers to India by the US Government was signed in New Delhi under the Indo-US Technical Cooperation Agreement.



## 2. The Need for Basic Industries<sup>1</sup>

We have been interested in the factory<sup>2</sup> from the very beginning not only because we considered it essential from the country's defence point of view but also because it is one of those basic things that every country must have.

We are not interested in the little factories that are spread over the country, for at best they are money-making propositions for individuals and do not add to the country's wealth. It is necessary to develop basic industries, like the one I am opening, which can be called mother industry from which other industries grow.

It is not enough to set up a factory, import plants from abroad and run to other countries if there is some mistake in the working of the plant or if any spare parts are needed. Taking help from abroad—from countries like America, England and France—is not bad, but we should not be too dependent on others.

The task before us is to make our country happy and prosperous. We have to provide the people with the essentials of life like food, clothing, shelter and education. The question of unemployment and poverty has to be tackled. They are not problems which can be solved with a magic wand or by pushing a button. Therefore, it is necessary to concentrate our energies on making the country economically independent.

I do not know exactly, how many independent countries are there in the world today—sixty, seventy or eighty. We know that not all of these countries are independent in the real sense of the word. Politically independent they may be, but a number of them are economically dependent on others. The economic independence of a country is judged by its capacity to produce all the things it requires—of course not all the things can be produced, and I do not want to take the extreme view. There are problems like that of raw materials. But, what I mean to say is that most of the necessities of life should be produced. It is, therefore, necessary to develop basic industries, which will provide the economic base for the country.

1. Speech at the opening of the Machine Tools Prototype Factory at Ambemath. 13 January 1953. From *The Hindu*, 14 January 1953.
2. The machine tool prototype factory at Ambemath, about 40 miles from Mumbai and situated on a 26-acre site adjacent to an existing ordnance factory, was a joint endeavour of the Government of India, and the armed forces personnel, and a leading Swiss firm, Messrs Oerlikons, which enabled the completion of the project in three years.

The people should shed narrow outlook and eschew petty squabbles and direct their concerted efforts towards making the country economically strong. It is no good to develop only one part of the country. All the States will have to progress simultaneously. It is, therefore, necessary to be united.

Every Indian should go through the First Five Year Plan and understand the problems confronting the country. The people should not waste their energy on the small things of life. I have visited the Bhakra-Nangal Project in Punjab and several other schemes which are now in various stages of construction and these are giving a new look to independent India.

This factory is an example of international cooperation. We all welcome such cooperation. We do not wish to isolate ourselves from others. We wish to learn from others, and if we have anything they do not have, we shall be happy to give it to them. We wish to be friends with others. The idea that I wish to impress upon you is that we should become less and less dependent on others. That process must go on.

Those engaged in the factory must regard themselves as partners in a great national undertaking, forgetting petty issues. As human beings, they are no doubt all equal, but the man who does more work, will naturally be entrusted with greater responsibility. These factories are not being set up merely to earn profits. In fact, whatever profit accrues out of it will ultimately go to the people to better their conditions.

India's intentions are peaceful. The only battle she is now fighting is for economic independence and against poverty and unemployment. She has completed one pilgrimage by winning freedom and she is now on another pilgrimage for economic prosperity. Every Indian should regard himself as a pilgrim and do all that a pilgrim will do to reach his goal.

### 3. To K.C. Reddy<sup>1</sup>

Camp: Hyderabad  
January 16, 1953

My dear Reddy,

As the draft telegram has been approved by you and Deshmukh, I do not wish to change it at this stage, but I confess I am not satisfied with it wholly. Apart

1. File No 17(144)/49-PMS.



from the points mentioned in the draft, the major point was the creation of a vested foreign interest, namely, American-Japanese, for a considerable period of years in India in regard to a basic industry. We objected to the whole industry being in charge of Japanese managing agents for this period. We did not like this and we felt sure that the public would not like it.<sup>2</sup>

However, it is difficult to explain all these in the telegram now, though I think our Ambassador should be informed separately, if necessary. Ultimately it came to this, that we were handing over charge and control of this basic industry to a foreign combine, because we were likely to get some money from them. The amount was not very great and it was felt that it is better to find the money ourselves and keep control while taking every assistance from foreign experts.

You can send the telegram.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. A hundred million-dollar Japanese iron works project in which Japanese businessmen were expected to invest capital did not materialize because the Indian negotiators did not want to give the right of management to Japanese interests and the financial arrangements proposed by the latter were also not acceptable to India.

#### 4. Cable to M.A. Rauf<sup>1</sup>

I have seen your letter to Chanda<sup>2</sup> dated 21st January and Chanda's telegram to you in reply. I am sorry that any misunderstanding was caused. Partly this may be due to our having gone thus far in exploring scheme but as it emerged finally there were many aspects of it which were undesirable and overall position was that Japanese-American combine would have overall charge and control of basic industry for considerable period. On full consideration we are generally opposed to such foreign control of basic industries and there would undoubtedly

1. New Delhi, 31 January 1953. File No 17(144)/49-PMS. M.A. Rauf was India's Ambassador to Japan at this time.
2. A.K. Chanda was Deputy Minister for External Affairs at this time.

have been considerable public criticism. Foreign or technical assistance is always welcome. This is for your information only.

It appears to us that Japanese are really interested in obtaining iron ore from us. We might consider this proposition provided long term arrangements could be made and financial liability for construction of necessary transport facilities accepted. Japanese Ambassador<sup>3</sup> here referred to this and said he would write later.

3. Thutomu Nishiyama was Japan's Ambassador in India at this time.

## 5. The Importance of Village Industries<sup>1</sup>

No modern nation can retain its freedom without the help of large-scale industries, which should be State-controlled and State-owned. In a big country like India village industries have vast scope. I think there is no basic conflict between big industries and small.

However much big industries might develop and expand in India there will always be a vast scope for the expansion of village industries. The question is one of coordination—how to coordinate the small industries in the overall economy of the country. I am confident that by employing new methods and techniques, khadi industry can make much greater progress and stand on its own legs.

In the final analysis, those who are now concerned with the work have to prove—they should work sincerely to prove it—that the economic utility of khadi and village industries still remains an important factor in the country's well-being. No institution can progress unless it has its inherent strength. Nor can any institution flourish if it depends entirely upon the help of others, or the Government. The Government would, of course, render necessary assistance, but the need for encouraging and developing its own inherent strength is there. I have often heard of complaints that the Government is not helping institutions of this character. There is no point in blaming the Government. The progress and the future of the Board depend on the strength of the movement and, unless the economic foundation involved in

1. Address at the first meeting of the All-India Khadi and Village Industries Board, New Delhi, 2 February 1953. From *The Hindustan Times* and *The Hindu*, 3 February 1953.



the work is strengthened, it can hardly make progress. The work may take five or ten years. You should not despair at it; it is worth labouring for. I can assure of my own help as best as possible, and the Government would also help in all possible ways. But the main task of development has to be shouldered by the village industries and workers themselves. The khadi industry can best go ahead under its own momentum and under the impulse of its own economic and social influence on society and not by an artificial prop.

All these matters are of course inter-connected with the larger issue of the economic policy of the country. In the fast-changing world, one has to adjust to the changing conditions and no one can afford to remain static. But some orthodox economists do not realize that none can live in isolation and work exclusively. The outlook of many has to change along with the changing conditions in the world.

We are all very anxious to develop khadi and other small industries not for the sake of staging some sort of a "show" or for any exhibitionist reasons but to achieve concrete results. We sincerely believe that small industries can really help the economic advancement of the people.

Khadi and village industries developed under the inspiration of Gandhiji who laid particular emphasis on *charkha*. *Charkha* was made by him as an economic and revolutionary symbol for the people. It became a weapon in the hands of the struggling Indians to secure economic uplift and stage a political revolution. The nation profited by it enormously politically. While the political aspect of *charkha* and khadi had been fully realized with the gaining of freedom, its economic significance has now been ignored, or it has disappeared. With one of its two pillars thus knocked off, it has to stand only on the bulwark of economic benefits to the people. Every effort must, therefore, be made to strengthen this economic significance of khadi and village industries.

The various khadi and small industry organizations should not feel helpless and blame the static position of the industries on lack of governmental and other support. No organization with that outlook can forge its way ahead. Others' faults are always there, but we have to look at our own. I have a strong faith that if we are on the right path we shall achieve our objective and we can shape social and economic forces and policies.

Some persons suggest that khadi can be used by the Army or by Government messengers. I wonder how far can khadi be practically useful to a soldier who has to crawl on ground and walk in jungles. There are objections by several State Governments that it would increase their expenses much more if only khadi is used by them. We should not think in terms of Government help alone in this way. That way, not much progress can be possible.

The Communist Party has many good things, and many bad things too. These people who call themselves revolutionaries are surprisingly reactionaries in some respects. Some of their economic and political theories are sixty to seventy years old. They do not change or adapt themselves to the changing conditions and varying circumstances.

The khadi workers should not become dogmatic and should be receptive to modern trends and ways. They could revitalize and regenerate khadi and village industries by a new approach and outlook. There should be a dynamic approach in dealing with the development of khadi and village industries, for the nation benefited immeasurably from khadi during its freedom struggle. The effect of adopting the *charkha* as a symbol and khadi as an instrument was immense in the country's political struggle. But some weakness or drawbacks had crept in, and the movement remained stultified. It is for the khadi workers now to take stock of the situation and examine that weakness and those drawbacks from which the movement of khadi and village industries suffered. At present, self-introspection is always good and it is no virtue to blame others.

In my own mind an idea is growing daily that the yardstick by which one can measure the economic progress of a country is the extent of employment. We have been talking of having a Welfare State. A Welfare State is one where every citizen is a partner, sharing its benefits and responsibilities equally. Every citizen must realize that he is actually a partner in the State. People must have full employment. How could there be a Welfare State if people could not get employment? For the unemployed, the Welfare State has no meaning. The biggest problem before the country is, therefore, unemployment of young men. This question has got to be solved. It is a social disease and it has to be checked and removed. Some people think that this problem can be solved if the country maintains the present rate of progress, but I feel we have to place a greater emphasis on the questions of solving the unemployment problem. Khadi and village industries have a great role to play in this sphere of solving unemployment.

I assure you that the Government will give its fullest support to the Board in its task of developing khadi and village industries in the country. I feel that such a Board should have been set up four years ago. Although the delay has caused me surprise, I am glad to note that a beginning has been made at least now. When the Board was about to be constituted, some friends had suggested that the Prime Minister should be closely associated with it. I liked the idea but I was told that rules and regulations forbade association of the Prime Minister with such organizations and that his presence in such a Board would have only superficial value. I therefore told the sponsors that I would not like to be directly associated with the Board. I, however, gave the assurance that I would give all the help to the Board that was needed.



## 6. Tele-Communications Factory<sup>1</sup>

I agree that it will not be desirable to run this proposed Wireless and Electronics Factory<sup>2</sup> departmentally. There should be an autonomous or semi-autonomous body to manage it. Whether this should be a private limited liability company or some other form of organization, has to be considered. Private limited companies have to observe a number of complicated rules which have little application to Government concerns. Therefore, it has been suggested that Government concerns should have a somewhat different form of organization. Possibly this requires legislation or an amendment of the existing law insofar as it applies to Government-owned concerns.

2. I think that this matter as a question of principle should be put up before the Cabinet for decision. If we take any steps in any direction now without having this principle decided, then we might have to change that decision later.

3. I agree with the opinion of the Minister of Defence that we should take early steps in this matter.

4. I agree also that it is not necessary for the Mysore Government to be represented on the Board of Directors.

5. I think the names of the non-official Directors should be considered carefully. I am not particularly attracted to the names suggested. Dr Bhabha is certainly an eminent scientist. He is a very busy man and hardly has any time to do research work for which he is particularly suited. I think we should consult the Ministry of Natural Resources and Scientific Research in regard to a scientist to be put on the Board. Indeed, I should like to consult Dr Bhabha himself as well as Dr Bhatnagar.

6. A brief summary should be prepared for the Cabinet. This should state that the contract has been signed with the CSF<sup>3</sup> for the setting up of a Wireless and Electronics Factory and it is proposed to start work on this as soon as possible. Some indication of the capital required should be given. It should be stated that Bangalore is the most suitable place for this factory.

1. Note to Defence Secretary, 14 February 1953. File No 17(278)/53-PMS. Extracts.
2. A contract had been entered into by the Government of India with a French firm for the setting up of an electronics and tele-communications factory in Bangalore. The total outlay was about Rs 7 crores.
3. On 26 December 1952, the Government of India signed an agreement with the French firm, Campagnie Generale de Telegraphers Sans Fil, which provided for training of Indian technicians in designing, and in the setting up of a plant and machinery of the factory.

7. Some indication should be given as to when the factory can start functioning if we begin to take steps soon. (This is mentioned in Deputy Minister's note).

8. It should then be stated that it is proposed not to run the factory departmentally, but either as a private limited company or in some other more or less similar way. A decision is required on that as it is intended to start such a company soon and entrust future work to the Board of Directors.

9. As regards the composition of the Board of Directors, it should be stated that there will be four officials and three non-officials, of whom one at least should be an eminent scientist. It should not be stated as to who will be Chairman of the Board and no names should be mentioned of non-officials....

## 7. Export of Thorium Nitrate<sup>1</sup>

I dislike the idea of our restricting our legitimate business abroad because of the American embargo. While thorium nitrate may be considered as a war material, it is undoubtedly largely used for peace purposes. If we extend our ban to Indonesia, etc., then it becomes very difficult for us to carry on our Indian Rare Earths Company.<sup>2</sup> Our natural market for its products is the Far East.

2. At the same time, I realize that, just at this particular moment when perhaps far-reaching policies are being considered at Washington, any such export may help to give a wrong turn to these policies.

3. While I am clear that we should not restrict our activities because of the American embargo, I do not wish, at this stage, to do anything which might worsen matters. I should like to wait for a brief period, say about a month or

1. Note to Foreign Secretary, 20 February 1953. File No Z/53/2311/11, MEA.

2. The Indian Rare Earths Company at Alwaye, a joint stock company of the Government of India and the Travancore-Cochin State, wished to export thorium nitrate to China, Indonesia and some other countries.



so or till the end of March, to see what happens in the United Nations and what developments take place otherwise.

4. I would, therefore, postpone decision in regard to the Chinese demand for the present, but I would be prepared to consider it again a month or so later.

5. In regard to Indonesia, I think we should agree to supply the thorium nitrate to it.

## 8. Export of Iron Ore to Japan<sup>1</sup>

I am quite clear that we should encourage in every way the export of iron ore to any country. That would be a source of income for us. Therefore, there is not only no objection to our exporting iron ore to Japan, but we would welcome it. The real difficulty that has come in our way is in regard to the original cost involved in making arrangements for such export, such as, harbour facilities, railway transport, etc. I think we should certainly discuss these terms with Japanese representatives and a negotiating team for the purpose might be constituted.

2. I do not like the idea of a foreign Government dealing with private parties in India. I should like this to be under State agency. That State agency may either be the Government of India or the State Government.

3. It would be desirable for the Ad hoc Committee on Iron and Steel to consider this matter, but there should be no delay. These papers might, in the meanwhile, be sent to the Finance Minister and other Ministers on that Committee.

1. Note to the Ministry of Production, 1 March 1953. File No 17(144)/49-PMS.

9. To T.T. Krishnamachari<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
March 5, 1953

My dear T.T.,

Some time back I spoke to you about the Titanium Dioxide Factory in Travancore. A day or two ago I enquired about it and I find that H.V.R. Iengar<sup>2</sup> has sent a note. I do not myself see how the Tariff Board can help in this matter, though of course they could throw some light about prices, etc. The proposals made by Bhatnagar<sup>3</sup> indicated that it might be possible to start the factory without much delay. Bhatnagar or your Ministry here has nothing to do in this matter. I consulted him and Homi Bhabha<sup>4</sup> merely because the matter was raised in the House at question time and people spoke to me about it when I went to Travancore.

There is no question of our Government purchasing this factory. It is only in the way of advice to the Travancore Government. It is a pity that a factory in which Rs 73 lakhs have been invested should lie idle. That is not a good testimonial to the Government that invested it. I am rather inclined to suspect that the ICI,<sup>5</sup> which is a part sharer, is not keen on this factory being started. I distrust these big foreign organizations.

The proposal to be considered is a relatively simple one, that a market should be assured for the products of the factory and it has been suggested that we may lay down by order that all purchasers of ilmenite from India should purchase 10% of it in the form of titanium dioxide. Before such an order is made some negotiations should be carried on with the likely principal buyers. The big buyer would be National Lead of the USA.

The other proposal is to reduce costs of manufacture greatly by making sulphuric acid. This involves putting up a sulphuric acid plant which should cost not more than Rs 10 lakhs and possibly less.

I suppose it is for the Travancore Government to consider this, if you would advise them to do so. We are only really concerned with giving them advice if they want it. I have no doubt that this factory can be made to work.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Secretary, Ministry of Commerce and Industry.
3. S.S. Bhatnagar, Secretary, Ministry of Natural Resources and Scientific Research.
4. Secretary, Department of Atomic Energy.
5. Indian Chemical Industries.



### III. RIVER VALLEY SCHEMES

#### 1. To C.D. Deshmukh<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

January 25, 1953

My dear Deshmukh,

I am writing to you about the Chambal scheme<sup>2</sup> and more particularly about the Gandhi Sagar Dam.<sup>3</sup> I believe this has been included in the Five Year Plan. There has been a great deal of talk about this and much excitement in Madhya Bharat and Rajasthan. Indeed, committees<sup>4</sup> have been formed there to collect money and to get voluntary work too. During my visits to Madhya Bharat and Rajasthan, I came into direct contact with many of these people who were working up public enthusiasm for this scheme.<sup>5</sup> They were very pleased to learn that it had been included in the Five Year Plan.

There was a talk of raising Rs 10 crore loan<sup>6</sup> earmarked for Chambal which would be subscribed by the people of Madhya Bharat and Rajasthan. I was asked to help in giving a push to this movement. The date was almost fixed for me to go there to give the first push to the work of Gandhi Sagar Dam. They were anxious to start this soon, as the Madhya Bharat Government had already spent nearly Rs one and half crores and were incurring a monthly expense of Rs 70,000/- for the maintenance of engineering and other staff. They intended starting the work from Republic Day, 26th January.

The Madhya Bharat Government now informs me that they are having considerable difficulty in this matter and are not allowed by the Reserve Bank

1. File No PC(V)62/53 KW, Natural Resources, Irrigation & CAD, Planning Commission. Also available in JN Collection.
2. The 28-crore rupees Chambal Irrigation and Hydel Development Project designed to generate 96,000 kilowatts of hydro-electric power and irrigate one million acres of land in Rajasthan and Madhya Bharat was well under way.
3. The Gandhi Sagar Dam, was to be built on the border between Rajasthan and Madhya Bharat. The dam, 1250 feet long and 200 feet above the bed of the river, was to have a storage capacity of 4.20 million cubic feet and power generation of 60,000 kilowatts.
4. Two Committees, consisting of Ministers, MPs, MLAs and prominent citizens of the States were constituted to collect money for the scheme.
5. For example, when Nehru visited Gwalior on 2 December 1952, the workers of the State-owned Gwalior Potteries factory presented him a gift of their one day's wages for speedy execution of the Chambal project.
6. The scheme, at the first stage, was to cost Rs 33 crores. The two States were to raise a loan of Rs 10 crores in two years.

to float a loan, nor is any other money being given to them or advanced to them to start operations on the understanding, if necessary, to pay back that sum from their loan proceeds. Dravid,<sup>7</sup> the Madhya Bharat Minister in charge of the Chambal project, went to the Reserve Bank and was told by the Deputy Director that even the terms of the loan could not be discussed at present, because nothing could be done unless the details of the Central Government loans have been finalized.<sup>8</sup> According to the Deputy Director, no step could be taken in regard to the Madhya Bharat Chambal Project loan till August, at the earliest.

Both the Madhya Bharat and Rajasthan Governments are, therefore, in a fix. They had recently, at Hyderabad, all met together in a conference and planned the inauguration of a big campaign for collecting funds. They were specially aiming at going to the countryside in time to benefit by the reaping of the *rabi* harvest in April. A delay of two or three months would make all the difference. It would also damp the public enthusiasm that has been created. It would be difficult to repeat the process of creating that public enthusiasm again at a much later stage.

Chambal, apart from its own importance, has been mentioned by us in various parts of India, as a symbol of self-help by raising money from the people. Delay involving partial failure of this scheme will thus have larger consequences. I should like you, therefore, to consider this matter, more particularly the question of allowing the Madhya Bharat people to raise their loan as early as possible, so as to take advantage of the harvest season. They propose to have a number of inducements for this loan, apart from the desire of the people to have the Chambal project.

I have a feeling that the Reserve Bank, while paying every attention, as it should, to the technical and financial aspects, has no understanding whatsoever about the other realities which could do so much when an appeal to the public is made. Hence their repeated failure to get enough money for their loans. They can only think in terms of a past age when the British Government used to issue loans. They cannot even learn from the example of loans floated in England or America or other countries, where an organized effort is made to enlist public cooperation. That effort can certainly be made here too, but only

7. V.V. Dravid (1913-1994); founder-member, INTUC, Minister, Madhya Bharat, 1952-56; President, INTUC, 1965-67; Member, Congress Planning Committee, also several other committees appointed by Government dealing with labour.

8. In his letter of 6 February 1953 to Deshmukh, B. Rama Rau, the Governor of the Reserve Bank, wrote that N. Sundaresan, the Deputy Governor, had expressed his tentative views to Dravid on the assumption that in accordance with RBI's usual practice the Central Government would float their loan in June 1953 and there were no definite recommendations made in regard to the Chambal loan.



if the proper approach is made. As you know, the old investing public has shrunk greatly and some of them sulk. Yet, the manner of our normal loan appeals continue to be the same and is addressed to the same people, most of them having become non-existent. The lack of success is thus inevitable. We have to think of an entirely different set of people and an entirely different approach to them. I fear that bankers, with all their virtues, do not possess the virtue of appealing to the public or even understanding the public. They only understand the old small investing class which rapidly fades away.

The question is a much bigger one than that of Chambal, because we have to rely very greatly on loan money. It is not easily possible to go on increasing our taxation. Here and there it may be possible, but ultimately this will defeat its own purpose. Additional finances must, therefore, come from loans. We cannot even rely too much on foreign money. Therefore, it becomes a question of high importance how to get loan money from our own people. Inevitably we have to look to a very large number of small investors.

A small investor is not very much interested in the rate of interest, whether it is  $3\frac{1}{2}$  per cent or 4 per cent or  $4\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. It is the big investor to whom the rate of interest makes a difference. The small investor is attracted by other inducements, which are not so much financial. He is attracted by the object of the loan or by a particular project for which it will be used. Nobody can possibly get excited in regard to a bare invitation to subscribe to a Government of India 4 per cent loan. The big investors might put in money, but no small investor has the least interest in it. But a development loan or a Five Year Plan loan or better still a loan earmarked for a particular project would have an intimate appeal to the individual. If that appeal is started not only by well-organized propaganda, but also by attractive pictures indicating the object for which the loan will be used, and something to connect the use of the money subscribed with the wishes of the investor, the result may well be marked. I do hope that we shall have no more loans of the dull, uninviting and depressing kind that we have thus far had. I think this requires careful consideration, because so much depends upon our tapping the public and more particularly the public which is not usually tapped by loans.

But I am particularly writing to you about the Chambal project. I have no greater interest in Chambal than in any other project, but, by a set of circumstances, Chambal has become some kind of a symbol for our Five Year Plan and the people's cooperation in working it out, and it would be unfortunate if that symbol gets tarnished.

If you like, this matter might be discussed by the Planning Commission or with the Reserve Bank.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. To C.D. Deshmukh<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
February 2, 1953

My dear Deshmukh,

Thank you for your letter of February 1 about the Chambal loan.

What I wrote to you about the general question of raising loans from the public was, you will remember, something that I have often said before in Cabinet and in Planning Commission. In fact I said it to Matthai<sup>2</sup> when he was Finance Minister. This has nothing to do with Chambal. I have a feeling that the purely official and orthodox approach does not touch the relatively small investor, to whom the appeal has to be on some other basis than that of pure investment. It is true that the National Savings movement has to some extent reached him and that is good. But we do not tap the good impulse of the people. Naturally I cannot say what the result would be and I can only guess. But I feel that it might be possible to approach certain classes of people who are not otherwise approached.

During the World War, conditions were different no doubt and money in a sense was plentiful. At the same time there was a good deal of public sentiment against helping Government. Nevertheless, by various measures, some undesirable, the British Government managed to get a great deal out of the country, chiefly from the rich who became richer during the War. Now, in one respect at least, conditions ought to be better. Public sentiment cannot be against a loan and it can be made very much in its favour. It is true that the richer people are not in the same position to contribute and even some who might not wish to do so. It is often said that there is a wider distribution of money and the non-investing classes have got more of it than they used to have. The problem thus is to touch this. This would help, I suppose, in preventing inflation also.

The lack of purchasing power will no doubt affect a loan, and yet there may be some classes with much less purchasing power and some who have money to spare in relatively small quantities.

When I said that the Chambal project had become a kind of symbol of the Five Year Plan, I did not mean to imply that the Five Year Plan would be greatly affected if the Madhya Bharat Government did not raise their ten crore loan.<sup>3</sup> What I meant was that for a considerable section of people,

1. File No PC(V)62/53 KW, Planning Commission. Also available in JN Collection.

2. John Matthai.

3. In his letter, Deshmukh had stated that even if the Madhya Bharat Government did not raise the loan of Rs 10 crores "the project would have to proceed slowly" and "this will not affect the rest of the plan."



especially in Madhya Bharat and Rajasthan, that had become a symbol and they would be greatly disappointed if this did not go ahead as they hoped it would.

I think you must have misunderstood me about the Madhya Bharat Government protesting to me.<sup>4</sup> As I wrote to you, they have been anxious to get a date from me to inaugurate their project or some part of it. It is in this connection that they have approached me once or twice. You will remember that I function in many ways even apart from being Prime Minister, for instance, as Congress President. The Madhya Bharat Government did not formally approach me or complain to me.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. Deshmukh protested at the Madhya Bharat Government's complaint to Nehru "about the advice of the Reserve Bank" before first writing to him to give him an opportunity to find out if he could intervene.

### 3. Inauguration of the Tilaiya Dam<sup>1</sup>

This completes the first project in a series of national undertakings that have been planned for the progress and prosperity of the country.

In a moment's time, electric energy will be generated and water will flow.<sup>2</sup> These river valley schemes throughout the country are aimed at not merely supplying electricity to villagers; that is only a part of the programme. Now our peasants will not have to look to the sky and pray helplessly to God for rain. Vagaries of nature are over once for all.

I hope this will bring prosperity to the valley and the country as a whole. We shall now be able to make available to the people cheap electricity not only to light their huts and roads but also to start cottage industries.

1. Speech on the inauguration of Tilaiya dam and Bokaro thermal power station of the Damodar Valley Corporation. Tilaiya, 21 February 1953. From *The Hindu*, 22 February and the *National Herald*, 23 February 1953.
2. On 21 February 1953, Nehru switched on the first power unit of the Damodar Valley scheme. The Tilaiya dam in Bokaro, the first of the multi-purpose projects, was a reservoir of twenty square miles in extent, of 94 feet height and 510 feet width. It was to irrigate one lakh acres of land.

The road to industrialization is being cleared removing all obstacles from the way. That is the meaning of this dam and of the power generating station. The common people are fighting the battle so that they themselves and posterity might be benefited.

The dam is a life-giving centre, and I congratulate those who, by their expert knowledge and hard labour, have made the project a success in this short period.

When I see this structure, I find it representing a great partnership of millions of people in India and outside. I particularly congratulate the foreign experts and engineers and the World Bank who have helped in the implementation of the scheme.

Damodar, the terrible, known for its floods and destruction, is being tamed. Men in India have taken the step of conquering nature for the benefit of the common people.

The Damodar Valley Corporation<sup>3</sup> is not meant to serve a selected section of people. It is meant for the entire country and its people. India is an ancient land with its glorious past, but at the same time, the country has inherited some evils from the British rule. Poverty is the biggest of these ills. This cannot be removed in a day. Aladdin's lamp, or a magic, will not change India overnight. People will have to toil hard and work for the prosperity of their country. Indeed, the scheme when completed would remove unemployment, increase industrial production, and raise the standard of living.

I hope the people of this area, and those who are far away, will recall the day after many, many years. The work done here required hard labour. Many of these villagers assembled here today have seen, day in and day out, thousands of people working hard for its completion.

Lakhs of people, both in Bihar and West Bengal, suffered loss and came to grief every year due to floods in the Damodar river.<sup>4</sup> Today by our own efforts we have constructed the dam which will control the flood and generate hydro-electric power. These will be utilized by the peasants and workers, by the factories and other concerns.

3. The Damodar Valley Corporation was constituted on 7 June 1948 on the pattern of Tennessee Valley Authority of USA. In the first phase, four multi-purpose dams—Tilaiya, Maithon, Konar and Panchet Hill—were taken up. Hydro-electric generating stations had been established at Tilaiya, Panchet and Maithon with a total installed capacity of 104 MW. Three thermal power stations were being built at Bokaro, Chandrapura and Durgapur.

4. For example, damage to the extent of Rs 8 crores was said to have been caused in Bengal due to floods in the Damodar river.



The problem today is to increase national wealth and to distribute it evenly among the common people. Plans aiming at these have been envisaged in the Five Year Plan. The Five Year Plan, if implemented with the cooperation of the people, will be able to do the things desired by us all. Controlled water will be available to the people and cheap electricity will bring light in their homes. Mills and factories will flourish, solving, to a great extent, the problems of unemployment and poverty of the people.

You must remember the teachings of Mahatma Gandhi—unity is essential for the growth of India. A man, whether living in Bengal or Bihar, whether he is a Hindu or a Muslim, irrespective of his caste or religion, must serve his motherland. Wealth does not consist of the currency notes only; it is the productive efforts of men, be it in the field or in a factory.

How long can we stand this humiliation of depending on foreign countries for foodgrains? That is why more emphasis has been laid on irrigation and agriculture so that this country may become self-sufficient in food, and we do not have to depend on USA or any other country for it.

For our river valley projects, we have taken the help of all sorts of people. People alleged that we have taken foreign aid.<sup>5</sup> Yes, foreign technicians are here. They have helped us in building this plant. This plant, whether built by foreign technicians—Americans—or Indians, belongs to you and me and to the common people of this land.

Today is an auspicious day not only for the people of the Damodar Valley but for the whole of India when this small village Tilaiya, once known only to the people of Bihar, will be remembered with pride. Now it will get a place of pride in the hearts of millions of people in the country. I rejoice on this occasion as I myself can take part in this great task, which represents the beginning of a new India. I see before my eyes, thousands of undertakings like this which are gradually taking shape all over the country and are rejuvenating this ancient land of ours. I dedicate this great structure to the people of India, and hope that this would give them strength in shaping other tasks.

5. The DVC was granted two loans totalling thirty-eight million dollars by the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development.

## IV. SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH

1. Science and Human Understanding<sup>1</sup>

Your Excellency,<sup>2</sup> Mrs Sahni,<sup>3</sup> and gentlemen,

I came here three and a quarter years ago to lay the foundation stone<sup>4</sup> of this building. I often have to resort to this profession, sometimes successfully, and at other times it takes time to show results. Sometimes it has happened that the stone remains a solitary stone. Therefore I am happy to be here again today and to have seen the completed building from the outside. Soon we shall see it from the inside.

You have heard some of our elders and others who have come here from other countries especially for this occasion, to participate in this function, not for what is being said here but, in fact, to show their respect and love for Birbal Sahni<sup>5</sup> in whose name this institution has come up. In fact it is he who first thought of this idea and got some people together. It is our misfortune that he passed away right at the time of its inception. But you can understand the extent to which he influenced people, even in his short span of life, with his work and his personality by the fact that people have come from far and wide to show their respect. It has been said repeatedly today that this is quite unique in its own way not only in Asia but the whole world.

I have been wondering how many of the people present here, apart from the specialists, understand what palaeobotany really is. It is possible that even I would have found myself in difficulties. But by a coincidence, many years ago, when I was reading in Cambridge in England, I became interested in this subject and learnt a little. In fact, there used to be a very famous professor of botany in Cambridge<sup>6</sup> those days and whose student Birbal Sahni was, a little after me. So I went to his lectures and whether I learnt a great deal or not, at least I understood what the subject is all about.

When Birbal Sahni came to me first and told me what he wanted to do, I

1. Speech at the opening of the Institute of Palaeobotany, Lucknow, 2 January 1953. AIR tapes, NMML. Extracts.
2. K.M. Munshi, who was the Governor of Uttar Pradesh at this time.
3. Savitri Sahni (1902-1985); botanist; wife of Birbal Sahni, Founder-Director of Birbal Sahni Institute of Palaeobotany, Lucknow; President of the Institute, 1959-68; awarded Padma Shri, 1969.
4. The foundation was laid on 1 April 1949.
5. (1891-1949); Founder-Director of the Institute of Palaeobotany, Lucknow. He died three weeks after the foundation was laid.
6. Professor A.C. Saward.



was reminded of those long-ago events when I too read books and used to carry a special magnifying glass in my pocket to look at fossils. Anyhow, it was partly due to all this that I was attracted. But what really drew me was Birbal Sahni himself because he was a man of such high calibre as a scientist ought to be. A nation can never have too many of such people; in fact there are too few around. People reach up to high positions because the slots are vacant and somebody has to fill them. But sometimes a man does not need a position to be great. And it was obvious that Birbal Sahni was such a man. There are others like him in our country. In our country and maybe elsewhere also, too much importance is attached to positions and to those who occupy them. Very few people pay attention to true knowledge and scholarship or to those who work with dedication.

When Sahni came to me I told him that we would give him whatever help was possible. People often ask why it is so important to study fossils and stones, even when they are millions of years old. But on the other hand, we do not really have to go back so far, nor do we need to study fossils. You can find such fossils of human beings right here in the present! So it can be argued as to why we need to go looking for fossils when they are present all around us. An institute should in fact be set up to study such people though the problem is that they may have some objection to such efforts and there may be tension.


When we study facts and fossils from the olden days, in a roundabout way, in some form or the other, it is an attempt to understand human beings. If we fail to understand human beings, then all our other knowledge is of no avail. We cannot know everything but we must know a little about everything if we are to understand the world we live in. The most disastrous thing for a human being is to keep the doors and windows of his mind shut or that his mind should become a closed compartment with not the slightest desire on his part to get out of it. In such cases, he can neither make any progress himself nor help others to do so. The strange thing is the bigger a nation, the more its excellence and advantages and disadvantages too. Those who live in small countries perforce look out. They have no choice in the matter. Therefore there is often a danger that the inhabitants of large countries may develop narrow-mindedness. They may forget the world beyond and ignore the knowledge that the world has to offer, and close the windows of the mind.

This was the danger which we faced in the olden days and it did us a great deal of harm. It is true to some extent today also but there are several ways of overcoming the problem. When the world knocks loudly at one's doors, as it is happening today, then it becomes difficult to keep them shut. One way to look at the world is to go out oneself or read about it in books of travel and form a superficial picture in your mind. It is possible that you may even write books about your travels. But that is only a superficial look at the world which is also useful. But you cannot form an idea of the things—the forces, the ideas,



INSIDE THE BOKARO THERMAL POWER HOUSE, 21 FEBRUARY 1953





PRESIDING OVER A MEETING OF THE GOVERNING BODY OF THE COUNCIL OF SCIENTIFIC AND INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH,  
NEW DELHI, 11 MARCH 1953

tensions—that have shaped the world by a superficial look. You have to look deeper and of all the ways to do so, the best is through science, because the world has been shaped by it. I do not mean to imply that nothing else except science has any significance but science has its special place in the modern world. Even without travelling much, you can understand the modern world by grasping the forces of science. Therefore it would be a good thing for our country to pay more and more attention to science. The more industries and scientific institutes come up, the better we will understand the modern world.

The strange thing is that you can look at fossils and plants which have left their imprint over millions of years and through it you may understand the world beyond and thus your mind will come out of its narrow compartment. Once our minds reach out to new branches of knowledge, fresh winds will blow in and clear away the cobwebs. That is why I feel happy when such institutes and laboratories and research establishments are set up. I am particularly pleased to see the thousands upon thousands of young men and women who are working in these laboratories in some capacity or the other. As far as I know, they are doing excellent work of fundamental significance. Whenever I feel a little dejected at some of the things that are happening, the heart buoys up with hope again at the sight of young men and women doing such excellent work. India is making a place for itself on the scientific map of the world. Not that we are boasting about it. That would be petty. But we must become partners in the larger quest which will benefit India and the world. Why should we copy others or be beholden to them?

So I attend functions such as these with alacrity because it renews my faith and I want the whole country to realize this, to open the windows of its minds to the fresh breeze of new knowledge. I congratulate those who run this place, especially Mrs Sahni.

## 2. The Role of the Scientist in Society<sup>1</sup>

Mr President,<sup>2</sup> friends,

I have come here today not to speak on scientific subjects but rather to listen and more especially to offer, on behalf of the Government of India, a welcome to all the eminent scientists who have come from abroad and those who have

1. Speech at the Indian Science Congress, Lucknow, 2 January 1953. AIR tapes, NMML.

2. D.M. Bose was President of the Indian Science Congress.



come from various parts of this country. I hope many of you have realized that the Government attaches great deal of importance to science, to the uses of science, and therefore also to those who are the high priests of science today.

During the past few years the Government has tried, within its capacity, to help the development of science in various ways by building a number of national laboratories and institutes. Many of you who are present today might be working in these very fine institutions. For my part I think that one of the most satisfactory features, among the features good or bad, of the last four or five years has been the building up of these great laboratories and the opportunities they afford for the development of science in this country.

It is curious that all of us in practically every country worship, in some way or other, at the shrine of science, and yet, doing so, we seem to keep science and what science stands for in a particular corner of our minds and do not allow it to interfere with the rest of our activities. Hence some kind of dual approach to problems is made by most of us, probably by politicians, most of all. Politicians will come and perform various ceremonies in connection with scientific institutions and say something about the great virtues of science, but in some other activities they are not likely to reflect too much either the temper of science or the training of science. I mention politicians because I am one of them, and I think I should begin by dealing with my own tribe. But it applies to others too; oddly enough it sometimes applies even to scientists, who in their laboratories are very good and they specialize in their particular subject. Outside their lecture halls and laboratories they appear to become something entirely different from what a scientist is supposed to be.

Yet no person can afford not to realize quite astounding changes that have taken place in the world because of the development of science and its technique. The last 100 or 150 years have changed the face of the world enormously. They have affected every kind of human institution, human lives and human thinking. Perhaps they have not affected human thinking quite so much as they have affected human life, although they have affected it inevitably. We take many factors for granted, many things produced by science. We are surrounded by them. We cannot escape them and we take them for granted. But they have not produced often enough an adequate impact on our minds. I am not talking about individuals. I am talking about the generality of the people. Our minds continue to function in what might be called the pre-scientific age and sometimes even an earlier age. So we have this very peculiar combination of something which is obviously the product of the human mind, that is, science and all that has happened, and yet the human mind lagging behind its own product. This disparity, possibly, is one of the reasons why we are tied up into knots and why, while we talk rather glibly of One World—which is perfectly true because scientifically and by the development of communications and the like, we become a very tight One World—and yet any person can see that we are as far

removed from the One World, in spite of all this coming together, as anything can possibly be. In fact, parts of the world resent even the existence of other parts. Parts of the world want to destroy the other parts of the world.

Surely, this is not the kind of prelude to a One World. So we get this extraordinary contradiction. While reason, logic and all modern trends in life point to the closest cooperation all over the world, human wishes, passions, prejudices, or whatever they may be, try to go as far away from this idea of One World cooperation and continually think rather in terms of elimination of one or the other or the destruction of one or the other. They do not at all appreciate or understand that it is possible for any such cooperation to take place in the world as it is today. Whether scientists or politicians or others can solve this riddle or not, I do not know. But obviously the future of the world depends upon that, more especially because the alternative now is rather terrible to contemplate. So how are we to approach this problem? If scientists go on functioning in an ivory tower, they will do, no doubt, some good. If they come out of the ivory tower and help in solving the problems of the age, they will do a great deal more of good, as many have done indeed.

But somehow even the solution of limited problems does not necessarily take us much farther in the solution of the major problems of the age and the avoidance of this tremendous conflict which seems to envelop us all the time and which results in lowering the scientific temper of the age. A scientist as an individual may be exceedingly good at his particular kind of work but as I said, just now, even that individual scientist becomes a prey to prejudice in other spheres. What happens in these other spheres, we can see all around us. On account of this destructive fear and anger at each other, the critical faculty ceases to function in groups, in nations, and to some extent in individuals. Now, if the critical faculty does not function, it means the scientific faculty too does not function, because science must be critical, it cannot accept or reject theories wholesale without analysis, without criticism, and without examination. We see the threat of a complete or large-scale extermination of the critical faculty today in the world. Outside the limited sphere when we consider the kind of problems, let us say, that an unhappy foreign minister has to consider, we find very little of the critical faculty left but only complete rejection of something, denunciation of something or complete acceptance of something with fulsome praise. Everybody thinks in terms of just black and white and there are no shades of grey left.

Apart from this we have a feeling, which again appears to me rather odd, that others should be like ourselves, each group imagined that others should necessarily be like itself in ways of thought, ways of living, ways of action, and everything. When two or more groups think like that, they come into conflict. I should have thought that one of the obvious lessons of this world was that the world is very diverse. Obviously climates differ. Climate and



environment have a powerful effect on human beings. Even within India it is no good asking a person coming from the south to go about in a fur coat, which is very necessary in the Himalayas. Nevertheless, people seem to think that others must shape themselves, model themselves according to a certain scheduled pattern, which means, like themselves. Now, it is very odd that an individual should think that he, his group, is the model of behaviour, model of living, and model of thinking, which others must follow. I suppose each one of us is rather egocentric. Nations are more so. But it does make a difference. Each one of us is the centre of a circle, as we probably are. In that way it does make a difference. We are the circumference of that circle. If it is a very small circle with a narrow circumference, Well, we become narrow. The broader it is, possibly the broader our outlook would be.

It is not for me to criticize others, and specially this great and varied diverse world. But even in my own country I can see all these different trends and urges at work. India is a country which has shown in some ways a remarkable unity even when split up in various ways. There is an essential unity about it. India is also a country with a very remarkable diversity. The problem is to maintain both, not to crush the diversity and not to lessen the unity—in fact to increase it. However we find weakening forces at work. Some individuals want to regiment it to the extent of putting an end to all the richness of life in India. Each person wants to make the other function as he does himself, even in small matters of clothing. Now, as I mentioned, it is quite easy for me in Lucknow to wear a certain type of footwear which will be completely inappropriate in Ladakh. In fact I won't survive at all if I wear *chappals* in Ladakh. I have to wear thick boots with woollen lining there in order to survive, apart from other clothing. The same applies to so many other things. I do not approve of this proselytizing spirit of imposing yourself on others, whether it is the question of language, or whether it is any other question. Personally, I have a liking for the crusader. There is something attractive about him, there is something good; and it is the crusader who has made the difference in this world, the person with a certain missionary spirit for a cause, forgetting himself in that cause. But the crusading spirit can sometimes be exercised for wrong ends and bring about wrong results.

I am referring to these various things because the only way to consider them is with what might be called the even temper of science which does not allow us to run away with particular individual fads and fancies, and helps us to get out of those narrow circles in which as an individual or as a small group we may live. We must recognize that people are different. And why should not they be different? Variety contributes to the richness of human life and experience. Nobody should try to impose himself on others in the political or the economic field. We talk of words like imperialism and the like which means political imposition, economic exploitation and all that. Those are generally

understood, and most people in the world feel that we must not have that, we must put an end to this kind of imperialism which dominated, let us say, the nineteenth century. It is largely disappearing and will no doubt disappear. It is disappearing not only because it was not a good thing in the balance, but because it really cannot exist now because of the new forces that have arisen. But there are also other ways of imposition. Apart from that old type of imperialism, there are other ways of interfering with others. Well, in any human society there is bound to be some interference, some regulation, some discipline. But I take it that the democratic way of looking at things is to keep that interference to the minimum. There is of course the problem of modern life demanding more and more centralization. That is essential, and yet centralization to some extent comes in the way of democracy and individual freedom, and one has to balance the two.

These problems trouble my mind. Even a good thing like nationalism, when carried to an extreme, becomes bad. All of us in this country have been bred on nationalism. It has been to us a liberating force—a good force—and yet, obviously, that very nationalism, carried to an extreme, becomes a narrow, limiting and restrictive creed. We see even the idea of doing good to others becoming so aggressive that it becomes a nuisance, whether national or international. The idea of making others conform to a certain pattern of your liking may have bad results, and it usually has bad results. At the same time there has to be some conformity. One cannot go to pieces. Each individual cannot do what he likes in organized society. One has to find some balancing factor—how to preserve individual freedom as well as the richness of diversity.

Where does science come into the picture? Of course science comes in and should come in because the idea that the role of science is merely to produce things or improve the material lot of man is not good enough. It has to do it, more especially in a country like India, which is economically backward and where standards are very low; our very first priority is to raise those standards. It is no good talking about spiritual and cultural advancement to hungry people. We have to give them the primary necessities of life, whether it is food or clothing or housing. Only then can we think of the rest. Nevertheless, even though we might lack the primary necessities, and we try to fulfil that lack, the other problems face us all the time, press upon us and tend to upset us. As they upset us they upset other countries too. A scientist has, therefore, to tackle these other problems also, help in tackling them, and the best help the scientist can give is to try to generate that critical faculty in considering problems, that evenness of temper, that objective way of looking at things, which if enough of us cultivate it, would help tremendously in lessening tensions, national and international, and in going some way towards the solution of those problems.

So I invite you, scientists, to help us in solving our material problems and



also to help in dealing with the larger problems, social, economic, psychological and all that, and finally to bring about, as I said, the temper of science. Unless we develop that temper, the good that science has done and the tools it has developed can be used for evil ends and we ourselves will be swept away by passions of the moment. That would be a tragedy for science and the scientist.

So I welcome you all on behalf of our Government and assure you that to the best of our ability we shall encourage the development of science in this country and ask the scientists here to associate themselves above all in the solution of our problems. It may be that the scientists might not get the same financial inducements as others do. Somehow financial return has seldom been tagged on to learning in any country. Perhaps it is as well though it is not well if this means a pressure of circumstances on the worker in science. In India, in the old days, when some kind of theoretical or practical division of society was aimed at, the man of learning was put at the top, but he was not supposed to have either financial power or indeed much resources, or political power except rarely. His power of learning was supposed to keep him at the top. While the modern division of society as practised does not give quite that theoretical status to the man of learning and other people usually get at the top, the fact remains that the scientist must inevitably occupy a more important place in society. In ancient times, probably the priest occupied it. The scientist is really the priest of today in that sense. Of course they talk in an intricate priestly language which most people do not understand!

In India in the last hundred years or more, the administrator became the top person, ordering about everybody else. Even now the administrator on the whole considers himself important and occupies a very important, probably the top place. An administrator is important of course, but I do not think he is quite so important as he thinks he is. Just as the politician is not quite so important as he thinks he is. Of course when I use the word administrator I use it rather in the sense of the professional administrator. The politician is sometimes an administrator and sometimes not. People still seem to think that scientists, experts, engineers and the like are there to be consulted as experts, and then pushed aside and the wise administrator comes to a decision. Yet, in coming to a decision one has to see every aspect of the question, and if, as often happens, the expert sees only one aspect very intensely he may not be able to judge aright about the other aspects. That is true, but still I do not approve of this business of thinking that a person who sits at the head of an administrative office is more important in the scheme of things, because he does not know as much about a particular thing as does the expert. We must gradually adapt ourselves to thinking that the administrator also has his place. He should not be all over the place. We should fashion a society where the scientist will play a more important part in its development and in promoting scientific temper. I welcome you again. Thank you.

### 3. Scientific Advance is Necessary<sup>1</sup>

India's progress will be seriously hindered if she lags behind other countries in scientific advance. Applied science and technology has a tremendous, if not always direct, influence on modern society and on thousands of problems facing it.

It always gives me great pleasure to be associated with the opening of scientific institutes and laboratories, because they provide the basis for the building of a new India.

There are many people in the country, including politicians, who think that the country can be changed for the better merely by passing laws and resolutions or making speeches. The question is often put to me, for instance, why the minimum monthly income of an average Indian should not be Rs 250. But this cannot be accomplished by merely having a law passed to that effect because laws by themselves do not increase the wealth of the country.

Another common misconception is that some millowners or producers buy some machinery and set up a small concern and make money. They think that their job is done and that they have contributed to the industrial development of the country.

But it is not merely by making money that the country's progress can be achieved. The basic question is whether there is an advance in the field of technology. It is ultimately technology that provides the basis for the advancement of the country. Even the problem of the armed forces is more or less technological. It is finally the superiority in armaments that decides victory in modern wars.

Unless there is progress in the technological field, the country will have to depend on technical advice from foreign countries, which are not always ready or willing to give such advice, but give only superficial advice....

1. Speech at the opening ceremony of the office building of the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, New Delhi, 10 January 1953. From *The Hindu*, 11 January 1953. Extracts.



#### 4. Need for a Uniform Calendar<sup>1</sup>

I am glad that the Calendar Reform Committee has started its labour. The Government of India has entrusted to it the work of examining the different calendars followed in this country and to submit proposals to the Government for an accurate and uniform calendar based on a scientific study for the whole of India.

I am told that we have at present thirty different calendars, differing from each other in various ways including the methods of time reckoning. These calendars are the natural result of our past political and cultural history, and partly represent past political divisions in the country.

Now that we have attained independence, it is obviously desirable that there should be a certain uniformity in the calendar for our civic, social and other purposes and this should be based on a scientific approach to this problem.

It is true that for governmental and many other public purposes the Gregorian calendar is followed,<sup>2</sup> which is used in the greater part of the world. The mere fact that it is largely used, makes it important. It has many virtues, but even this has certain defects which make it unsatisfactory for universal use.

It is always difficult to change a calendar to which people are used to because it affects social practices. But the attempt has to be made even though it may not be as complete as desired. In any event, the present confusion in our own calendars in India ought to be removed.

1. Message sent to Meghnad Saha, Chairman of the Calendar Reform Committee, at the first meeting of the Committee held in New Delhi on 21 February 1953. From *The Statesman*, 22 February 1953.
2. Named after Pope Gregory XIII, who undertook a reform of the then existing Julian calendar for civil and ecclesiastical purposes in the late 16th century. The Gregorian calendar is based on the solar or seasonal year of about 365¼ days, that is, the time taken by the earth to go once around the Sun.

## 5. Dilemma Facing the Scientists<sup>1</sup>

... I hope that while the defence scientists gathered at the conference deal with particular problems in their respective countries, they would also bear in mind the larger background of the world and help in creating an atmosphere in which science can be diverted more and more to the areas of peace and construction and cooperation. The Government of India will extend its full cooperation in the tasks that they are engaged in.

What these tasks are, I am rather dimly, sometimes rather uncomfortably, conscious. Science is the parent of the arts of peaceful progress of the world, but, oddly enough, science has often progressed under the pressure of war. This is due to two reasons: scientists have to think rather furiously than ever when there is that stress and strain of war; and the other reason is that governments in such times almost against their will turn to scientists for their help and thus encourage the growth of science.

Today the world looks up to science to find a solution of its ills, but at the same time it is terribly afraid of what science may do in destroying what it has itself built up. It is an extraordinary dilemma.

When the consequences of their work are so tremendously widespread and affect humanity at large, then the responsibility upon the scientists also becomes terribly great and they have to function, inevitably, in some areas slightly more than in the purely scientific field.

There is little solution to this dilemma in merely casting the blame on others. Maybe, others are to blame, but that is poor satisfaction when the situation brings disaster.

In the olden times when man had a more integrated personality and a more balanced mind than today he functioned in a sort of caste system. Each one functioned in his own sphere and there was more emphasis on executive specialization in one direction. Today the world looks to science for a solution of all its ills, and at the same time is terribly afraid of the consequences of more scientific development.

The advances made during the war brought some good in the civilian field too; but it would be infinitely better if the process could be reversed, and one does not have to wait for the destructive aspects of war in order to achieve the civilian good....

1. Speech while inaugurating the Commonwealth Conference of Defence Scientists held in New Delhi from 2 to 14 March 1953. From *The Hindustan Times* and the *National Herald*, 3 March 1953. Extracts.



## 6. To Kathleen Lonsdale<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
March 9, 1953

Dear Miss Lonsdale,

... I was not really blaming the scientist, nor indeed was I blaming anyone specially, in what I said before the Conference here. I do not know whether any particular person or group is specially to blame. In another sense all of us are partly to blame. We get tied up in a set of circumstances and do not quite know how to get out of them. It is something at least to have awareness of this dilemma and not to take things for granted.

I agree with you that in our efforts to avoid all risks we take the most appalling risks.

I do not know that the countries of the Orient have more spiritual strength in them than the countries of the West. The only thing that can be said about them is that they are not quite so tied up and enmeshed in the consequences of technological development. That is only a negative advantage, if any. In any event, all of us, whether we live in the Orient or Occident, should think about these matters and endeavour to break this vicious circle.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. A copy of the letter along with the letter under reply, in original, was forwarded to S.S. Bhatnagar. Extracts.

## V. EDUCATION

### 1. To Syed Mahmud<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
January 1, 1953

My dear Mahmud,<sup>2</sup>

... I am afraid my own view of the writing of history is rather different from

1. Syed Mahmud Papers, NMML. Extracts.
2. A Member of Parliament. He became a Union Minister in 1954.

the one that prevails in India. I do not know of a single person in India who writes history as it should be written. We all think in terms of the nineteenth century and consider history to be a string of odd facts. History is the study of the interaction of various forces, in which the economics predominate. History and indeed life itself has been powerfully affected by changes brought about by the Industrial Revolution.

History cannot be written by a board. A board can only supervise. It has to be written by a single individual with an integrated outlook. Love,

Yours affectionately,  
Jawahar

## 2. Grant for Jamia Millia Islamia<sup>1</sup>

... 2. I am rather surprised to read some notes of the Finance Ministry enquiring if any committee of visitors or experts have gone into the organization, etc. Educationists in India have often gone there and have expressed the highest opinion about it. Only recently there was a seminar on social education<sup>2</sup> there and on that occasion eminent educationists came to it and expressed their admiration for the work of the Jamia.

3. From the point of view of basic education, which is so important for us, the Jamia is one of the few places which is laying the foundations for the spread of this type of education. For these and various other reasons, I think it is of importance that it should be helped. To what extent, I cannot say...

5. It is difficult for changes to be made in the budget at the last moment. These must upset various calculations. It is also right that we should follow the normal rules in the sense that each proposal should be examined fully. I do not think any examination about the competence of the Jamia is necessary, because

1. Note to the Ministry of Education. A copy of the note was sent to Mahavir Tyagi, the Deputy Minister of Finance, 9 January 1953. File No 40 (41)/48-PMS. Extracts.
2. A three-day seminar on "the preparation of literature for neo-literates" under the auspices of the Indian Adult Education Association presided over by Amarnath Jha, educationist and Chairman, UP Public Service Commission, was inaugurated by Nehru on 20 December 1952 at Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi. See *Selected Works* (second series) Vol. 20, pp. 122-23.



it is acknowledged to be an outstanding institution, but the financial aspect should certainly be examined.

6. If it is possible for the sum necessary for the Jamia to be found from the Education Ministry's budget, then this should offer no difficulty. Presumably that budget will be in terms of the Five Year Plan recently passed. The matter has to be considered in terms of that Plan also....

### 3. Future of Basic Education<sup>1</sup>

I had a talk yesterday with Shrimati Ashadevi Aryanayakam....

2. The question arose about the future of basic education. All of us talk about basic education and Government have recognized it as the proper system of education to be adopted by us all over the country. Most State Governments have also said so. But the progress made appears to be remarkably slow and most of our schools continue to teach in the old way. As for colleges, there is no scheme, so far as I know, of extending the basic method to them.

3. Another important point arises. It almost appears that basic education is meant for what might be called the poor and the lower classes while the more fortunate go to private and aided schools which are better equipped and which have a different type of education. Thus, we are relegating basic education to a definite class and not considering it good enough for the more fortunately placed. This idea, if it spreads, will obviously be bad for basic education.

4. It is sometimes said that basic schools are more expensive than ordinary primary or secondary schools. I do not know how far this is true, but, to some extent, I believe it is so. I think this is so because an ordinary primary school is very poorly run and has hardly any equipment. In fact, an ordinary primary school practically consists of a teacher and little in the way of equipment. There are exceptions of course.

5. I think the time has come for these matters to be considered more thoroughly and for basic education to be encouraged more positively. This can be done in a variety of ways. Some good basic model schools should be specially encouraged and given State help and recognition. They might be slightly

1. Note to the Ministry of Education, 30 January 1953. File No 40(96)/1949-PMS. Extracts.

expensive compared to the ordinary schools, but they will give us an opportunity of real comparison with the best of the other type of schools. Secondly, State Governments might be encouraged to adopt this method and other methods of encouraging basic education. Indeed, even in private schools basic education should be insisted upon.

6. Although we talk of basic education, we do not, I believe, recognize it in the normal way. That is, a person holding a post-basic diploma is not recognized for purposes of going to the universities or colleges. A post-basic standard approaches, I believe, the intermediate standard. The least we can do is to recognize it as the equivalent of matriculation.

7. I suggest that these matters might be considered and some steps taken in this direction.

#### 4. Academy of Letters<sup>1</sup>

I confess that I feel reluctant to accept this responsibility.<sup>2</sup> I greatly fear that this Academy of Letters will be rather an official and passive body, occasionally meeting to pass some resolutions and do little else. The persons who are likely to be members of it, mostly nominated by the States, might hardly come up to the mark in literary matters. However, as Maulana Sahib desires it, I shall agree to his proposal.

1. Note, 17 February 1953. File No 40(7)/56-PMS.

2. Nehru was requested to accept the Chairmanship of the National Academy of Letters, known as the Sahitya Academy, set up in December 1952 to work actively for the development of Indian languages, to help them set high literary standards and promote through them the cultural unity of the country.



## 5. Grant for the Institute of Nuclear Physics<sup>1</sup>

Dr M.N. Saha<sup>2</sup> came to see me yesterday and said that what he was asking for was last year's grant and it was on the basis that work had been carried on. Now he will have to dismiss the staff if the grant is not forthcoming. It is not quite clear to me what the position is, as you say he is continually asking for new grants. I am enclosing his letter, together with the older papers which you sent me.

2. It is obvious that we cannot allow the Institute of Nuclear Physics<sup>3</sup> to deteriorate or fade away. If work is not done there satisfactorily, this should be improved. According to your note, a new Director<sup>4</sup> has been appointed there. Early steps should be taken, therefore, to decide this matter.

1. Note to S.S. Bhatnagar, 15 March 1953. File No 17(16)/56-PMS.
2. Member, House of the People, at this time.
3. Founded in April 1948, the Institute was formally opened in 1950. Attached to Calcutta University, the Institute, running a post-graduate course, was later renamed as the Saha Institute of Nuclear Physics.
4. Dharendra Nath Kundu.

## 6. Shakespeare in India<sup>1</sup>

I do not know if your attention has been called to a certain correspondence with the Ministry of Education in regard to the visit of a British theatrical company to India. This company performs Shakespearean plays as well as some plays of Bernard Shaw. It is of the nature of an educational programme. On a previous occasion, a like company came to India and gave a number of performances specially arranged for students at concession rates. As a matter of fact such a company cannot make money in India because of the lack of a normal audience for English plays. It has to suffer a loss. Sometimes the British Council sponsors them and guarantees their losses. On the last occasion too they lost rather heavily.

2. The question of some Shakespearean Company coming to India was

1. Note to Ministry of Education, 21 March 1953. File No 40(27)/56-63-PMS.

raised again, but it fell through. I was anxious that, where possible, such a company should be encouraged to come here, because it gives reality to these classical English plays as well as relatively modern Bernard Shaw plays, and improves the knowledge of English of our students. From that point of view it is far more important than any number of class-room lectures on English. However, we could not fix this up because we were not prepared to take any liability.

3. Sometime ago I had a letter from Mr Kendal,<sup>2</sup> the organiser of this company, saying that he intended coming here with a fairly high-class Shakespearean Company. Well-known persons of some distinction in England also informed me that this was really a very good company from the point of view of Shakespearean plays and it would be a good thing for our students as well as others to have an opportunity of seeing these. We were not asked to give any subsidy or financial help. All we were asked was to inform the Universities and, perhaps, give them some normal concession rates on the railways.

4. I thought this was a worthwhile proposal and I recommended it to the Education Ministry. Thereupon, the Education Ministry sent some kind of a circular letter to Vice-Chancellors. This letter was unfortunately not properly worded and not at all explanatory. It was, as is usual, a formal and stiff document giving no facts at all and asking for information about the number of students, etc. It could have been, of course, worded differently and, more particularly, pointed out that these would be Shakespearean plays, etc.

5. I am now informed that one of the Vice-Chancellors of a major university has sent a reply which I have seen. I do not know who the Vice-Chancellor is and which University is concerned in this matter. But I have read his reply with considerable surprise. It is an offensive and improperly worded reply.

6. I suggest that the Education Ministry (the Secretary should write and not the Deputy Secretary) should reply to this letter. The reply should mainly be in the form of communicating a note by me. I give a draft separately.

7. I should like to know the name of the Vice-Chancellor and the University.

2. Geoffrey Kendal (b. 1909) was associated with the Shakespearean Theatrical Company in England. The company, when it came to India in 1944 and again in the nineteen fifties, created a good deal of interest in Shakespearean plays.



## 7. To Abul Kalam Azad<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
March 22, 1953

My dear Maulana,

Yesterday I spoke to you briefly about the correspondence with a certain Vice-Chancellor in regard of Kendal's Shakespearean Company. I felt then that the kind of letter that was sent to the Vice-Chancellor from the Education Ministry by the Deputy Secretary was not a proper letter.<sup>2</sup> Many of our Vice-Chancellors have a feeling that they are not given the courtesy that is their due in the correspondence with the Education Ministry. Apart from courtesy, it eases things if we approach them in a friendly way and not always in a stiff and formal official way.

That, of course, applies to all our dealings with all our Ministries. The old British method, both of correspondence and dealing, is hardly applicable today. As a matter of fact, a very great deal of correspondence in External Affairs Ministry with our Ambassadors etc. is conducted by me personally on the personal basis. If I do not write, the Secretary-General writes or the Foreign Secretary. A Deputy Secretary will hardly ever address them except on some trivial matter.

Vice-Chancellors are non-officials of standing and have some position in public life. They do not particularly like being treated by a Deputy Secretary in the Education Ministry as if they were some minor officials under his charge to whom orders are issued. Normally speaking, the Secretary should write and should write in a semi-formal manner explaining things. The old Governmental way of correspondence has to be given up by us more and more....

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No 40(27)/56-63-PMS. Extracts.

2. See the preceding item.

## VI. LANGUAGE

1. The Growth of Hindi<sup>1</sup>

We should strengthen Hindi by allowing its natural growth and should not weaken it either by artificially amending it or by pitting it against any other language.

If a language is to grow from strength to strength, we must draw upon foreign words naturally creeping into it and be able to draw upon other languages. Hindi has become the national language because it is the language of the people. Once we try to amend it artificially, it will become lifeless and incapable of any development. But the fact that Hindi is accepted as the national language, does not imply that all the other languages should be neglected. On the contrary we must endeavour to see that other languages also flourish in their own way. As Milton<sup>2</sup> has said the people are known by the language they speak, for a language is derived from the very life of the people.

I dislike the rivalries among the various languages in India, especially between Hindi and Urdu. Urdu, like all other languages listed in the Constitution, is one of our languages and should not be discriminated against....

1. Speech at a meeting of the Hindustani Prachar Sabha, Mumbai, 13 January 1953. From *The Hindu*, 16 January 1953. Extracts.
2. John Milton (1608-1674); a distinguished English Renaissance poet.

2. Too Much Use of Foreign Language<sup>1</sup>

I am anxious to see that there are equal opportunities for all to receive education in this country. At present, there are several complaints about our system of education. Some complaints may be correct, some may not be. I often feel that, under the present system of education, full opportunities for education

1. Address at the Founder's Day celebrations of Modern School, New Delhi, 15 February 1953. From *The Hindu* and the *National Herald*, 17 February 1953. Extracts.



exist only for a select few. Majority of the people are deprived of these opportunities. This is neither proper nor desirable.

I am sorry to note that the basic system of education introduced in schools has not made any headway so far. I am surprised that this system of education which we are thinking of introducing in colleges as well, has not shown any progress....

Children are the hope of the nation. I derive immense satisfaction to see the resplendent and blooming faces of children. This reminds me that these very children will one day grow up and take up the task of building up the nation. But it must also be borne in mind, as to how far these children are being prepared to face the future problems and become good citizens. We have to see that they grow on sound lines and do not develop any separatist tendencies, which ultimately prove harmful.

The English-knowing people in the country must remember that English is a foreign language and ultimately they have to develop their own language without which the country cannot go forward. While I am not hostile towards English and love it like other languages, I strongly feel that it is not consistent with India's prestige and honour to make too much use of an alien language and ignore her own.

It is good to know English, Persian, Arabic or any other language, but it is also very essential that we develop and patronize our own languages. English is a great language and the country owes it much and it would have to be retained and preserved in India. But along with it every effort has to be made to develop and foster our national language.

Many English-knowing people in India, even when they are familiar with their national language, make frequent use of English just to display their knowledge of this language. I am also guilty of this practice sometimes and I have no claim to advise others on this matter, but I hope that this is avoided.

## VII. THE YOUTH

### 1. Dignity of Labour<sup>1</sup>

University degrees should not be granted to students unless they take up manual work for a specified period under the Five Year Plan. In some countries, military

1. Speech at the inauguration of the Academy of Physical Education, Hyderabad, 20 January 1953. From *The Hindu*, 21 January 1953.

training for two years is compulsory for every boy of certain age, regardless of his being poor or rich. In India, it would be a useful contribution under the Five Year Plan before the youth get their degrees.

A nation cannot progress unless the people have a good physique. A sound body is generally the prerequisite of a sound mind. The coordination between the hand and the mind ensures a proper and harmonious development. The world may get on for some time without taking much help from the mind but it will come to a standstill without manual work. Unfortunately, in India, dignity of labour is not understood properly. We prefer to be a clerk in an office with a small salary rather than work with our hands and feet and gain more income.

The caste system, to a certain extent, is also responsible for lowering the dignity of labour. It is assumed that manual labour is to be done exclusively by a certain class or caste of people. You must give up this antiquated idea and judge your contribution to the nation by the quantum of hard work you do in the shape of digging tanks, laying roads and producing food.

Physical culture should not merely aim at developing the body but should generate positive energy to transform the society. Physical training should be made compulsory in schools and colleges. There should be an incentive for students to take to regular physical exercise, like running, swimming and jumping. A diploma in physical culture should be instituted. When I was a student in England every student was required to learn swimming and do certain physical exercises, unless he was medically advised not to do so. Such a system should also be introduced in India.

## 2. A Universal Culture with National Roots<sup>1</sup>

I send my good wishes to the Pakistan Youth Convention which, I was informed, is not a political body,<sup>2</sup> but an organization working in the fields of education, culture and art.

If we cannot build a new world, we should at least try to re-fashion the

1. Message to the Pakistan Youth Convention, which met at Karachi on 24 January 1953. *National Herald*, 25 January 1953.
2. The All-Pakistan Youth Movement was started on 16 October 1952 as a 'living memorial' to Liaquat Ali Khan. Sponsors included teachers, students, journalists and public workers with Inamullah Khan as the convener.



old world and make it a happier and more worthy place for the millions who live in it.

These subjects are constantly being referred to and yet I often wonder how far many of us realize the true significance of education or culture and art. Each one of these subjects is intended to broaden the mind, to take us out of our narrow grooves, and to give us a wider outlook and understanding of the world and our fellow men and women. True culture is something that is or should be universal, although it may have its national aspects.

The world today, in spite of its tremendous progress through science and technology, is increasingly a scene of conflict, and people and nations dislike and hate each other. That is the reverse of culture, and any education that leads to this is a false education. It is more especially the youth of every country who should endeavour to get out of these grooves which breed hatred and fear of each other.

### 3. Promotion of Unity<sup>1</sup>

While I do not want this country to be turned into a military camp, I would like everyone to possess some of the qualities of the soldier.

When I inspected guards of honour in various places, I was pleased to see the cadets of the National Cadet Corps,<sup>2</sup> both boys and girls. In the Corps, they learn the lesson of discipline and acquire the will to work together. The organization now has a strength of over 70,000 but this is too small a number for a country like India. I wish the training can be given to all, although I am not in favour of conscription.

India must be made into a first-class country. She possessed certain great qualities but her basic weakness in the past had been lack of unity. People pull apart in different directions and do not work together. India was enslaved not so much because of defeats in the battlefield as due to her own internal weakness and lack of unity.

1. Address to the NCC, New Delhi, 24 January 1953. From *The Hindu*, 25 January 1953. Extracts.
2. The National Cadet Corps was inaugurated with the object of giving compulsory military training to all young men and women and the strength of the NCC at this time was 2,500 officers and 78,000 cadets. In certain rural schools an experimental scheme called the National Youth Movement was also launched for the same purpose.

There are three types of people in the world. One type of people learn from the experience of others. They are really wise men. Secondly, there are people who benefit from their own experience. They are also wise. The third type of people are those who profit neither from others' experience nor their own experience. They are fools. Today, when different voices are heard—voices of religion or of separatism—it is important to remember the lessons of the past. Strength comes from working together, and dissensions weaken individuals and nations. The Defence Services contain people who come from different parts of India and live and work together and understand one another... You have to do great things in the country. These require trained and disciplined minds.

## VIII. PROHIBITION

### 1. To Morarji Desai<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
February 19, 1953

My dear Morarji,

...In your letter<sup>2</sup> you refer to our Finance Minister's statement on prohibition. I am sorry he made that statement. Personally I am convinced that it is not right or possible for the Bombay Government to go back on prohibition. It is possible that they may introduce variations in the method, but the principle has to be adhered to. I agree with you also that Ministers of the Centre or of the States should not say anything which might embarrass.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No 7(154)/49-PMS. Extracts.
2. On 5 February 1953, Morarji Desai, Chief Minister of Bombay, wrote to Nehru that a statement made by C.D. Deshmukh, the Union Finance Minister, at a press conference in Pune on 28 January 1953, suggesting that the Bombay State should review its prohibition policy to earn revenue had greatly embarrassed him.



## 2. To Ravi Shankar Shukla<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
March 15, 1953

My dear Shuklaji,<sup>2</sup>

I like the idea of your asking your officers to set an example in regard to prohibition.<sup>3</sup> I do not like the idea of their being asked to sign pledges. I think that if it is understood by your officers that they should follow the general Governmental policy in this matter, that would be enough. A Government should not take pledges about personal life. That raises all kinds of difficulties.

We have to deal with the Army. I have been trying my best to discourage consumption of alcoholic drinks in the Army, but this has been largely by advice and suggestion and it has had some considerable effect. If I issued an order to stop this, it would have a very far-reaching and disturbing effect on the Army.

I am sending your letter to the Home Minister, Dr Katju.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No 2(244)/48-PMS.
2. He was Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh at this time.
3. To implement its policy of prohibition, the Madhya Pradesh Government decided not to give liquor permits to Government servants, save in exceptional cases. The scheme came into force from 1 February and Government servants who had applied for permits were given temporary and non-renewable permits.

## 3. Prohibition in Bombay State<sup>1</sup>

For a long time past prohibition occupied an important place in our national programme. When the Constitution of India was drafted and passed, the policy

1. Message to the Prohibition Week Celebration Committee, Mumbai, 26 March 1953. File No 7(154)/49-PMS.

of prohibition was mentioned as one of the guiding principles of our policy.<sup>2</sup> Some of our States have given effect to it fully,<sup>3</sup> some partly, and some have proceeded more slowly.

Conditions differ from place to place and those responsible for the governance of each State have to decide on what steps to take and when to give effect to this national policy. Naturally all these steps should be carefully thought out so that each step should be firmly taken and any untoward consequences avoided. But it should be remembered always that we have to go in a certain direction as laid down in our Constitution.

There has been a good deal of controversy over this issue, more especially because of financial difficulties. Financial considerations have to be borne in mind. But if, from a social point of view, a particular reform is considered desirable, then financial considerations have a secondary place. We may well consider the best method and the most suitable steps to bring about that reform, but the direction should remain the same.

The major consideration should always be the good of the masses of our people. I have little doubt that the masses of our people profit both in the short run and in the long run by a policy of prohibition.

I send my good wishes, therefore, on the occasion of Bombay State observing a Prohibition Week.<sup>4</sup>

2. Article 47 of the Directive Principles of the Indian Constitution, stressing the need for raising the level of nutrition and the standard of living of the people, stated that "the State shall endeavour to bring about prohibition of the consumption, except for medical purposes, of intoxicating drinks and of drugs which are injurious to health."
3. During the decade 1946-56, prohibition was introduced in the four States of Andhra Pradesh, Bombay, Madras and Saurashtra. Assam, Madhya Bharat, Madhya Pradesh, Mysore, Orissa, Kerala, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh went dry partially.
4. The Prohibition Week was observed from 5 to 12 April 1953.



## IX. POPULATION PROBLEM

### 1. To J.R.D. Tata<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
January 21, 1953

My dear Jehangir,<sup>2</sup>

Thank you for your letter of the 13th January.<sup>3</sup>

... You have raised the question of population. Broadly speaking, I agree with you that we should tackle this problem. But we have to proceed with care so as not to raise a hornet's nest around us which might make progress more difficult. Also progress in this direction cannot be fast enough in the near future to react on our economic problems. However, we have to think of the distant future also.

I agree with you that it is not possible for obvious reasons to raise the minimum legal age of marriage much more. In fact, in some western countries the marriage age is becoming less and less. I do not mean the legal marriage age, but in practice. I also agree that the various mechanical and chemical contraceptives, as well as the rhythm method, can hardly be expected to produce any large-scale results within an appreciable time. The new method to which you have referred does offer possibilities of quicker and more widespread results. We should keep in touch with it. I do not think there is any question of financial backing for work to be done in the US or the UK. They do not lack money there. What we should do is to keep in touch with that work and encourage it in India. I shall get in touch with Dr B.C. Roy about this.

As a student of history, I have been interested in the decline and fall of populations. Presumably, modern contraceptives were not used and yet populations fell considerably. What the reasons were cannot be determined with accuracy, though many are suggested. As a matter of fact, even the fall in population in some western countries in recent years is not supposed to be due so much to the use of contraceptives as to other reasons. This seems to have

1. File No 28(65)/51-PMS. Extracts.
2. Chairman, Tata Group of Industries.
3. Expressing concern at the rate of growth of the population in India, J.R.D. Tata wrote that except for a drastic raise in the minimum legal age of marriage, none of the existing methods were effective enough to control this phenomenon. However, an increase in the marriage age presented innumerable political and social difficulties and the Government should actively assist the research work on oral contraceptives being done in the UK and the USA. He added that work in this field was already being done in Calcutta.

something to do with the vitality of a race and the effect of modern industrial living and environment. However, these are big questions.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 2. To C.D. Deshmukh<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
January 31, 1953

My dear Deshmukh,

J.R.D. Tata wrote to me<sup>2</sup> some little time ago making a very fervent appeal for Government to help scientists in devising proper contraceptive methods for controlling the birth rate. He said that the mechanical method could hardly be applied largely in Indian conditions. He was, therefore, much attracted to a news item about other methods being experimented upon in the US and the UK. He also referred to an Indian doctor who was experimenting on certain biological reactions.

I wrote to Dr B.C. Roy on this subject to find out. He has sent me a reply with a number of other papers. I am sending all these to you. Of course, you need not read through all this.

You will notice that Dr Sanyal is carrying on these experiments and has already achieved some success.<sup>3</sup> He wants Rs 20,000 for the next year's experiments. The Bengal government has promised to give him Rs 10,000 and Dr Roy suggests that the Government of India might be able to give him the remaining ten thousand.

Normally this should go to the Health Minister. But I feel rather hesitant at this stage to send it there. If you prefer it, I will do so.

I feel that we should provide this Rs 10,000 for this work which might well prove of great value.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No 28(65)/51-PMS. Extracts.

2. See the previous item.

3. Sudhir Nath Sanyal; a pathologist at the Bacteriological Institute in Calcutta had developed an extract from peas which possessed the properties of fertility control and could be administered by injection or orally.



## X. TRIBAL WELFARE

### 1. To C.D. Deshmukh<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
January 29, 1953

My dear Deshmukh,

You will remember the talk we had about the Autonomous District Councils attached to the Assam State. These tribal areas are largely undeveloped. The people living there have hardly come in touch with the rest of India, as they were kept apart by the British. Civil administration also was in a rather primitive state, except for some parts. Some missionaries spread out there and did good work so far as education was concerned. There were a fair number of conversions also.

The tribes differ from each other considerably and have different languages. Indeed, even in one major tribe there are many languages, like the Nagas, and sometimes a person living in a village can hardly understand the language of some villages ten or twenty miles away. The people generally are physically strong and intelligent. Their womenfolk are particularly attractive and free. The Khasi women and the Lushai women are intelligent and attractive. The Nagas vary from the headhunter variety to others who, when trained and disciplined, are excellent stuff. The Naga battalion in the Assam Rifles is first-rate.

These people are very independent-minded and cannot easily be forced to behave in a manner which they do not like, but they make good friends. Where they have had a chance of proper education, they have made progress. They are artistic and their weaving is very good. Altogether, they create a fine impression.

They live near the frontier of India and some of the same tribes live on the other side of the border, like the Nagas in Burma. They occupy thus a strategic position of great importance which has grown in recent years. Properly treated and encouraged, they can become a bulwark of our State. Otherwise, they are a danger and a weakening factor. On the whole, thus far they look with friendliness towards India, except for a certain section of the Nagas who are troublesome and claim independence. But, while they are friendly to India as a whole, there is a measure of apprehension too about the future, as if they have not quite made up their minds. They do not get on very well with the Assamese who, in the past, treated them as inferiors. They are not prepared to tolerate any stigma of inferiority from anyone. As friends, they react well.

Because of all these factors, it is of considerable importance that we should

1. JN Collection. Copy of this letter was sent to K.N. Katju and Jairamdas Doulatram.

help them to develop themselves. It was a happy thought to bring some of these people from the frontier regions for Republic Day celebrations here. These celebrations have impressed them greatly.

It would have been far better if all these areas had been placed directly under the Centre. As it was, some of these areas were separated into the North East Frontier Agency and put under the Centre, through the Governor of Assam, who functions as an agent of the Central Government. The other areas were divided up into a number of autonomous districts, I think, six in number, corresponding to the various tribes, and placed under the Assam Government. I had rather vague ideas on the subject at the time the Constitution was framed. If I had my present knowledge, we might perhaps have made somewhat different arrangements. It is difficult to change these now, though we need not rule this out in the future. It was realized of course even at the time of Constitution-making that these areas had to be treated separately and hence the formation of the Autonomous District Councils.

A peculiar position has been created. Here is this large area, mostly undeveloped, tagged on to the State of Assam which itself is rather backward. The valley of the Brahmaputra can hardly support these areas or do much to develop them. We are doing something in the Five Year Plan.

Apart from the Naga District Council, which has not come into existence because of the non-cooperation of the Nagas, the other District Councils have been formed, but they start from scratch as far as administration is concerned as well as finances. Some of these District Councils show some enthusiasm, but they are hampered greatly by lack of finances. The Assam Government has given them some advances, but they are not adequate. If these District Councils fail to function right at the beginning, then this experiment will collapse and it will become more difficult for us to start afresh with these people. It is important, therefore, that we should help these District Councils to function and that they should have the sensation of some measure of self-government, as was intended by the Constitution.

You are quite right that the responsibility for these areas rests with the Assam Government, but as a matter of fact this Government is just not capable of doing all that is necessary and we have to help them, at least to begin with. So far as education is concerned, we are trying to get the basic education people from Sewagram to take this matter up there. Basic education is good anywhere, but it is particularly suited to these tribal areas.

I have been impressing upon the Assam Government to do its utmost to help these areas. I find that they have thus far given as advances or grants a sum of Rs 3 lakhs to them. In addition they have transferred some monies which had lapsed to them at the time the Constitution started functioning. This sum amounts to about Rs 6½ lakhs. Thus, altogether, they have given a little under Rs 9½ lakhs to these District Councils. This does not include the Naga



District Council which has not come into existence and which, therefore, has to be governed directly by the Assam Government.

The Assam Government has thus done something for these Councils. I think that we should allot Rs 10 lakhs from the Centre for this purpose. We need not consider this a recurring grant or loan. Once the District Councils, begin functioning, they will have some sources of revenue. For the present, we have to get them started. The money we have allotted to the Five Year Plan is for strictly developmental work and can hardly be utilized for this purpose.

If we agree to give this money, it would go through the Home Ministry. I think it will not be desirable to hand it over to the Assam Government without some scrutiny and without deciding how best it can be utilized. The Governor has in fact suggested that an official of the Finance Ministry might go there to help these District Councils to frame their budgets and their rules, etc. This official could advise the Home Ministry as well as the Assam Government and final decisions could then be made in consultation with the Governor.

A number of other questions arise about the division of certain taxes and revenues between the Assam Government and the Autonomous District Councils. The Finance official could also advise us in this matter.

There is a certain urgency about this and the sooner we take steps, the better. If you agree, as I hope you will, to allot Rs 10 lakhs for this purpose, the other steps can be taken speedily.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 2. To Bisnuram Medhi<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
January 29, 1953

My dear Medhi,<sup>2</sup>

You have written to me previously about the autonomous District Councils. I have been pressing you to give them as much help as you can. You gave me some figures of the help you had already given. This appeared to be very uneven. Some District Councils got much more money than the others. I should like to have your latest figures and an explanation as to why you have helped some more than the others.

In the Naga Hills there is no Council and I suppose, therefore, that the expenditure there is being directly borne by your Government.

1. JN Collection. A copy of the letter was sent to Jairamdas Doulatram, the Governor of Assam. Extracts.
2. Chief Minister of Assam at this time.

I have had some difficulty with the Finance Ministry here on this subject. They said that this was clearly the responsibility of the Assam Government and they did not wish to assume any such responsibility on behalf of the Centre. However, I am having talks with them and I hope it may be possible for us to give some financial assistance for these areas. I think it will be desirable for a senior official of the Finance Ministry to visit these areas and give advice about financial matters relating to the District Councils. This will be helpful to you and to us. I have suggested accordingly to the Finance Minister here....

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

### 3. To Jairamdas Doulatram<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
January 29, 1953

My dear Jairamdas,

You will remember writing to me on several occasions about the Central Government helping financially and otherwise the Autonomous District Councils in Assam. I had recommended this to our Finance Minister. His first reaction was against it, because he said that he was not prepared to accept the responsibility of the Centre for this, it was the Assam Government's responsibility. I had a talk with him subsequently and he more or less agreed to give some help provided this was not supposed to be a recurring item and the Assam Government did not consider it the Centre's responsibility.

I have now written to him again and suggested that Rs 10 lakhs might be given for this purpose, also that he might send a senior Finance Officer to advise in various ways, as suggested by you.

Deshmukh wanted to know what the Assam Government was doing in the way of financial help. I have given him some figures supplied by Medhi. I should like to have fuller details. The figures that Medhi sent me were very uneven, i.e., some District Councils had been helped considerably, others to a much smaller extent.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.



#### 4. To All Union Ministers<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
1st March, 1953

...This gives some idea of the difficult problems we have to face in these frontier tribal areas. We are apt to judge of people in various parts of India by the same standards and measure them by the same yardstick. The fact is that they differ in many ways in their customs, ways of life, etc. This is particularly so in the North-East areas, where they have been cut off from India. They are a tough and likable people. They can be won over by friendly treatment and alienated by any attempt to suppress them or impose different ways on them. I am afraid, not many people approach them with sympathy and understanding. We go with our own ideas and presume that they are the best. What is necessary is to try to understand the ways of life of these fine people in the mountains and try to help them. It would be a great pity indeed if they lost their artistic background and became crude imitations of something else.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection..Extracts.

#### 5. Welfare of the Tribals<sup>1</sup>

Our tour<sup>2</sup> is in fulfilment of the desire of the two Governments to confer together in dealing with the common problem of the welfare of the tribal people.

There will be no joint programme by the two Governments, but we shall learn from each other and keep in constant contact so that we might profit by our own actions.

The Burmese Prime Minister is already on the other side of the border. Tomorrow, I will be sending my plane to bring U Nu to Kohima, where the first meeting between the two Prime Ministers will take place. Together we will visit the border two days on this side and two days on the other.

1. Talk to press correspondents at Imphal, 28 March 1953. From the *National Herald*, 29 March 1953.
2. Nehru and U Nu, the Prime Minister of Myanmar, undertook a joint tour of the tribal areas on either side of the Indo-Myanmar border.

I am going to Imphal and later across the border into Burma because some three months ago U Nu invited me to do so. This has nothing to do with special problems or special situation that might have arisen there.

U Nu said that he was going to the Naga area and, therefore, he would like me to join him there. The idea appealed to me and I promised to do so.

This was when U Nu came to India for the Sanchi celebrations.<sup>3</sup> No date was fixed at that time and we were waiting for the air-strip to be constructed on the other side of the border and for suitable weather conditions.

U Nu had in the meantime fixed his programme and it was forwarded to me. I was glad to have adapted my programme accordingly and then invited him to join me on our side at Imphal and then to go together to the other side.

3. He came to Sanchi on 29 November 1952 on the occasion of the opening of a new *vihara* and to attend the International Buddhist Cultural Conference held there.

## 6. Aims of Joint Tour<sup>1</sup>

My discussions with the Burmese Prime Minister, U Nu, who arrived here today, will have nothing to do with any recent occurrence or any particular situation that has arisen.

The present joint tour follows a letter from U Nu some months ago, giving his ideas about tribal people and what his Government is doing for them in Burma.

During my meeting with U Nu we intend to discuss common matters because there is a great desire on both sides to cooperate in the largest possible measure. Both Governments have various welfare schemes for the tribal people on both sides and we will compare our respective approaches and discuss what we have done and intend to do about them.

1. Talk to press correspondents at Imphal, 29 March 1953. From the *National Herald*, 30 March 1953.



It is obvious that KMT troops have absolutely no business to be in the Burmese territory. Normally, they should be disarmed or they should go away.<sup>2</sup>

Burma has been keeping India informed of this development during the past years regularly. The new development has arisen because, it is stated that KMT troops have been helping the insurgents. This is a development which Burma will not like.

KMT troops seem to be better uniformed and equipped now than they have been a year or two ago. But for this they would have simply played their way. There must be a source of supply and it is suspected it is either Formosa or Thailand.

It is quite possible these equipments might be American, as there are plenty of American materials in Formosa. The American Government can, of course, say they are not responsible for this.

Welfare measures for the tribal people on the India-Burma border cannot be undertaken jointly by both Governments because administrative operators in India and Burma in these areas are different. Perhaps U Nu wants to discuss this matter with me because India has some greater experience administratively in these areas than on the other side of Burma. But it is possible officers on both sides may go across the frontiers for consultations with their opposite numbers.

2. Myanmar faced a problem from the military operations of the Chinese Nationalist troops in the northern and eastern parts of the country. These troops were the remnants of Chiang Kai shek's army who fled from their country in 1949. In addition to harassing the people of Myanmar they trafficked in opium and other contraband goods, which they obtained from Thailand, an ally of Chiang's regime and the US Government. These troops also got military supplies from other countries through Thailand, and Americans helped them in operating their airfields. The Myanmar Government could not succeed in persuading the Chinese Nationalists to withdraw and the US Government to bring pressure on Chiang's Government to halt their support to them.

## 7. Tour for Better Understanding<sup>1</sup>

The Burma border is a friendly frontier, and Burma is our neighbour, but it is marked only in the map. Let there not be any border in the hearts of the people of these two countries.

1. Address at a public meeting at Imphal, 30 March 1953. From the *National Herald*, 31 March 1953.



GIVING CERTIFICATE TO A KRISHI PANDIT AT THE CONVOCATION OF THE INDIAN COUNCIL OF AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH,  
NEW DELHI, 6 JANUARY 1953





I welcome U Nu as the Prime Minister of a neighbouring country and as an affectionate comrade. It is significant that in these days when frontiers are usually guarded by forces and people on either side are afraid of one another, here we do not have any need to take any protective measure of that kind. It is a friendly frontier. We are going to talk not about our disputes and difficulties but rather about the peaceful pursuits of life so that we can advance the interests and welfare of the people on both sides of the border.

I wish the representatives of both the Governments meet occasionally and discuss such peaceful pursuits rather than about their difficulties or differences.

Unless the people cooperated with the Government and worked hard, they can neither solve their problems nor can build up their country. Manipur is beautiful with great natural resources. They should develop the State by joint efforts shunning all group rivalries and feuds.

An advisory council for Manipur will be formed soon. Later, other steps will be taken. An advisory council can be formed only with four or five people. I have talked with leaders of different parties, and I find each one attacking the other. If things are what they say, they should have an advisory council with at least a hundred members.

## 8. Outsiders Misleading the Nagas<sup>1</sup>

The outsiders who are misleading the Naga people against the best interests of the country may face serious consequences if they continue to indulge in their activities. We shall have to put an end to it.

I have seen the memoranda submitted to me by the Nagas demanding independence.<sup>2</sup> I feel none of them is drafted by any Naga nor by any Indian. They are drafted by outsiders who do not know what India is. These memoranda contain foolish things.

There is some boycott of the district council by the Nagas. The Government wants them to rule themselves in their own way and to manage their own

1. Address at a public meeting, Kohima, 30 March 1953 From the *National Herald*, 31 March 1953.
2. The Naga National Council demanded a sovereign Nagaland comprising, besides the Naga Hills district, the Naga Tribal Area (administered by the Central Government) and the contiguous Naga areas of Sibsagar and Nowgong districts and of Manipur State and Myanmar.



affairs. It is very strange that they should boycott the council<sup>3</sup> although they are given full freedom to manage their own affairs.

The visit of the Burmese Prime Minister to Kohima is a symbol of friendship between the two countries. The Burmese Prime Minister is greatly interested in the development of the Nagas as there are Nagas in the Burmese territory also.

3. The Naga National Council organized a plebiscite in May 1951 and in early 1952 called for a boycott of general elections, as a result of which they had no autonomous district council and no representative in the Assam Assembly or in the Constituent Assembly.







## I. THE JAMMU AGITATION

1. To Shaikh Abdullah<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
January 1, 1953

My dear Shaikh Saheb,

...But it is not merely enough to understand the background of the situation, important as that is. One has to deal with it with success. We have to control a situation not only from the governmental point of view, but control it by winning over people's minds. If we do not succeed in that, then we have failed.

There can be little doubt that the whole genesis of the Jammu movement<sup>2</sup> has little to do with the Jammu problems. It is definitely a subversive movement of the most reactionary communal type aiming at something much bigger than Jammu. I said something to this effect in Parliament.<sup>3</sup> The unfortunate thing is that the mischief-makers have managed to influence large numbers of other people by certain cries which appear to them rather attractive. We have to win them back by a direct and positive approach, both of governmental policy and personal approach. I should like very much to discuss these matters with you and I had hoped that you might be able to come here. I had at first intended myself to go to Jammu for a day or so and I wrote to you to this effect....

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. When the Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly decided to implement some parts of the Delhi agreement of July 1952, the Jammu Praja Parishad started an agitation in November 1952. Following the arrest of the Parishad leaders. Prem Nath Dogra and Sham Lal Sharma on 21 November 1952, the Parishad volunteers attacked police stations and tehsil buildings in Ranbirsinghpura, Chhamb, Udampur, Samba, Sunderban and some other places, which were very near to the Indo-Pakistan border. Attempts had been made to damage Ministers' cars, and even threats to kill the Ministers were given. The Jan Sangh, the Hindu Mahasabha and the Ram Rajya Parishad started a campaign outside the State in support of the demands of the Praja Parishad.

3. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 20, pp. 369-72.



## 2. To Syed Mahmud<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
January 4, 1953

My dear Mahmud,

...I am closely following the Jammu situation. I think that something should be done, something of a positive kind. But I am not prepared to deal with the Parishad people. As for implementing our agreement, I agree with you. I wish Shaikh Saheb would take this matter in hand. Probably he will be coming to Hyderabad and you can have a talk with him also....

Yours affectionately,  
Jawahar

1. Syed Mahmud Papers, NMML. Extracts.

## 3. To K.N. Katju<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
January 4, 1953

My dear Kailas Nath,

...However, I am not particularly worried about the Kashmir issue in the Security Council. It is difficult, but our way is clear and we have indicated it. What I am worried about is the local situation, more especially in Pepsu and Jammu. Both these have become tests for us in their different ways. Pepsu is a political scandal of the first magnitude and I do not at all like our helplessness in dealing with this situation.<sup>2</sup> I have no doubt whatever that both the Chief Minister and the Rajpramukh are hand in glove in this matter. I know that the Congressmen there, or the so-called Congressmen, are most of them a bad lot and have made a mess of things. But governmentally we have to deal with the Chief Minister

1. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. The second session of the Pepsu Legislative Assembly was called by the United Front Government on 19 November 1952 and was to continue upto 28 November. However, on 25 November, when the House was discussing an important Bill the Opposition tabled a notice of no-confidence against the Speaker and, all of a sudden, without even allowing the discussion to conclude, the Speaker, after reading a letter from the Chief Minister, Gian Singh Rarewala, adjourned the House *sine die*. The Opposition alleged that it was done out of fear of the impending downfall of the ministry.

and the Rajpramukh. For my part, I am so disgusted with their methods that I feel reluctant in even seeing them. I have nothing definite at the present to suggest, except that the time has come to give them no rope at all. I do not think they should continue. How to remove them is another matter. Meanwhile, Rarewala, who has already filled nearly all the important service posts<sup>3</sup> with his own henchmen and incompetent persons, will no doubt continue this policy and bring about a complete collapse in the services as well as in the law and order situation. I think we should at least have some reliable men in important offices there who cannot be bought over or suppressed by Rarewala.

I suggest that your adviser or whatever he is called (I believe Pillay is his name) should be called here for a personal report and consultation.<sup>4</sup> I should like to meet him also.

The Jammu situation is not serious in any big way. But basically, as I have stated several times, it is an attempt of the most poisonous kind to upset the entire policy of Government, not only in Jammu and Kashmir State, but in India as a whole. Its effect on the Kashmir issue in the Security Council as well as in Pakistan is obvious. Its effect in India may be worse. Syama Prasad Mookerjee is playing a very clever and, what I consider, a very dirty game. I think we should realize that and give him no quarter.

The so-called Praja Parishad agitation in Jammu is backed up completely by the Jan Sangh and the Hindu Mahasabha. Their representatives rushed up to Kanpur to meet the Jan Sangh leaders and, more particularly, Syama Prasad Mookerjee, for further advice as to what to do. I am quite clear that we should take up a strong line against the Parishad, the Jan Sangh and such other organizations as may be involved in this matter. There can be no compromise on this issue, for a compromise means giving up of every basic principle for which we have stood.

The situation as it is developing reminds me powerfully of the days of July-August 1947. These very forces, including of course the Akalis, were going all out to create trouble in a big way. The Partition helped them and they had their bloody way for some time. Being suppressed to some extent then, they assassinated Gandhiji.

After the general elections, these communal forces laid low for a while. Gradually, they tried to build themselves up by petty incidents and by softness on our part. In Jammu, the Praja Parishad leaders had been interned by the

3. For instance, Iswaran, the Chief Secretary, sent by the Government of India, was removed within twenty-four hours of joining duty because of the Chief Minister's displeasure at the publication of the notice calling the Assembly.
4. V.K.B. Pillay was the Counsellor in Pepsu at this time. He met Nehru on 6 January.



Kashmir Government, but at our instance they were released and allowed a free hand.<sup>5</sup> We see the consequences.

I have a feeling that among our officers, there is no clear understanding of these issues and there is a measure of sympathy for these communal organizations. Syama Prasad Mookerjee has intimate contacts with many of them and influences them. The result is not only a general weakening in our attitude, but an absence of news coming to us at the right time. Thus, the Jammu Day meeting and hartal in Delhi came as a surprise to many.<sup>6</sup> Even the Delhi authorities did not know about it till late the previous evening. And yet I am told that the Hauz Qazi *thana* had been informed much earlier the previous day. Their information was not passed on to the higher authorities.

This kind of thing should be put down sternly. Delhi is a nerve centre and we have to be alert all the time. A little slackness or delay means trouble.

The States Ministry does not seem to me to function with the speed or effectiveness that it ought to show. Somehow it has inherited the old reputation and functions of the Political Department. I think it should be made to sit up and informed clearly what our policy is....

Yours affectionately,  
Jawaharlal

5. First major protest by the Praja Parishad was launched in February 1952, when the students of Gandhi Memorial College in Jammu protested against the hoisting of the National Conference flag at the college building. Prominent leaders of the Praja Parishad were arrested and only released following the intervention of the Central Minister, Gopaldaswami Ayyangar.
6. On 14 December 1952.

#### 4. To Shaikh Abdullah<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
January 5, 1953

My dear Shaikh Sahib,

I have read in this morning's newspapers the report of a speech you delivered

1. JN Collection.

yesterday in Jammu.<sup>2</sup> If I may say so, it was an excellent speech, firm and friendly. More particularly, your references to the Dogras were happy.

I need hardly tell you that I have been giving constant thought to these developments in Jammu. I have occasionally written to you. But I would have preferred, of course, a talk. Unfortunately that could not take place. My own inclination is always to go to the heart of the seat of trouble whenever and wherever it occurs and to deal with it in my own way. That way is apart from the normal governmental way which, of course, has to be pursued. Ultimately where one has to deal with people, especially in considerable numbers, it is the human approach that tells and not mere logic or governmental action, though both are necessary. Where the human approach is lacking, no real solution comes of any problem even though that problem may be suppressed for some time. It is because I find that human approach in your recent speech in Jammu that I felt happy.

On two or three occasions I felt like going to Jammu, although it is very difficult for me to find the time. But where some important work has got to be done, time is found. I think I mentioned to you in a letter as well as to Bakshi the possibility of my going to Jammu. As neither of you suggested that I might do so, I gave up the idea because I had no desire to interfere.

More and more I have felt that a positive human approach is not only necessary but will pay dividends as it always does. This is so especially in the case of people like the Dogras and the Rajputs, who do not shine in intelligence or logic, but who are always receptive to a friendly approach. Unfortunately they have a feeling that they are disliked and condemned and so they develop a sullen attitude which is on the verge of despair. They are tough people in their own way. Occasionally their toughness goes in the wrong direction. We have had plenty of dealings with them in Rajasthan, Madhya Bharat and many other parts of India. We have had trouble from them also, and we have also succeeded often in winning over the very persons who created trouble as well as those who sympathized with them. So I speak with some experience of this kind of persons. I have little doubt that they have had this feeling of sullenness at what they thought was the bad treatment given to them. As you pointed out in your very good analysis of the Jammu situation, which you sent me, the Dogras and the Rajputs have been a ruling group in Jammu and, to some extent, all over the State. The fall from that status, therefore, which was inevitable,

2. On 4 January 1953, Shaikh Abdullah said at Jammu that "Kashmir valley and Jammu province cannot exist apart... To drive a wedge between the people of Kashmir Valley and Jammu province would only have disastrous consequences. The integrity of the State had to be maintained, and Kashmir and Jammu province had to sink or swim together.... If in spite of everything the people of Jammu wish to pursue their destiny in their own light, then nothing can stop them because it is not force that is keeping the Jammu province and the Kashmir Valley together, but it is the unifying force of love."



has been all the greater because of this. They required rather careful and tactful and friendly treatment. They got, I think, justice, as you have shown in your appraisal. But something more was necessary. There were unfortunately frequent references to them as being a bad lot. Some of the speeches of Afzal Beg<sup>3</sup> were very unhappy and led to this strong feeling of resentment among these Dogras and Rajputs of Jammu. Instead of being the ruling group they felt that they had been suddenly put down and made a ruled group and another group had become the rulers. The change was sudden for their medieval minds and they reacted badly to it. That change could have been toned down by that human approach as well as by petty governmental measures which would have made them feel that they are at least being treated in a friendly way and their difficulties are appreciated.

I have tried to study the situation in Kashmir and Jammu with all the data available to me, and that is a good deal, from all sources. But what is more, I have approached this question with a certain emotional receptiveness, which is so necessary to understand any problem. Kashmir has been for me something much more than a political issue, as you know. I have tried to balance all the factors involved in the course of our numerous talks in the course of last few years. More particularly, we had long talks when we were discussing various constitutional problems with you and other colleagues some months ago. It was clear to me that Kashmir and Jammu must hold together.<sup>4</sup> Any attempt at separation was harmful to the whole State, but more particularly to Kashmir. Kashmir proper was, I might confess, far more important from a variety of points of view than Jammu. But Kashmir by itself, that is separated from Jammu, was left in the air, politically speaking, and could not survive politically or economically. Therefore, even from the point of view of Kashmir itself, the situation in Jammu became of high importance. Ladakh is not so important of course, but it stands in the same category as Jammu from this point of view. Minus Jammu and Ladakh, Kashmir becomes rather helpless and would become an easy pawn for all kinds of forces. The people of Kashmir with all their courage and perseverance would be put in exceedingly difficult position.

Obviously the backgrounds of Kashmir proper and Jammu and Ladakh are different and each has to be approached from a different angle. The approach thus far made has generally been from the point of view of Kashmir proper. That is good. But by itself it could have little effect on Jammu and Ladakh. Indeed it was quite possible that it might have a contrary effect. The odd thing is that this contrary effect in Jammu might well produce reactions in the Valley itself so that we give in to a vicious circle. I have little doubt that this present

3. In his speeches, Afzal Beg was reported to have declared himself in support of the demand for the separation of the Kashmir Valley and, eventually, for its demarcation into an "independent" State.
4. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 19, pp. 322-30.

highly objectionable agitation in Jammu must be producing unfortunate results in the Valley. To what extent, I do not know and I am sure you will be able to deal with the matter. But the fact remains that whatever happens in one part of the State must react on the other, for good or ill, and the whole picture has to be kept in view all the time and a balanced policy adopted.

Many months ago, after long discussions, we arrived at a certain agreement which was placed before Parliament here by me and before your Constituent Assembly by you.<sup>5</sup> That agreement was a result of a consideration of all the factors and each part of it was supposed to balance the other. Since then, a part of that agreement has been given effect to. I have often been asked in Parliament here as to when the rest of it will be implemented.<sup>6</sup> I have answered that this will be done soon. There is some criticism of the delay in implementing the rest of the agreement. It is possible that this feeling exists in Jammu also.

The present demands in Jammu are absurd and can only lead to injury to all concerned.<sup>7</sup> I am quite sure that the average person in Jammu, even though he might not be very intelligent, can see this. Yet many people continue this disruptive and dangerous agitation which can lead them nowhere. That is a sign of despair and of giving up all hope. It is bad when people feel that way. It is possible that if we gave them something positive without giving up any principle that we adhere to, this itself might produce a marked change and give us the chance of dealing with the situation much more satisfactorily.

In politics as in life generally it makes a great deal of difference as to who has the initiative. During the last few weeks, it appears from a distance that the initiative has been with those carrying on the agitation and the State Government have acted in self-defence. To some extent that was inevitable so far as the law and order situation was concerned. But politically that was a weak position and the initiative should be in the hands of the State. If it slips away at any time, it has to be recovered by political means. One has to balance two factors—not giving in to a wrong agitation and not losing the initiative politically. I should have thought that one good step would have been to give early effect to every part of the agreement we arrived at some months ago. That agreement has to be given effect to. If so, why should it not be done at a

5. Nehru announced the Delhi agreement on 24 July in the House of the People and on 5 August 1952 in the Council of States. Shaikh Abdullah placed the agreement in the Kashmir Constituent Assembly on 11 August 1952.
6. Although action had been taken on certain points agreed to by the Prime Minister of India and Shaikh Abdullah, no action had been taken on the remaining points, particularly those relating to fundamental rights, appeals to the Supreme Court in case of denial of these rights, and the action to be taken by the President under Article 352 of the Constitution.
7. The aims of the Praja Parishad were stated to be: (1) complete accession of the State to India; (2) the use of the Indian Flag to the exclusion of the State Flag; and (3) self-determination for the people of Jammu if there was no complete accession to the Union of India.



time when full advantage can be taken of it and not when we have suffered injury for lack of it.

I am in full touch with what is happening in India in relation to the Jammu agitation. I know how mischief-makers are working here to help that agitation. We have taken not only governmental steps but also steps on behalf of the Congress to meet this. Nevertheless, it is clear to me that all the mischief-makers in India could not succeed in doing much in Jammu if there had not been fertile soil and if the root of the trouble did not lie there. Therefore, the situation has to be met really in Jammu and not in India, though the latter has to be kept in view.

There are, of course, many aspects of this question and I am not referring to them here. There is one aspect, however, which does appear worthy of consideration. In regard to land reforms, if it is true that the Jammu lands are much poorer than those in the Valley, then they might have been dealt with on a somewhat different basis. In India the ceiling we have fixed is calculated on a basis of quality of land as well as quantity and not mere quantity. If we had only a quantitative basis, it would have hit people very hard, say in Rajasthan, where land is very poor.

I am quite sure that Maharaja Hari Singh is helping the mischief-makers, though to what extent, I do not know. I have no sympathy for him. But for the present we have to judge every step by its effect on the general situation. Any step that might be used by the mischief-makers to help them has to be avoided. I mention this in regard to certain orchards that belong to Hari Singh. I understand that these orchards are being resumed by the State. I was under the impression that all orchards were not being treated in this way. But apart from this, to do this just at the present moment does not appear to me a very wise move. It will irritate the Dogras and the Rajputs. In war, as in any political conflict, one has to deal with the major front and not add to one's troubles by having numerous fronts. Also one has to undermine the morale of the opponent, not encourage it by any action or procedure.

I have ventured to write to you frankly as to how I feel. I hope you will not mind. What I am rather worried about is rather somewhat passive attitude, politically speaking, to this agitation. The first active response that I have noticed has been in your speech at Jammu yesterday. Therefore, I was pleased.

You have not informed me as to when you might be going to Hyderabad. I hope you will let me know.<sup>8</sup>

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

8. In reply, Shaikh Abdullah wrote a long letter justifying the stand of his government. He described the whole Jammu problem as the work of communal organizations, calling it "a violent reaction on the part of Jammu landlords and other upper classes."

5. To Karan Singh<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
January 7, 1953

My dear Yuvaraj,

Thank you for your letter of the 4th January.<sup>2</sup>

I can quite understand your great concern over the developments in Jammu. I am naturally also very much concerned and I have followed them closely. I entirely agree with you that while police measures are of course necessary, that is only a negative way of dealing with the situation. A positive approach is always necessary. For your personal information, I might tell you that I have written at some length to Shaikh Saheb on this subject.<sup>3</sup> I hope that he will come to Hyderabad for the Congress session and I shall certainly discuss these matters with him fully. And so with others. On my return from Hyderabad, I shall take such further action as might appear proper then. Perhaps I might come to Jammu myself.

I agree with you also that a negative and defeatist attitude is all wrong. To talk about the Jammu province, or part of it, breaking away from the rest of the State is folly. It is wrong for the Praja Parishad people as well as some of their supporters in India to talk of this. It is equally wrong for others to say that if Jammu wants to break away from Kashmir, it can do so. This defeatist tendency must not be encouraged.

...The situation in Jammu is serious enough to deserve our fullest consideration and such positive action as may be considered necessary. At the same time, one has to view these matters, as all other important matters, coolly and dispassionately.

I am terribly busy at present. That is my usual fate, but work and responsibility grow as India plays a more and more important role in the world. We have all kinds of conferences and seminars here drawing important people from other parts of the world.

With all good wishes,

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. Karan Singh urged the Government of India's intervention in the Jammu situation so that the State Government dealt with the agitation there not only with police measures but with concrete political, economic and administrative measures.

3. See the previous item.



## 6. To Syama Prasad Mookerjee<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
January 10, 1953

My dear Syama Prasad,

I have today received your letter of the 9th January<sup>2</sup> I am replying to it immediately as I shall be going away soon from Delhi on my way to Hyderabad.

There is no question of prestige about our dealing with the situation in Jammu. If any course appears to us to be right, we shall certainly follow it. You say that there has been a reign of repression in Jammu, and further that there has been no violence on the part of the Praja Parishad or their supporters. Surely it does not require any proof to substantiate the fact that violence on a widespread scale has been indulged in by the Praja Parishad people. The fact that a large number of officers and policemen have been injured and damage done to public buildings, is adequate proof of violence.

I am naturally interested in developments in Jammu and have followed them closely. I have not only what might be called official reports, but plenty of unofficial sources of information. All of these agree that the Jammu and Kashmir Government has tried to avoid repressive measures and, considering the circumstances, has shown considerable restraint. Quite apart from the merits of the case, I should like you to put yourself in the position of any Government which has to face this type of agitation accompanied by violence. Either a Government abdicates or it controls the situation. There is no middle way. It is true that in the attempt to control a situation excesses may be indulged in on the part of the authorities, but, as I have said above, my information is to the contrary. I cannot of course speak about every detail.

You say that interviews were sought with us and were not granted.<sup>3</sup> I am not aware of any interview asked for from me during recent months. All I saw were threats in the public press.

I hope I am capable of keeping an open mind. Anyhow, I try to do so and

1. JN Collection.

2. In his letter, S.P. Mookerjee stated that the Jammu movement could not be suppressed by force or repression. Certain basic demands which had been made must be dealt with in a proper manner. "Pray do not stand on false prestige or imitate the methods followed by British administration who thought that by ruthless repression they could solve any matter affecting the rights and liberties of the people."

3. Mookerjee claimed in his letter: "Repeated efforts were made by the Praja Parishad leaders and others to have an amicable settlement by constitutional means. Representations were sent to Dr. Rajendra Prasad, to yourself, to the Minister of States and to Shaikh Abdullah. Interviews were sought for with some of them, but such requests on most occasions were not granted."

I am prepared to consider any suggestion. In this matter, more than any other, I have to give the closest thought to every development. What happens in Jammu is not a local matter. It has the largest implications on the whole Kashmir issue, on the future of the Jammu and Kashmir State, on the UN, etc. The question has to be viewed in that larger context. It amazes me that this context is forgotten or ignored or no value attached to it by those who support this Jammu agitation. To me it seems perfectly clear that the Jammu agitation, if it succeeded, would ruin our entire case relating to the State. Indeed, nothing could be more injurious to the objectives proclaimed by the Praja Parishad than this agitation. How they expect to achieve their objectives in this way, passes my comprehension. You have some knowledge of the background of this entire Kashmir issue and I would like you to think over this whole question.

Suppose some remnants of the Muslim League in the Valley of Kashmir started an agitation which was anti-India and pro-Pakistan, how should we deal with it? What effect do you think has the Praja Parishad agitation on such persons in the Valley or elsewhere? If you open Pandora's box, then all kinds of unexpected and undesirable things come out of it. A consistent policy has to be followed in both cases.

You have referred to the agreement arrived at between the Government of India and the Jammu and Kashmir State Government some months ago and have criticized it. We dealt with this matter at the time fully and I tried to explain the reasons for it. Obviously, the case of Jammu and Kashmir State cannot be considered in exactly the same light as other States in India. That requires no argument. It is not a question of our wishes or desires but of facts and rather complicated facts. Having considered all these facts, we came to a certain decision which I think was fair and which tied up the State to India very firmly. Ultimately it is not some kind of legal decision or change in the Constitution that will finally settle this question of the State. There are other factors overriding constitutional factors that are at play, including international factors. Foreign policy does not just mirror our wishes, nor is it a mere exhibition of temper. It has to be equated to the facts of the situation and the nation's strength to give effect to its wishes.

You refer to Shaikh Abdullah telling you that he and his colleagues were willing to get their Constituent Assembly to pass a resolution about the State's accession to India, but that I did not approve of it.<sup>4</sup> This is partly true; but it refers to a particular time. When the Constituent Assembly first started

4. Mookerjee wrote: "We are anxious that the question of accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India should be finally and irrevocably settled... I was told by Shaikh Abdullah that he and his colleagues were willing to adopt this procedure (passing a resolution in the Constituent Assembly in favour of accession to India), but you were not prepared to approve of it."



functioning this proposal was considered. Our advice then was that it would not be wise to pass that resolution immediately as this would lead to the conclusion that the Assembly had been called just for that purpose and not for other purposes. As a matter of fact, according to us, the accession was complete and a resolution of the Constituent Assembly, though welcome, could not have made it more complete. The question was not of adding to that accession, but of our attitude towards the UN. We had made this clear and we wanted to adhere to what we had stated. That is a large issue. It is of course completely open to the Constituent Assembly to pass such a resolution. As a matter of fact, the agreement between the Government of India and the Jammu and Kashmir State Government some months ago was patently not only a confirmation of that accession, but acting up to it. Without accession that could not have happened.

You refer to that agreement not having been given effect to.<sup>5</sup> That is true. But there have been some difficulties in the way which delayed matters. The very first question that was taken up took some months to decide. The other matters will no doubt be taken up.

There is no question of the Head of the Jammu and Kashmir State being some kind of a rival President. He is the Head of a State just like the Head of any other State in India. He can only be appointed after the approval of the President of India.

I am quite prepared, and I am sure that Shaikh Abdullah is prepared, to consider any grievances of the Jammu people and try to rectify them where this is possible. But the demands of the Praja Parishad are basic constitutional issues which cannot be given effect to for obvious reasons. They are trying to decide a very difficult and complicated constitutional question by methods of war. It does not require much thought to demonstrate that this method cannot yield those results, whatever the merits may be. It can only injure the whole cause of the Jammu and Kashmir State and in particular what presumably some of the Jammu people demand. You talk of separatism.<sup>6</sup> I agree with you entirely that we should not encourage this tendency. But that is exactly what the Praja Parishad agitation is doing.

You should know how anxious I am to settle finally the whole Jammu and Kashmir State issue. That is not only because of the State itself, but also because

5. Mookerjee wrote: "The delay in giving effect to some of the agreed proposals as announced by you in July last, dealing with matters such as citizenship, fundamental rights, Supreme Court, President's emergency powers, etc. has created great misgivings in the minds of the people."
6. Referring to the provision for an elected President or a separate flag, Mookerjee felt that "if similar demands were made by other States, it would give momentum to dangerous tendencies of separatism."

of its large repercussions in India. But this issue has got tremendously complicated and there is no magic way of solving it by decree or Act of Parliament as some people seem to imagine. There are many other issues in the world today which remain unsolved, in spite of the greatest powers wishing to solve them. We have to take into consideration all these various factors and not allow our wishes to run away with us.

You refer to rehabilitation of refugees as well as to abducted women. All these years we have been consistently trying to deal with these matters. A large number of abducted women have been recovered and large numbers of refugees in India have also been sent back for rehabilitation and settled in the State. It is not true to say that nothing has been done.

The right way to approach the Jammu question is to stop this agitation completely and then deal with any grievances that may exist. I hope you will exercise your influence with the Praja Parishad in this direction.

I shall gladly meet you if you so wish. But I am going away to Bombay and Hyderabad, and shall be away for about ten days or so. I understand that Shaikh Abdullah will also be going to Hyderabad.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 7. To Rajendrasinhji<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
January 20, 1953

My dear Rajendrasinhji,<sup>2</sup>

...Some time ago I drew the attention of our Defence Ministry to the effect on ex-servicemen of the Praja Parishad propaganda in Jammu and I believe some inquiry was made about it then. I think that something should be done about these developments to which reference has been made by Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad....

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Army at this time.



## 8. To Bhimsen Sachar<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

January 22, 1953

My dear Sachar,<sup>2</sup>

Your letter of January 20th. We have been following carefully events in Jammu and the Punjab. Both you and the Governor<sup>3</sup> have sent me frequent reports.<sup>4</sup> The situation in Jammu is undoubtedly causing some concern. But I do not think that it is such as to continue to cause a serious trouble. We have to adopt a positive line of approach there, apart from the purely governmental and law and order line, which is of course necessary. I think that Shaikh Abdullah and his colleagues realize this and will take the necessary steps. This does not mean any kind of a compromise or even talks with the Praja Parishad leaders. I am not prepared to encourage them in any way. It does mean an approach to the large mass of people who may sympathize with the Praja Parishad agitation for a variety of reasons. They have certain grievances which can be remedied. For the rest, we should not get excited and carry on in a normal way....

Your Government should take particular steps to stop entry into Jammu from the Punjab. You should also keep in touch with Shaikh Abdullah or Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad in Jammu so as, if necessary, to coordinate activities. I have found that where the Jammu agitation is clearly explained to the people, they understand it and realize its folly. This evening Shaikh Saheb spoke at great length to a large Delhi audience<sup>5</sup> and created a very good impression.

I cannot suggest to you exactly what you should do about this agitation. That is for you to decide in consultation with your colleagues. But we must not remain passive spectators. Our line must be clear and should be followed both governmentally and otherwise by the public through the Congress. The extreme folly of the Praja Parishad agitation, which can only do good to Pakistan, should be pointed out.

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. The Chief Minister of Punjab.

3. Chandulal Trivedi.

4. Bhimsen Sachar had reported that "the sympathisers of the Jammu movement in Punjab had been holding secret meetings, enrolling volunteers, collecting funds, making speeches and poisoning the minds of simple people."

5. At a public meeting in New Delhi on 22 January which was organized by the Delhi State Congress Committee, Shaikh Abdullah said that unity and solidarity among the various communities of India was the only effective weapon to fight the psychological war that Pakistan had unleashed against Kashmir.

I do not quite understand what you mean by declaring the movement illegal. The Praja Parishad can be declared illegal or any other organization participating in the agitation. The RSS people talk tall and make a great deal of noise. But they have a way of collapsing if dealt with firmly.

I shall be seeing you soon here.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 9. To Bhimsen Sachar<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
January 25, 1953

My dear Sachar,

...It seems to me that we have not fully realized the extent and implications of what lies behind the Jammu agitation. It is obviously a more widespread affair than perhaps most people imagine and is being used by communal elements for other purposes. I need not dilate this point. Obviously, East Punjab and Delhi are most affected.

The reports I have been receiving from the Governor and from other sources in the Punjab have confirmed this opinion. It would appear that we are functioning very much on the defensive. The initiative is in the hands of the communal bodies. To some extent the Congress in the Punjab has tried to do some propaganda, etc., but this is feeble and does not compare at all with the agitation on the other side. Recent happenings in Pathankot were significant. On that occasion it was announced that some half-burnt ashes of persons killed in the Hira Nagar firings would be carried through the bazaar and a hartal would be observed. The hartal was, I understand, a success and objectionable slogans were raised during a procession.

So far as the agitation in Jammu itself is concerned, we are dealing with that matter separately, and I think that it is likely to subside. As I told you, we should take stringent measures to prevent wrong people from the Punjab infiltrating into Jammu. Nevertheless, some people will do that because it is difficult to guard the whole border. I am not greatly worried about this. What I should like to have done is a more active and vigilant attitude both on the part of the Punjab Government and the Punjab Congress.

1. JN Collection. Extracts.



The first thing is for our policy to be fully understood by all concerned, that is, the Government officers of all degrees right to the bottom, Congressmen, again of all degrees right to the village, and the public generally. There must be no misunderstanding about it because we just are not going to tolerate this agitation, whatever the consequences. If any people think that we are going to surrender to the agitation, they are completely mistaken. This agitation is vicious and giving in to it will have very far-reaching consequences. It is a part of the agitation in some other parts of the country, like Saurashtra, although the apparent basis there is different. Probably there will be attempts at a flare up in Delhi when Parliament meets here.

I do not mean to say that if there are any grievances they should not be remedied. I think the Jammu and Kashmir Government is fully conscious of this fact and is functioning, on the whole, on right lines. But we shall have no truck with the communal leaders of the Praja Parishad there or of the RSS, etc.

Having made this perfectly clear to all concerned and making them understand the situation, the Government should take such action as it thinks suitable. The action should be swift, when necessary. A wrong procession, like the one at Pathankot, should be banned. Any individual creating trouble in this respect should be proceeded against or detained. Full arrangements should be made for information to come in quickly and to be acted upon.

I am rather worried about the inactivity of Congressmen, or rather the weak activity. Still more so, I do not like the half-hearted attitude of some Congressmen in the Punjab in regard to communal questions. I understand that in the Pathankot hartal, etc., little was done by Congressmen to prevent it and that some noted Congressmen who were shopkeepers, shut up their shops. Among those who shut their shops were persons who are licensed cloth dealers and quota holders and thus who are in that way favoured by Government.

I am quite sure that if a clear attempt is made to make these people realize that this kind of activity is objectionable and will not be tolerated, they would hesitate to indulge in it.

I am writing to Pratap Singh on this subject also, more especially on the Congress aspect. My point is that we must be alert and vigilant and take necessary steps to nip any trouble in the bud rather than to wait for it to grow big.

I am sending a copy of this letter to your Governor.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 10. Threat of Agitation in Delhi<sup>1</sup>

I understand that every attempt is being made on behalf of the communal organizations like the Jan Sangh, RSS and Akali Dal to create trouble in Delhi on the basis of the Jammu Parishad agitation. Probably a situation will be created here, in the course of the next fortnight or so, so as to have big demonstrations when Parliament meets. In East Punjab the same policy is being pursued. I have spoken and written to the Punjab Chief Minister and the Governor about these matters there.

2. I am writing to you so that the Delhi Administration might remain alert and vigilant and not wait for events to happen. They must keep the initiative in their hands and take action to nip any trouble in the bud. They must look upon this matter as important and something that demands their full attention. When early action is not taken, trouble grows and then it is more difficult to deal with it.

3. Our officers at all levels, and of course the public, should be made to understand very clearly how we view this agitation and that we should not give it any quarter. If there are any grievances anywhere, we can consider them separately and certainly deal with them. But so far as this communal agitation is concerned, whatever shape or form it may take, we are determined to meet it.

1. Note to Minister of Home Affairs, 25 January 1953. JN Collection.

## 11. Disunity will Spell Disaster<sup>1</sup>

All will be well with India if we truly take to heart the great lesson of unity taught by Gandhiji, and all will be well with the world if it follows his path of peace and non-violence.

1. Speech at a public meeting in Delhi on the occasion of the observance of the fifth death anniversary of Mahatma Gandhi, 30 January 1953. From *The Hindustan Times*, 31 January 1953.



Casteism and communalism and narrowness had been the bane of India at times which had led to her enslavement and degradation. Now that the nation has turned the corner and won freedom under the leadership of Gandhiji by following the path of unity indicated by him, we have to guard and consolidate that freedom and give a new vitality and strength to the country.

If we do not break down these barriers of caste and community and religion, there is the danger of freedom again slipping from our hands.

The rise of the British power in India should be a stern reminder to every Indian, how disunity led to subjugation, how one king had turned against another, and one dynasty against another and they all, blinded by jealousy and spite, had sought British aid to defeat their rivals. That should be a warning to all.

So let this day be a day of self-introspection and heart-searching when everyone of us should look back on his achievements and failures. Let us not fritter away that rich heritage of freedom, and let us all work together to usher in a brighter future when poverty and unemployment will be abolished from the land.

The communal agitation in Jammu and those who are carrying on that agitation in that strategic area, which is surrounded by enemy forces, are not being faithful to India. It is a mean and vicious movement which, if allowed to succeed, would only break up the Jammu and Kashmir State and do incalculable harm to India's case before the UN.

The Praja Parishad is just RSS in another garb. It is trying to deceive unsophisticated and simple people in the name of religion and culture and is playing upon their passions. Beware of such communal organizations, and challenge them boldly. It is the duty of everyone to do so, for we cannot tolerate any movement which strikes at the very base of our national State.

The Parishad movement, though carried on in the name of unity with the Indian Union, could benefit nobody but the enemies of India. I have no doubt that if it goes on unchecked it would bring about a result which would be the very opposite of what its sponsors and supporters aim to achieve. If the agitation is successful, it means that our whole case for Kashmir falls.

Kashmir's accession to India is hundred per cent complete. Under the Constitution, the States enjoy autonomy, and Kashmir, too, has that autonomous status in internal matters, while the Centre controls its foreign affairs, defence and communications. Under the Delhi agreement of July, Kashmir has some more autonomous powers. The agitation, in reality, is directed against Parliament and the people of India who have ratified that agreement.

However, certain people in Jammu have some economic difficulties. The Kashmir Government is considering them and they would be set right. Take the case of those zamindars who, after the abolition of the zamindari, got only

22 acres.<sup>2</sup> In certain cases this land happened to be barren or rocky. Such cases would be looked into and the grievances redressed. But the present agitation, which has even become violent, is no way to solve the problem. The Praja Parishad is trying to create a dangerous law and order situation in an area which is a vital defence zone of India.

It is utter bankruptcy of wisdom to start a movement in Kashmir, even a peaceful one. And to start a violent movement—of which the many injured officials and policemen lying in hospital are a testimony—is a betrayal of India and her people.

The Parishad movement, which is being carried on with the help of the Hindu Mahasabha, the Jan Sangh, the RSS and the Akali Dal, is a revolt against the country, and the people must realize its sinister implications. The agitation, if successful, would only dismember the State into three or four parts, and I do not know what would happen to Jammu itself. Any man with a little intelligence can see the utter senselessness of that agitation.

I appeal to the people to give their enthusiastic support to the Five Year Plan and become partners in this great national enterprise. The country cannot prosper on the material aid given by the USA or some other foreign country, although India is thankful for all the help that she got. I do not think it is the right way to prosper through the help of others. It is through our own toil and effort and sacrifice that we can build up a free India.

India, like a magnet, draws today many leading personalities from other countries. They look to her with great expectations. India is not anxious to become the leader of Asia or any part of Asia or of the world, but she aspires to become strong, not in any military sense, through her own inherent moral and economic strength and unity, so that she may effectively pull her weight on the side of peace.

2. The Abolition of Big Landed Estates Act of 1950 made individual holdings of more than 22 acres illegal. As a result, approximately 563,500 acres of land was transferred to peasant tillers. The issue of compensation was referred to a ten-member committee of the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir which in its report on 27 March 1952 recommended abolition of landlordism without compensation. The Assembly adopted the recommendation unanimously on 31 March 1952.



## 12. To Shaikh Abdullah<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
January 30, 1953

My dear Shaikh Saheb,

General Thimayya came to see me this morning to report on his visit to Jammu. He gave me a copy of his written report which he had presented to the Commander-in-Chief....

I discussed with Thimayya the other aspects of the Jammu agitation as I wanted to know what his own reactions were to it. He is a person of intelligence. I was particularly interested in finding out from him the reactions among our Army officers and men as well as in the old Jammu and Kashmir Forces.

Thimayya told me that our Army had kept completely aloof and was not directly concerned, but the officers were naturally interested in what was happening. They felt that the movement, though misconceived, had certainly a mass appeal and, to some extent, had become a mass movement. Conditioned as they were, they did not like our Flag to become a subject of controversy and to be brought into disrepute. When this was explained to them—the political and sentimental reasons for having the State's Flag—they were disturbed at the Union Flag being rather pushed out of the picture. They also enquired as to why the agreement arrived at between the Government of India and the Jammu and Kashmir Government had not thus far been implemented. Regarding land reforms, Thimayya said that some of the land in Jammu Province was to his and their knowledge quite stony ground and yielded very little. Therefore, the ex-Servicemen and others who had got this type of land were considerably dissatisfied.

Later I saw D.P. Dhar<sup>2</sup> and I discussed various matters with him, including the proposed talks at Geneva. Dhar told me that an undesirable development in Jammu Province was that some bad characters were moving about harassing officials, teachers, etc. Further that the agitation had rather gone out of the hands of the Praja Parishad. I gathered from him that you and your Government were considering a positive approach to some of the problems that had arisen, in particular, in relation to land. It had been suggested that a Commission might be appointed for the consideration of these problems which would deal with: (1) questions common to Kashmir and Jammu, such as adjustments, where found necessary, in regard to changes in land; (2) questions peculiar to Jammu, such as size of holding of land; (3) questions peculiar to Kashmir, such as transport, etc.

1. JN Collection: Extracts.

2. Deputy Home Minister, Jammu and Kashmir Government.

The proposal was that three Judges of the High Court might be appointed.

Dhar further told me that you were considering taking steps in regard to the implementation of the agreement between the Government of India and the Jammu and Kashmir Government with a view to deal with this political aspect separately and speedily. The Drafting Committees might be asked to submit their reports as soon as possible and the Constituent Assembly to consider them soon after.

I was glad to learn this because, as I mentioned to you some time back, a positive approach appears very necessary, quite apart from what might be called the law and order approach. Where any problem has a powerful human aspect, it cannot be dealt with by cold logic, and human emotions have to be appealed to. It is clear that a considerable section of the people in Jammu Province have been unfortunately moved by this misconceived agitation. They have to be won over and not merely suppressed. Suppression leads to a trail of ill-feeling which breaks out from time to time later. I am very glad, therefore, that in your speeches you have made the right kind of appeal. In addition to this, some action taken on positive lines would go a long way to improve the situation. The lines you appear to be considering seem to me to be right, that is, a commission to consider adjustments, etc., of land and other problems, both of Kashmir and Jammu and, secondly, speedy steps to demonstrate that the old agreement is going to be implemented soon. In regard to the commission, it would be a good thing to associate a land expert as Secretary or in some other capacity. The commission might be authorized to co-opt experts and to appoint committees, wherever necessary.

The recent display of the Union Flag on Republic Day has had a good effect here and must have had a good effect in Jammu. It would be a good thing if the National Flag was put up in one or two places together with the State Flag. We have ourselves built up a strong tradition about the National Flag and we must not allow our opponents to take advantage of our own weapon. To display the National Flag at the same time as the State Flag in some places would be in perfect accordance with what you have often stated. This would have a strong appeal to many persons who now feel rather disgruntled.

We have now to deal with a mixed situation. On the one hand the Opposition groups are weakening; on the other they are thinking of starting a new phase of the agitation in northern India. In about a week's time there is going to be a big meeting in Delhi of the communal groups, the Jan Sangh, Hindu Mahasabha, Akali Dal, etc., and it is rumoured that they intend to take advantage of the meeting of Parliament on February 11th to start some big show. We shall deal with that in the normal way, but it would be exceedingly helpful if before Parliament meets we could undermine this Opposition position by signs of the positive approach in Jammu and Kashmir State.



Chatterjee,<sup>3</sup> the Hindu Mahasabha leader, saw Dr Katju the other day. It appeared that he was rather worried about what Syama Prasad Mookerjee had said. To some extent, he seemed to understand that this agitation was very harmful to the whole Kashmir issue. He pressed, however, for a meeting of the Praja Parishad leaders. In fact, it was quite clear that some face-saving device was wanted. Dr Katju told him that while the Jammu and Kashmir Government had always been prepared to consider any particular matter or grievance, they could not confer with the leaders of this agitation.

I think this is the psychological moment for action to be taken by you on both the positive and the other front to disable this agitation and, at the same time, to win over many people who have been misled in the past. We are concerned with the Jammu and Kashmir situation of course, but we are also concerned with the way this has been exploited in the Punjab by the Akalis and others who are becoming very troublesome in Pepsu and the Punjab.

Gopalaswami's serious illness has cast a heavy burden on me specially. I fear he is not coming back to work. This is just the time when I wanted his wise advice in so many matters. As our senior and experienced colleagues fall out, the burden on me becomes almost more than I can bear. But one has to carry on.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. N.C. Chatterjee.

### 13. To K.N. Katju<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
February 3, 1953

My dear Kailas Nath,

Trivedi has sent me today some copies of instructions issued to the District Magistrates in the Punjab in regard to the Praja Parishad agitation. I also had a talk with him this evening. I am sending these papers to you. I understand that action may be taken after two or three days.<sup>2</sup>

1. JN Collection.

2. On 6 February 1953, the Government of Punjab ordered a 60-day ban on public meetings in eleven towns to prevent demonstrations against Shaikh Abdullah's action against the Praja Parishad in Jammu. Nine Hindu leaders of Punjab were also arrested.

I think it is right that this type of action should be taken now. We cannot allow this kind of thing to be carried on indefinitely. My own information is that there is a definite slackening, although there might be an attempt to do something in Delhi to rouse up people when Parliament meets.<sup>3</sup> I am told that Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee was rather disappointed at the way the agitation was not going forward as he had hoped.

These papers should of course be kept secret.

Yours affectionately,  
Jawaharlal

3. The Jan Sangh and the Hindu Mahasabha volunteers from Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Bharat and West Bengal came to Delhi to court arrest, and several *jathas* tried to make unauthorized entry into the State.

## 14. To Syama Prasad Mookerjee<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
February 5, 1953

My dear Syama Prasad,

Your letter of the 3rd February reached me yesterday.<sup>2</sup> I have however been so fully occupied by the Governors' Conference that I could only read it today and I am now answering it rather late at night.

Your letter, I suppose, is meant to be an indictment of me and the policy we pursue. You can hardly expect me to enter into an argument on this subject.<sup>3</sup> If you think that I have pursued a wrong policy, I am equally convinced that the policy you have pursued in regard to Jammu and Kashmir and certain other matters is completely harmful to India's interests and to the ideals we have always proclaimed. If my life's history denotes failure, that is my misfortune. In any event, whatever I have done has been very much before the public and they can judge me as they like. I am hardly likely to be influenced

1. JN Collection.
2. S.P. Mookerjee wrote that Nehru's speeches since he wrote to him had been abusive and vituperative of those who differed from him. "You have ascribed to us all sorts of base motives and have even dubbed us as betrayers of the country's interests. Outbursts of anger and passion will not help us in solving any big problem."
3. Mookerjee stated that to him the Jammu agitation was part of his continuing feud with the Prime Minister. "It is through your mistaken policy and your failure to understand the viewpoints of those who differ from you, that the country is being brought to the brink of disaster."



by the judgment of those who hold entirely contrary opinions and whose objectives are also different from mine.<sup>4</sup>

According to my thinking, the agitation of the Praja Parishad in Jammu is not only communal but is supported by communal and narrow-minded elements in India.<sup>5</sup> I have not a shadow of a doubt that if that narrow approach was adopted in our country as a whole, it would bring disaster in its train not only for the Jammu and Kashmir State but also to the larger interests of India. Believing this as I do, the only course that I can follow is to resist this utterly misconceived agitation. That is our Government's opinion, and they propose to adhere to it and pursue that policy.

I do not know if your letter is meant to be a threat.<sup>6</sup> The agitation certainly, as it has developed and perhaps as it was conceived to be, is a threat to India. I have often stated that the people of Jammu may have, as many people in India have, certain grievances which should be looked into. But it is clear that these grievances have little to do with the real objective of the agitation. Indeed, only recently, the Jammu and Kashmir Government have appointed a Commission to enquire into these grievances. If the agitation had been mainly concerned with these, the appointment of this Commission would have been welcomed. Instead of this, it has been publicly stated that the agitation will continue.

This leads to the inevitable conclusion that those concerned with this agitation are not particularly interested in any grievances of the people relating to economic and like matters but think in other terms. The question of Jammu and Kashmir has often come up before Parliament and whatever has been done thus far has been done with the explicit approval of Parliament. The agitation, therefore, is against those decisions of Parliament relating to constitutional matters. This agitation also directly concerns itself, as your letter does, with an

4. Mookerjee charged that Nehru in "his life's history" had failed to stand against Muslim communalism and followed a policy of concessions and appeasement which had ultimately brought about the Partition of the country. "If today we want to be cautious and to avoid the tragic follies of the past we do so in the highest interest of the country and not for any narrow communal ends or for any sectional interest."
5. "The demand on the part of a section of our countrymen living in the State of Jammu and Kashmir to see that their State is finally integrated with India and governed according to the Constitution of Free India is not an unpatriotic or disintegrating or communal move," said Mookerjee.
6. In his letter Mookerjee asked for action on certain points: (1) State's accession to India through a resolution to be adopted by the Constituent Assembly; (2) adoption by the State of the provisions of the Indian Constitution regarding Fundamental Rights, citizenship, jurisdiction of Supreme Court, President's powers and financial integration; (3) policy regarding the liberation of the Pakistan-held territory; (4) grievances of the people of Jammu relating to economic advance, employment, rehabilitation of refugees and division of border districts on communal lines; (5) the position of the Head of the State; and (6) the adoption of one flag for the whole of India.

issue which, you know, is an international issue with all the complications that this implies. Thus we have a certain section of the people of Jammu trying to interfere in international affairs and the foreign policy of India by the agitation and even gaining your support. You will remember that at one stage in Parliament, I ventured to say that a few people in the House were supporting the Jammu agitation.<sup>7</sup> You and a few others challenged this statement and denied it. I presume that there will be no denial now of what I had then said.

In effect, this agitation challenges the authority and supremacy of our Parliament in a vital matter. It also seeks to interfere in international affairs which have far-reaching consequences. I am, indeed, surprised that you should expect me or our Government to countenance any such attempt which strikes at the roots of democratic Government and accepted canons of policy.

The questions you have put in your letter have been repeatedly answered in Parliament to the satisfaction of the House. I do not propose to flout the decisions of Parliament at whose behest I have to carry out as Prime Minister. Evidently your respect for our Parliament and its decisions is not very great. Apart from constitutional and democratic principles, I should have thought that it was apparent to any thinking person that, from a practical point of view, this agitation in Jammu could only profit the enemies of India. It could not possibly achieve even the objectives which the sponsors of the agitation declare. If this is so, then I cannot conceive why this folly should be continued, unless the real objective is something other and different. Gradually one is driven to the conclusion that this is not a normal agitation for the redress of grievances, but is an attempt to start a subversive movement affecting not Jammu only but the rest of India. To that, any government can only give one reply.

You suggest the release of those who have been arrested and a conference,<sup>8</sup> presumably, with them. Neither the Government of India nor the Jammu and Kashmir Government desire to arrest or imprison any person unless circumstances are created which compel them to do so. But when such circumstances exist, they have to do their duty. What you suggest would mean, at the present juncture, the Government of India as well as the State Government ceasing to function and handing over authority to those who have challenged them on these basic constitutional issues by an agitation which has become increasingly violent and subversive. We have no intention of abdicating and running away from the duty that has been entrusted to us by the people and by Parliament. It would be an extraordinary thing for this agitation to be carried

7. On 4 December 1952.

8. Mookerjee wrote that he would request Nehru earnestly to consult Shaikh Abdullah and, as a first step, release all those who have been arrested, and withdraw the vindictive punishments and orders inflicted on them, and that "should be followed by a conference at which matters of dispute should be discussed and a solution sought to be reached which would be to the good of India...."



on and at the same time for those who do so to be given full freedom to indulge in these activities and to be asked in conference. I regret I am unable to treat the Praja Parishad or their associates in this manner. If indeed the agitation continues, it will be for us to consider what other and further steps Government should take in the matter. The larger good of India as well as of the people of Jammu and Kashmir State, with which we have been entrusted, is more important than the wishes of a group of persons who can only think and act in a narrow and bigoted way, and who do not hesitate to do deep injury to India's well-being for the sake of some fancied group advantage.

You say in your letter that you are coming to Delhi this evening and can see me tomorrow morning. I am always prepared, if I can find the time, to see you or others who may differ from me. But I regret that tomorrow and for the next day or two I am completely occupied. I confess also that, reading your letter, I find it a little difficult to discover any common ground for a talk. You have stated yourself that it is obvious that we do not see eye to eye with each other on this momentous issue.<sup>9</sup>

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

9. Mookerjee said that though he knew that "You do not see eye-to-eye with many of us on this issue," yet he had "the hope that you will keep an open mind and try to appreciate the viewpoint of those who differ from you on this matter."

## 15. To N.C. Chatterjee<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
February 10, 1953

Dear Mr. Chatterjee,

I have received your letter of February 9.<sup>2</sup> I have read this letter with care. I have also read the resolution,<sup>3</sup> a copy of which you have sent me.

1. JN Collection.
2. N.C. Chatterjee, President of the Hindu Mahasabha, warned the Government of India that if it did not intervene in the Jammu and Kashmir affairs "before it is too late, the agitation will take the shape of an all-India movement and the repercussions will be serious." He suggested that Shaikh Abdullah should summon a round table conference of the leaders of the Praja Parishad and the National Conference for securing an honourable settlement of the Jammu problem.
3. On 9 February 1953, the executive committee of the Hindu Mahasabha, in a resolution, reiterated the party's demand for the release of prisoners in Jammu and the calling of a round table conference, as conditions precedent to a suspension of the agitation during the period of negotiations.

I had hoped that, even though we might differ in many ways, in a matter of such national importance we might reduce that difference of outlook and approach. I am afraid that, as I read your letter and the resolution, I see that there is little common ground in thinking. The resolution you have sent is rather extraordinary, even in its drafting. I do not quite know whether it is a resolution or some odd bit of a speech.

I am anxious that this trouble and conflict in Jammu should cease. There is no question of prestige for me and I do not think there is any question of prestige for Shaikh Abdullah. But there is a question for both of us to adhere to some principles which we have held dear for years past and which have been the basis of our action. Perhaps those principles do not mean much to you, or perhaps you have different principles. That is why we have functioned in different planes in the past.

I am always prepared to take an initiative if it leads to good. But you can hardly expect me to take the initiative in a direction that I consider wrong.

It passes my comprehension how I can be asked to function against the will of Parliament and to discuss matters of grave national concern and international implications with a local agitational group. I can understand, even though I might not agree with it, any agitation for the removal of economic and like grievances. But I do not understand a local group trying to agitate in this way and coerce Parliament and the entire country to adopt a policy different from what it has adopted in the past. As an individual, I disagree with the basic objectives of that agitation, as Prime Minister, I have to carry out the will of Parliament.

So far as economic or like grievances are concerned, the Jammu and Kashmir State Government have appointed a Commission with the Chief Justice of the State as Chairman. It is as good an official Commission as could have been appointed. Any non-official Commission would have been criticized as favouring one party or the other. The Commission has wide terms of reference so far as economic grievances are concerned. Political and constitutional matters have to be dealt with at a different level.

I would request you to consider this matter from a larger point of view of India, or even consider it, if you like, from the point of view of Jammu and Kashmir State itself. Whatever views a person may hold, can this conflict help in any way in solving the problems of that State or even those which some people in Jammu have raised. There can be only one answer to this and if that is the answer, the right step is to put an end to this agitation.

I hope you will exercise your influence in this direction.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru



## 16. To Shaikh Abdullah<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
February 10, 1953

My dear Shaikh Saheb,

As you know, there have been prolonged conferences here of various communal organizations, namely the Jan Sangh, the Hindu Mahasabha, the Ram Rajya Parishad with Master Tara Singh thrown in.<sup>2</sup> Each of them met separately for two days and then they met jointly for two or three days. As a result, I have received formal communications from Dr Syama Prasad Mookerjee and N.C. Chatterjee sending me copies of long resolutions.<sup>3</sup> I am not sending these letters or resolutions to you.

The result of all this is that they are likely to start a biggish agitation in various places in India, more especially in the Punjab and Delhi and parts of the UP. If they do so, as is likely, we shall of course face it. The objective of course is something much more than Jammu. It is a challenge to our whole policy and to the Government.

Probably they will not do so for the next two or three days. Partly this is because there are some by-elections in Delhi in about five or six days' time and partly because, I suppose, they want to prepare for it. Already a number of their people in various parts of India have, as is said, gone "underground". I am not particularly afraid of this agitation. But of course it is a nuisance and interferes with our work. I should like to meet them from as strong a position as possible. It would help us greatly if some indication came from your Government about the early implementation of the agreement arrived at between the Government of India and the Jammu and Kashmir Government. That would partly disable any big agitation.

It is a great misfortune that Gopalaswami has passed away.<sup>4</sup> I feel lonelier than ever, for I relied on his advice and comradeship so much.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

2. On 7 February 1953, the three parties met in Delhi to discuss the Praja Parishad agitation in Jammu and the arrests of party workers in the Punjab on 6 February. Later they held separate meetings and set up a five-man committee to continue the joint talks. The meetings which lasted three days from 8 February were also attended by Tara Singh, the Akali leader, and Nandlal Sharma, a leader of the Ram Rajya Parishad.

3. On 8 February 1953, the Jan Sangh executive considered a draft resolution on Kashmir and left it to the joint special committee to finalize it. The resolution characterized the arrest of their leaders in the Punjab as "uncalled for and unjustified" and said that it was the duty of the Prime Minister of India to intervene in Jammu and make Shaikh Abdullah declare in unequivocal terms that he would accept the Constitution of India in its entirety.

4. On 10 February.

17. To Syama Prasad Mookerjee<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

February 10, 1953

My dear Syama Prasad,

I have received your letter of February 8th. After reading it, I confess to a feeling that we move in somewhat different mental worlds and the same words have different meanings for you and me. You are continually accusing me of making wild aspersions<sup>2</sup> and the like. Your own letters have not been couched in what might be called gentle and persuasive language.

It is patent that my colleagues, and I am sure Shaikh Abdullah and his colleagues, do not wish this unfortunate conflict in Jammu to continue. Nothing could please us better than that it should end, not only because it is bad in itself, but, even more so, because it leaves a trail of bitterness and hatred. That conflict was none of our seeking. It may be that some policies pursued by the Government of India or by the Government of Jammu and Kashmir State were not approved of by a certain section of the people in Jammu. I am sure there were other and better methods to adopt to give expression to their views than this method of so-called *satyagraha* which has resulted in conflict and suffering. I have before me a detailed list with full particulars of over a hundred officers, high and low, including District Magistrates, Superintendents of Police and constables, who have been more or less seriously injured by the crowds of so-called *satyagrahis*. That is hardly an evidence of a peaceful agitation.

But, however that may be, nothing would please me better than to put an end to this business. You say that the Commission appointed to enquire into economic and other grievances is defective and its terms of reference are narrow. Further that it cannot obviously deal with basic political and constitutional matters, and it has to work in an atmosphere surcharged with distrust and bitterness.<sup>3</sup> I entirely agree to the last two propositions about the basic constitutional matters and the atmosphere. How is one to improve this atmosphere? Surely by stopping this ill-advised movement and facing these economic and like problems. The alternative is, not to appoint a Commission till the movement ends. If that course had been adopted, people could have

1. JN Collection.

2. In his letter of 8 February 1953, Mookerjee wrote that he was sure that in his cooler moments Nehru would regret that he "could not reply to arguments with arguments but had only to cast motives upon and make wild aspersions against those who differed from your official policy."

3. Mookerjee added: "the Commission has not roused any hope or confidence. Its terms of reference are narrow. Its composition is defective. It has to work in an atmosphere surcharged with distrust and bitterness. It cannot obviously deal with basic political and constitutional matters."



justly criticized us for not taking the right step because of something else that was happening.

As for the composition of the Commission, I doubt if any other type of Commission would have appeared to you to be better. It is an official Commission presided over by the Chief Justice, who can be relied upon to take an impartial view. If non-officials had been appointed, the criticism would undoubtedly have been made that they are not representative. It was better therefore, to have a high-class official Commission, unconnected with parties and the like.

The terms of reference are wide, but certainly they do not deal with political and constitutional issues. Would you have a Commission sit in judgement over Parliament and decide grave national and international issues? I really am surprised at this criticism.

Whether I have made mistakes in the past or not in dealing with the Kashmir issue on the national or international plane has hardly any relevance in the present context. We have to take things as they are now and to deal with them as such. I fail entirely to understand how these high constitutional matters affecting the whole of India and affecting international issues, can be made the subject of a local agitation. Nor do I understand how we can even discuss these matters with some local group, quite apart from the fact that that local group is indulging in an aggressive and subversive agitation.

I think, this is important. In effect it means agitation against the authority of Parliament. Certainly Parliament is not greater than the country,<sup>4</sup> but it is normally presumed that Parliament represents the country. Certainly also, a certain group in Jammu is not greater than the country. Is the entire country and Parliament to be coerced by a local group in a matter affecting the entire country? I am sure that if you give this matter thought you will appreciate that this is a proposition which cannot be advanced. I have to function in accordance with the Constitution of India and under the authority of Parliament. If Parliament decides something which I think is contrary to my convictions in basic matters, then it is my duty to leave my post and let others hold it. In no event can I override decisions of Parliament. Normally speaking, in every State, whether it is the Jammu and Kashmir State or any other State, in India, the State has the authority and power under the Constitution to deal with certain matters. The Central Government can intervene in some matters and advise in others. It cannot override the autonomy of the State. You are pleased to accuse

4. Mookerjee had written: "Parliament is in danger of ceasing to be a democratic forum when this basic approach disappears due to totalitarian tendencies. Parliament is not greater than the country itself and any timely warning sought to be given to the people or to appeal to them against any wrong government policy is certainly no offence against Parliament's authority as such."

me of totalitarian tendencies.<sup>5</sup> I have thought that this charge could be relevantly brought against those who wish to impose their will on Parliament and the country as a whole.

I really do not wish to enter into any argument because, as I said, we appear to move in different mental spheres. I try to the best of my ability to judge of a situation in terms of the objectives that I have in regard to India. I endeavour to work to that end with such strength as I possess. I have no doubt that you wish well to India, but the fact remains that our conceptions of what is well for India appear to differ. Because of this, our past lives have moved largely in different spheres. Neither of us can wipe out or ignore that past which has produced the present. I consider the communal approach to India's problems, or to any other problems, as inherently bad, narrow and injurious to the individual, the group and the nation. You object to my using the word communal and deny my charge. Obviously we think differently and our actions are presumably the result of our thinking.

However, all this does not help much in the present situation. I can assure you that I want peace in India with all my heart. That is a prerequisite for any work to be done. But you will not expect me to do something which I consider completely wrong and harmful in the interests of India. If I could venture to advise you, I would suggest that you exercise your influence to put an end to this agitation in Jammu, which cannot possibly do any good and which can certainly do much harm.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. Mookerjee wrote: "Apparently you are not in a mood even to understand the views of those who differ from you, far less to talk to them...If it is decided by you to start discussions with Praja Parishad leaders and others, the movement should stand suspended."

## 18. To N.C. Chatterjee<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
February 12, 1953

Dear Mr. Chatterjee,  
Thank you for your letter of February 12th.

1. JN Collection.



I am sorry that I am unable to convince you in this matter.<sup>2</sup> It is this that led me to the conclusion that our approaches are so different that what appears to me completely right and clear does not appear to you to be so and vice versa.

In answer to a letter received by me today from Dr Syama Prasad Mookerjee, I have sent him a reply<sup>3</sup> this evening. I enclose a copy of that reply so that I might not have to repeat it here.

I would only add that when you ask for a gesture to create the requisite atmosphere, that gesture was partly made by the Jammu and Kashmir Government in appointing a Commission. I would also draw your attention to what the President stated in his Address to Parliament yesterday.<sup>4</sup>

The question of the State of Jammu and Kashmir's relations with India is one which must ultimately be decided by the people of Jammu and Kashmir. I am not referring to the plebiscite, but to the reactions of those people there. We do not propose to, and indeed no country can for long, impose our will by force of arms against the wishes of the people. Therefore, it becomes important to have the people's goodwill on our side. Anything that affects that goodwill weakens our relationship. Fortunately, we have had that goodwill in a large measure and that has been the justification for the action we have taken in the State. The Jammu agitation cannot but affect and weaken the goodwill of large numbers of people and, therefore, come in the way of the close relations between India and Jammu and Kashmir that we all desire.

The agreement arrived at between the Government of India and the Jammu and Kashmir State undoubtedly brings that State much closer to India than previously. It goes beyond the three subjects for accession. Accession was indeed complete and is complete even without that agreement. With that agreement, further steps are taken towards integration in many ways. The fact that that integration is not as complete as it is in the case of other States does not lessen the fullness of accession. It appears to me patent that, because of a number of reasons, the Jammu and Kashmir State has to be treated on a special basis. Any attempt to regiment it would fail in its purpose and come in the way of the very objective that we aim at. The Jammu people surely should realize that by their agitation they are harming the very cause which they espouse.

You say that Shaikh Abdullah only implemented certain items of this agreement which suited him, but did not finalize the other matters. But please remember that the moment first implementation took place, the agitation started

2. N.C. Chatterjee, referring to Nehru's letter of 10 February, wrote that it was difficult for him "to appreciate that difference in outlook and approach between them is so fundamental that it is not possible to come to a reasonable understanding."

3. See the next item.

4. See *ante*, pp. 14-23.

and actually came in the way of further action being taken. I have no doubt that this further action would have been taken but for this fact.

You refer to financial integration.<sup>5</sup> Of course, financial arrangements have to be arrived at, whatever they might be. But it should also be remembered that the effect of these arrangements will be a burden on the Government of India's exchequer. Thus, if customs duties are abolished, the Government of India will have to find the money which was previously realized from customs and that is a substantial sum. All this requires careful thought and full discussion between the two Governments. It is not a matter which can be discussed with non-official organizations.

I am entirely in favour of goodwill being created and I feel sure that Shaikh Abdullah and his Government are equally desirous of this.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. Chatterjee wrote that "there is nothing inconsistent with the expressed will of the Parliament to demand financial integration without which economic distress cannot be mitigated."

## 19. Syama Prasad Mookerjee<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
February 12, 1953

My dear Syama Prasad,  
Thank you for your letter of the 12th February.

I am always prepared to meet you and discuss any matter. But the points for consideration that you have suggested are most of them hardly capable of consideration even by Government by itself and much less so with non-official organizations or individuals. It is easy enough for the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir State to pass a resolution approving of or confirming the accession to India. They can certainly do so. But that does not bring finality in the sense that you perhaps mean.<sup>2</sup> That finality is tied up with other

1. JN Collection.

2. Mookerjee asked Nehru if the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir State could not pass a resolution accepting final accession and settle one of the main points raised by the Praja Parishad. "What is your alternative proposal for finalizing accession? How and when, if at all, we are going to get back this portion of our cherished territory?"



considerations which are not wholly within our control. As a matter of fact, the action that the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir State has already taken in regard to various matters, more especially in confirming the agreement arrived at with the Government of India, is itself much more than confirming the previous accession. It goes beyond it in many ways.

Some of the matters<sup>3</sup> you have referred to have been included in the Constitution that is being framed by the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir. One cause of delay in doing this has been, I imagine, this agitation itself which has made it difficult for the Government of Jammu and Kashmir State to expedite these matters.

It has been stated very clearly, and on occasion acted upon, that the Indian Flag is supreme.

Regarding the policy for the liberation and occupation of Pakistan-held territory, this is surely not a question that can be discussed, as it depends upon all kinds of political and military matters. You will appreciate that no Government, however powerful, can do just what it wants to do. There are limiting factors. Even the great powers cannot do what they want to do and therefore come in conflict with each other and a deadlock, threatening the peace of the world, continues. Indeed the Jammu agitation has made it much more difficult to deal with the question of the Pakistan-held territory, because it must have created far-reaching repercussions on the people there. We do not think in terms of holding any territory by force of arms and have to rely on the goodwill of the people concerned.

Even in States other than Jammu and Kashmir, we have to respect provincial autonomy and, though we give advice to our colleagues there, we do not interfere. No State Government can carry on if it is overridden by the Central authority.

I am sure that the right course is for this agitation to be withdrawn and an attempt made on all sides to bring about normality and goodwill. That is the basis of any progress and removal of grievances or disabilities.<sup>4</sup>

You are no doubt aware that at the present moment conversations are being carried on by our representative, Girja Shankar Bajpai, with Dr Graham and

3. "We were not satisfied about the deviations made in the agreement between the Government of India and Shaikh Abdullah's Government in July last. But even this modified application of the constitution has been unreasonably and unnecessarily delayed. The genuine desire on the part of the Praja Parishad to secure the fundamental unity and integrity of India and to be governed as common Indian citizens is being dubbed as treacherous conduct."
4. Mookerjee further remarked: "I am equally anxious with you that the present movement should terminate. I would suggest that you and Shaikh Abdullah should meet some of its leaders preferably in Delhi. If this offer is communicated to them, they will, I hope, agree to suspend the movement."

the Pakistani representative in Geneva. In international affairs of this kind no country can take up an attitude of dictating terms. Even the greatest cannot do it and we have to proceed cautiously and with patience and at the same time firmness insofar as our principles are concerned. You can imagine the effect of the present Jammu agitation not only on those hostile to us but also in other countries and more especially on the conversations taking place in Geneva.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 20. To Karan Singh<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
February 14, 1953

My dear Yuvaraj,

... The Jammu situation is very much before me and I am giving constant thought to it. As a matter of fact, it is no longer a Jammu situation, but an all-India situation in which, unfortunately, several communal organizations in India are taking an important part. Therefore, we have to pay a great deal of attention to it. Indeed we are threatened with an all-India agitation. Therefore, in considering this matter we have to keep this in view.

I am keeping in fairly close touch with Shaikh Abdullah by correspondence.

I have had some correspondence also with Dr Syama Prasad Mookerjee and Mr. N.C. Chatterjee. The letters they wrote to me were singularly unhelpful and to some extent rather irritating. The speeches they delivered here last Sunday<sup>2</sup> were highly objectionable. We cannot permit this aggressive communal

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. On 9 February 1953, at a public meeting in New Delhi, S.P. Mookerjee warned the Government that if, within the next three weeks, it did not "explore the possibility of a peaceful settlement" of the Praja Parishad agitation, it would spread to other parts of the country. The only way of achieving a settlement was by a round table conference between the Government and the leaders of the Parishad "who should be released for the purpose." During the period of these negotiations, the Praja Parishad would suspend the movement. N.C. Chatterjee, said at the same meeting that there should be no difficulty for the Government to call for a conference with the Praja Parishad leaders to thrash out the issues. He also said that the arrests of the Punjab leaders had been unprovoked and unjustified. Tara Singh said that Indians should not rely upon Shaikh Abdullah and the Kashmir Muslims. "No agitation could be stopped by resorting to violence", he said.



approach to prevail in India. I think they realize this and are therefore toning down. If they start any agitation, we shall have to take all necessary measures to meet it. That is clear. I hope, however, that they will see wisdom.

So far as the Jammu situation is concerned, I think that it will improve. What I am concerned with is not merely the immediate situation but, looking ahead, the avoidance of trail of bitterness. I shall do my utmost to avoid this.

All good wishes,

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 21. To Chief Ministers<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
15 February, 1953

My dear Chief Minister,

There has been much reference recently to the agitation in Jammu started by the Praja Parishad there. This agitation has been openly supported by the Jan Sangh, the Hindu Mahasabha and Ram Rajya Parishad. The RSS has also lent its quiet support to it. Master Tara Singh of the Akali Dal has promised support, though without committing himself too far. Recently, there were separate and prolonged meetings of some of these organizations in Delhi and then a joint meeting.<sup>2</sup> The resolutions passed<sup>3</sup> indicate that an effort might be made in the near future to start an all-India agitation, including what is mistakenly called satyagraha.

Whether this will be finally done or not, I do not quite know because the leaders of these communal organizations have, I believe, begun to realize that

1. File No 25(6)/1952 PMS. This letter has also been printed in G. Parthasarathi (ed) *Jawaharlal Nehru: Letters to Chief Ministers 1947-1964*. Vol. 3 (New Delhi, 1987), pp. 242-45. Also available in JN Collection. Extracts.
2. At joint meetings of the leaders of the Jan Sangh, the Hindu Mahasabha and the Ram Rajya Parishad, it was resolved to "work unitedly" on the basis of a common programme in support of the Praja Parishad agitation in Jammu. Tara Singh and Gokal Chand Narang, a Hindu Mahasabha leader from Punjab were special invitees to these meetings.
3. For example, the Working Committee of the Jan Sangh passed a resolution on 9 February reiterating the party's demand for the release of prisoners in Jammu and declaring that "if the Government continued to remain adamant and chose to rely only on force, it would be the duty of the Jan Sangh to call upon the people to resist the policy of Government in a peaceful and non-violent manner."

this is a dangerous game and public opinion, by and large, will be against them, quite apart from the steps Government might take. They have been trying, therefore, to find some middle way which would enable them to demonstrate to the public that they have succeeded in some measure and thus add to their prestige. For our part, we would like of course this agitation to end as quickly as possible and for normality to return, but we cannot compromise any vital principle nor can we do anything which merely strengthens communal organizations and enables them to start some other big agitation in the future.

As you must know, the Jammu and Kashmir Government appointed a Commission recently under the Presidentship of their Chief Justice<sup>4</sup> to enquire into economic and like grievances caused by the recent land reforms or otherwise. All that remains is the highly complicated political and international issue of the State itself. At the present moment, talks about this are going on with Dr Graham in Geneva. Even apart from this, it is quite absurd for Government to discuss these national and international matters with any non-official agitational group. This whole Praja Parishad agitation has been so singularly misconceived that it injures the very cause which they claim to have at heart, i.e., the closer union of Jammu and Kashmir State with India. The only party that has gained by it is Pakistan, who have given full publicity to it. The demand of the Praja Parishad that Jammu and Ladakh should at any rate be fully integrated with India obviously means that they should be separated from Kashmir proper, i.e., that there should be a disintegration of the State. If this took place, it would inevitably mean that Kashmir proper is made a present of to Pakistan. Then, Ladakh would be almost completely cut off. This whole approach is so utterly wrong that it passes one's comprehension how any intelligent person should adopt it. I can only come to the conclusion that the objective is entirely different and has nothing to do with Jammu....

Indeed, recent speeches delivered by the communal leaders,<sup>5</sup> which were of an extremely violent and aggressive type, point to the same conclusion. It is a challenge to the Government as a whole and to the basic policies we pursue. To that challenge there can only be one answer.

Recently, the East Punjab Government took strong steps<sup>6</sup> to prevent the

4. Justice Jankinath Wazir, Judge, High Court, Jammu and Kashmir, 1937-48; Chief Justice, 1948-67.
5. For example, at a public meeting in New Delhi on 8 February 1953, S.P. Mookerjee, N.C. Chatterjee and Master Tara Singh condemned the Government for suppressing public opinion on the Kashmir issue by misusing the Preventive Detention Act.
6. On 8 February 1953, prominent workers of the Jan Sangh, the RSS, and the Hindu Mahasabha were arrested at different places in Punjab under the Preventive Detention Act. Simultaneously, public meetings and processions were banned in twelve districts for a period of two months.



extension of this agitation to their province. These steps have had good results and have been generally approved by the public there.

One of the methods adopted by the Praja Parishad people and their supporters is to carry about in procession some "ashes" which are supposed to be those of some persons shot down in police firing. By this method it is sought to excite people. This was done to some extent in the Punjab till it was prohibited. The Delhi Administration has also prohibited this kind of thing<sup>7</sup> and is otherwise prepared to take any action that might be considered necessary.

I understand that attempts will now be made to take out these "ashes" in procession in some of the north-western UP towns and so on.

I am writing just to keep you informed, so that your Government might be vigilant and watchful. We cannot permit this kind of blatant communal and vicious propaganda to be carried on and to lead to serious law and order situation.

Reports have come to me also that some of the communal organizations might make an attempt to create trouble during the Holi festival. I hope that your Government will instruct the local officers to take necessary steps to prevent any trouble from taking place.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

7. Prohibitory orders were passed in Delhi on 7 February banning processions and public meetings for one month.

## 22. To Syama Prasad Mookerjee<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
February 15, 1953

My dear Syama Prasad,

Thank you for your letter of February 14. I was so very busy yesterday that I did not read your letter till late at night. It was only then that I noticed that you had suggested our meeting in the evening.<sup>2</sup> It was too late then and you have now gone to Calcutta.

1. JN Collection.

2. Mookerjee wrote that before leaving for Calcutta on 15 February he would like to see Nehru on fourteenth evening "if you feel that at this stage a personal discussion may be helpful."

There can be no two opinions that we are all anxious to bring about normality in Jammu and to put an end to this deplorable agitation and conflict. But many of the questions you have raised in your letter are so far-reaching and complicated that they cannot be considered in a casual and hurried way. Insofar as some of them are concerned, we have arrived at decisions after very full and long argument between the Government of India and the Government of Jammu and Kashmir State and it is not quite clear to me how we can discuss them except when the time comes, as between the two Governments.

As I pointed out to you, every State normally deals with these problems itself and the Central Government does not intervene except by way of advice occasionally. Any other course would not only be rather against our constitutional procedure but would come in the way of the responsibility of the State itself.

The Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir State will be meeting some time in the near future. It will, presumably, consider the reports of certain committees appointed by it. Those committees are now sitting. I do not see how even the Kashmir Government can bypass all this procedure. As for the Constituent Assembly passing a resolution supporting accession,<sup>3</sup> it can certainly do so if it so chooses. As a matter of fact, all its proceedings are based on accession and proceed on that assumption. Nothing more can be added to that by a resolution. I have no objection to such a resolution. It is not this point that creates difficulty, but saying that such a resolution finally ends the reference to the UN. The position we have thus far taken up and publicly stated is that the Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly has every right to express its views on this as well as other matters, but that the assurances we have given to the UN are our responsibility and have to be judged accordingly.

The real difficulty, as I have pointed out to you previously, is the whole background of this business. Whatever anyone's motives might have been, it is undoubtedly of an extreme communal colour with all the disturbances that such an approach leads to. It comes up, therefore, against the basic policies in India that we have sought to follow with some measures of success. Most of the people associated with it have opposed those governmental policies in the past and taken up a line which we consider communal and harmful to the interests of the country. The speeches made in support of this movement have been extreme and even violent and have brought out this basic communal element. I was deeply distressed to read the reports of the speeches made at last Sunday's

3. Mookerjee urged Nehru and Shaikh Abdullah to get a resolution passed in the Constituent Assembly supporting Jammu and Kashmir's accession to India for he felt "whatever may be the nature of the obstacles that we will have to face from UNO and Pakistan, our position will not be weakened by this step. On the other hand, within India and Kashmir you will have one solid opinion supported by all parties."



meeting in Delhi. Reading reports of those speeches the question of Jammu sank into the background and other major questions of policy were emphasized. Between these two basic approaches, there is no common ground. Subject to our holding fast to the principles which have guided us and to the policies which we have pursued, the Government will gladly do all in its power to bring about normality and peaceful cooperation in the Jammu and Kashmir State. I am sure that Shaikh Abdullah and his Government hold the same opinion. But this agitation was not of our seeking and the first step should be to withdraw the agitation completely.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

### 23. Praja Parishad Agitation Clearly Communal<sup>1</sup>

Whatever grievances or demands the Jammu people have, they would be carefully considered, but so far as the Praja Parishad agitation is concerned, it is clearly communal and is intended to disturb the Government of India. Ever since the last elections, the Hindu Mahasabha and the Jan Sangh had been planning to start an agitation against the Government. If they now think that the Jammu agitation can be utilized for this purpose, they apparently do not realize, or do not care to understand, what would be the consequences of the agitation—particularly what would happen to Jammu itself. The real object of the agitation is not to secure redress of any economic or other grievances but to attack the Government of India.

Regarding the suggestion that the customs barrier should be removed, I may say that we have to consider the financial implications as it would involve a loss of revenue to the extent of Rs 1½ crores....

1. Address to a meeting of the Congress Parliamentary Party, New Delhi, 15 February 1953. From *The Hindustan Times*, 16 February 1953. Extracts.

24. To Shaikh Abdullah<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
February 23, 1953

My dear Shaikh Saheb,

...I suppose you have received detailed reports of some of the speeches that were delivered here during the debate in Parliament. The general impression created by the debate was, I think, good and Syama Prasad Mookerjee and his colleagues were very much deflated. In fact he practically confessed as much.<sup>2</sup> Of course that does not mean that our difficulties have been surmounted. It does mean, however, that the present crisis is passed and we are on the ascendant. I have no doubt that the Praja Parishad and other people in Jammu feel sullen and disgruntled. The thing to do now is to keep the initiative in our hand, as it is now to some extent. As I wrote to you previously, the first step appears to be to give effect to the agreement between the Government of India and the Jammu and Kashmir Government. What other steps should be taken has also to be considered....

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. On 17 February 1953, he made an "offer" in Parliament to "withdraw" the Praja Parishad movement, provided the Kashmir Government undertook the release of the arrested Parishad leaders and asked them to attend a round-table conference.

25. To Chief Ministers<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
February 26, 1953

My dear Chief Minister,

I must apologize to you for not having sent the usual fortnightly letter. I have been terribly busy. I hope to send you that letter soon.

You must have learnt of the arrest of Master Tara Singh and some of his colleagues for defiance of the law in the Punjab.<sup>2</sup> This was a clear defiance

1. JN Collection. Also printed in G. Parthasarathi (ed.) *Jawaharlal Nehru: Letters to Chief Ministers 1947-1964* Vol. 3, p. 246.
2. Master Tara Singh, was arrested in connection with Akali Dal agitation in Amritsar on 24 February 1953.



and Government had to take action. The situation is well in hand, but naturally all of us should be fully alert.

We have to remember at the same time that the Jan Sangh and the Hindu Mahasabha and other communal organizations have not given up the idea of some major agitation in connection with the Praja Parishad's movement in Jammu. There has been a slight lull recently. From all information received, they intend to begin soon what they have been threatening to do for some time past. It is possible that the Akali Dal agitation and this might join hands.

I am only writing these few lines to you so that your Government might be vigilant and take all necessary precautions.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 26. To Abul Kalam Azad<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
March 1, 1953

My dear Maulana,

...I fear that Shaikh Saheb's mind is so utterly confused that he does not know what to do. All kinds of pressures are being brought to bear upon him and he is getting more and more into a tangle. There is nobody with him who can really help him much, because he does not trust anyone fully, and yet everyone influences him. Undoubtedly, a difficult situation has arisen, both in Jammu and Kashmir. One reacts on the other. It is no good for him or for us to blame others for a situation. We have always to take our own responsibility for what happens. My fear is that Shaikh Saheb, in his present state of mind, is likely to do something or take some step, which might make things worse.

I had invited him to come here, but he does not seem anxious to do so. I can understand that as his mind is not clear.

He talks about a complicated procedure for conforming to Delhi agreement.<sup>2</sup>

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. Shaikh Abdullah wrote on 27 February 1953 that the Drafting Sub-Committee was giving "final shape" to the Delhi Agreement before submitting it to the Basic Principles Committee, scheduled to meet during the Budget Session of the Assembly on 25 March 1953, and once the Committee finalized the draft, he would "take immediate steps to send a copy" to Nehru.

In a moment of crisis, people do not act in this leisurely way. The fact is that he has so many pulls in different directions, that he just cannot make up his mind.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 27. To Shaikh Abdullah<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
March 1, 1953

My dear Shaikh Saheb,

...We all agree that the uncertainty about the State should end as soon as possible. But you say in your letter that you do not know how this is going to happen.<sup>2</sup> It is not enough for us to feel that something should be done. We all want the Korean war to stop. Probably everyone wants that. And yet it continues. We want the very serious problems in Europe and Africa to be solved, lest they lead to world war. But thus far, no progress has been made and, in fact, things are a little worse than they were.

It is thus not merely enough to desire that something should happen, but to know how to get that done. The result is never entirely in any one individual's or group's or country's hands, but one works for certain ends and looks at the whole problem with some vision and perspective, not allowing any immediate difficulty to obscure that vision....<sup>3</sup>

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. In his letter of 27 February 1953, Shaikh Abdullah, while referring to the Praja Parishad agitation and "the various things" that had happened in the past two or three months, expressed his doubt as to how the state of uncertainty was going to end.

3. Abdullah did not respond to Nehru's letter of 1 March 1953.



## 28. To Shaikh Abdullah<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
March 5, 1953

My dear Shaikh Sahib,

I did not write to you about my interview with the Dogra Sabha<sup>2</sup> of Jammu because there was not much to write and, as usual, I have been terribly busy. But it has struck me that you might be wondering what happened then. So I am giving you a brief account. Five persons came to see me. They began by all kinds of apologies for intrusion on my time. They added that they had no desire to interfere in political and like matters, but a situation had arisen in Jammu which could not be ignored and which is affecting large masses of people. In particular, they referred to what they called police repression and atrocities, more especially in regard to the molestation of women. They said that their earnest desire was that this trouble should end in Jammu and normal conditions be restored. They appealed to me to help in this.

I drew their attention to a poster some of them had issued strongly criticizing your Government and encouraging the Praja Parishad agitation. I pointed out that if they did this kind of thing they were not neutral and had in fact encouraged an agitation which from every point of view was highly objectionable and most harmful to all concerned—India, the Jammu and Kashmir State and more especially Jammu. It passed my comprehension how any person with the least intelligence could not see the very great harm that had been caused and was being caused by this Praja Parishad agitation. As for charges against the police, I could not obviously say anything about any particular charge but it was clear to me that many of them were grossly exaggerated. There may be some truth in some. When there is this kind of conflict, it is quite possible for some excesses to take place. But they must remember the grave excesses on the part of the Praja Parishad and their supporters. This was clearly demonstrated by the fact that over a hundred persons on the Government side, including high officers, had been injured, some seriously. The fault lay with the people who started this agitation and sometime put women in front as a cloak. If they wanted normality to return to the State, the first step obviously was to withdraw this agitation completely. I was sure that the Jammu and Kashmir Government would then help in every way in restoring normality. I

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. The Dogra Sabha worked for the recognition of Jammu's regional identity, regional leadership, and its equitable share in the power structure of the State. It held that the principle of regional autonomy would solve the Kashmir problem.

was interested and the Jammu and Kashmir Government was interested in getting over this bad period and promoting goodwill and everything would be done to that end....

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 29. Disturbances in Delhi<sup>1</sup>

...May I say a word, Sir? So far as Government is concerned, we welcome, if the Opposition requires it, a full discussion not only of this particular incident or that, but all these amazing things<sup>2</sup> that are happening in Delhi today: a challenge to this Government, a challenge to law and order, a challenge to decency and a challenge to everything for which this Government and this country stand. I should like a full discussion of all these things. When honourable Members go and break the law deliberately, when honourable Members side with the enemies of the country, when honourable Members do something which encourages the enemies of this country, I am amazed at the attitude of some honourable Members raising these petty points when these big things are considered. Let us have a full discussion of all matters. Let us see who is right and who is wrong.

1. Intervention in the House of the People, 9 March 1953. *Parliamentary Debates (House of the People)*, *Official Report*, Vol. II, Pt. II, cols. 1588-92. Extracts.
2. S.P. Mookerjee of the Jan Sangh, N.C. Chatterjee of the Hindu Mahasabha and Nandalal Sharma of the Ram Rajya Parishad were arrested in New Delhi on 6 March 1953 for leading a demonstration in violation of a ban order on public gatherings.

## 30. To Cabinet Ministers<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
March 11, 1953

My dear Minister,

The Jan Sangh agitation in regard to Jammu raises some very important matters

1. JN Collection.



for consideration. Fortunately this agitation has not attracted many people in Delhi. It has been mainly carried on by groups of RSS people and so-called volunteers brought from other parts of India. But the very nature of this agitation is wholly pernicious. Apart from creating disturbances daily in some part of Delhi, it is having a powerful effect on the whole Kashmir issue. That effect is wholly disadvantageous to us. Thus the agitation is playing completely into the hands of the enemies of India and, from that point of view, might be considered verging on treason.

For Members of Parliament to participate in it and deliberately to defy law raises various questions of privilege and the authority of Parliament in dealing with its Members.

You will thus see that this matter cannot be left to drift along vaguely but has to be dealt with with the utmost firmness.

I am convening a meeting of the Congress Party on Friday, 13th March, at 10 a.m. to consider the situation both from the parliamentary and the public points of view. I hope you will attend this meeting. Subsequently I should like this matter to be discussed in Cabinet.

There is one aspect of this agitation to which I should like to draw your special attention. I am informed that some of our clerks working in the Central Secretariat not only sympathize with this agitation but, to some extent, participate in it. Two or three years ago when the RSS challenged Government and started satyagraha on a big scale, Government had to issue a clear warning to all their employees on this subject and in fact steps were taken in regard to a number of them. Whatever general instructions might be issued on this subject will have to be considered by us. But I suggest to you that you might have it made clear to all the employees in your Ministry that any association with this agitation will be considered a serious offence and will be dealt with accordingly.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

### 31. To G.B. Pant<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
March 15, 1953

My dear Pantji,<sup>2</sup>

After some looseness in the matter, we have decided to come to full grips in

1. JN Collection.

2. Chief Minister, Uttar Pradesh, at this time.

every way with the Jan Sangh agitation in Delhi. We are dealing with this on all fronts—governmental, Congress, public etc.—and we are meeting with good success. As a matter of fact, the agitation in Delhi is being carried on not by Delhi people, but by volunteers from outside. These volunteers mostly come from the UP.

I should like you to consider what the UP Government can do in this matter. The first thing, of course, they should do is for them to keep in constant touch with the Delhi Administration. More especially, the District Magistrates on the Delhi border could do so. Ghaziabad is one of the places from which volunteers enter into Delhi State.

I should like you in particular to instruct your District Magistrates in Meerut and Ghaziabad to deal with this question of the Jan Sangh sending volunteers to Delhi. I understand that at Ghaziabad the Jan Sangh have put up a camp.

Apart from this, I hope that the UP Government will deal with the Jan Sangh agitation effectively and strictly. This is, as you know, one of the most objectionable agitations we have had.

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

## 32. To Rajendra Prasad<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
March 20, 1953

My dear Mr President,

Thank you for your letter of the 16th March<sup>2</sup> sending me a copy of an intelligence note on the Kashmir National Conference and Communists there.

I have been in close touch with all these developments in Kashmir and personally know most of the people concerned and their relations to each other. It is, I think, not true at all that Communists have heavily infiltrated the National Conference. There are in fact no Communists there as such. There are two or three well-known Communists who have, from time to time, influenced the

1. File No 218(2)/52, President's Secretariat.

2. Rajendra Prasad wrote that on the basis of an article in the *New Leader* magazine of USA about Communist infiltration in the National Conference, he had asked for the report of the Home Ministry which mentioned the connection between Dhanwantri, the Communist leader from Kashmir, and Girdhari Lal Dogra, Ghulam Mohammed Sadiq and D.P. Dhar, who were all influential members of the Kashmir Government.



Government somewhat, especially in regard to social policy. The general tendency of the Government in the last year or two has been to keep them out or in check.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

### 33. To Karan Singh<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
March 22, 1953

My dear Yuvaraj,

...There are one or two matters which I should like to mention to you. You refer to police excesses. Probably there had been excesses and undoubtedly where such excesses take place, they should be dealt with properly. On no account must there be any vindictiveness on the part of the police. But the kind of reports that are circulated by the Praja Parishad are, on the face of it, so wildly exaggerated and often without foundation that hardly any credit can be attached to them. Many of these reports here emanate from the Pathankot office of the Praja Parishad. Every wild rumour is put down without the least attempt at verification.

As you know, the Jammu situation is hardly a Jammu situation now and Dr Syama Prasad Mookerjee and others have tried to make it an all-India affair. In Delhi they carry on some kind of satyagraha, as they call it. This usually means some violence also in the shape of stoning the police. The Delhi people have kept quite apart from this, except for groups of RSS boys. The so-called satyagrahis are drafted from other parts of India, Kanpur, Gorakhpur, etc., and are very poor lot as a rule. The whole thing is completely artificial and has created practically no effect in Delhi. Of course this kind of thing can be carried on for some time, so long as somebody provides the funds for it.

There is general realization in Parliament as well as outside that, whatever the nature of the Jammu situation, the steps that Dr Syama Prasad Mookerjee and others have taken here are so utterly wrong and so harmful to India's interests that it is astonishing that any intelligent person could have acted in that way. There is no doubt at all that the Praja Parishad and Jan Sangh agitation has made our situation in regard to Kashmir very difficult, national and

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

international. Jammu and Kashmir have just been exploited merely to discredit our Government here.

You refer to Dr Mookerjee's speech in Parliament. It is true that his speeches are somewhat weaker than they were previously. The fact is that he realizes completely how wrong he has been. Among themselves, that is, as between Syama Prasad Mookerjee and Chatterjee and Nandlal Sharma, there is conflict and disagreement. Each is blaming the other. There is no doubt that they want a way out to withdraw this agitation. I would welcome the withdrawal. But I just do not want them to put it across to the people that they are the peace-makers and that their viewpoint has prevailed. I am always prepared to see Dr Mookerjee as an MP. But I do not propose to give any encouragement to the Praja Parishad or the Jan Sangh as such.

Only today Pandit Govind Ballabh Pant came to see me. He is, as you know, very gentle in his approach. He insisted that we should not have any dealings with the Jan Sangh or the Praja Parishad people. In my view what these people have done is little short of treason against the country and the people should realize it....<sup>2</sup>

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. In his reply of 27 March 1953, Karan Singh wrote: "What really disturbs me is the fact that the gulf between Jammu and Kashmir has widened tremendously over the last few months, and that the breach instead of being bridged seems to be steadily widening. Neither of the parties seems to quite realize the implications of this, and I fear that we may reap a very bitter harvest in years to come."

### 34. Situation in Jammu<sup>1</sup>

...I have been trying very hard at least to understand the point of view of some honourable Members opposite, the honourable Member who initiated this discussion,<sup>2</sup> and the one who has just spoken.<sup>3</sup> It is not for lack of trying, now or previously in the course of our correspondence, that I failed to understand

1. Statement in Parliament, 25 March 1953. *Parliamentary Debates (House of the People)*, *Official Report*, Vol. II, Pt. II, cols. 2894-2906. Extracts.
2. S.P. Mookerjee.
3. N.C. Chatterjee.



that point of view. Indeed I came to the conclusion that there must be something radically different in our mental approaches to this or other problems. One can understand a difference. One can understand an opponent's viewpoint. But it is something deeper than that. It was a completely different way of thinking or mental approach or mental climate in which I live and the honourable Member lives, which made us inevitably, I suppose, to arrive at entirely different conclusions. Here is the honourable Member, Mr Chatterjee, talking in melodramatic tones<sup>4</sup> of what is happening in Jammu and elsewhere and asking for our sympathy. Asking what? Just have a talk around a table. We will settle it in the course of discussion. It seems so simple. They are very simple demands! Non-communal! There is nothing communal about these demands, I can accept them; at any rate why not I give some indication of accepting them.

Now, what appears to the honourable Member so simple and so obvious appears to me a highly pernicious and a malignant thing. I do not wish to use weaker words, because I think that the whole approach to this problem on the other side has been malignant—nothing short of it. I do not say it is deliberately malignant—not that. But it is a whole 'make-trick' and out of this a thing comes out, and comes out from time to time, occasionally in a semi-offensive way, occasionally in a nationalist way, occasionally in a way of advancing the culture of India, occasionally in this way or that way—to the better glory of India! But somehow in that 'make-trick' there is that poison which has injured us in the past many a time, which has brought down India, which has split India, which has led India to civil war, which has degraded India and which has humiliated India. And it comes out again and again. So I wonder in what century I live? Am I wrong? Have I no understanding of this era, of this middle of the 20th century when these things come to me from some medieval age—this way of thinking—in terms of 500 or 300 years ago? Are they right or am I right? There must be some mistake somewhere. Obviously I can hardly—try as I like—come to the conclusion that I am wrong and the other party is right. Naturally, I consider that it is more likely that I am right....<sup>5</sup> But there is this vital difference and I want this House to realize it. It is not a question of what I might call a superficial political difference of approach in the matter—one may have a different viewpoint here and there—but it is a vital thing which goes down to the very roots of things. When I say—the honourable Member may deny it—something about the communal approach, he says I have got communalism on the brain, and, I repeat it. Maybe—I do not say who is right—I have got it on the brain, but I am not afraid of that. Not in that sense; we

4. N.C. Chatterjee appealed to Nehru "not to play the role of Linlithgow, and other British imperialists", but to come down "from your heights" to settle the matter "in a spirit of compromise."
5. Interruption by Ramnarayan Singh.

have dealt with it in the last thirty or forty years adequately and repeatedly. But I am not afraid of this as I am not afraid of the particular movement or any other, from the governmental or from any other point of view. But what I am afraid of is this attempt, this repeated attempt, to rouse up certain passions in the people, to rouse up certain prejudices in the people to play upon them, to exploit them in the name of the country, in the name of nationalism, in the name of various good things and thereby turn the country's mind or the minds of many people in an utterly wrong direction, in a dangerous direction, which not only stops progress, but, what is more than that, may bring great danger in its train. I have no desire to make the flesh of people creep. It is not necessary. But we can never forget what we have seen five years ago in the city of Delhi and other places round about. It is the identical approach that brought and may well bring about great disasters. We will overcome them, but it means a throwback, it means going back.

Look at this matter. So simple—the integration of Kashmir. Now, who is against it? What have the Government, what have I—if I may in all modesty speak about myself, because I have been concerned with this Kashmir problem—wanted for the last five years and a half since the Kashmir problem came up? Surely this House and every one of us has wanted to finalize the Kashmir problem. Surely we have wanted to bring Kashmir into the closest association with India. Has there been any difference of opinion here? None. We have wanted to do that. Why then have we not succeeded? If you like, you may say: You made this mistake that mistake. But surely the urge, the desire, the wish to do that is here. Something comes in the way. Maybe a mistake. Something has come in way all the time...<sup>6</sup> How to get out of it? The honourable Member suggested that we get out of it by talking to the Praja Parishad people. That is an extraordinary suggestion...<sup>7</sup> Sitting round a table with the Praja Parishad leaders...<sup>8</sup>

...We have in the course of the last five years discussed the Kashmir issue on many occasions in this House. About nine months ago or less, we discussed it very fully—on the occasion of this agreement that we had with the Kashmir Government. And that agreement was, in a sense, ratified by this House. In the course of this session, twice we have discussed this matter at some length: first on the occasion of the President's Address, and secondly, when the External Affairs estimates were being discussed. So there has been no lack of discussion in this House in this matter. Because it has been an important matter—the whole Kashmir issue—we have tried to keep the House in touch with developments. And now after it has been discussed and after the House has agreed to a certain policy, I put it to the House for its consideration—because

6. S.P. Mookerjee asked "how to get out of it?"

7. S.P. Mookerjee interrupted.

8. S.P. Mookerjee, V.G. Deshpandé and Algu Rai Shastri interrupted.



this point has troubled my mind—here is this matter, a policy which this House had decided definitely, deliberately—leave out even its international implications. How far any Members of this House are entitled—every Member is entitled to agitate for the change of that policy; I am not saying that—but how far they are entitled to encourage, participate in and make others break laws in regard to a policy—involving a change of policy which Parliament has approved of? I do not wish to pursue this thing, but it is something which the House should consider. It is an extraordinary position, as far as I can see this approach to this matter.

Then, we discussed it only less than a month ago or two months ago. Repeatedly we discussed it. The House obviously knows. Therefore, in order to bring pressure on this House something is done in the city of Delhi, something is done in the town of Pathankot; while the way it is done is another matter. I think it is rather a curious way, a rather fantastic way.

Honourable Members talk about people coming from Gorakhpur and elsewhere. What is more, they come with garlands in their pockets and come out on the streets as satyagrahis; nobody else garlands them. Is anything more artificial than what is happening in Delhi in the course of this Jan Sangh agitation? I cannot for a moment consider it in the shape of an agitation. It is completely artificial; it has no roots and I should like the House to consider this.

Take those matters over which Mr Chatterjee grew so eloquent. Now just think about it—a mass agitation for Fundamental Rights. I can agree. The House may want them and I want them, but the urgency of Fundamental Rights becomes so much in Jammu and Kashmir that people perform satyagraha. 'We must have Fundamental Rights.' Now, I regret to say my own knowledge of the various forms of agitation and satyagraha which may not be as great as Mr Chatterjee's or Dr Mookerjee's has not led me to the conclusion that this type of thing can be called a mass agitation. They may have other reasons—that is a different matter—but here again some demands are made upon us and we are asked to discuss them. What are those demands? Honourable Members referred to one or two suggestions given in these letters and booklets circulated. Now, I put it to this House that some of those demands are such—I am a modest individual—that this Parliament cannot give effect to them, even if I so choose, for the very simple reason that this Parliament's writ does not run outside India. Obviously when you have to deal with an international question, well, then you have to deal with it either diplomatically or by war. There is no third way of dealing with an international question; either by friendly diplomacy or unfriendly diplomacy or by war. You do not pass a law in your Parliament to impress upon somebody outside your country, who refuses to acknowledge the authority of your Parliament. May I give you an example? Here is this woeful war going on in Korea. Great countries are involved in it and I have no doubt that everyone of these countries would like it stopped.

Those great countries cannot stop it by passing a law in their Parliament or Congress. It is something beyond them. Even if they want to do it they cannot do it, however great or powerful they may be. It is beyond the authority of their Parliament to do that.

Therefore, when a question becomes an international question like the Kashmir question, this Parliament can take many steps, of course, but it cannot solve the international part of it...<sup>9</sup> The accession of Kashmir to India, as the honourable Member knows, was in that sense complete, not subject to anything except subject to the goodwill of the people of Kashmir<sup>10</sup>....It is a very important thing and by that declaration we are going to stand. It is left to their decision. The honourable Member also knows that this question has been before the Security Council. For the moment, let us leave out whether it was right or wrong to send it there. Now it is before an international forum and how can I or this Parliament take it away? Some may say that the question is already decided because we passed this law or resolution. It is beyond my understanding. I can take a succession of steps if you like, which steps should involve, first of all saying, no more Security Council, no more United Nations. If you are prepared to do that and take the consequences of it, we may do it. We may not do it because the consequences are very serious. The consequences are not the withdrawal of the Kashmir issue; it may be withdrawal possibly of India from the United Nations. You may be prepared for that if you realize the consequences, the very serious consequences...<sup>11</sup>

I do not say, necessarily. I said we have to take into consideration the possible developments. I do not say it necessarily means that; it may mean that or it may not mean that. It is not such a simple issue as you suppose it to be. It has got all kinds of consequences in regard to our relationship with a large number of countries and other nations. Any question which has far-reaching consequences is a complicated issue. It is an issue, which, with all the goodwill in the world, we cannot solve suddenly by our wishing to solve it. I repeat, here is a thing we want. We wanted for the last five years the Kashmir issue to be finalized, and finalized in a particular way. In that there is no difference of opinion. What is the good of a person going to Chandni Chowk and doing some kind of so-called satyagraha for something that I have been trying to do for the last five years and have not been able to do?...<sup>12</sup> So I do submit that

9. S.P. Mookerjee asked whether Nehru was suggesting that the accession of Kashmir to India was subject to the approval of some international body.

10. S.P. Mookerjee felt it to be a different matter.

11. H.N. Mukerjee asked whether Nehru meant that the withdrawal of the Kashmir case from the United Nations meant the withdrawal of India from the UNO.

12. Here, while Mookerjee said to "strengthen your hands", and Nehru, expressing surprise, exclaimed: "Strengthen my hands!", Algurai Shastri of the Congress Party remarked: "God save you from such friends!"



nothing more in the way of agitations—both in regard to the objective aimed at and, if I may say so, to some extent, even the methods pursued—is really difficult for me to conceive.

Look at it from another way. If it is admitted that accession or no accession we are not going to hold on to Kashmir against the will of the people of Kashmir, it just does not matter whether there is accession or not. I make it perfectly clear that I am not going to hold on, by force of arms against the wish, to Kashmir. We are there because the people of Kashmir wanted us to be there or a majority of them. If they do not want us, out we come, whether the accession is legally binding or is complete or incomplete. That follows naturally not from what we said there but from our liberal policy in such matters.

Therefore, adopting a policy which weakens our position in the minds of the people of Kashmir, which is not for strengthening our hands or strengthening India's position anywhere outside India or inside India, is for you. It is patent that the policy of the Praja Parishad, as pursued there, weakens our cause nationally and internationally, in Kashmir and everywhere. How to strengthen anybody's hands? It is as obvious a thing as you can have it.

Then again it has been proposed—nothing has been said about it at this moment—'Well, if not Kashmir, let Jammu become completely inter-related with India.' That obviously means that the Jammu and Kashmir State is disrupted. And we support this famous process of integration by disruption and by throwing away inevitably the rest of the State into somebody's lap. But a little logic will show that all these things lead to something which is entirely opposed to the so-called demands of the Praja Parishad or Jan Sangh. Every step that they are taking or have taken leads them away from India, away from the very things that they demand. That is why I say it is a most amazing agitation because, consciously or unconsciously they go on injuring the very cause they pretend to have at heart.

Mr Chatterjee referred to some telegrams he sent me and my reply; and he said that it was amazing how rapidly I have inquired into them in the course of two or three hours. Mr Chatterjee will appreciate the rapidity with which I reply to letters from him.<sup>13</sup>

What I wrote to him was this: that every day and sometimes twice a day the Praja Parishad representative at Pathankot sent me, and him as it appeared subsequently, telegrams. And in fact his previous telegrams, every one of them, I have sent them there and made some inquiry. I do not say that I instituted a commission presided over by a High Court Judge to inquire into them. I have made some inquiry and invariably I have found that those telegrams were an amazing concoction of things that had not happened, or exaggerations. It was

13. S.P. Mookerjee said: "There I agree entirely."

astounding. Yes, these things were not even on sight at Pathankot—may be queer concoctions or rumours of some things that happened somewhere and not where he was. So, I pointed out to Mr Chatterjee that I have inquired into these matters and have found most of them to be complete falsehoods and, I should like to say, lies. Because it is entirely beyond my possibilities to find out what is happening there. I have tried to keep in touch and I have tried to enquire and I have seldom come across a more amazing collection of concoctions or falsehoods and lies than are contained in some of the publications of the Praja Parishad and it is much more astonishing the way they pile up thick falsehood upon falsehood and if they get hold of an atom of truth they make a mountain of falsehood. These are repeated in some of the Delhi papers to which Mr Shiva Rao referred here<sup>14</sup> and really it is a matter of deep regret to me: the type of newspapers we are developing in this country, some of them of the type, specially of the Urdu newspapers in the Punjab and in Delhi, is a painful thing. Because, apart from a complete departure from veracity, the vulgarity of it, the indecency of it, the lowness of it amazes—this kind of thing, if it is published, degrades their minds.

An honourable Member, who is not here, yesterday or the day before issued some kind of a statement—I have not seen it; but I have heard about it—saying that because of *jehad* in Pakistan or something, he should withdraw his movement. It is up to him and to his colleagues to withdraw it or not, but I would like to assure him and other honourable Members that there is no *jehad* in Pakistan at the present moment. There is no difficulty, and we are not worried about that in the slightest degree, so that that need not be considered in this particular connection. As a matter of fact, as the House knows, Pakistan is facing very severe troubles of its own—internal troubles; very grave difficulties. But *jehad* or no *jehad*, it is true that the activities of these organizations in Jammu which are carrying on this agitation have attracted a tremendous amount of attention and publicity in Pakistan. It would have been much greater but for the fact of their own troubles suddenly coming to the front. Because, this is just the thing which—if I may say so—some of the minds in Pakistan fully understand. That is how their minds function. They understand it, and they like it, because it feeds their own bigotry. It does not matter what cloak it wears on either side. Here, the honourable Member says that it is not communal. He asks: what is communal there in asking for a greater integration of Jammu and Kashmir? There is nothing communal, but everything from A to Z behind this movement is communal—from the beginning. There is no doubt about it. The whole approach, the whole mentality and, if I may say so, the whole past of the gentlemen behind it, are communal and their past is a witness, not only

14. B. Shiva Rao, Member of the House of the People.



during a year or two, not only five years ago, but ten or twenty or thirty years ago, to the disruptive activities of these organizations. One of them is, of course, a new organization....<sup>15</sup>

Here is a definite approach to our political, our social and to our economic problems and I have no doubt that what I consider—with apologies to the honourable Member opposite—the communal approach is a limited, narrow, bigoted approach. It is a reactionary approach. It is to some extent a revivalist approach, and I think that this movement of the Praja Parishad is a communal one. Every honourable Member must know that the Praja Parishad suddenly came into existence a short time ago, say, two or three years ago, when the RSS or its branch in Kashmir was banned. The very same gentlemen suddenly became the Praja Parishad, so that you will appreciate that that does not change their background, or their way of thinking, or their way of functioning in the narrowest way. It is true, and I am prepared to admit it, that other people in Jammu have no doubt economic and other grievances, which I hope are being enquired into. A committee has been appointed and it has enquired into them, and I hope more will be done towards that end.

These people have been exploited by this agitation. We should consider those matters no doubt, but if I am asked to discuss these high constitutional matters, international matters, with the Praja Parishad or any other Parishad like that, I regret I wholly and absolutely am unable to do so. I am unable to do so for a variety of reasons. Number one is that I cannot discuss these matters in this way, discuss international matters in this way, with any outside movement. Secondly, I am not prepared to discuss them with any organization which has functioned in the way during the last three or four months. I think it has done a grave disservice to India and all those who have encouraged it have done and are doing a very grave disservice to India, to India's position internally, to India's position externally and internationally, and I am not prepared—I should be completely frank and speak with complete candour to this House—I am not prepared to do anything which adds to their prestige by one iota, because they will utilize that for future trouble. I am quite sure of it. If it is a question of struggle with them, well, it is a misfortune, but we have to face it and we shall face it. We are facing it and we will face it, because if that movement by any mischance gains any elements of success, it means a black night for India in the future. It means disaster and ruin for India. Therefore, we shall fight it with all our strength.

So I would have this House to consider this matter in all its aspects, and not in the sense that this movement is strong enough to upset anything or create any grave results. I would like it to consider the mentality lying behind

15. At this stage, Nandlal Sharma, V.G. Deshpande and S.P. Mookerjee protested against Nehru's remarks about the communal nature of certain organizations.

it, the way it is being carried on. I am not referring to the facts of the movement—how the whole thing, as I said, is completely artificial, and how people coming from elsewhere are carrying it on. Shopkeepers and others come to us and complain: Can you not put an end to this mischief round about us? Can we not lead our ordinary lives and do our business? They come to us, and everybody knows that the shopkeepers and most of the residents of Delhi have nothing to do with it and are entirely opposed to it. No doubt some young boys come and shout slogans etc. and occasionally throw stones. But the whole conception of it, the whole purpose of it, is mischievous. Some people may be led away. They may not realize it. But there can be no doubt that this movement is harmful and mischievous, and it is because of that—and not because of any particular significance of this movement; it is because it comes under false colours; because it talks about nationalism; because it talks about high ideals; of the Supreme Court; of Fundamental Rights and so on—it is because of these things I say that the average person may be taken in by it. We have to explain this to them, and tell them that this movement has nothing to do with them. We shall consider the question of Supreme Court, of Fundamental Rights.

Certainly, Kashmir—remember this carefully—has been in the course of the last five years a war area. We have fought our first war there, and even now it is a period of truce and we have not finished it. Even now our troops stand sentry on the borders there. And there, where our troops remain within ten or fifteen miles of the border, the Praja Parishad goes, and does satyagraha. Just try to think of it. Just think of this idea of doing satyagraha on the ceasefire line, or almost on the ceasefire line. Can that be a bona fide thing to achieve any results? It is mischievous, I say. It is mischievous to go and make our troops and soldiers think, to infect them, to make them feel that there is something wrong with them and that the satyagrahis are sympathizing with them. The whole thing is wrong from beginning to end, and I hope that this House will therefore fully appreciate and agree with the policy that the Government has been following in this matter.

### 35. To K.N. Katju<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
March 26, 1953

My dear Kailas Nath,

In the event of the Jan Sangh agitation in regard to Jammu continuing for a

1. JN Collection.



few more days, I think we should definitely consider whether we should not ban the Jan Sangh as well as any other organization participating in this agitation. This kind of daily performance in Delhi cannot be tolerated indefinitely. I should like you to give thought to this matter and have it looked into.

Yours affectionately,  
Jawaharlal

3

KASHMIR

II. Negotiations at Geneva





## II. NEGOTIATIONS AT GENEVA

1. To B.G. Kher<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
January 3, 1953

My dear Kher,<sup>2</sup>

You know that we have rejected the Anglo-American Resolution on Kashmir in the Security Council.<sup>3</sup> We have informed our representative<sup>4</sup> in New York to tell Dr Graham, should he make any enquiry, that we cannot carry on any negotiations on the basis of that Resolution. Indeed we have gone a step further and said that if any talks are to bear fruit, they must be on the basis we have indicated, that is, the withdrawal of all Pakistan and 'Azad' troops from Kashmir State territory.

Probably in the course of the next two or three days, Graham will make a formal approach to us. Our answer will be as stated above. That might put an end to any further talks and Graham will have to report accordingly to the Security Council. What happens after that, I do not know. Nor do I know what the UK or the USA might then decide to do. Probably they do not know themselves and will now feel that they are in a quandary.

And yet it is very peculiar how they have persisted with this Resolution in spite of our telling them that we will have none of it. This attitude of the USA and UK has pained me greatly.<sup>5</sup> It is definitely unfriendly. I am thinking of drawing up some kind of an *aide memoire* on this subject which can be presented to the UK Government and the USA. I shall decide in two or three days' time and of course communicate with you.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. India's High Commissioner in London.
3. On 23 December 1952, the Security Council adopted a Resolution which, among other things, urged the Governments of India and Pakistan to enter into immediate negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations Representative in order to reach agreement on the specific number of forces that would remain on each side of the ceasefire line in Kashmir at the end of the period of demilitarization. That number was to be between 3,000 to 6,000 men on the Pakistan side and between 12,000 to 18,000 men on the Indian side.
4. Rajeshwar Dayal.
5. The spirit behind the Anglo-American Resolution and the views expressed by the British and US delegates clearly showed that they sought to equate the status of India with that of Pakistan in Kashmir. Gladwyn Jebb, the British delegate said: "To sift and evaluate facts and apportion responsibility for the events leading up to the outbreak of fighting in Kashmir" would not help towards a solution. The US delegate, John C. Ross, declared that it was "undesirable, unnecessary and unconstructive" to go back into the history of the Kashmir case. To set at naught all compulsions of history is an extraordinary attitude, especially when it is in a responsible organization by the responsible representatives of these responsible countries."



## 2. Cable to Indian Delegation, New York<sup>1</sup>

Your telegram 8 dated January 8. Kashmir.<sup>2</sup>

You should accept Graham's invitation to meet him and inform him, as stated already, that we are wholly unable to accept Resolution passed by Security Council or to have any talks on the basis of that Resolution. We are, however, as we have repeated before, always prepared to explore every avenue to a peaceful settlement which does not violate basic principles for which we stand.<sup>3</sup> We cannot accept the retention by Pakistan of any forces, including 'Azad' forces, in any part of Jammu and Kashmir territory. The very basis of UNCIP Resolutions was the removal of all Pakistan control and forces from State territory.<sup>4</sup> This is vital for us both from practical point of view and because sovereignty of State over all its territory must be acknowledged by withdrawal of aggressor's authority and forces.

If Graham suggests further negotiation on basis of September 4 proposal<sup>5</sup> or examination of question of general implementation of two UNCIP Resolutions, we are agreeable to doing so, subject always to our basic principles as stated above.

1. New Delhi, 9 January 1953. JN Collection.
2. Rajeshwar Dayal, conveyed to Nehru that Graham had invited the representatives of India and Pakistan at New York to ascertain their attitude to renewal of negotiations. If India refused to negotiate on the basis of the recent Security Council Resolution, Graham would ask whether she would agree to negotiate on the basis of proposals of 4 September 1952 and if no agreement was reached on that basis he would examine the question of the implementation of the two UNCIP Resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949.
3. India's basic principle was that there should be no soldier of Pakistan army or 'Azad Kashmir' forces on the Pakistan-held territory of the Kashmir State when a plebiscite was to be held.
4. In accordance with the Resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, to which India, Pakistan and the United Nations were parties, the withdrawal of the Pakistan forces from Kashmir territory and the demilitarization of 'Azad Kashmir' forces was the first obligation of the Government of Pakistan. If and when Pakistan, to the satisfaction of the United Nations Commission, had fulfilled this undertaking, bulk of the Indian forces were to be withdrawn in stages agreed upon with the Commission.
5. The proposal, made to India by Graham on 4 September 1952 during a ministerial-level conference at Geneva, was whether India would accept a military force of 6,000 men on the Pakistan side, excluding the Gilgit and Northern Scouts and of 18,000 men on the Indian side, excluding the State Militia.

### 3. Note to R.K. Nehru<sup>1</sup>

Received Dayal's message dated 12th January Kashmir. We cannot refuse to have talks on basis of UNCIP Resolutions of August 1948 and January 1949 which we have already accepted. Therefore we are prepared to accept formula suggested for resumption of negotiations.<sup>2</sup>

2. Presumably this includes Graham's twelve proposals and Geneva talks in September. In order to avoid any misapprehension, Dayal should make clear again that we are not prepared to negotiate in any way on basis of Security Council Resolution of December 23rd. Further that it is of vital importance to us as stated in our last message that all Pakistani and 'Azad' forces should vacate Kashmir State territory.

3. As regards venue, we are not agreeable to New York. We do not mind either Geneva or The Hague.

4. Our representation will depend upon venue and timing. If venue is India then we hope Gopalaswami Ayyangar might participate, otherwise someone else will have to be chosen. This also requires time and any date previous to 1st February would be exceedingly inconvenient to us.

5. Personal. In view of proposal to negotiate on basis of old Resolutions, it is desirable that someone fully acquainted with old happenings should represent us. Krishna Menon not fully acquainted with details. There is just possibility of Bajpai being able to go, though this raises some difficulties. We shall wait for Graham's final reply before deciding...

1. R.K. Nehru was Foreign Secretary at this time. New Delhi, 14 January 1953. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. Graham presented to the Indian and Pakistani representatives a new formula to resume talks which dealt with details such as the possible timing of talks and the venue but avoided the controversial issue of demilitarization. It suggested that the negotiations be conducted on the basis of the Resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 bearing in mind the assurances, clarifications and elucidations given by the UN Commission to the Governments of India and Pakistan.



#### 4 To Rajendra Prasad<sup>1</sup>

Hyderabad  
January 17, 1953

My dear Mr President,

As you know, there is a likelihood of Dr Graham inviting us for further talks on the Kashmir issue. Although we have not agreed to discuss anything on the basis of the Resolution passed by the Security Council recently, we have expressed our willingness to have talks with him to explore other avenues of reaching a settlement. It has not yet been settled where and when we meet as well as some other matters, but it is likely that we may have to send a representative fairly soon, probably by the end of this month or the beginning of February. We had suggested meeting in Delhi or Karachi, but Dr Graham would prefer the meeting to take place at some place like Geneva. We may ultimately agree to this. I am, for the present, waiting for a reply from Dr Graham.

The question arises as to who should go to represent us during these talks.<sup>2</sup> This has placed us in some difficulty, because there are very few persons fully conversant with the past events and previous talks and discussions. Shri Gopalaswami Ayyangar, who would probably be the best representative, is unfortunately not in a position to go because of his health. After giving much thought to this matter, we feel that it would be desirable to ask the present Governor of Bombay, Shri Girja Shankar Bajpai, to go there. This would probably mean about a fortnight's or at most three weeks' absence in Geneva.

I had hesitated to suggest his name because I do not like the idea of a Governor being asked to leave his post of duty, but after consulting my colleagues, Maulana Azad and Dr Kailas Nath Katju, as well as Shaikh Mohamad Abdullah, we felt that it would be desirable to send Shri Bajpai. I have not yet mentioned this matter to Shri Bajpai, though I propose to do so. I gather that he would be willing to go.

I have spoken to Shri Morarji Desai about it and he is agreeable.

I am not quite sure what formal steps we have to take in this matter. Presumably, if Shri Bajpai goes, he will have to take leave. He cannot function as Governor outside India and he should not do so. Somebody will take his

1. JN Collection.

2. The ministerial-level conference took place in Geneva from 4 to 14 February 1953. The Indian delegation led by G.S. Bajpai included V. Shankar, Joint Secretary in the Ministry of Defence, D.P. Dhar, Deputy Home Minister, Jammu and Kashmir Government, and A.J. Kidwai, Information Officer in the Indian High Commission in London.

place. In discussing this matter with Dr Katju, as well as Shri Morarji Desai, Shri Mangaldas Pakvasa's<sup>3</sup> name was suggested for this intervening period. I think it is a good name as Shri Pakvasa has already functioned as Governor in Madhya Pradesh.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Mangaldas Pakvasa, who had been the Governor of Madhya Pradesh during 1947-52, was appointed acting Governor of Bombay during the absence of G.S. Bajpai.

## 5. To G.S. Bajpai<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
January 30, 1953

My dear Girja,

... I had a talk with D.P. Dhar today. He felt that it would be better for us not to say anything about Nimitz. There is something in that of course, but I told him that it was not intended that any formal reference to Nimitz should be made. What I am anxious about is a charge at some later stage that we had passively acquiesced in Nimitz.<sup>2</sup> Of course, any reference to Nimitz or the Plebiscite Administrator might make them think that some other person should be immediately chosen and that we are looking forward to the appointment of a Plebiscite Administrator. As for Nimitz, our latest information from the US definitely shows that he is totally unsuited for this post. Probably Ratan has sent you a copy of that letter.<sup>3</sup>

All good wishes,

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. In his third report on 22 April 1952, Graham wanted that the Plebiscite Administrator-designate be associated with him in further talks with the two parties. This India found difficult to accept and stated so in a communication in May 1952: "If Admiral Nimitz should get involved in any prior controversies, which are bound to arise in the course of negotiations for demilitarization, it would prejudice his position as plebiscite administrator... because he would have lost his impartiality."
3. On 15 January 1953, M.A. Husain, the Consul General of India in San Francisco, wrote to R.K. Nehru about Admiral Chester Nimitz and his unfavourable attitude towards India on the Kashmir issue.



## 6. Cable to G.S. Bajpai<sup>1</sup>

Your telegram 05 of February 3. We can hardly oppose discussion of two UNCIP Resolutions on lines suggested by Marin.<sup>2</sup> Question of appointment of Plebiscite Administrator cannot arise till demilitarization completed under 1948 Resolution. We should avoid even nomination of Plebiscite Administrator till various matters in dispute have been settled and given effect to. Our basic position that Pakistan authority, military and civil, must wholly end in occupied areas holds.

Even though Graham's twelve points are not discussed, the line we took up then in regard to many matters will still be relevant.

1. New Delhi, 4 February 1953. File No 52/200/NGO-52, MEA.
2. Miguel A. Marin, Graham's Principal Secretary, had suggested that since Zafrullah Khan, Pakistan's representative at the Geneva talks, would not discuss any plan of demilitarization except on the basis of the quantum of forces to be maintained on each side of the ceasefire line in Kashmir according to the Security Council's Resolution of 23 December 1952, Graham would advise discussion of the UN Resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. Such a discussion would include consideration of the date of appointment and functions of the Plebiscite Administrator.

## 7. Cable to G.S. Bajpai<sup>1</sup>

Your telegram 06 dated 4th February.<sup>2</sup> I do not understand utility of discussion of odd parts of old Resolutions without reference to connected matters. Question of 'Azad Kashmir' forces has been one of the vital matters under discussion and we cannot discuss anything without reference to this. Indeed so far as we are concerned, 'Azad' forces are part of Pakistan Army and we cannot

1. New Delhi, 5 February 1953. File No 52/200/NGO-52, MEA.
2. Bajpai reported that on the interpretation of UNCIP Resolution of 13 August 1948, the Pakistan delegation differed sharply from India. Whereas India would not regard a truce agreement worth its while without complete disbandment and disarming of the 'Azad' forces, Pakistan had not accepted the principle that the 'Azad Kashmir' Government had no right to have anything to do with demilitarization. The Pakistan delegation insisted that there would be no disbandment or disarming of 'Azad' forces during the first stage of demilitarization and there would only be partial disbandment during the second stage.

distinguish them in any way now. When original Resolutions were passed, this was somewhat doubtful. We cannot agree to separating question of disbanding and disarming 'Azad' forces from implementation of 1948 Resolution.

I think it would be better to face these vital issues right at beginning and not be dragged into complicated arguments about other matters and at later stage come up against these difficulties.

## 8. Cable to G.S. Bajpai<sup>1</sup>

Your telegrams.<sup>2</sup> We have given full consideration to issues in consultation with General Thorat. We shall reply fully tomorrow.<sup>3</sup> Meanwhile, I might point out that withdrawal of few thousand Pakistani troops from 'Azad' area leaving 'Azad' forces intact there does not in any way lessen our dangers and we cannot reduce our present forces there as a result of this.

1. New Delhi, 7 February 1953. File No 52/200/NGO-52, MEA.
2. While conveying the progress of the discussions with Graham, Bajpai said in the cables of 5 and 6 February 1953 that the Indian delegation had insisted that India's security requirements must take note of the existence of 'Azad Kashmir' forces on the other side and Zafrullah Khan had conceded that India could not overlook the presence of these forces while making assessment of her security requirements.
3. Lt. Gen. S.P.P. Thorat, Chief of General Staff, Army Headquarters.

## 9. Cable to G.S. Bajpai<sup>1</sup>

We give below data and appreciation of military situation on either side of ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir State.

2. On 1st January 1949 at time of ceasefire, we had 130,000 troops in State territory. This included administrative and other personnel. Our estimate then of combined strength of Pakistan and 'Azad' forces in Pakistan occupied areas on that date was 50,000. Immediately behind them lay, of course, the bulk of the Pakistan army. Later Pakistan claimed that they had 68,000 troops in 'Azad' area on date of ceasefire. Subsequently they added administrative and other personnel and revised this figure to 84,000.

1. New Delhi, 8 February 1953. JN Collection.



3. In 1950 we withdrew about 25,000 troops, but there was no corresponding action on Pakistan's side. It is true that they reduced number of 'Azad' battalions from 30 to 20, but these 20 battalions were reorganized and reequipped and placed on sounder military footing. Since then Pakistan have paid considerable attention to training, equipment and officering of 'Azad' forces. These are now considered to be as efficient as Pakistan troops and are for all practical purposes integrated with regular Pakistan army. About half their officers are regular Pakistani officers. Remaining officers are mostly ex-officers.

4. Our information is that in 'Azad' area today there are 5,000 Pakistan regular troops and 32,000 'Azad' forces. In addition, there are 1,600 Chitral Scouts and 1,200 Gilgit Scouts stationed on Pakistan border, but so positioned they are capable of giving immediate support to forces in 'Azad' area in any aggressive action. All these are further backed by regular Pakistan army which is deployed in Pakistan territory in close proximity to frontier. Distance between Pakistan army concentrations and ceasefire line is on an average 20 to 25 miles. They could, therefore, move into 'Azad' area and launch offensive operations against Indian forces with ease. Presence of 'Azad' forces in 'Azad' area provides military link which could make this tactically and administratively much easier. Even if all military forces, including 'Azad' forces, were removed from 'Azad' area, the military threat would not be completely removed as these forces would still be in close proximity to ceasefire line.

5. On our side of ceasefire line we have in Jammu and Kashmir State today about 75,000 troops. Their role is three-fold. First, they have to prevent infiltration and raids all along ceasefire line. Secondly, they have to guard Ladakh-Tibet frontier. Thirdly, due to presence of 40,000 odd Pakistan and 'Azad' forces in 'Azad' area, as well as proximity of regular Pakistan Army concentrations, Pakistan are in a position to concentrate strong forces against us at any point of their choosing. Thus, our forces are spread out along entire ceasefire line as well as on eastern frontier while Pakistan can attack at any point. We must, therefore, maintain an adequate force to deal with such a threat. For all these tasks our present strength is barely adequate.

6. For these reasons, withdrawal of only 5,000 regular Pakistan troops from 'Azad' area would make no material difference. Militarily, the risk to security of State could only be removed if Pakistan troops were withdrawn, 'Azad' forces were disarmed and disbanded, so that there might be no link, and army concentrations in Pakistan were shifted considerable distance from ceasefire line. This would make reconcentration of forces on both sides equally difficult. We can hardly expect Pakistan to agree to removing their forces far away from the Kashmir-Pakistan frontier and that danger has anyhow to be faced. If, however, all Pakistan troops were withdrawn from 'Azad' area and 'Azad' forces disarmed and disbanded, risk to security would be somewhat reduced

and we could then carry out the substantial reduction in strength of forces on our side to which we have already agreed.

7. The question, therefore, of reducing Pakistan or 'Azad Kashmir' troops in 'Azad' area does not help at all so long as there is that link. Danger of sudden attack remains which can only be reduced by clearing 'Azad' area of all armed hostile elements.

8. This leads to the conclusion that it is not possible for us to reduce our present forces on our side if only Pakistan troops are withdrawn from 'Azad' area, leaving 'Azad' forces intact.

## 10. Cable to G.S. Bajpai<sup>1</sup>

We have sent you separately military appreciation. In view of this only course left open at present is second alternative mentioned in your telegram 11 of February 6th.

In considering old Resolutions of 13th August 1948 and 5 January 1949 we must always remember present context and various developments that have taken place since then. For instance, in August 1948 much attention was not paid to 'Azad' troops and they were not considered as very important from military point of view. Now they are as good as the Pakistan army and are a part of it.

1. New Delhi, 8 February 1953. File No 52/316/NGO-54, MEA.

## 11. Cable to G.S. Bajpai<sup>1</sup>

Your telegrams 12 and 15 February 8.

Total strength of forces mentioned in (iii) (c) of your letter of 17th June 1949 is 45,000. To this should be added 11,000 State forces, bringing the total Indian forces to 56,000.

2. In June 1949, we were prepared to reduce our forces to this minimum figure. We made it clear, however, that phasing of withdrawal of Indian forces

1. New Delhi, 9 February 1953. File No 52/200/NGO-52, MEA. Also available in JN Collection.



would be dependent on progress made with disarming and disbandment of 'Azad' forces. At that time our information was that Pakistan forces numbered about 50,000 including 27,000 'Azad' forces, 20,000 Pakistan regular army and 3,000 Scouts. Presumably we did not attach much importance then to 'Azad' forces and did not consider them as properly trained or organized.<sup>2</sup>

3. But the main point then was that we were to consider withdrawals after a settlement had been reached on final picture. Having reached that settlement, we discussed phasing of withdrawal. Risk of hostilities breaking out again would have been much less after that settlement and in context then existing and we decided to take that risk. At present we are considering partial withdrawals without any settlement or full picture being agreed to. Thus present risk of war continues and any step we take must be judged from both military and political considerations. For Pakistan, withdrawal for 20 miles, keeping substantial connecting forces throughout, makes no military difference whatever.

4. We have also to keep in mind Tibet frontier. (For your information). In Jammu at present a violent agitation is being carried on by Hindu communal elements supported by Jan Sangh, Hindu Mahasabha and even Akali Dal, who are threatening spread of movement to other parts of India.

5. Withdrawal of 5,000 Indian troops, though involving certain risks, might have been agreed to, provided there was some larger settlement in view. But to accept parity in withdrawal is bad in principle. Pakistan's withdrawal of 5,000 of their forces from 'Azad Kashmir' would hardly attract notice. Our withdrawal would have large significance at present and would create trouble for us both in Kashmir and in rest of India.

6. Pakistan regular troops have been reduced from 20,000 on 1st January 1949 to 5,000 at present. This reduction is largely due to withdrawal of administrative and other personnel of Pakistan regular troops, as 'Azad' forces have now their own administrative personnel, etc. Our information is that on 1st June 1951 Pakistan forces numbered 44,500 including 23,000 'Azad' forces, 18,000 Pakistan regular troops and 3,500 Scouts. Devers'<sup>3</sup> estimate of 30,000 Pakistan regular troops in 'Azad' area has not been accepted by us.

7. It must be remembered that in Pakistan constant threats of war are held out by people in authority. Politically and economically there is deterioration and a bankrupt regime might well indulge in adventurism. Hence we cannot afford to take too grave risks. If fear of war was removed, then one might take risks. That is not likely to happen in near future at least.

2. Graham, while attempting to bring a truce agreement under the 13 August 1948 Resolution, found Pakistan's insistence on the withdrawal of "bulk" of Indian forces a stumbling block. Graham had asked Bajpai to suggest the number of forces that would be required on the Indian side keeping in view the presence of 'Azad' forces in the 'Azad' area. Bajpai therefore asked Nehru to provide him the information regarding India's security requirements assessed on the basis of the present strength of 'Azad Kashmir' forces.

3. General Jacob L. Devers, US General and military adviser to Graham.

## 12. Cable to G.S. Bajpai<sup>1</sup>

6. ... As Graham is now considering possibility of demilitarization as single continuous process, we can suggest that we would be prepared to consider scheme of demilitarization in following three phases:

Phase One: On Pakistan side, forces to be reduced to five Pakistan Army *plus* ten 'Azad' battalions *plus* administrative backing less supporting arms. On Indian side, forces to be reduced to 60,000.

Phase Two: Remaining Pakistan forces to be reduced to three Pakistan Army *plus* four 'Azad' battalions *plus* administrative backing. On Indian side remaining forces to be reduced to 28,000.

Phase Three: Remaining Pakistan forces to be withdrawn and remaining 'Azad' battalions to be completely disarmed and disbanded. Civil armed force of 4,000 or more, in which some disbanded 'Azad' forces will be included, to be formed. On Indian side remaining forces to be reduced to 21,000.

7. Basic principle of this scheme is that in final stage of demilitarization no Pakistan troops or other armed formations, e.g. 'Azad' forces, which are under direct or indirect Pakistan control, shall remain in any part of Jammu and Kashmir State.

8. You will observe that our present proposal is far-reaching and shows to what extent we are prepared to go even though this involves considerable risks, which we have previously pointed out. Phase two is on lines of previous talks with Devers.

9. We have given you our general line of approach. You can put this forward in such manner as you think best. We would repeat that we attach greater importance to disbanding and disarming of 'Azad' forces than merely to withdrawal of Pakistan army.

1. New Delhi, 12 February 1953. JN Collection. Extracts.



### 13. Cable to G.S. Bajpai<sup>1</sup>

... 2. It seems to me however that 7A(III)<sup>2</sup> is basically different from what we have all along stood for.<sup>3</sup> It resembles somewhat Phase III of our proposal in my telegram of 12th February.<sup>4</sup> But it is clear that in spite of some kind of separation from administrative and operational command of Pakistan it will undoubtedly by continuation of 'Azad' Forces presumably under present officers. Our figure of 21,000 was based on total evacuation of Pakistan and affiliated forces and neutral force in 'Azad' area. Obviously if 6,000 'Azad' forces remain there this makes very great difference.

3. Also any presence of 'Azad' forces even in different shape or form infringes sovereignty of Jammu and Kashmir State over that area and Indian Union's responsibility. Presence of such 'Azad' military force will undoubtedly prevent return of refugees.

4. It is not clear to me how local authorities can control any military force even though that might be under ultimate surveillance of UN representatives.

5. If Pakistan army withdraws and 'Azad' forces remain in some numbers, then it will not be possible to disband or disarm them later without great difficulty. In fact their remaining there means they have some right to remain there. I do not understand how logically their presence can be justified from the point of view of law and order or preventing raids.

6. I find myself unable to accept Graham's new proposal.<sup>4</sup> But I shall telegraph more fully after consulting Thimayya and Thorat.

1. 15 February 1953. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. Paragraph 7A(iii) of Graham's proposal demanded "large-scale disbanding and disarmament of the 'Azad Kashmir' forces so that at the end of the period of demilitarization there should be the minimum number of forces that are required for the maintenance of law and order and of the ceasefire agreement with due regard to the freedom of the plebiscite."

3. In this cable, Bajpai had stated that "complete disbanding and disarming of 'Azad' forces, is, therefore, essential for State security. UNCIP's decision for large-scale disarming and disbanding is not basically inconsistent with our position when we have agreed to some 'Azad' forces being absorbed in proposed Civil Armed Force."

4. At separate meetings with representatives of India and Pakistan on 14 February 1953, the UN Representative had presented them revised proposals for discussion, providing *inter alia* that at the end of the period of demilitarization, there would remain on the Pakistan side of the ceasefire line a force of 6,000 men separated from the administrative and operational command of the Pakistan High Command and without armour or artillery. At the end of that period an Indian armed force of 21,000 men, including State armed forces, were to remain on the Indian side of the ceasefire line. They were also to be without any armour or artillery.

#### 14. Cable to G.S. Bajpai<sup>1</sup>

Shankar's telegram 23 dated 14th February.<sup>2</sup> Your draft statement appears to be right insofar as it goes.

Just received your telegram 27. This necessarily means addition to or further consideration of your draft statement. We are considering this and shall communicate our views later. Our general approach has been laid down in our last telegram.

1. New Delhi, 15 February 1953. File No 52/316/NGO/54, MEA.
2. V. Shankar had mentioned that India was unable to accept any reduction of its present forces except as part of an overall arrangement. This included withdrawal of Pakistan troops, tribesmen and Pakistan nationals who were not normally resident in the State but those who had entered it for the purpose of fighting. This would also include an agreement on the measures to be adopted for the complete disarming and disbanding of the 'Azad Kashmir' forces. India also contemplated the creation of civil armed forces with personnel drawn from the disarmed and disbanded 'Azad Kashmir' forces to prevent violations of the ceasefire line from the 'Azad Kashmir' side.

#### 15. Cable to G.S. Bajpai<sup>1</sup>

...Graham's fresh proposals are in effect slight variation of suggestions made in last Security Council Resolution which have been rejected by us. Only difference is that instead of upper limit of 18,000 suggested by Security Council for our forces, the number now suggested is 21,000. We rejected Security Council resolution on basic grounds of principle, apart from numbers of troops. We cannot now agree to any proposal which offends against those principles and is a mere rehash of Security Council Resolution.

It is clear that Pakistan's insistence on keeping 'Azad' forces in some form or other in Pakistan occupied territory, which is supported by Security Council

1. New Delhi, 16 February 1953. JN Collection. Extracts. Also available in File No 52/200/NGO-52, MEA.



and Graham, is not based on any military or law and order reasons, but purely on political ground.<sup>2</sup> This is meant to justify their occupation of that territory and to equate them with India on the other side of ceasefire line. This basic position can never be accepted by us.

We have made it clear that from law and order point of view we are prepared to consider augmentation and better arming of civil armed force. We cannot go beyond this.

Question of local authorities not yet even considered. As they are supposed to control 'Azad' side, it is essential that we should know character of local authorities and not leave this vague. In this matter Pakistan's views are opposed to ours. Our views have been mentioned in Shankar's statement.

It should also be clear that Plebiscite Administrator's functions in regard to forces relate only to disposition.

We are, therefore, unable to accept Graham's new proposal.

2. The Government of Pakistan held that paragraph 7 of the UN Representative's proposal of 4 September 1952, namely the number and character of forces to remain on each side of the ceasefire line, contravened the Security Council Resolution of 23 December 1952. The arbitrary raising of the figure of the numbers on the Indian side to 21,000, as against 6,000 of 'Azad Kashmir' forces would put the security of the 'Azad Kashmir' area in jeopardy. It argued that the demilitarization should be carried out in such a way as to involve no threat to the ceasefire agreement either during or after the period of demilitarization. The Government of Pakistan maintained that the Government of India expected that by its sustained attitude of intransigence it would ultimately procure the formulation of a truce agreement on its own terms.

## 16. To Vijayalakshmi Pandit<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

March 3, 1953

Nan<sup>2</sup> dear,

...I really cannot tell you anything new as to what attitude to take about Korea.<sup>3</sup> Krishna sent me a telegram, to which I sent a reply to you. It is evident that nobody knows what to do in Korea.

1. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. She led the Indian delegation to the United Nations.
3. In her letter of 23 February 1953, Vijayalakshmi Pandit wrote: "The press keeps asking whether we have a new formula and Dayal tells me that the Americans intend to leave it to us to make a new approach on Korea."

Here we are full of our troubles. The Jammu agitation has toned down a little, but now we are threatened by the Hindu Mahasabha, Jan Sangh, etc., by an all-India agitation beginning from day after tomorrow. Shaikh Abdullah is very unhappy, distressed and confused about it all. He does not quite know what to do and is, at the same time, not prepared to accept our advice. So he is in a complete jam and is very disheartened about everything.

Bajpai has come here today to report on the Geneva talks.<sup>4</sup> Of course, we knew all about them, but he threw some fresh light on certain aspects. I do not myself see what we can do about Kashmir in the UN now, except to say that the real difficulty has been that the Security Council has not considered our complaint and decided on the original issues, hence our inability to come to any decision in spite of long talks. Therefore, if the Security Council wishes to deal with this matter effectively, they must pronounce an opinion on the original complaint....

With love from,  
Jawahar

4. The ministerial-level talks at Geneva ended on 19 February 1953 without achieving any progress on the question of demilitarization and the number of troops each side should be permitted to retain during the holding of a plebiscite to determine Kashmir's future.





## REORGANIZATION OF STATES





## I. GENERAL

1. Policy on Linguistic States<sup>1</sup>

The Congress approves of the steps taken by the Government of India in the matter of the formation of a separate Andhra State. These steps are in accordance with the policy laid down in the Congress manifesto and the Report of the Linguistic Provinces Committee appointed by the Jaipur Congress.

2. While confirming that policy, the Congress would draw special attention to the "other factors" which must be taken into consideration in any reorganization of the present States in India. Some of these factors are of paramount importance, such as considerations of promoting the unity of India and discouraging separatist tendencies, national security and defence, financial considerations and economic progress, not only of the whole nation, but of each State. The implementation of the Five Year Plan must be given first priority as all future progress depends upon the success of this great effort to promote national advance on all fronts. Whenever any change is contemplated, the resources of the proposed new State and the residuary State or States have to be carefully assessed, as also the consequences in regard to the other factors mentioned above. Any further steps in the direction of dividing the country on the basis of language or any other basis will naturally depend on the successful stabilization of the Andhra State.

1. Resolution drafted by Nehru for the Subjects Committee meeting of the annual session of the Indian National Congress at Hyderabad, 15 January 1953. JN Collection. It was moved by N.V. Gadgil in the Subjects Committee on 17 January 1953.

2. Factors Governing Reorganization of States<sup>1</sup>

For my part, I have not the slightest objection to the reorganization of the States in India. But while so doing, various factors such as linguistic, administrative, financial, economic and the like have to be taken into

1. Speech on the resolution on Linguistic States in the Subjects Committee meeting, AICC Session, Hyderabad, 17 January 1953. From *The Hindu*, 18 January, and the *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, 19 January 1953.



consideration and linguism is only one among them. I do not know if you have heard of Pandora's Box. It is a story in old Greek mythology where an inquisitive young lady opened a box which she ought not to have opened, and as a result all kinds of evil things came out of it which she could not put back into the box. So one has to be careful not to start something or open a box out of which all kinds of mutual suspicion and ill-will come out and then the main problem is lost sight of in our prejudice and argument.

The resolution is neither a resolution of action nor inaction. It is a policy resolution and its heading is 'Reorganization of States.' You take action on some policy. This question of reorganization of States obviously is one of those questions which have to be considered coolly and in all the wisdom and forbearance they possess because it is a question which rouses people's passions and excites their prejudices. You don't take action through the excitement of the moment and sentiments, especially action which involves all kinds of complicated matters affecting a State. We have to consider every aspect of it. The resolution lays down a policy by which we should approach the subject. We may approach it sooner or later and the sooner the better.

I agree with Mr Rajagopalachari's remark<sup>2</sup> that the very idea of the formation of linguistic States is a tribal idea. But very few of us have got out of this framework. Those who observe castes are hundred per cent tribal. Let us realize that we are tribal in spite of everything we may imagine. While reorganizing a State, we have to balance a number of factors before arriving at the right decision.

The Congress thirty years ago laid stress on linguistic States, an aspect which had been completely ignored by the British Government. But that does not mean there were no other factors to be considered. When we have to consider these matters realistically, we have to take into consideration all factors. The issue of linguistic States has been mentioned in our manifesto. But we said there too that other factors such as administrative, financial and economic had to be considered. We have laid stress on that in this resolution. It is not different from our manifesto. It only makes the position a little clearer. Language is important but other factors may override that factor. We have to take that also into consideration.

For my part, I have not the slightest objection to the reorganization of the States in India. In fact, I have long cherished ideas on that subject. I do not believe in huge provinces personally. But I am not at all attracted towards the

2. Speaking on the resolution on 17 January, C. Rajagopalachari warned that dividing the country on the basis of language was a mistake and it was like going back to "the tribal idea" when civilization had progressed to territorial democratic government.

linguistic idea, though inevitably it comes in. I am very much opposed to our doing things which upset the balance of things as they are. We should not take a step which would upset the present equilibrium. Every step we take must be a safe step and we must stand firmly after taking that step from all points of view. Any person in a position of responsibility, any organization viewing these questions with responsibility, can take no other view.

This resolution is by way of a warning to us and advice to us as to how we should consider this important question. It is no good some people saying that this is a thing to put off everything. It is not a question of your passing or not passing a resolution. The Congress should face the country's problems squarely, not bypass them. By bypassing a problem, you do not get rid of it. And it is not the Congress habit, nor should it be the habit of any live organization, to try to bypass anything.

Although we had passed a resolution on linguism thirty years ago, we have to consider the various developments that have taken place since then. Whatever we are doing, we are not doing it for the day. It will be for the future too. Geo-politics changes with the rapid development of communications. We have to think of the future, something ahead of us and when we think of the future we need not think in terms of the present political situation continuing. We have to think in terms of basic factors, apart from resolutions and political approaches of this party or that party. The basic factors are defence, geo-politics and others.

Therefore, the Congress by this resolution advises the country, and our own organization especially, in what way and at what time and in what manner one should face this problem. The importance of this problem does not mean that we should rush in a state of hurry and excitement; in fact it means that we should be even more careful.

Every person will admit that everything laid down in this resolution is essential when you are considering a problem of this nature. For my part, I have no theoretical or even practical objection, subject to these matters, to a complete reorganization of India, except that it means, obviously, that it is such a big task that it delays other things and stops you from doing something else. If you think it is worthwhile doing it, let us do it. But it does stop your functioning otherwise, and it stops your concentrating on any issue like the Five Year Plan, etc. and it may add an additional burden unless it is done in a proper way. Our administration is already considered to be top heavy, which it is. The problem before us is how to reduce that top-heaviness. Each province need not try to become a semi-independent State in all things from top to bottom. All these things can be considered in a fresh way and with a fresh mind and not in a hurry.

The resolution that you have passed is the right resolution, a resolution of policy, not a resolution of action or inaction.



### 3. To Morarji Desai<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
February 19, 1953

My dear Morarji,

...You will have noticed the President's reference in his Address to Parliament<sup>2</sup> to re-distribution of provincial areas in India. I think that some time or other we shall have to tackle this problem on a much larger basis than the linguistic one and on an all-India basis. After waiting for the Andhra State to be established and got going, we should think of a really high level commission which can go fully into this subject all over India keeping in mind all the various factors. I would not have public sessions of this commission at all. I think all the facts should be gathered and the possible consequences are placed before the public so that the question can be viewed in the largest perspective....

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. While recognizing the importance of language and culture in the formation of States, Rajendra Prasad said on 11 February in Parliament that unity of India, national security, financial and administrative aspects and economic progress were other important considerations to be taken into account. See *ante*, pp. 18-9

## II. ANDHRA STATE

### 1. To R.K. Patil<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
January 5, 1953

My dear Patil,<sup>2</sup>

Your letter of the 3rd January. What you write is perfectly true. The Andhra precedence will give rise to such demands elsewhere. Indeed, it has done so already.

As a matter of fact, what I said about Andhra was said by me in almost exactly the same language two years ago and I have repeated it since. What I

1. JN Collection.
2. Minister, Madhya Pradesh Government, at this time.

had added previously was that there should be some general consent. Now I presumed that consent. I was partly correct, though not wholly.

We were thinking of making this declaration even before Sriramulu started his fast and were in correspondence on this subject with the Madras Government.<sup>3</sup>

We shall have to deal with this matter at the Hyderabad Congress.<sup>4</sup> My own view is that while accepting the general principle, we should clearly say that we can only go step by step. We should wait till the Andhra Province is fully established before we think of taking another step. Obviously, if we start changing provinces all over, it will completely upset everything, including the Five Year Plan.

I am personally wholly opposed to the disintegration of Hyderabad, at least in the near future. This will create grave problems. Apart from that, all these new Provinces will mean far heavier expenditure all round.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. To achieve immediate formation of an Andhra State, Potti Sriramulu undertook a fast on 19 October 1952 and, in spite of assurances from Nehru that there was every desire on the part of the Government to help the Andhras realize their goal, continued his fast and died, after 58 days of fasting, on 15 December 1952.
4. In the resolution adopted on 18 January 1953, the Congress had approved of the steps taken by the Government of India regarding Andhra State, which were in accordance with the policy laid down in the Congress manifesto and the report of the Linguistic Provinces Committee appointed by the Congress at its annual session in Jaipur in 1948.

## 2. To Rajendra Prasad<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
February 12, 1953

My dear Rajendra Babu,

Thank you for your letter of the 11th February about Madras.<sup>2</sup>

I am greatly concerned about Madras and I confess that, for the present, I see no easy way out of the tangle. There are three matters which have, each

1. File No 242/52, President's Secretariat.
2. Referring to Sri Prakasa's fortnightly letter to him, Rajendra Prasad wrote, that Rajagopalachari had taken the Central Government's attitude on the proposal for reducing officials' salaries and on the financial position of the Madras Government very seriously. Rajagopalachari feared that his Government might find it difficult to carry on in the midst of such financial stress and he would like to be relieved. Rajendra Prasad asked Nehru what he proposed to do in the matter.



one of them, led to this deadlock. One relates to the question of the cut in salaries.<sup>3</sup> The second is about a subvention of Rs. 10 crores which Rajaji has asked for.<sup>4</sup> The third is about the Andhra province and the capital.

So far as the first is concerned, I think that we shall be able to come to some decision in accordance with Rajaji's wishes. The chief point that was raised on our behalf was that there should be uniformity in these cuts insofar as all-India Services were concerned.<sup>5</sup> Perhaps we can do that.

In regard to the second, Deshmukh takes a strong view against any such subvention and says that if he agrees to Madras, there is no reason why he should not agree to a number of others which are perhaps even worse situated. Where is the money to come from, and so on? We shall consider this matter again fully.

Thirdly, there is the question of Andhra. Wanchoo's recommendation is that while we should decide definitely to have the capital in Andhra and even indicate the place where it should be built, for some time temporarily the capital may continue in Madras city. This period may be three years or so. The Andhra people would be tenants and guests, if I may say so, of the Madras Government for this purpose. He says that there are enormous difficulties in the way of the capital being started elsewhere immediately.

To this Rajaji is completely opposed. Indeed I have had a telegram from him to this effect today. He has not seen Wanchoo's report yet.<sup>6</sup> I have myself not read the full report, though I have read summary of it and have had a talk

3. Serious differences had arisen between the Government of Madras and the Centre regarding the implementation by the State Government of the proposal to cut salaries of its officers drawing Rs 300/- or more per month.
4. The Madras Government had requested the Centre for a grant of rupees ten crores to meet the expenditure on various projects and relief work for the victims of famine and cyclone.
5. Rajagopalachari's proposal to reduce the salaries of the members of the Indian Civil Service was turned down by the Union Cabinet because of constitutional implications. Rajagopalachari threatened to resign because a large subvention sought by the Madras Government had been refused.
6. Running into 65 pages with 12 appendices, its main recommendations were: (1) The new Andhra State to be carved out of twelve districts of the existing Madras State without the Madras city and with predominantly Telugu-speaking taluqs of Bellary District, Adoni, Alur and Rayadurg in it; (2) boundary disputes between Andhra, Madras, Mysore and Orissa to be solved by appointing an all-India boundaries commission; (3) the temporary capital to be located in Madras city for five years and then be moved to Guntur and High Court to be set up in Tirupati; (4) separate Governor and Public Service Commission to be appointed for the new State; (5) a credit of Rs 230.4 lakhs from the residuary State and Rs 10 crores from the Central Government to be given to Andhra for the new capital; (6) division of assets and liabilities; (7) budgetary provision and prospects; (8) division of services; (9) educational facilities for Andhras in the residuary State; and (10) hospital beds in Madras.

with Wanchoo. I am sending you Wanchoo's report. I shall be grateful if you could kindly return it to me when you have read it.

Rajaji is deeply hurt at the attitude taken up by Deshmukh<sup>7</sup> and to some extent Katju.<sup>8</sup> Katju, of course, has the deepest respect for Rajaji and will ultimately agree to whatever decision we think proper. Deshmukh is more rigid in these matters.

I shall discuss this matter with you later because I want your advice on it. There is no doubt that this conflict may have grave consequences.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

7. Rajaji felt that Deshmukh should have viewed the Madras Government's requirements sympathetically and afforded relief. As this was not done, Rajaji suggested that "there should be Presidential Rule in Madras so that the Andhra tangle might be solved with comparatively less difficulty and confusion and the residuary State of Madras also carried on in accordance with the wishes of the Government of India, without any complications of legislative discussions."
8. On 27 January 1953, Sri Prakasa wrote to Nehru that Katju's inability to accede to Rajaji's proposals to reduce salaries of the All India Services borne on the Madras cadre was regarded by the latter as a "slap on the face" and "something that would make the Services laugh in their sleeves."

### 3. To Rajendra Prasad<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
February 15, 1953

My dear Rajendra Babu,

I must apologise to you for the delay in dealing with your letter of the 14th February.<sup>2</sup> As I was occupied the whole day yesterday, I only saw your letter late at night. It was not possible then to prepare any kind of a summary of Justice Wanchoo's report. The preparation of any summary will take a little time. I should myself like to read the report fully.

1. JN Collection. Also available in File No 242/52, President's Secretariat.
2. Rajendra Prasad wanted a summary of Justice Wanchoo's recommendations to avoid making any conflicting statement. He wrote that Justice Wanchoo had given very cogent reasons for his recommendations which however did not always count when feelings ran high. He wrote that not only the temporary location of the capital but some other recommendations also would not be liked by the residuary State people. He suggested that an early decision by the Government would avoid growing bitterness on the issue.



I entirely agree with you that, however logical Justice Wanchoo's recommendations might be, one has to consider many other factors. Over this Andhra question, feelings run high still. There is of course the question of the capital, the High Court, etc., and the Bellary District.

About the capital, Rajaji, all his Tamil Ministers (and possibly even some of his Telugu Ministers) and indeed the Tamils as a whole are absolutely opposed to even the temporary capital remaining in Madras.<sup>3</sup> Indeed I doubt very much if any responsible person in Tamil Nad would accept the responsibility of Government there if the Andhra capital is kept there even temporarily. On the other hand, there are the wishes of the Andhras and the difficulties of the situation.

About Bellary, there is also some strong feeling both on the Tamil part but even more so in the Kannada part.

Thus we have still to face difficult decisions. For my part, I have an open mind and I do not want to close it till we have discussed the matter fully. I think that before we come to a decision, we should have Rajaji here and possibly some others.

I agree that a decision should be made without much delay. At the same time a few weeks will not make much difference and we should not be hustled into a decision. It is impossible of course to get the new State started by the Telugu New Year Day.<sup>4</sup> It might be possible to make a statement by the date.

The attitude I have adopted in meeting people, whether Tamils, Andhras or Kannadas, is not to give any opinion whatever or even an indication of an opinion, but merely to listen to them. I suggest that it would be advisable for you also perhaps to follow this policy. Every word that you or I may say will be seized upon and perhaps extended to mean something that might not have been intended. Therefore it is best not to say anything.

I met Swami Sitaram this morning and merely listened to him.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. In a telegram on 13 February, various Tamil leaders opposed Justice Wanchoo's recommendations regarding the location of the capital of Andhra and the High Court in Madras even temporarily as it would result in unseemly agitation, acrimonious controversies and administrative conflicts and would adversely affect the friendly atmosphere.

4. Swami Sitaram and some other Andhras met Rajendra Prasad on 13 February and suggested that the province should be created as soon as possible, preferably on 16 March 1953 which was the Telugu New Year Day.

#### 4. To Sri Prakasa<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
March 2, 1953

My dear Prakasa,

Your letter of February 28th. I think Rajaji has taken an unnecessarily serious view of the President's meeting with Prakasam.<sup>2</sup> But it would have been right for the President first to ask Rajaji.<sup>3</sup> The circumstances are peculiar and these little formalities should have been remembered....<sup>4</sup>

Yours affectionately,  
Jawaharlal

1. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. T. Prakasam, after meeting Rajendra Prasad on 25 February in Madras, told the press that their talk covered a wide range of topics dealing with the formation of the Andhra State and he had also given a memorandum to the President.
3. Rajagopalachari, on 24 February 1953, expressed displeasure about keeping the invitation to Prakasam, leader of the United Opposition Front in the Madras Assembly, "away from my knowledge.... This special invitation without any request on the other side from anyone boosts what was already bad enough."
4. Sri Prakasa, replying on 6 March, wrote that "the meeting has had good psychological effects."

#### 5. Formation of Andhra State<sup>1</sup>

On the 19th December 1952, the Prime Minister made the following statement in the House of the People:

In furtherance of the statement I made in the Council of States on the 9th December 1952, and in terms of that statement, the Government of India have decided to establish an Andhra State consisting of the Telugu speaking areas of the present Madras State, but not including the city of Madras, and intend to take early steps to this end in accordance with Article 3 of the Constitution. Government are appointing Mr. Justice K.N. Wanchoo, Chief Justice of the Rajasthan High Court, to consider and report on the financial and other implications of this decision and the questions to be considered in implementing it. Mr. Justice Wanchoo will report by the end of January 1953. On receipt of this report, Government will take other necessary steps. They are anxious to avoid

1. This summary for the Cabinet was drafted by Nehru, New Delhi, 15 March 1953. JN Collection. Extracts.



all possible delay in establishing the new State. They hope that the establishment of this State will be brought about with the friendly cooperation of all the people concerned.<sup>2</sup>

2. Mr. Justice Wanchoo spent a month in Madras State and undertook a tour of the Andhra Desa.<sup>3</sup> He submitted a long and detailed report on the 7th February 1953, in which he has made various recommendations in regard to the formation of the Andhra State. Copies of the report have already been circulated to Members of the Cabinet.

3. The creation of a new State and the division of an existing State create many problems. Some of these are of high policy, others are administrative and financial. It is not possible, at this stage, to consider in detail many of the administrative and financial problems. But it is desirable that certain questions of outstanding importance should be dealt with and decisions taken at an early date. Till such decisions are taken, controversies will continue about them and it will not be possible to proceed with the determination of many other questions, which depend for their solution on certain political decisions.

4. This summary is submitted to Cabinet for decisions to be taken on these important questions which have been the subject of a great deal of controversy. After such decisions are taken, it will be necessary for a fuller consideration of other problems flowing from the division of Madras State and the constitution of a new State.

5. Government are fully committed to the formation of an Andhra State in terms of the Prime Minister's statement. That means that the uncontested Telugu-speaking areas of the present Madras State should form the new Andhra State. That new State will not include the city of Madras. For a proper indication of the actual boundaries of the new State, it would have been desirable to have a Boundary Commission. But this would mean delaying matters and adding to the tension that unfortunately exists. That tension will not help in a proper determination of the boundary. It is proposed, therefore, that the districts should be taken as units or, where absolutely necessary, as in the case of one district, the taluqs should be considered as units, and a broad division made on this basis. This need not mean a finalization of the actual boundaries of the new State. At a later stage this matter can be considered in detail and minor rectification in the boundaries made. It would be desirable, however, to defer this matter till some time after the Andhra State has been established. The State Governments concerned can then take it up in a friendly and cooperative spirit, with the cooperation of the Central Government.

2. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 20, pp. 256-7.

3. Justice Wanchoo arrived in Madras on 7 January 1953, and received representations from various groups, organizations and individuals, and held discussions with them. He also toured various places to hold further discussions and submitted the report on 7 February.

6. For the present, therefore, the new Andhra State should consist of the undisputed Telugu-speaking districts of Madras State. There is some dispute about Bellary District. This will be referred to later in this summary.

7. It will be necessary to introduce legislation in Parliament in order to constitute the Andhra State. It is not possible to introduce this legislation in the present session and much work has to be done before that legislation is ready. It is hoped, however, that legislation may be introduced and passed in the next session of Parliament, that is in July-August 1953.

8. In that legislation, a date will have to be fixed for the constitution of the new State. Probably a suitable date would be the 1st October 1953. That will give adequate time for preparation and that would also be, to some extent, helpful from the financial point of view, as the financial half-year will end then.

9. The immediate points to be considered and decided are: (i) in relation to the capital of the Andhra State, (ii) the location of the High Court, (iii) the Governor, (iv) the legislature and Ministry and (v) Bellary District.

Other important questions deal with the services and administrative set-up, the budget, division of assets and other financial implications. All these will require fuller consideration and may be taken up at a somewhat later stage.

10. The capital. It is clear from the statement made by the Prime Minister in December 1952 that the city of Madras cannot form part of the Andhra State. Therefore, the capital of the Andhra State cannot be fixed in the city of Madras. Although this point has been determined already, there are some elements among the Andhras who still claim that Madras should be either a joint capital or, in the alternative, a Chief Commissioner's Province. Both these suggestions have to be ruled out completely in terms of the Prime Minister's statement.

11. Another suggestion, which is widely favoured by the Andhras, and which has been recommended by Justice Wanchoo, is that the capital of the new Andhra State should remain temporarily in the city of Madras till other suitable arrangements are made for its transfer to Andhra territory. The period suggested for this temporary capital is from three to five years and it is further suggested that the Tamils should treat the Andhras, during this period, as their tenants or guests in Madras city.

12. Mr Justice Wanchoo has recommended this because, according to him, there is at present no suitable town in Andhra which can function effectively as a capital. If this is not feasible, however, Justice Wanchoo has recommended Vishakhapatnam as a temporary capital. He has further indicated a place between Guntur and Vijayawada where a permanent capital can be built.

13. Apart from the Andhras, all others in Madras State have expressed themselves strongly against this proposal of the temporary capital of Andhra being situated in Madras city even for a brief period. The Tamils have taken



the strongest exception to it and have unanimously opposed it. In addition, most of the others in Madras city, that is, those who are neither Tamils nor Andhras, have also opposed this proposal of a temporary capital in Madras city.

14. Many reasons have been advanced for and against this proposal. It would appear, however, that, apart from any academic consideration of this problem, the mere fact of this strong disagreement makes it difficult for the Andhra capital to be kept in Madras city even temporarily. This would be considered an imposition by the Tamils and others of Madras and would lead to constant friction and increasing bitterness. Questions of law and order might also have to be faced and the normal function of government there would become exceedingly difficult....

40. The points for immediate decision, therefore, are:

- (1) The location of the capital of the new Andhra State: It is recommended that this should be within the territory of Andhra and should not, even temporarily, be situated in the city of Madras. The Andhra legislature should determine both the permanent and the temporary location of the capital. Till such decision is made by the Andhra legislature, the capital should be located at Waltair or Vishakhapatnam. While the Governor should reside there and the new legislature should also have its seat there, some offices of the Andhra State might continue in the city of Madras. These can be moved, as convenient, in consultation between the Andhra State and the residuary Madras State.
- (ii) The location of the High Court: The new Andhra legislature should decide about the location of the High Court in Andhra territory. Till this decision is made, the present Madras High Court should continue to function also as the High Court of the Andhra State. Rules can be made and conventions established in this High Court for dealing with judicial appointments and other like purposes in Andhra State.
- (iii) The Governor of the Andhra State: It is suggested that the Governor should be selected some time before the actual establishment of the State and should function as an Officer on Special Duty to facilitate work in regard to the establishment of this State.
- (iv) The Legislature and Ministry: It is recommended that the Andhra members of the Madras State Legislature, i.e., members elected from those areas which are going to form part of the new Andhra State, should form, to begin with, the new Andhra State Legislative Assembly. There should be no Second Chamber in Andhra State.
- (v) Bellary District: The three taluqs of Bellary District which are acknowledged to be Telugu-speaking and adjoin the Andhra areas

should form part of the new Andhra State. The remaining seven taluqs of Bellary District should either be incorporated in Mysore State or should continue, for the present, in the residuary Madras State. At a later stage, the question of Bellary taluqs in the District can be considered by a Boundary Commission for any further division which may be considered necessary from the linguistic or other points of view.

- (vi) The Tungabhadra Project: Special arrangements should be made for joint control and supervision of this project by the States concerned in cooperation with the Centre. Meanwhile, work on this project should be continued under the present set-up. The necessary financial arrangements for this should be worked out.
  - (vii) After the establishment of the Andhra State, the question of having a Boundary Commission to make such rectification of the frontier areas as may be considered necessary, should be considered.
  - (viii) Questions relating to the Services and administrative set-up, division of assets and other financial implications should be further examined.
  - (ix) Legislation to give effect to the decisions for the formation of Andhra State should be framed and placed before the next session of Parliament in July/August 1953. The date for the formal inauguration of the new State should be fixed for the 1st October 1953.
41. The Minister of Home Affairs and the Prime Minister have seen this summary.

## 6. To C. Rajagopalachari<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
March 19, 1953

My dear Rajaji,

Yesterday we considered at some length in Cabinet the question of the Andhra State. We are continuing our discussion in Cabinet today. Probably we shall make some statement in Parliament in the course of the next five or six days.<sup>2</sup> This statement will only deal with certain important matters in controversy, leaving others to be considered and decided a little later. The idea is that if these controversial matters are cleared, it will be easier to consider other matters that flow from the establishment of the new State.

1. JN Collection.

2. See *post*, pp. 264-68.



Probably we shall decide that right from the commencement of the State the political capital of Andhra should be in Andhra territory. That is to say, that the seat of the Governor, the Ministers and the legislature should be in Andhra State and not in Madras city even temporarily. We shall not indicate at this stage where this capital should be located. We shall leave this to the Andhras themselves. The Andhra legislature will, of course, decide about their permanent capital. As regards their temporary capital, this may be decided by the prospective Andhra legislature. We do not wish to decide ourselves where this temporary capital should be and we wish to give the opportunity to the Andhras to come to a decision. It will be open to the Andhra Assembly at any time to reconsider its own decision. In the event of their not deciding within a reasonable time, we may have to consider giving some indication ourselves.

As regards the High Court, the location of it will have to be decided in future by the Andhra legislature. But till then the present Madras High Court should continue to function also as the High Court for Andhra State. Some conventions will, no doubt, be laid down for the judiciary, etc.

We feel that a convenient date for the inauguration of the Andhra State will be October 1st. That will give us enough time to work many things out. At the same time, financially it will be a more convenient date than any other, except the end of March which is not feasible.

Although the political capital must be situated in Andhra right from the beginning, we feel that full facilities should be given to the Andhra State to continue many of its offices in Madras city till such time as they can be moved. This, of course, requires the goodwill and cooperation of the residuary Madras State. I am sure that your Government will gladly give this cooperation and assistance.

I would earnestly suggest to you that as soon as our decision is announced, you should make a friendly gesture to the Andhras and assure them that you will give them full facilities for their offices, etc., in Madras city till they find it convenient to take them away. Otherwise also you might give them your goodwill and your assurance about facilities for them in Madras city in regard to education, hospitals and the like. I am sure, you will agree with me that it is of the utmost importance that we should try to get all this done with as little of heat and controversy as possible. A friendly gesture from you would go a long way to help.

If I may further suggest, even before we make a declaration about the capital, etc., you might make friendly references to the Andhras and your wish to cooperate with them and help them.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

7. To Sri Prakasa<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
March 20, 1953

My dear Prakasa,

Our Cabinet has been considering the Andhra State matter and has come to certain conclusions in regard to some points in controversy. Other matters would be considered later. It was thought necessary to come to these conclusions because it was hardly possible to make any progress unless these decisions were made. I am having the substance of these decisions sent to you separately from the Cabinet office. They are being sent to Rajaji also. They should, of course, be kept secret, although these things have a tendency to leak out. Anyhow, you should not mention them.

You will see that in regard to the capital, we have decided that even the temporary capital should be outside Madras. The location should be decided upon by the Andhra people themselves. We have not suggested any place. But we have added that we can accept most of the offices to continue in Madras till such time as they can be removed conveniently. I do hope that Rajaji and his Government will move generously in this matter now that the principal question has been decided in their favour. I have suggested to Rajaji to make a friendly statement addressed to the Andhras promising them all assistance, etc.<sup>2</sup>

In regard to the High Court, we decided that for the present the present High Court should continue for both the States.

In regard to Bellary District, six taluqs will go to Mysore and three to Andhra. Bellary taluqs will require a little further investigation.<sup>3</sup>

I think that we shall probably make a statement in Parliament to this effect in the course of the next week.

Yours affectionately,  
Jawaharlal

1. JN Collection.
2. See the preceding item.
3. Sri Prakasa replied on 23 March 1953 that Bellary taluq should go to Andhra and four taluqs should be merged with the contiguous districts of Anantapur and Kurnool instead of forming a separate district. He also suggested that Hyderabad, along with Madras, Mysore and Andhra, should have the authority to control and supervise the Tungabhadra project.



## 8. To C. Rajagopalachari<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
March 21, 1953

My dear Rajaji,

I presume you have received a summary of the decisions we have so far taken in regard to the Andhra State. These decisions relate only to a few matters, which might be considered basic and political. So far as the apportionment of assets and liabilities and the division of the Public Services are concerned, these will be considered later.

As you will have noticed that in regard to Bellary District, we have decided that six taluqs should go to Mysore and three should go to the new Andhra State. In regard to Bellary taluq, we have thus far not come to any final decision. We hope to examine the population figures of this taluq rather carefully and to take other matters into consideration also. If it is considered necessary, we may send some one to visit the place, rather quietly and without any fuss. But we are not likely to do this. It is conceivable that Bellary taluq might itself be divided up if the nature of the population indicates this clearly. It should not take us long to decide this matter.

I hope to make a statement in the House of the People in the course of the next four or five days. Katju has gone out of Delhi. As soon as he returns we will draw up the statement. I do not wish to delay this. The statement will be based on the decisions thus far arrived at.

I hope you received my previous letter<sup>2</sup> and that you have taken into consideration what I suggested therein, i.e., making a statement in the way of a friendly gesture to the Andhras. You will, of course, appreciate that the sooner controversies end, the better so that we can set about the real business.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. A copy of this letter was sent to the Minister of Home Affairs also.

2. See *ante*, pp. 259-60.

## 9. To N. Sanjiva Reddy<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
March 23, 1953

My dear Sanjiva Reddy,<sup>2</sup>

In the course of the next two or three days I hope to make a statement in the House of the People about the Andhra State. I earnestly hope that this statement will end all controversies and all those interested in the new State will cooperate to make this great venture a success. In particular, it will be the business of Congressmen to do so.

I have noticed with surprise that you have been striking a somewhat discordant note and stating that the demand for constituting the city of Madras into a Chief Commissioner's Province had not been abandoned. You must know that there is no chance whatever of this being done and to repeat this demand is merely to carry on a harmful controversy and do injury to the new State. Our decisions have been taken after the most careful consideration and we shall abide by them.<sup>3</sup>

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

2. President, Andhra Pradesh Congress Committee, at this time.

3. Replying on 24 March 1953, Sanjiva Reddy assured Nehru on behalf of Andhra Congress members that they would do their best to create a good atmosphere and maintain peaceful and cordial relations between the two States. Also the future status of Madras city would no more be an Andhra concern. He wrote that the controversy would not have arisen but for the uncharitable statements of Rajagopalachari.



## 10. To C. Rajagopalachari<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
March 25, 1953

My dear Rajaji,

Your telegram<sup>2</sup> about Sukthankar's<sup>3</sup> letter has just reached me.

Last night I sent you the draft of the statement I propose to make today in Parliament in regard to the Andhra State. In that statement I had said that "Many offices of the Andhra State might continue to be located in the city of Madras till arrangements are made for their transfer to Andhra territory." I am changing the word "many" to "some". I think that this meets your point.

About the High Court functioning as a High Court of Andhra State, we felt that this was a more correct phrase. It means exactly the same thing as you have suggested. Anyhow, this is not a legal document and we have to consult lawyers as to what words to use subsequently in the legislation to be passed. In this matter we may consult the Chief Justice of the Madras High Court also later.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Rajagopalachari telegraphed on 24 March about Cabinet Secretary Sukthankar's letter giving a gist of Cabinet decisions. He sent two suggestions for Nehru's statement in Parliament of which the first one was incorporated by Nehru. The second suggestion that the Madras High Court should "continue to exercise jurisdiction over the Andhra Area" was not incorporated.
3. Y.S. Sukhtankar (1897-1973); joined ICS, 1922; served the MP Government for many years, later the Government of India as Special Secretary and Cabinet Secretary and finally the Planning Commission between December 1952 and 1957; Governor of Orissa, 1957-62; Government Director, Board of Indian Shipping Companies, 1965-67; President, Maritime Freight Communications, for some time.

## 11. Proposed Inauguration of Andhra State<sup>1</sup>

On December 19, 1952, I informed this House that the Government of India had decided to establish an Andhra State, consisting of the Telugu-speaking

1. Statement in Parliament, 25 March 1953. *Parliamentary Debates (House of the People)*, Official Report, 1953, Vol II, Prt II, cols 2803-08. Extracts.

areas of the present Madras State, but not including the city of Madras, and that the Government were appointing Mr. Justice K.N. Wanchoo, Chief Justice of the Rajasthan High Court, to consider and report on the financial and other implications of this decision and the questions to be considered in implementing it.<sup>2</sup>

Mr. Justice Wanchoo conducted this enquiry and presented his report on the 7th February, 1953. A copy of this report is placed on the Table of the House. Other copies will be available to Members. Government have given the most careful consideration to Mr. Justice Wanchoo's report and to the other matters connected with the establishment of the Andhra State. Some of these matters, more especially those relating to financial implications and the effect on the Services, require further detailed consideration which they are receiving. There are, however, certain questions of a political nature, which have given rise to some controversy, and which have to be decided immediately so that further progress may be made. In regard to these, the Government have arrived at certain decisions.

The basic considerations which have to be kept in view are that an Andhra State has to be established and that it should consist of the Telugu-speaking areas of the present Madras State. Further that the city of Madras is not to be included in the proposed Andhra State. The Andhra State, therefore, is to consist of what might be called the undisputed Telugu speaking areas of the present Madras State. At a subsequent stage, as I shall indicate later, a Boundary Commission or Commissions may have to be appointed to determine the exact boundaries of this new State. As this investigation might involve some delay, it is desirable that the State should be constituted as early as possible on the basis of existing boundaries of the districts except, in one case, where the boundary might be according to taluqs.

The Andhra State will consist of the following eleven districts: (1) Srikakulam, (2) Vishakhapatnam, (3) East Godavari, (4) West Godavari, (5) Krishna, (6) Guntur, (7) Nellore, (8) Kurnool, (9) Anantapur, (10) Cuddapah and (11) Chittoor. It will also consist of a part of Bellary district as I shall indicate later.

It is clear that the capital of the Andhra State has to be in the territory of the new State. The Government are of opinion that the site of the capital should be determined by the Andhra people themselves through their Legislative Assembly.

A question has arisen about the temporary capital of the Andhra State till adequate arrangements are made for the functioning of the permanent capital. It has been suggested that there is some convenience in this temporary capital being located in the city of Madras. While it is true that certain conveniences

2. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol 20, pp 256-257.



in regard to accommodation, etc., will result from this temporary location in the city of Madras, there are important and, in the opinion of the Government, overriding considerations against this proposal. It is desirable that, right from the inauguration of the new State, it should have its political headquarters in the State itself and should be enabled to function as a complete unit, freely and unhampered by any other considerations. The full integration and progress of the new State will thus be facilitated and any possible friction and complications, which might arise from the temporary location of the capital in the territory of another State, would be avoided. The location of the political capital of the Andhra State in Andhra territory, right from the commencement will also result in the development of normal and cooperative relations between the new State and the residuary State.

The Government, therefore, are of opinion that the temporary capital of the Andhra State should be located in Andhra territory. This means that the seat of the Governor, the Ministers and the legislature should be located in the territory of the new Andhra State. The decision as to the site of this temporary capital should be left to the Andhra people themselves and may be taken by the Andhra Members of the Madras Legislature, who are likely, at a later stage, to form the Legislative Assembly of the new State. This decision should be indicated to the Government of India by the beginning of July 1953.

While the capital of the State should be located within the territory of the State from the date of the inauguration of that State, it is not necessary that all the offices pertaining to the Andhra State should also be transferred to the territory of the new State from that date. Some offices of the Andhra State might continue to be located in the city of Madras till arrangements are made for their transfer to Andhra territory. The Government are assured that the residuary State of Madras will make every effort to accommodate such offices.

The new Andhra State will be inaugurated on October 1, 1953, which is considered a suitable and convenient date for this purpose.

It should be clearly understood that any proposals involving financial assistance from the Central Government would require the approval of the Central Government and would depend upon the capacity of the Central Government to render help. Therefore, any decision about the capital or any other matter involving financial assistance would require the approval of the Central Government insofar as that financial assistance is concerned.

The Andhra Legislature, after the inauguration of the new State, should decide upon the location of the High Court within the territory of the new State. Till such decision is taken, the present Madras High Court will continue to function also as the High Court of the Andhra State. During this period, certain necessary conventions may be observed in regard to the administrative side of the High Court relating to Andhra as well as such other matters as may be considered necessary.

The Legislature of the Andhra State will consist of one Chamber only, that is, the Legislative Assembly, and there will be no Second Chamber. As regards the residuary State of Madras, it should be left to that State to decide the future of its Second Chamber.

The members elected to the present Madras Legislative Assembly from the areas which would form part of the new Andhra State, should constitute, to begin with, the new Andhra State Legislative Assembly.

The case of Bellary district has to be considered specially and it cannot be treated as a single unit for attachment to any State. It is bilingual and a considerable part of it has a clear majority of Kannada-speaking people. There are at present ten taluqs in this district. Six of these taluqs, namely, Harpanadhalli, Hadagalli, Hospet North, Hospet South, Sandur, and Siruguppa, have each of them a very large Kannada-speaking population. Three taluqs, namely, Adoni, Alur, and Rayadurg, have each a large majority of Telugu-speaking population. The remaining taluq of Bellary has a very mixed population and there are certain other factors also to be considered. The Government have, therefore, come to the conclusion that the three taluqs of Adoni, Alur, and Rayadurg should form part of the new Andhra State and the six Kannada-speaking taluqs, mentioned previously, should form part of the Mysore State. In regard to Bellary taluq, Government propose to consider the matter further and come to a decision later.

One part of the Tungabhadra Project is situated in Hospet North taluq. The other part of it is in Hyderabad State. That part of the project in Hospet North taluq will thus be in Mysore State after the establishment of the Andhra State. This great project will feed not only those areas which go to the Mysore State but also some areas in Andhra State. Both these States will be especially interested in this scheme. Special arrangements should, therefore, be made for the joint control and supervision of the project by the States concerned in cooperation with the Central Government. The Ministry of Irrigation and Power will, in consultation with the Ministry of Finance, the Planning Commission, and the States concerned, work out the necessary financial and other arrangements and prepare a scheme for the purpose. Till the date of inauguration of the new State, the Madras Government will continue the work on the Tungabhadra Project, as before. From the 1st October, the States concerned will manage it with the assistance of the Central Government, in accordance with the scheme drawn up therefor. It is desirable that the work on the project should be continued under the present set-up till it is completed.

A Boundary Commission or Commissions will be appointed some time after the establishment of the Andhra State to determine the exact boundaries of that State and to recommend such adjustments as may be considered necessary in regard to the boundaries of that State with the residuary State of Madras and the Mysore State.



The question of Services and the financial implications of the formation of the Andhra State will be considered separately later. As far as possible, the officers now serving in the Andhra area should continue. A committee of senior officers of the present Madras Government should, in consultation with an officer appointed by the Central Government, consider the adjustments that might be necessary between the Andhra State and the residuary State of Madras in respect of the Services....

## 12. To K.N. Katju<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
March 27, 1953

My dear Kailas Nath,

I enclose a letter from Rajaji and another from Sanjiva Reddy.

We shall have to decide soon about the Bellary taluq. I hope that all the facts will be collected to enable us to decide. There is a good deal of excitement, even now, about this taluq between the Andhras and the Kannadas. They both insist that it should go to them.

It is to be remembered, as Rajaji has pointed out, that the representatives of Bellary district will cease to remain in the Madras Legislature. Provision will have to be made about them.

Sanjiva Reddy now wants the High Court to shift also right at the beginning. I told him that it would be far better for the Legislative Assembly of Andhra, when constituted, to decide this. They can decide this on the very first day if they so choose. It is open to Andhra Members meantime to recommend the location of the High Court. Their difficulty is that, in terms of the Sri Bagh Pact,<sup>2</sup> they want to decide both questions together, that of the Capital and the High Court.

I have asked both the Kannada people and the Andhra people to let me have their case for the Bellary taluq.

Yours affectionately,  
Jawaharlal

1. JN Collection.

2. Rayalaseema, under the Sri Bagh Pact, an unofficial pact between Rayalaseema and Circar Andhra leaders signed in 1937, had the option to choose either the capital or the High Court of Andhra for location there.

### 13. To C. Rajagopalachari<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
March 27, 1953

My dear Rajaji,

Thank you for your letter of the 26th March.

We hope to decide about Bellary some time next month. This is not going to be left to a Boundary Commission.

Obviously, any elected representatives from Bellary district will have to leave the residuary State of Madras and go to their own legislature.

I hope you will take early steps in regard to the Services and appoint a committee therefor. In the statement I made, I said that the Central Government will appoint a representative. The idea was that we might appoint an Andhra representative. Sukthankar, our Cabinet Secretary, is going to Madras soon. His presence might be taken advantage of for any consultation that might be necessary. More particularly, he might be told what the Central Government should do in the near future.

I am going to Manipur and across the Burma border. I leave tomorrow morning and return on the 5th of April.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. A copy of this letter was sent to K.N. Katju also.

## III. KARNATAKA

### 1. To S. Nijalingappa<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
January 21, 1953

My dear Nijalingappa,<sup>2</sup>

... I am sure you will appreciate that this kind of thing is very unfortunate and improper.<sup>3</sup> There will be an end to all governmental or public functioning if it

1. File No 7(99)/48-PMS. Extracts.

2. A Member of the House of the People and of the Congress Working Committee at this time.

3. Thimmappa Rudrappa Neswi, a Congress MP, and A.J. Dodmeti, a Congress MLA in the Bombay Assembly, had started a fast for unification of Karnataka.



is to be governed by individual fasts. In any event, I cannot produce Karnataka Province or Karnataka unification unilaterally.

I hope you will see to it that this business of fasting is ended.<sup>4</sup> It helps nobody.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. The atmosphere in Karnataka region became charged as a result of Dodmeti's fast at Jakkali village-in Ron taluq of Dharwar district. At a number of places, fasting camps were organized. The chain of fasts starting at Jakkali culminated in the "fast unto death" undertaken four months later by Shankargowda Patil at Alavandi near Hubli.

## 2. To S. Nijalingappa<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
March 9, 1953

My dear Nijalingappa,

I have your letter of the 7th March sending me a number of papers in connection with formation of a Karnataka State.

I do not think it is necessary for you to convince me on this subject. All we have to do is to find ways and means. Even in regard to Andhra, which was a relatively simple affair, all kinds of difficult problems are arising. It is better to settle some of these problems beforehand than to have to face them later.

I am more and more inclined to think that we should view all these questions as a whole and not in parts. I hope that, when the time comes, we shall do this.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No 7(99)/48-PMS.

### 3. To B.N. Datar<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
March 14, 1953

My dear Datar,<sup>2</sup>

I regret to say that I have no sympathy at all for the gentleman<sup>3</sup> who is fasting for the Karnataka Province and I propose to say nothing at all on the subject.<sup>4</sup> Whatever I have to say, I shall say at the right time regardless of this fast. I am a little tired of this monstrous method of trying to achieve political results.

The telegram that you have drafted is not correct.<sup>5</sup> We are not taking up the question of Karnataka Province after the establishment of Andhra State. All I have said is that we shall consider the larger question of the reorganization of India and study that question fully in its bigger context after we have settled the Andhra State issue. I can give no guarantee about time or method or procedure. In any message you send, you should not commit our Government or me.

If the situation worsens in the Karnataka because of this fast, I shall be very sorry. But I really cannot help it. I cannot allow the situation all over India to worsen by surrendering to a fast. I think the attitude of some people in Karnataka is not very helpful in this matter.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No 7(99)/48-PMS.
2. Deputy Minister for Home Affairs, Government of India.
3. Narayan Pai of Mundgod in West Canara.
4. Datar had enclosed two telegrams from Hubli and Mundgod about Narayan Pai's fast. He wrote that this fast was symptomatic of the worsening situation in Karnataka after the adoption by the Congress of the resolution on Andhra at its session in Hyderabad, which had also announced postponing consideration of formation of other linguistic provinces until the stabilization of the Andhra State. He suggested that the Government announce taking up the consideration of this issue and its intention not to shelve it.
5. In Datar's draft telegram, Narayan Pai was urged to abandon his fast and told that the Central Government would take up the question of formation of Karnataka Province after the formation of Andhra State.





## STATE MATTERS



appreciate at all the way the higher services want to hold on to certain old style privileges. But I cannot see how we can get over this present difficulty, unless of course we set about amending the Constitution.

You have suggested that the matter might be placed before the Cabinet. If you so desire, I shall do so. But I am sure that the Cabinet would have to face the same difficulty as I have to do.<sup>3</sup>

Could we not take this matter up at a somewhat later stage and consider all aspects of it? Obviously any one step taken must have repercussions elsewhere.<sup>4</sup>

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

3. In fact, Bhimsen Sachar, during a talk with Nehru on 24 January, said he was also anxious to have a cut in the salaries of IAS officers.
4. Rajagopalachari replied on 23 January that he only wanted President's assent in respect of All India Cadre Officers like IAS and IPS in the employ of Madras Government who were not protected by the Constitution and a cut in their salaries required the assent of the Government of India. Therefore, there was nothing unfair about it. He also argued that this was an emergency cut of a temporary character.

## 2. To Sri Prakasa<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
January 31, 1953

My dear Prakasa,

Thank you for your letter of January 27.<sup>2</sup>

I hope we shall be able to get over the two principal difficulties that Rajaji has mentioned to you. But it takes a little time to do this and I hope he will be patient with us. We have naturally to think of larger consequences. As for Katju, he is the last person in the world to give a rebuff to Rajaji. In

1. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. Sri Prakasa wrote that Rajagopalachari was inclined to leave Chief Ministership of Madras as he had been greatly hurt by unjustified and unscrupulous attacks on him by the Andhra people. Rajagopalachari also found it impossible to carry on with an unsympathetic Centre. He told Sri Prakasa that he would not like at his age to receive "orders or rebuffs" from Katju or Deshmukh, so much younger than him and known to him for so long. Rajagopalachari also suggested Presidential Rule to solve the Andhra tangle.

fact he has felt very unhappy about all this. But naturally he has to consider the whole picture. We are going to put this matter up before the Cabinet.

So far as Deshmukh is concerned, I do not think he is unsympathetic to Madras particularly. Our finances are in a bad way and we are going to have a huge deficit. He is, therefore, compelled to be rather unsympathetic to everybody....

Yours affectionately,  
Jawaharlal

### 3. To C. Rajagopalachari<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
February 12, 1953

My dear Rajaji,

...You know very well that your advice is more important for me than from anyone else. India is some kind of a jig-saw puzzle with a tendency for separate parts to jump out. It is no easy matter to keep them together. Indeed, sometimes I am a little surprised that they do hold together. At the present moment we have to face a wholly misconceived agitation about Jammu which is being supported by all the embattled communal hosts, Hindu and Sikh. Few of these people care for Jammu or Kashmir, but they want some kind of an excuse to get Government in trouble. They find this a useful weapon. It is quite possible that in the course of the next two or three weeks we might have to meet a biggish challenge. The kind of atmosphere that is being created in Delhi is reminiscent of the days before Bapu was assassinated.

I would beg of you not to be angry with us but to help us. I quite realize the difficulties you have to face and, so far as I am concerned, I shall do my utmost to meet them.

The question of the cut in salaries has, as I wrote to you, my full sympathy. I only hoped that this might be done in a more general way. The matter, I hope, will be decided fairly soon.

About financial help to Madras, it is true that Deshmukh is somewhat rigid. That is his background and training. But he is in a difficulty as a number of States are equally badly off and it is no easy matter to keep the Five Year Plan going and at the same time to upset all the financial arrangements for it. Obviously if Madras State is in great need, as it is, something must be

1. JN Collection. Extracts.



done about it. Indeed, this whole question raises vital issues about our financial approach to the entire problem. We have perhaps been too orthodox and a more unorthodox approach might yield better results. It is because of this larger issue having come up before us that delay occurs in dealing with parts of it.

I am sorry I cannot think of releasing you, as you say. What am I to do when all our wise men go one after the other leaving me with some capacity but little wisdom to shoulder the burden of this country.

About Andhra, I confess that I have not read Wanchoo's report yet. I had a talk with him and read a few pages. I should like to read that report fully. Newspaper reports are not to be relied upon. So far as I know, Wanchoo has pointed out the difficulties which you mention. It is for us to decide. In coming to a decision we have to consider not only the present but the future. It would be a tragedy if any step we took now led to a trial of bitterness. Perhaps we cannot wholly avoid this, but we should try to minimize it.

I hate to give you trouble, but I would very much like you to come here, though not immediately. In any event, I hope, you will certainly come for the meeting of the Working Committee on the 8th March.<sup>2</sup> Indeed it would be better if you came a couple of days earlier for our own talks. I would have liked to meet you even earlier but that would mean a great deal of inconvenience to you.

There is no question of Hyderabad being split up or the Hyderabad City becoming Andhra capital at any time. Wanchoo has said nothing about this. Wanchoo has insisted that a capital in Andhra should be decided upon now and immediate steps taken to build it, etc. He has indeed recommended some place which is, I believe, between Vijayawada and Guntur, nearer to the latter.

Yours affectionately,  
Jawaharlal

2. Rajagopalachari attended the meeting of the Congress Working Committee in Delhi on 8 March.

## II. HYDERABAD

1. To the Nizam of Hyderabad<sup>1</sup>

Hyderabad  
January 14, 1953

My dear friend,

Thank you for your letter of the 14th January together with its enclosures.

I agree with you that these writings<sup>2</sup> are highly objectionable. The problem of dealing with similar writings in the Press has been before us for a considerable time. Unfortunately, many newspapers have degraded themselves to very low levels. They feel safe under the protection given by Constitution and because those people do not care to go to a Court of Law. Personally, I think that in any serious matter one should go to a Court of Law.

I am sending these papers to the Counsellor<sup>3</sup> here who will show them to the Chief Minister.<sup>4</sup> They will consider whether it is possible to take any steps in this matter from the legal or other points of view.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

2. The Nizam had complained about the calumnious writings against him in the press; the paper, *Milap*, being one of the guilty papers. It had apparently been receiving covert support from the Hyderabad Government.

3. Nehru wrote to M.K. Vellodi, State Counsellor, Hyderabad, that the Chief Minister or somebody should express himself forcefully to the editors of these papers.

4. B. Ramakrishna Rao, the Chief Minister, replied on 21 January that the *Milap* had been started soon after the Police Action, and received some help from the Military Government by way of the sale of the press of an ex-Razakar, who had since migrated to Pakistan, to a refugee from West Pakistan. Beyond that, the Hyderabad Government had not given any help. Other than the *Milap*, the *Iqdam*, the *Awam*, and the *Pratap* (among other papers) had also indulged in personal attacks on the Nizam and his family. Rao also wrote that except through the Public Safety Measures Act and a libel suit, the Government could not deal with such matters. He urged Nehru to devise suitable steps for a revision of the press laws.



## 2. To B. Ramakrishna Rao<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
January 30, 1953

My dear Ramakrishna Rao,

I have today received your letter of the 28th January together with the report of your sub-committee. I have rather hurriedly read through the report.<sup>2</sup>

As I wrote to you two days ago, the appointment of such a committee appeared to me to be an odd procedure. However, you did it. The report, on the whole, is an interesting document laying down some excellent principles. Where it deals with personal matters, it is difficult for me to judge. In any event, the appointment of this committee and the presentation by them of a report has created a new situation which cannot be ignored. I do not know what you intend doing with the report. If you circulate it to the members, it is bound to gain publicity outside which should be unfortunate. How else you can discuss it is not clear to me, unless certain points in the report are taken out and placed before your Party meeting.<sup>3</sup>

As regards the election of the Party Executive personally I do not like such an Executive to be nominated by the Leader. There is a distinction between a Cabinet and the Party Executive. The Cabinet must be nominated by the Leader, though of course he might do so after consulting his more important colleagues. To nominate also the Party Executive means a double series of nominations, i.e., the Cabinet and the Party Executive by the same person. It is always possible that some good person is not elected. On the other hand, nobody can object to the result of an election. Probably the right course is for the Leader to nominate Secretaries and leave the others to election. There is no hard and fast rule about such matters and I am only giving you my opinion. So far as I know, the British practice is for the Party Executive to be elected.

1. JN Collection.

2. The three-man sub-committee, appointed to take stock of the working of the Cabinet and the Congress Legislature Party during the last one year and to devise ways to strengthen the party, had suggested, among other things the constitution of a smaller Cabinet consisting of seven to nine ministers, four deputy ministers and three parliamentary secretaries. The committee also recommended that the present Ministers having failed to discharge their duties satisfactorily, should give up office.

3. Ramakrishna Rao placed the resignation of his Cabinet before the Legislature Party on 3 February.

The Chief Whip's post is obviously an important position. I rather doubt if a Minister can fulfil it adequately, because he has much other work to do. You will hardly have enough work for a portfolio for Assembly affairs. Perhaps the Chief Whip can be Deputy Minister. He should of course be kept in intimate touch with the work of Government.

In the Parliamentary system of Government, the Prime Minister or the Chief Minister is the pivot. A very great deal depends upon him and his responsibility is very great. Naturally he should keep in constant touch with his colleagues, but he must act on his own initiative and the impression that there is delay and matters are postponed because it is difficult to decide them, is bad. Obviously, the Leader must have a Cabinet which pulls together and which trusts him. That is the theory and one should try to get the practice to come as near it as possible. In existing circumstances, it is not too easy for practice and theory to coincide.

It is obvious that groups within a party are bad, groups within the Cabinet are infinitely worse. Members of a Cabinet need not have the same opinion about every matter, indeed they cannot, but they must have the good sense to hold together and trust each other.

As for the number of the Cabinet, you know that I felt that the present number was too large. This again depends not so much on theory, but on various considerations. The suggestion made by the Committee as regards numbers appears to be on the whole good. It was at your instance that I agreed to the present number and suggested reshuffling of portfolios.

I need not say anything about corruption and red-tapism. Both are bad and every attempt should be made to get rid of them. How far a Committee can deal with them generally, I do not know. A Committee might consider the general situation and suggest some general remedies. It is important however that any such charge should be investigated properly and speedily.

It would be a good idea to have occasional joint informal meetings of the Cabinet and the Congress Executive. Indeed, normally the Congress Executive meetings should invite Ministers to be present and the Congress Pradesh President should also be invited to Party meetings.

It is rather difficult for me to advise you as to what to do in the circumstances that have arisen. Things having come to this pass, the position must be faced and the Party must be made to feel that the present fluid condition cannot continue. They must be pulled up and if necessary such changes as may be considered advisable should be made.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru



### 3. To B. Ramakrishna Rao<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

February 14, 1953

My dear Ramakrishna Rao,

...You must always remember that Hyderabad is something more than a national problem. It is an international problem and whatever happens there has far-reaching repercussions. After the Police Action, much was done, more especially in the District of Aurangabad and elsewhere, which was horrible and disgraceful. It was the first duty of the Hyderabad Government to deal with this matter and to give relief to the numerous widows and orphans of those killings. The Hyderabad Government did very little for a long time and it is only recently that it has taken a little more interest in this.

Then also, we know that because of various steps taken, a very large number of Muslims have been thrown out of employment, whether from the Nizam's estates or the jagirs or the army or the services. This has created another difficult problem and the responsibility for it undoubtedly rests with the Government. To add to this unemployment in this particular way, would be not only cruel but most unjust. I gather that much of the money that is paid to the Nizam as compensation for the *Sarf-e-Khas*,<sup>2</sup> etc., is spent in maintaining large numbers of people.<sup>3</sup>

The abolition of the cash grants, *mansabs*, etc., which were granted chiefly on charitable and religious grounds, would bring considerable discredit, both nationally and internationally. It is possible for us gradually to reduce these amounts or deal with them in some other way. But to put an end to them would stop many schools, etc., from functioning and throw a number of people again out of employment. I have myself recommended in the course of the past three or four years the continuation of grants to some institutions which were quite good.

These are my first reactions. I might tell you that I do not at all like payments out of public funds in this way and I am constantly thinking how these sums can be reduced. But to do so arbitrarily and to break our solemn pledges does not appeal to me.

As I have said above, I am referring this matter to the States Ministry.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. A copy of this letter was sent to the Minister of States. Extracts.

2. *Sarf-e-Khas* were Nizam's own jagirs.

3. Ramakrishna Rao had, on 13 February, sought Nehru's guidance on: (1) the payment of Rs 50 lakhs to the Nizam as compensation for the *Sarf-e-Khas*, (2) the reduction of the commutation amounts payable to the jagirdars; and (3) the abolition of cash grants called *mansabs*, *yumias*, etc.

4. To B. Ramakrishna Rao<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
February 18, 1953

My dear Ramakrishna Rao,

...We have thus to keep in mind two governing principles—one is, the Leader who is chosen must be given a fairly free hand and must be responsible; secondly, the Leader must function as the Leader of the whole Party and produce a feeling of confidence in the whole Party and be able to carry it with him. This means that the Leader must function in such a way and form his Cabinet in a manner so as to produce a sense of homogeneity and, at the same time, of confidence in the entire Party. If there is a feeling of strong dissatisfaction in a considerable group, the Party doesn't work smoothly and difficulties occur. Political wisdom comes into the picture here and no hard and fast rules can be laid down.

After the recent resolution of the Party, the responsibility falls on you and the ultimate decision must be yours.<sup>2</sup> You must make the best of it and I would not like to thrust my opinion in these circumstances upon you. My advice would be for you to form a Cabinet which gives as large a measure of satisfaction as possible and, therefore, not to exclude important and efficient persons from it. My advice to others would be to cooperate with you fully.<sup>3</sup>

If you do not succeed and the Party pulls in different directions, well, then the Party and you have to face failure and will be discredited in the public mind...

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Copies of this letter were sent to K.N. Katju, Balwantray Mehta the Congress Party General Secretary and M.K. Vellodi. Extracts.
2. On 9 February, the Congress Legislature Party adopted a resolution by a majority of 45 to 17 with five members remaining neutral, requesting Ramakrishna Rao to withdraw his resignation and to reconstitute and consolidate his Cabinet in the light of the report of the sub-committee of the Legislature Party.
3. Nehru wrote to Ramananda Tirtha on 18 February that "all members of the Party should show discipline in this matter" and should not "refuse to serve in the Cabinet or lay down special conditions..."



### III. BOMBAY

#### 1. To K.N. Katju<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

January 1, 1953

My dear Kailas Nath,

I drew your attention today to the report in the *Current* about an argument between Chief Justice Chagla<sup>2</sup> and Shri Morarji Desai, Chief Minister of Bombay State. The report in the *Current* may not be accurate. But it is to be remembered that the Editor of the *Current*, D.F. Karaka, is very much opposed to the Bombay Government and, more especially, to the Chief Minister. Therefore, the report is not likely to favour or be partial to the Chief Minister at all.

I have received other accounts of this conversation also, which indicate that Chief Justice Chagla initiated this argument and continued it in spite of every effort of the Chief Minister not to discuss controversial subjects with him.<sup>3</sup> The occasion was a private dinner party given by a leading merchant on the occasion of the marriage of Shri Morarji Desai's son.<sup>4</sup> This marriage took place very quietly without any fuss and without any invitations being issued even to intimate friends. But the leading merchant referred to above was very anxious to invite the couple and the father of the bridegroom to a meal and thereupon Shri Morarji Desai agreed. He had no idea that other guests would be invited. He found, however, a fairly large gathering including the Chief Justice of Bombay and a number of prominent businessmen. It was on this occasion that this conversation took place.

It so happened that on that very day or perhaps the day before, the Bombay High Court had passed judgment in regard to the Bombay Sales Tax.<sup>5</sup> (This is now in appeal before the Supreme Court.) The merchants present at this dinner were naturally interested in this sales tax and the occasion was particularly inappropriate to discuss such matters. Nevertheless, the Bombay Chief Justice started this conversation and criticized the Bombay Government in strong language. As I have said above, the Chief Minister tried to avoid an argument, but occasionally he said something in reply as calmly as possible. The Chief Justice apparently spoke with some heat on the matter.

1. JN Collection.

2. M.C. Chagla was the Chief Justice of Bombay High Court at this time.

3. Chagla clarified his position in a letter to Nehru on 29 January following a communication from the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of India that the Prime Minister was extremely irritated on reading the report in the *Current* about the incident. See the next item.

4. Kanti Desai.

5. On 11 December 1953, the Chief Justice and Justice Y.V. Dixit of the Bombay High Court declared the Bombay Sales Tax Act to be *ultra vires*.

You can appreciate how very embarrassing it is to discuss these matters with a Judge at any time, more especially in a more or less public place where there are large numbers of other interested people present.

This is rather an extreme case. I have had many reports previously of remarks being passed by some of the Judges of the Bombay High Court in clubs and other places derogatory to the Bombay Government. In a number of public speeches also, the Judges of the Bombay High Court have passed strictures on or criticisms of the Bombay Government. I am not referring to any remarks they might make in the course of their judgments, but to other public functions.

We have avoided always any criticism of the judiciary because the judiciary should stand above criticism and it is important that its independence and impartiality should be maintained. Both the Central Government and the Provincial Governments have kept this in view and avoided any controversy with Judges anywhere. But it becomes increasingly difficult for members of Government to be criticized by Judges publicly, apart from their judicial capacity. The result can only be public arguments over controversial questions between Judges and Ministers. That indeed would be most unfortunate.

I attach great importance to this and I think that the attention of the Chief Justice of India should be drawn to this matter. Unless this tendency is checked, it is bound to lead to unfortunate consequences. I would, therefore, like you to bring this matter to the notice of the Chief Justice of India. If you like, you can show him this letter.

Yours affectionately,  
Jawaharlal

## 2. To M.C. Chagla<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
January 30, 1953

My dear Chagla,

I have received today your letter of the 29th January.<sup>2</sup>

1. M.C. Chagla Papers, NMML.

2. Chagla wrote that the Chief Minister, "smarting" under the Bombay High Court's declaration of Sales Tax Act as *ultra vires*, gave vent to his feelings in "intemperate and insolent" language. This being an attack on the High Court in the presence of some forty-odd people representing different sections of public in Mumbai, Chagla considered it his duty to "repel it" which he did not do mildly.



There is no question of loyalty or respect for each other that we may have. It is true, however, that I have gathered the impression that there is a continuing conflict between the Bombay Government and the High Court.<sup>3</sup> I am not referring to judgments of the High Court but rather to other statements or even casual talk. Whenever I have gone to Bombay, I have often heard about this. This distressed me. But I was and am particularly anxious that the Executive should not interfere in the work of the High Court in any way or even criticize it. A particular instance might not have any great importance. But a number of even small incidents indicate a continuing tension and dislike. Indeed there are some phrases in your letter which also reveal this feeling of dislike.

No one expects a Judge to be a partisan of Government. But it would be unfortunate if the impression went abroad that a Judge had a feeling of hostility to the Government.<sup>4</sup> Both are bad and a Judge presumably has to be above both of these deviations.

The report in the *Current* distressed me greatly, more especially as it had come on top of these various impressions that I had gathered. I might mention to you that the Chief Minister has very seldom spoken to me about the Bombay High Court. He might have done so once or twice. The impressions I gathered were from other people. The Chief Minister did mention the *Current* article which I had seen previously. He said nothing to me about the Judges in the High Court being tainted with the virus of communism as you mention.<sup>5</sup> No one else has said that to me either and if anybody had mentioned it, I would not have believed it because you especially and most Judges are very far removed from it.

I have no desire to lay down that Judges should not function as members of society and citizens.<sup>6</sup> Indeed I think that Judges should do so because of

3. Chagla wrote that every time the High Court gave a decision against the State Government, the Chief Minister thought it was a personal affront to him and his policy. But the judiciary had to "interpret the law as we find it. If the law is defective or unconstitutional, however reluctantly, we have to declare it bad." To prove that the High Court was not unfair to Government, he wrote that out of about half a dozen important measures challenged before the Court, all had been upheld except the Sales Tax Act.
4. Chagla added that the Chief Minister found it difficult to accept with equanimity judicial reverses. "Obviously I cannot be a partisan of Government on the Bench and often judicial detachment is misunderstood as judicial hostility."
5. Chagla also wrote that nothing could be farther from truth. The High Court was not a "school of political philosophy" and though the judges had their individual views on political, social and economic matters, they did not air them in the Court.
6. Regarding the accusation of attacking the Government in season and out of season at public and semi-public gatherings, Chagla wrote that by accepting judicial office, judges did not cease to be members of society and therefore give up interest in their country's problems. They could not seclude themselves and refuse to take part in what Nehru himself called "the glorious adventure of nation-building."

their experience and eminence and that they should take active part in many fields of social, cultural and educational activity. But, normally speaking, a Judge has to be more careful than a politician in regard to what he says because he occupies a position where absolute impartiality is considered to be essential. It is not enough for him to be impartial, but other people should also think him so. Therefore, even casual remarks which create a contrary impression are to be deprecated. In the case of the Bombay High Court, this care was perhaps even more necessary, because unfortunately certain tensions had arisen between the Government and the High Court and so even a casual remark might be distorted and considered to have some special meaning.

I know Karaka and thoroughly disapprove of his journalistic and other methods.<sup>7</sup> I know also that he is wholly opposed to the Chief Minister and, therefore, he was not likely to give a favourable turn, from the Chief Minister's point of view, to any report he gave. In any event, that report must have created a bad impression on people's minds. It was immaterial really whose responsibility was greater. The effect was there and hence my distress.

I could of course have spoken to you or written to you directly. But I am rather careful of writing to Judges on matters pertaining to their work. I remember, some three or four years ago, having written something about, I think, a Judge of the Allahabad High Court whose conduct was under enquiry. What I wrote was, in my opinion, completely innocuous. But the Chief Justice of India then said something in his final report which struck me as very unfair to me. Indeed, when this was pointed out to him later, he agreed that that was not necessary.

That was a lesson to me and I have refrained directly or indirectly dealing with such matters with Judges. I wrote therefore to the Home Minister<sup>8</sup> and suggested that he should talk to the Chief Justice of India which he did, or perhaps he wrote to him. I have not spoken to the Chief Justice of India or written to him about this matter.

Thank you for what you have said in the last sentence of your letter.<sup>9</sup>

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

7. Chagla wrote that Nehru knew Karaka and his journalistic ethics and his love for sensationalism much more than him and therefore, not surprisingly, the whole report as published in the paper was a distorted and garbled one.

8. See the preceding item.

9. Chagla concluded his letter saying that his services were "always at your disposal and I am prepared to serve my country in any capacity in which you think my work will be most useful to the cause for which in my own humble way I also stand."



### 3. To Morarji Desai<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
March 19, 1953

My dear Morarji,

In the *Times of India* today, there are big headlines about the Bombay Government victimizing the *Times* group of publications by withholding advertisements.<sup>2</sup> Some correspondence with you is also published.

I do not find any reference in this correspondence to one fact, to which my attention had been drawn previously. This was that the *Times of India* goes on increasing its advertisement rate and that the Bombay Government had told them that they would not pay that rate. The *Times* Manager<sup>3</sup> had refused to reduce this and thereupon the Bombay Government had refused to send them advertisements.

Apart from the other questions raised by you, this question of rates is important. No Government is compelled to pay very heavy rates to a newspaper. As a matter of fact, a few newspapers in India are now absorbing all the important advertisements. The more they raise their rates, the more they deprive others of advertisements. Big firms have a fixed sum available for advertisement. If more and more of this fixed sum goes to one or two newspapers, the others suffer. This is a bad development and is creating some kind of a monopoly.

Coming to the merits, I have myself noticed some highly objectionable items in the *Times*. I hope you will instruct your office to prepare fully your Government's case on this subject against the *Times*. The matter is bound to come up in the All India Newspapers Conference and we should be prepared for such developments.

It seems to me quite absurd that in name of the freedom of the Press, huge monopolies should develop killing that very freedom.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

2. *The Times of India* commented on 19 March 1953 that its group of publications was being victimized by the Bombay Government for its editorial policy. It said that the State advertisements had been withdrawn from newspapers belonging to *The Times of India* group, having the highest circulation in the State, for being critical of Government's idiosyncracies, such as prohibition, which had brought Bombay to the brink of financial disaster.

4. To Morarji Desai<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
March 20, 1953

My dear Morarji,

I understand that there is a possibility of a resolution being moved in your Assembly recommending the abolition of the Upper House. If such a resolution is moved, I do not see any reason why we should prevent it coming up. It is a legitimate subject for discussion and indeed many of us are rather opposed to these Upper Houses in the States. Probably the best course would be for the Upper Houses to continue for the present period and then to put an end to them.

However, I would suggest for your consideration that, if such a resolution is brought forward, you should permit its discussion and allow free voting on it. It should not be treated as a Party matter requiring a whip this way or that way. It would be as well for Government as such to remain neutral.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. J.C. Jain.

1. File No 32(11)/56-57-PMS. A similar letter was sent to Bhimsen Sachar, Chief Minister, Punjab.

## IV. RAJASTHAN

1. To K.N. Katju<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
January 7, 1953

My dear Kailas Nath,

I enclose copy of a letter I am sending to Jainarain Vyas.<sup>2</sup> I return your file. I rather doubt if Jainarain Vyas intended being discourteous to anybody, but inexperience leads to some step which should not be taken without full consultation.

I think there is some truth in his saying that during the past two or three years, when our Financial Advisers had been stationed in Rajasthan, it is not

1. JN Collection.

2. Chief Minister of Rajasthan at this time. See the next item.



quite fair to blame the Rajasthan Government for financial shortcomings.<sup>3</sup> Also for part of this time the States Ministry was in essence directly responsible for the Government of Rajasthan. It was during this time that the deficit grew more than at any other time. This was not the fault of the States Ministry, but of circumstances.

I have no doubt that economies can be made. But the real fact is that we have imposed a new and very expensive system of administration there which Rajasthan can hardly support. And so, deficits have become almost inevitable. Most of the resources are spent on this administration and little is left for any nation-building activity.

Probably the situation will improve after the Finance Commission's report is accepted and acted upon. But I am worried at this top heavy administration. In Travancore-Cochin, which is more or less administratively efficient, the salaries, except for Central personnel, are very low. I was surprised to see the senior officers there getting salaries of Rs 250/- or 300/-.

Yours affectionately,  
Jawaharlal

3. The Rajasthan Government was facing acute financial difficulties and did not even have money to pay salaries to its employees. The Government of India offered an advance of Rs 150 lakhs on certain conditions and advised the State Government to reorganize its administration and rationalize expenditure.

## 2. To Jainarain Vyas<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
January 7, 1953

My dear Jainarainji,

When you were here and saw me, you mentioned various matters. Among this was the question of continuing the Financial Adviser from the Government of India. You said that you had a competent person available locally and therefore it was not necessary to have another person who would have to be paid much more.

I have now been able to see some papers in this connection and the letters you wrote to Shri Mahavir Tyagi and the Secretary of the States Ministry. It appears to me that your complaint that the Financial Adviser sent from here was kept on there after his period had expired without your Government's knowledge or consent is not correct. It was at the request of your Government

1. JN Collection. A copy of the letter was sent to K.N. Katju.

that the Comptroller and Auditor-General agreed to keep his officer on there for a longer period. If you had passed any orders, as stated by you, on the 18th November 1952, these were not communicated here to the States Ministry or the CAG.

It is not the desire of the Government of India to thrust their experienced officers on the State Governments as they are themselves in great need of their services. But the Government of India is anxious to help State Governments in organizing their finances in a proper way, more particularly those State Governments which have to face difficulties in financial matters and who have to face new problems on account of changed circumstances. Experience available in the States is generally limited. Ultimately proper financial organization and checking saves a good deal of money even though it may cost some to begin with.

Whether the local officer you have is wholly suited for this work or not, I cannot say. Probably he would be able to do it. But this is a matter to be considered carefully and not rushed through. In any event, you must realize that our Finance Ministry would naturally like to help you and to be kept in touch with these financial affairs in the State.

What I am rather concerned about is the rather summary way in which you have suddenly asked for the termination of the services of the Financial Adviser sent from here. This savours of discourtesy to the Government of India as well as, of course, to the officer concerned. You will remember that in the old days of autocratic rule in the states no man had any security and even the highest officers could be removed at a moment's notice. That was bad, of course, and as a result many decent people did not like to serve in the states. We must not follow that past practice; or else it would be difficult for you to get people from outside. Apart from this, it is essential that there should be fuller cooperation between the State Government and the Government of India and any action taken by the State Government which creates an impression of discourtesy will not be liked by the Central Government.

You can rest assured that we want to help you and not to hinder you. But for that purpose there should be understanding and cooperation and not one-sided action.

This, of course, applies to the internal working of our Government also. There are many things that appear to me at first sight to be obviously right. But I do not take action immediately. I enquire into the matter. I refer to the Ministry concerned and get their views. After full consideration by all concerned, we have a fuller picture and then we come to a joint decision. As Prime Minister, I hardly ever pass any orders. At the most it is a recommendation to the Ministry concerned. As Minister for External Affairs, I have a direct responsibility and I can deal with it directly. Even so, important matters are considered by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Cabinet.



I suggest that you follow the same practice as Chief Minister. That not only prevents some wrong decision being made. But even if a right decision is taken in a hurry and without proper reference, it creates difficulties and comes in the way of the method of democratic working that we are trying to develop.

In regard to the Financial Adviser sent from here, you should not take a final step without full consultation with the Government here.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

### 3. To K.N. Katju<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
11th January, 1953

My dear Kailas Nath,

I had an hour's talk with Jainarain Vyas this evening. The talk began by my expressing myself rather strongly and Jainarain asking me to relieve him of his post and allow him to retire. He said that it would become impossible for him to carry on with constant intrigues against him.

After that I cooled down and discussed the matter more fully. He complained that some of his colleagues in the Cabinet were creating difficulties for him all the time. A few members of the Party went even further in this direction (A great majority of the Party are solidly with him and in fact the Party's strength has become greater in the last few weeks). He said his Finance Minister<sup>2</sup> was most unsatisfactory. He complained of some of the senior officials sent by the Centre to him and said that they were deliberately coming in the way.

Most of these are old complaints. I think they are somewhat exaggerated, but I also think that there is some truth in them. Jainarain Vyas has a way of doing things sometimes which itself creates difficulties. He is in a hurry, but I think it is true that there is not much cooperation between him and some of his colleagues in the Ministry. Also that there is a lack of cooperation with the Counsellor, etc., for which probably both parties are to blame.

I have known Jainarain pretty well for more than twenty years. I think he has many virtues and some failings. From the Congress point of view, he is the only possible leader in Rajasthan. The Party, as a whole, stands by him. I

1. JN Collection.

2. Tikaram Paliwal.

do not think there is a possibility of our having any kind of a Congress Ministry there except under him.

I told him that if the Ministry did not function properly there could be no objection to reorganization. Also if there was lack of cooperation with some officials lent by us, we could consider gradually withdrawing them or replacing them, but that it was essential that everything should be done properly, decently and according to conventions. What I objected to very much was sudden decisions and steps taken without proper consultation. I was prepared and you would be prepared to consider any matter and give effect to the decision arrived at if this was done in a proper way.

The immediate issue about some Finance Secretary was not very important and could be adjusted easily. The larger issues should be taken up after we come back from Hyderabad. They might take some time, but we will be prepared to deal with them one by one in the proper way. I told him that I would give him every help provided he did not take any major step without consulting me or you. Knowing the background of the Congress people in Rajasthan, pretty well, I could help him. In particular, he ought to be careful in his dealings with the Central Government and their offices, as any friction with us creates difficulty.

He will be seeing you tomorrow and for the present we can settle these immediate issues. The rest we can take up later.

Unfortunately there is not much goodwill between Jainarain Vyas and some of the senior officers in the States Ministry who themselves have served in Rajasthan. They do not like him with the result that in small matters there is delay and friction. I think that we should remove the impression in Jainarain's mind that we want to obstruct his work.

Yours affectionately,  
Jawaharlal

#### 4. To Jainarain Vyas<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
March 5, 1953

My dear Jainarainji,  
... Whether a tax is justifiable or not depends on a variety of circumstances

1. JN Collection. Extracts.



and the content of that tax. In existing circumstances, generally speaking, the sales tax is a proper way of raising revenue<sup>2</sup> and, in fact, it has been adopted in most States. As we function democratically, we have to carry the people with us and even a justified tax may create trouble if we do not have adequate support. Therefore, one should think carefully of the content of the tax beforehand and also try to explain it to the people. In the final analysis the people have to choose between development and being taxed. In imposing a new tax, it is better to start in a relatively small way.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. In his letter of 3 February 1953, Jainarain Vyas had sought Nehru's opinion about levying sales tax in Rajasthan.

V. DELHI

### 1. To Sushila Nayyar<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
January 31, 1953

My dear Sushila,<sup>2</sup>

...It seems to me that it is necessary and desirable for the Delhi State to have a large hospital under its direct control. I need not go into the reasons for all this. Therefore, I think that the Irwin Hospital should remain with the Delhi State Government.

In regard to the Willingdon Hospital and Nursing Home,<sup>3</sup> I think that this should be placed under the control of the Health Department of the Government of India for a variety of reasons in which I need not go at present. This hospital is part of the Five Year Plan of the Central Government and caters largely for the employees of the Government of India and the embassies.

The All India Medical Research Institute<sup>4</sup> should be built at Safdarjung.

1. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. Health Minister of Delhi State at this time.
3. The present Rammanohar Lohia Hospital.
4. All India Institute of Medical Sciences.

I think this arrangement should satisfy the needs of the situation and the parties concerned.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 2. Development of Delhi<sup>1</sup>

I think that something should be done to control building operations in Delhi. There is a good deal of such building going on by private persons as well as on public account. There is no coordination whatever, so far as I can see. I am not for the moment referring to the nature of the buildings put up, though that is important, but rather to the site chosen. It seems to me most important that we should define clearly where buildings should be put up and where not. This odd growth of the city is not only unseemly, but will come in the way of any future scheme of planning. Sometimes historical spots which ought not to be built over, are invaded. There appear to be ever so many authorities dealing with these matters, apart from private persons.

2. The larger question of Delhi planning is fairly intricate, though we cannot ignore it and we should take it in hand some time or other. For the present, I would suggest early steps to be taken to classify areas in Delhi and roundabout, which may be reserved for building purposes, as well as those areas which should not be built over. Then again, there should be some classification for different types of buildings—industrial, residential, shopping, rehabilitation, etc. The areas to be kept open should be clearly demarcated.

3. It would also be desirable to make some rules for Government permission to be taken before any site is built upon. I do not wish to suggest any procedure involving delay, but some check on this indiscriminate building in wrong places should be put.

1. Note to the Ministries of Home, Health and Rehabilitation and the Chief Minister of Delhi, 31 January 1953. File No. 28(7)/56-65-PMS.



## VI. SAURASHTRA

### 1. To U.N. Dhebar<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
January 10, 1953

My dear Dhebar Bhai,<sup>2</sup>

... I have already spoken to you at length on this subject giving you my general reactions. How to judge a particular situation at a particular moment is difficult from a distance. As I said to you, our attitude always should be a mixture of firmness and conciliation. I presume of course that we are convinced of our own position. In every agitation,<sup>3</sup> there is a hard core which it is difficult to convince or win over and which therefore has to be dealt with firmly. The agitation becomes serious when this hard core attracts large numbers of others, who might be considered to be generally non-political. Conciliation should be applied to this general mass and not to the hard core.

A law and order situation has to be dealt with firmly, care being taken of course that firmness does not go too far. Weakness to meet such a situation is always bad.

Political situations have to be met both with firmness and conciliation, if large numbers of people are involved. In the present case, your sales tax is completely reasonable and I do not see why you should give it up. I have now seen the statement you made which is a very friendly and conciliatory one.<sup>4</sup> I should imagine that if this is followed up by personal approaches etc., much good can be done and many reasonable people will be convinced.

The question you have put to me can hardly be answered by "yes" or "no". No one can ever say in politics that we should stand firm, whatever the consequences, because our action is governed by consequences. But generally speaking, I agree that we should stand firm on the principle, making, if you consider proper, minor concessions which do not affect the principle. You have already done something of this kind.

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. Chief Minister of Saurashtra at this time.

3. A strike to protest against the introduction of general sales tax was observed in Rajkot and some other places in Saurashtra. The Sales Tax Bill was passed by the Saurashtra Legislative Assembly in September and was put into effect with effect from 1 December 1952.

4. On 9 January 1953, the Saurashtra Government announced several concessions to the mercantile community in the State to further simplify the sales tax law and provide some relief also. Dhebar stated on the same day that these modifications "coming upon the already liberal legislation will go to convince everybody that the Government has dealt with the subject not only justly and fairly but very generously also."

But where large scale disturbances have taken place and have resulted in firing, lathi-charge, etc.,<sup>5</sup> another question arises, which is of principle, that is, of satisfying the people that no improper thing was done. Normally in such cases there should be an enquiry by some eminent person who is respected, usually a Judge. Even the enquiry can hardly take place while disturbances are occurring. The enquiry has two aspects. It may exonerate Government and the police or it may criticize. One has to take that risk. It is not necessarily an enquiry to punish the police. You have already ordered a District Magistrate to conduct a local enquiry and his report will be with you in a few days' time.<sup>6</sup> On receipt of the report, you and your colleagues should come to a decision about the larger aspect of an enquiry. If you feel that this would be desirable, you can state that as soon as all disturbances are over and normality returns, you propose to have a full enquiry about these disturbances, etc. That enquiry will not deal with the political or economic issue, but only with the disturbances and the action taken by Government.

As regards the political issue, I think you have stated your position correctly. That is, you cannot give up the sales tax unless some alternative source of revenue is found. That is to say, the sales tax continues. About that I am clear. But you are prepared to discuss with people what alternative they can suggest. You will of course put the case of the sales tax before the public and point out the taxes that are being levied in Bombay or elsewhere. Suppose Saurashtra became merged in Bombay State, they would have to pay much heavier taxes immediately. If Saurashtra is a heavily deficit State, some way will have to be found and it may be a merger. Personally I would not like a merger at this stage because it would create complications.

The point is that all these possible consequences can be pointed out to individuals or groups. In pointing these out, it should be clearly stated that you cannot give up additional sources of revenue and meanwhile, the sales tax is to go on.

My answer, therefore, is that a firm attitude should continue. But that attitude should be accompanied by a friendly approach. I know that is not a satisfactory answer. I feel, however, that you should succeed because I am convinced you have the right approach, and however angry some people may be now, they must have a good deal of trust in you.

You can of course rely on our support whenever it is needed.

5. On 2 January 1953, the anti-sales tax agitation took a violent turn when a crowd attacked a police post in Bhavnagar; eight persons including two police constables were injured in the incident.
6. The District Magistrate of Zalawad, V.G. Subedar, who held the enquiry, stated in his report that "the circumstances in which firing was resorted to themselves provide a full justification for the firing."



In Saurashtra, more than elsewhere, probably the personal approach tells. I think that particular care should be taken to keep in touch with the other elements who had not been affected thus far by the agitation, such as students, industrial labour, etc. Indeed an attempt should be made to get them actively on your side.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 2. To U.N. Dhebar<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
January 22, 1953

My dear Dhebar Bhai,

I have been seeing your daily telegrams addressed to the States Ministry here. If I may say so, it is not necessary to send such very detailed telegrams. A broad review with mention of any particular incident is good enough.

I think that you have made the right approach in this matter and made your and your Government's position quite clear. It is obvious, as you have pointed out, that the motive behind the agitation now is clearly political. I think the best course for you would be now not to make any further approaches and offers or even statements, but to carry on the administration in a quiet way. People should not feel that your Government is too much exercised about developments. That encourages the agitators.

I am sure that gradually this agitation will become more and more limited to a few persons and will ultimately die out.<sup>2</sup>

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

2. The agitation petered out and all the agitators were released in early February 1953.

3. To U.N. Dhebar<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
January 25, 1953

My dear Dhebar,

... I am not at all worried about the agitation or the so-called satyagraha,<sup>2</sup> although it is unfortunate. But I attach more importance to winning over the public or the majority of it than to any action that we might take. From a distant view, it does appear to me that there is considerable ill-will at present against the Saurashtra Government. We have not only to overcome this, but to change it into goodwill. The first thing to do is not in any way to lose nerve but to pursue our way quietly and in a friendly way. Secondly, always to appeal to the mass of the people and try to get them to our side, even though a certain group does not agree.

As regards a fuller enquiry,<sup>3</sup> I think that when there is a large public demand, one should always have such an enquiry. One must not stand on prestige or fear other consequences. The only question is whether the demand is right or not. I think that some time or other you will have to have this fuller enquiry which should not be confined to such incidents of firing etc., but should include the activities of those carrying on the agitation. Such an enquiry, however, could obviously not take place while the agitation is being carried on.

The people should never be made to feel that the Government is revengeful or angry with them. If any such feeling arises, it should be countered by friendly approaches to the mass of the people and restrained behaviour. That inevitably produces results in the long run. You are in fact following this policy and I am sure it will produce these results before long.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Extracts. A copy of this letter was sent to Morarji Desai, Chief Minister of Bombay.
2. In spite of Saurashtra Government's announcement of concessions and release of prisoners arrested during the agitation, traders' association, on 18 January 1953, decided to continue the "second stage of the honest and non-violent struggle of the people" against the sales tax.
3. On 14 January 1953, Dhebar, replying to the demand for a judicial inquiry, said in Rajkot, that so far as the Bhavnagar firing was concerned, the Government was awaiting the report of Zalawad District Magistrate which would be ready in a day or two.



## VII. PEPSU

### 1. To Brish Bhan<sup>1</sup>

January 4, 1953

My dear Brish Bhan,<sup>2</sup>

I received your letter of the 28th December. You are right in saying that the developments in Pepsu have distressed me greatly. The distress has not been due to the fact that Congress did not win some thing or other, but the utter degradation of our public life which Pepsu has shown. I quite agree that there must be a thorough enquiry into this matter and a purge.

Unfortunately, owing to my absence in Delhi, I could not take any steps. But we have decided to have an immediate preliminary enquiry and a much fuller enquiry a little later. The AICC Office is taking steps to this end.<sup>3</sup>

However distressed I might feel about any developments, I do not allow that distress to make me feel disheartened. People who have no principles can make a nuisance of themselves for some time. But they can be dealt with if we are clear in our own minds and act with integrity and discipline.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. A copy of this letter was sent to Balwantray Mehta together with the letter under reply in original.
2. He was a leader of the Congress Party in Pepsu, and the Deputy Chief Minister from May 1951 to April 1952.
3. In a statement on 26 January 1953, the AICC General Secretaries stated that immediate arrangement would be made for an enquiry into the Congress affairs in Pepsu for the "recent events have shown that the political life in the Pepsu has sunk to a very low level and the Assembly and the Government there are made to function not in the public interest but for the advancement of personal ambition and self-interest." Takhatmal Jain, a leading Congressman from Madhya Pradesh, sent by the AICC to enquire into the Pepsu affairs, arrived in Patiala on 31 January.

## 2. To Hukam Singh<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
March 7, 1953

Dear Sardar Hukam Singh,<sup>2</sup>

...I am afraid, I cannot convince you about anything against your wishes,<sup>3</sup> but if anything could be a clear case for the President's interference in a Province, it was Pepsu. I can hardly imagine a clearer and more obvious case. I am not concerned with any particular group or party and you are entirely wrong in thinking that there is any motive behind this action, except the clearest application of the Constitution and the actual conditions in Pepsu.

As for what you call 'a wave of repression'<sup>4</sup> in the Punjab, I really do not know what you refer to. If people deliberately break orders, are we to discriminate? Here in Delhi, the most astounding behaviour is being indulged in by some persons, who seem to live in some remote past age. Is the Government to look on or surrender to these elements, which continually create trouble in Delhi or elsewhere?

I know something about democracy and I am not aware that democracy includes this kind of behaviour.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. Member of Parliament at this time.
3. On 5 March 1953, Hukam Singh wrote to Nehru that the suspension of the Constitution in Pepsu would "embitter the Sikh feelings." Such a step was "unwarranted and unjustified."
4. He wrote that the "Punjab Government had started a wave of repression against the Sikhs as they could not answer the charges of discrimination and unfair treatment."











## 1. To K.N. Katju<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
February 13, 1953

My dear Kailas Nath,

... Nevertheless, I am writing to you because this matter has been delayed very greatly, although it is of high importance.<sup>2</sup> A Border Defence Committee was appointed long ago and it made certain recommendations about the putting up of check-posts and taking other steps on the UP-Tibet border. There is no doubt that that has to be done, but long argument has resulted over the quantum of expenditure which the Government of India or the UP Government should bear. Then Finance Commission somehow comes into the picture and we wait for its report. On the whole we forgot about this important matter....

Yours affectionately,  
Jawaharlal

1. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. The sensitive border areas of UP adjoining Tibet had been causing concern to the Central and UP Governments. Nehru had forwarded to Katju a letter sent by K.M. Munshi, the Governor of UP, about this matter.

## 2. To Hukam Singh<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
February 24, 1953

My dear Sardar Hukam Singh,<sup>2</sup>

Thank you for your letter of February 21st.<sup>3</sup> I have read it with care. You make a number of general statements in this letter which it is difficult to examine or to test.

It is true, of course, that the Sikhs have played a very important and, to some extent, a dominant part in our Army. With the inclusion in our Army of many classes or groups that were previously excluded, the nature of the Army

1. JN Collection. A copy, with the letter under reply, in original, was sent to Defence Secretary also.
2. Member of the House of the People at this time.
3. Hukam Singh had complained about discrimination against the Sikhs. "There is a lurking distrust of the Sikhs ... created by interested communal sections." He wrote: "The Sikhs are not communal, if communalism is some definite frame of mind or a policy or a programme. They are rather victims of communalism ... instead of getting sympathy and human approach they are maligned and abused."



somewhat changes. It becomes more broad-based. That is good. But, as a result, the greater emphasis on certain classes, such as the Sikhs or the Rajputs, etc., naturally becomes a little less. That appears to be an inevitable development. On the other hand, this is counter-balanced by many other openings.

It is also true that due to the integration of States some demobilization has taken place. This has been common all over the States in India and does not apply to the Sikhs in any way. Probably it applies most of all to the old Hyderabad State Army.

Both these changes were natural developments and cannot be considered as favouring or not favouring any particular group or class. In fact, all this was the result of independence as well as the attempt to broadbase our Army, unlike what it was in British times. Another development was the very rapid promotion of Indian officers due to the withdrawal or removal of the large British element in the Army. Thus, an entirely new field was opened out. I am glad to see that our officers have generally done well in these new responsibilities and that the efficiency and discipline of the Army have not suffered.

As for individual discrimination, it is not easy for me to deal with such a charge without each case being considered separately.<sup>4</sup> It may be that personal inclinations may have some effect occasionally. That cannot be wholly avoided in any set up. But I am not aware of any policy to that effect. Indeed, there can be or should be no such policy. Only five or six years ago practically the seniormost Indian officer was a Colonel. Now we have to deal with higher ranks and some kind of test of experience and ability has to be used.

During the last three or four years a number of cases of senior Army officers against whom complaints were made were brought up before me. Sardar Baldev Singh, the then Defence Minister, went into these cases very thoroughly with his senior advisers. He often consulted me and I also gave a good deal of attention to these cases involving senior officers. Among these were a few senior Sikh officers. Every time that any action was taken, it was done after the most careful scrutiny and, if I may say so, with a certain bias in favour of the officer concerned, because we did not want any senior officer to be judged harshly. Any decisions taken were thus based on a very wide and careful scrutiny and consultation and were usually practically unanimous. On the whole, I think, they leant towards leniency.

Should you wish to see me, I shall, of course, gladly meet you.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. Hukam Singh wrote back on 5 March that for fear of further victimisation at the hands of their departmental heads no particular instances of officers discriminated against were referred to him for enquiry and justice. He added: "This is the reason why we had been asking for some independent commission to go into the cases." He also cited one case of alleged discrimination by the UPSC.

### 3. Formation of a Joint Intelligence Organization<sup>1</sup>

I am sending you a recommendation from the Joint Intelligence Committee which is supported by the Chiefs of Staff. This is in regard to the formation of a Joint Intelligence Organization.

2. It is obvious that we require to strengthen our Intelligence organization and make it work much more effectively and efficiently. In principle, therefore, we have to agree to this strengthening and proper organization of Intelligence. Obviously we have to start on a modest scale. This is desirable not only for financial reasons, but because anything of this kind should grow organically and not be suddenly imposed.

3. The estimated cost does not appear to me to be too heavy. It may be, perhaps, reduced somewhat to begin with.

4. I am not quite clear, however, about the relationship between this proposed organization and civil Intelligence. In the main, Intelligence concerns three Ministries—Defence, Home and External Affairs. Are these three Ministries to coordinate their activities in this organization? Or, will this be principally a Defence organization with some civil officers attached?

5. The Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee till recently was Shri S.N. Haksar. Who is now functioning in his place? And what would be the place of this Committee after the joint organization has been established? I presume the Committee would be absorbed in the JIO.

6. Where would the finances come from? Would the Defence Ministry be entirely responsible for them? Will it be necessary to get special sanction from Finance for this or will it come out of the moneys provided for in the existing budgets?

7. I should like you to look into this matter and discuss it with the Defence Secretary and other persons concerned in External Affairs as well as Home.

1. Note to the Secretary General, MEA, 5 March 1953. JN Collection.



#### 4. Need for Check-Posts on UP-Tibet Border<sup>1</sup>

I think I have drawn your attention previously to the difficulties we are experiencing on the UP-Tibet border. Two years ago or so a committee under certain recommendations about the steps to be taken on our frontier areas. Among these, they dealt with the UP-Tibet border and suggested check-posts, etc. Since then the UP Government has repeatedly written to us on this subject,<sup>2</sup> but somehow the matter has got hung up between the Home Ministry and the Finance Ministry.

2. I drew the attention of the Home Minister to this some days ago<sup>3</sup> and he said that he would immediately expedite it. The main things to be done are the development of communications and some kind of barracks or accommodation to be built at the border for our check-posts.

3. Shri Govind Ballabh Pant, Chief Minister of the UP, again spoke to me about this matter today, because all kinds of rumours are afloat there about possible infiltration.

4. Another aspect of the question is of developing those areas on our side so that the people living there might have some occupation. That is probably a UP Government matter. But communications and accommodation for our police or other forces there are partly at least a Central Government interest.

5. Could you please see that this matter is dealt with expeditiously?

1. Note to Secretary General, MEA, 9 March 1953. JN Collection.

2. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 16 Pt. II, p. 541.

3. See *ante*, p. 305.

#### 5. Approach to Defence Problems<sup>1</sup>

Some little time ago,<sup>2</sup> this House discussed the estimates in regard to the External Affairs Ministry. In discussing foreign policy, it was often stated that foreign policy was essentially a national policy of a country. Emphasis may vary and conditions sometimes may introduce some refinement here and there, but essentially it was a national policy. Now, if that applied to foreign policy,

1. Reply to the debate on the Defence budget, New Delhi, 26 March 1953. *Parliamentary Debates (House of the People)*, *Official Report*, Vol. II, Pt. II, cols. 2907-27. Demands totalling over Rs 215 crores were made for the Defence budget.

2. 16-17 March 1953.

much more of that argument applies to defence policy. A defence policy should essentially be a national policy, though, undoubtedly, opinions may differ as to whether emphasis should be made on one aspect of it at one time or another aspect. Also, essentially a defence policy has to keep wide awake. It depends on so many factors.

If I may give some kind of a rough and ready equation about defence, I would say that defence consists of armed forces, plus their equipment etc., plus the industrial production of the country, plus the economy of the country, plus the morale of the people, plus the international relations or international position. All these are important, every one of them affecting each other. And the first thing to realize is that defence does not consist merely of the armed forces. Essentially, and more and more, it consists of the strength behind those armed forces, the strength of the nation's economy, the industrial capacity of that nation to produce goods required for defence, etc., and other things that I have mentioned.

I have followed personally to some extent, and from reports, the speeches that have been delivered, and we have tried to profit by them. Some of my colleagues in the Defence Ministry have already answered some of the arguments. We shall naturally profit by any criticism that appears to us to be worthwhile or legitimate. Most of those criticisms, however, either deal with what I might call secondary aspects of our defence, or with such things as pay and allowances and conditions of service. These are important of course. But, if the House will permit me, I would rather deal with certain basic things. But I would say this in regard to those criticisms, that some of them astonished me very greatly....

If there is one thing that is quite clear and dead certain, it is this: that the men in our services are treated well. In regard to food, it is very good food indeed because I have taken it very often, first class food, and if I may suggest it to Mr Nambiar<sup>3</sup> if he could go and take that food, his health will improve. In regard to medical facilities, they are excellent—the medical facilities that we give to the people of our armed forces—and in fact the test of all this is the fine young men that you see, fine, strong, hefty, capable of hard work and endurance, far beyond, I regret to say, than any Member of Parliament, and certainly beyond myself. They are good people physically because they get good food, relatively good accommodation, they are well looked after, medically, and the rest. There is one remarkable thing that I noticed, from the reports, of children being kept in chains;<sup>4</sup> it is an amazing thing to a person who reads

3. K. Ananda Nambiar (b. 1918); Member, Madras Legislative Assembly, 1946-51; Member, Lok Sabha, 1952-57, 1962-71.

4. On 25 March, speaking during the debate, Ananda Nambiar said that as per reports, in family wards of Pune Military Hospital children were kept in chains and their parents were not allowed to see them.



about them. The fact of the matter is that in the hospital, small children are given number-plates with small chains attached either to their waists or to their chests, so that they might not get mixed up, and I think he described it as if the children were kept in chains in the hospital. It was a very extraordinary way of describing that.

As for the salaries the honourable Member<sup>5</sup> mentioned, he forgot completely the dearness allowance that they get, which adds up considerably.

Then, some honourable Members are here who have had some brief experience of our armed forces, having been in the Army, Navy or Air Force. They were fortunate in having that experience. I have no doubt that that will give them a greater insight into the working of these armed forces. Nevertheless, the mixture, the combination of some small experience as a pilot or something like that, with membership of Parliament is likely to be heady, is likely to make the honourable Member think that he has become a complete and final expert in all matters military, or air force, or naval. Well, of course we happen to have a few thousands of persons with infinitely greater experience who advise us in the Defence Ministry—thousands of pilots who have done much more work than the honourable Member who has become a Member of Parliament, who have spent their lives in ten, twenty years of service. Those are the persons who advise us. Naturally we have to take expert advice in all these matters, and we listen to them and their advice, with such intelligence as we possess as laymen, because the final decision is always, of course, of the civil apparatus of a country, but after taking the expert advice. So I would submit that a slight experience as a pilot does not necessarily make one an expert in regard to the other matters concerning the Air Force.

I would like the House to remember certain backgrounds in regard to this matter, in regard to the Indian Army. So far as the Indian Air Force and the Indian Navy are concerned, as the House knows, they are small, relatively small. We want to enlarge them somewhat, and we are gradually doing it. But the Army is still the biggest factor in our defence apparatus. Now, honourable Members may lay great stress on the one or the other. Some Members said that the Air Force is more important; undoubtedly, it is today. Some Members<sup>6</sup> told us that we should spend more money on our defence, specially on the Air Force, while some other honourable Member<sup>7</sup> said that we should spend less money. Well, all of them, from their respective points of view, are correct. On the one hand, it is obvious that we are spending a considerable sum of money

5. K. Ananda Nambiar.

6. For example, on 24 March, speaking in the debate, G.S. Singh pleaded for the expansion of the Air Force by economising in the Army and Joachim Alva felt that in the defence expenditure the Air Force should get more allocation to make it strong.

7. Frank Anthony said that only obsolete equipment were bought by the Army and added that it could be possible to effect economies of many crores in Defence expenditure.



annually on our defence apparatus, and we could ill afford that sum of money; we should like to economize and reduce it as much as we can, and we continually try to do so.

On the other hand, for the moment I am forgetting it—of course, I do not want to forget it, it is important—the amount of money that we spend for our defence apparatus considering the size of this country and the obligations that the defence apparatus has to discharge, is not too great. Looking at it broadly, we have to balance all these considerations. Naturally, we cannot spend money which we have not got. Naturally, also there is a certain minimum of defence requirements for the security of the country, for the future development of the country which we must provide. Even we may have to scrape for them. So both factors have to be borne in mind. And there is one very important factor. Honourable Members think of the numbers in the Army, the Air Force and the rest. But throughout history armies and the like have depended, of course, on numbers, of course, on courage and morale, but ultimately on the technology behind them. That was not so obvious in the olden days, but it becomes more and more obvious today. Yet, if any honourable Member takes the trouble to study the history of war and nonviolence—as I have taken that trouble occasionally, because it is a fascinating subject—from the study of the history of war and of famous Captains in history you can see the development of technology even more than in any other way, because war, unfortunately for us, has encouraged the development of technology more than anything else. Because when people are forced into a life and death struggle, their minds function rapidly; they have to find out something. And so always in times of war technology has advanced and ultimately it has not been courage—although courage counts and of course always will count—it has not been numbers, but the technology, the superior weapon that has counted in war.

If I had time I could give many interesting examples to the House, going back to some rather amusing instances of how Attila<sup>8</sup> overcame the Romans because he discovered the stirrup on the horse. A very simple thing, the stirrup—an obvious thing. But the discovery of the stirrup on the horse made his horsemen infinitely better placed to meet the Romans, and they could much more easily defeat the Romans in spite of the courage on this side or that side. So all that counts. Small improvements have been going on for several hundred years. Constantinople, which was under the old Greek Empire, had what is called the Greek fire.<sup>9</sup> It was that something, that secret weapon they had—the Greek fire—which protected them. And so it went on.

8. Attila (406-453 AD) was the son of Mundzek and a King of the Huns.

9. 'Greek fire', a mixture of petroleum and other inflammable substances, was used by the early Chinese. Constantine used it against Saracens about 673 AD. Later the Saracens used it against the Crusaders.

Now, coming to the history of India, leaving our ancient history about which we have no proper historical records—presumably from the technological point of view we were not backward then compared to others—and coming to later times, all our deficiency and defeats have been due to the fact that we were backward in these matters. We stuck to our chivalry, our courage as well as our enormous capacity for fighting each other and disruption. And we were defeated not for lack of courage or lack of brains even, but for backwardness in technology. It was always so, whether you take it from Babar<sup>10</sup> who first came to this country or others. Why did Babar win? Maybe they were efficient; but the fact is that they had a better gun. A simple fact—they had a better gun which the Rajput chivalry could not meet. Later, take the whole of the Mughal period. It is a very curious thing that our minds in India were not directed towards technological development. We took things from others. Throughout the Mughal period the persons who made guns in India were Turks always. They were sent for from Turkey and, in fact, they had a special title. Most of the ordnance men in those days were called 'Rumi Khans' after the name for Constantinople. 'Rumi Khan' was the title of the man who made the guns. They always used the Turks, that is, always our reliance was on some external person to build something for us to carry on war.

Meanwhile, of course, Europe was going ahead—fast ahead—in developing technology and better weapons. And you will see when the English and the French came to India as adventurers, they had the better weapons of course. First of all, their weapons were hired, and their officers were hired, by the local rulers of the day. They were hired because they had the better weapons; they could train soldiers better, and whoever hired them, they wanted something for it and took a share in it.

So it is extraordinary how dependent we were on others, and ultimately that dependence was bound completely by our becoming totally politically dependent. That happened. That is our history for the last hundreds of years.

When we face the problems today, we have to remember this. Honourable Members do not seem to remember that adequately. Honourable Members tell us that we must not be dependent on others. Well, that is obvious. That is the basic fact from which we start in considering defence, that is, we must not depend on others.

But how are we to be independent of others? That is not such a simple proposition. We cannot suddenly develop that industrial apparatus in this country. We cannot develop the large numbers of persons who invent things, because, remember, in defence some things are common, that is, they get known by every country. Every country, every big country, has its own types, models,

10. Zahir-ud-Din Mohammed Babar (1483-1530 AD); a descendant of Timur the Lame, and founder of the Mughal Empire in India.



prototypes etc. which nobody else knows till ultimately they are used in warfare and then copied, as for example, the Maxim-gun.<sup>11</sup>

So ultimately it is dependence on the development of science and the scientific mind, the inventor, the discoverer. And then it depends on the development of industry, that is, the application of that science in technology. Therefore, the biggest thing in defence we have done in India is to put up a large number of scientific laboratories. They are not put under Defence yet, but that is the biggest thing. That is the failing we have suffered, from science, for the last hundreds of years. We have been backward and we will continue to be backward not only in defence but in industry generally if we merely relied on buying some idea or invention from outside. That is pure dependence—we will get second-hand ideas and second-hand machines from outside. So the first things we did both from the larger point of view of the country and the point of defence was to build up the great and fine National Laboratories that we have.

Honourable Members sometimes enquire about them, as if they are mass-producing machine laboratories. A laboratory produces first of all the scientist, the human brain, trained brain, out of which occasionally come wonderful discoveries, sometimes smaller discoveries, sometimes nothing at all. You have to take that chance. The human brain does not function this way, that it goes on producing something, manufacturing an article. That is the first thing.

Secondly, coming to defence itself, we have tried to build up a Defence Science Section which is important. It is of course in complete touch with our other laboratories, but it pays particular attention to the defence aspect of science and it is in charge of very good scientists—I can assure the House.

Naturally, it would be absurd for me to say whether in our general science or in our defence science we are to be compared at present to the advanced nations of the world. That is not so. In quantity it is not so. In quality we are not bad; numbers may be small. Anyhow we thought of defence in these basic terms. It is not a question of having a few more ships, old or new. But we have to build up something new and build up something which has not been in the tradition of this country for the last few hundred years, because we were copying, getting others to do things for us. But the process of building up itself requires that we should get help where we could. Obviously, if we start discovering and inventing everything from scratch it will take a mighty long time and others will go ahead. We have always to keep in view that we have to rely upon ourselves, our men, our scientists, etc, our technicians, our technologists etc. So we have taken help from abroad; we have tried to.

You may criticize that. That is a different matter. But I am putting the

11. Precursor to the modern machine gun and invented by Hiram Maxim.



basic thing before the House. We have taken help from abroad where we thought it necessary. We have sent for occasionally from abroad eminent scientists connected with defence to advise us. We have sent for from abroad eminent theoreticians in defence matters to come and look and advise us. We have not always accepted their advice, but we have wanted to learn from them and we have learnt. I do not mean Ministers and others, but large numbers of our officers have listened to them and cross-examined them and thereby sharpened their own wits and minds on those subjects.

I can tell you that although I happen to be in entire overall charge of Defence only now,<sup>12</sup> I have been taking a most intimate interest in the Defence services ever since I became Prime Minister and I have met large numbers of officers of the services and a large number of other men, and I can express not only my own opinion about it but the opinion of the better placed men, better able to judge. I mean that our young officer, our average officer, is very high-class. I need not say anything about our average soldier. He is known to be a stout man and a courageous man, well-disciplined person. I am for the moment talking about the quality of our officers. It is a high quality and it is a quality which can well compare with any elsewhere. I do not mean to say that we are producing Napoleons and Chengez Khans and the like. I mention Chengez Khan, because my personal opinion is that he was the greatest General history has produced. It has nothing to do with what he did. I am really talking about his generalship. People may think that he swept through the whole of Europe through sheer numbers—nothing of the kind; it was because of his generalship he did that. We are developing the very basis of Defence. It is, first of all, advancing scientifically and technologically; secondly, an intellectually trained officer corps, which can understand not only the improved ways of warfare but which can understand modern trends, modern developments, technical improvements etc., because not only our officer but even the soldier, a man in the Air Force has to become more and more technically minded. War becomes more technical. It still remains much else and it is not a purely mechanic's job but it still becomes more technical.

I should like the House to think for a while of the old Indian Army in the British days, what it was. It was a fine Army, well disciplined, and it did well whenever it was put to the test. But, in effect it was an extension of the British Army in India, and composed of Indians except for the officer ranks, generally speaking. Essentially it was an extension of the British Army in India and the policies were laid down in Whitehall. The general staff was in Whitehall—there might have been a small Army staff here. The real decisions were taken in Whitehall and carried out here. All the officers in the Army were foreigners,

12. Nehru, also Minister of External Affairs, took charge of the Ministry of Defence after the death of N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar.

except for the last few years when some persons did become Colonels and the like. At the time of Partition—I am speaking from memory—I think there were roundabout 8,000 British officers in the Indian Army. It is a large number. We had to undergo a tremendous change. First of all, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force had to be split up between Pakistan and India; then the removal of these officers, thousands and thousands of them. However bright our young officers might be, it is not an easy matter suddenly to assume higher responsibility without experience. After all, normally speaking, a man becomes a General—I do not know—after about 20 years of service or about that. However brilliant the men might be, the pushing up of thousands of people was a difficult task for all of them. Well, we have survived that test. We built up a general staff here and we had to depend upon ourselves.

Yesterday, my friend, Mr Tyagi, gave some figures<sup>13</sup> about British or foreign officers. I do not know how Members of the House realize the significance of those figures. I should put them somewhat differently. Today in the Army there is not a single British officer or foreign officer in any operational or executive post. Not one, from top to bottom, it is a completely self-dependent Army so far as personnel is concerned. We have got some British officers. We have got one Adviser to advise on whatever organisational or other problem is placed before him. We have got one senior Adviser for some time more—not for very long—and we have got a number of technicians in the Army, people to train, without any executive responsibility. That is a very big change in the Army of the size we have. If you like, you can compare things over the border, in Pakistan. You can see a vast number of English officers in executive responsible position in that Army and they carry on. We have none in that position. Now, in the Air Force—I am not at all sure for the moment—I think I am not saying something wrong—as far as I know, there are only one or two—of course the Air Marshal is there. Mr Jaipal Singh<sup>14</sup> is making signs.... I said training technicians we may have, a person training in a Military Academy. Those are training jobs; that is to say, no operational work is entrusted to them. Insofar as this training is concerned, we have got a number of them.

In the Air Force, there are very very few practically except the man at the top—only the Air Marshal—and may be one or two others, I am not quite sure. That too, I think in the course of this year, by the end of this year, will

13. Mahavir Tyagi said that "on 1 April 1948 there were 244 British officers including 6 Generals, 2 Brigadiers, 21 Colonels, 59 Lt. Colonels and 146 Majors etc. in the Army. Today we have only 57 British Officers ... planned programme of reduction has been drawn up according to which there would be no British officer left by 1955 except a few EME technicians"
14. (1903-1971); President, Jharkhand Party; President, All India Adivasi Mahasabha since 1939; Oxford Blue at Hockey and in 1928 captained the victorious Indian Olympic Hockey team in Amsterdam Olympiad.



be completely, 100 per cent, so far as officer ranks are concerned, under Indian officers.

The Navy is in a somewhat different position and in all likelihood we shall continue to have some senior British officers to help us there because, frankly speaking, our young men who are very fine have not got the necessary experience yet. They are gaining it rapidly and even at the end of this year, there are likely to be major changes, so that the change-over from the old 8,000 British officers to the present stage in five or six years has been very remarkable indeed.

After all what are we aiming at? Not merely calling or saying that we have 100 per cent Indianized Army, etc. Of course, we are aiming at first-rate staff, we are aiming at having a definite apparatus in this country, which not only in quantity but also in quality, bears comparison with anything and creating, advancing, progressive apparatus, not merely simulating from somebody else. I see absolutely no reason why we should not take the fullest advantage of such help as we can get from abroad, provided that help is given. There are two ways of giving it. One is self-illuminating help and the other is self-perpetuating help, which is very bad. That is for us to see.

Take another aspect of this problem. As I said, Defence ultimately depends on the Army. I was astonished—I think an honourable Member, Mr Gopala Rao, used the words, ‘What steps have been taken to change the character of the Army, which is savage and brutal and according to old traditions?’ I do protest against our Army or its character being called savage and brutal. I think it is very unfair....

I do not know where the honourable Member<sup>15</sup> gets his facts from but so far as I know, the relationship of the officer with his men is exceedingly friendly, exceedingly cooperative....

I do not know. Of course, I have no personal knowledge of all the armies in the world, but some knowledge I do have, and from such as I have had either from books, by reading about them, or to a slight extent from personal experience, I have found that in every army discipline is considered important....

...In most armies, discipline is much more rigid than in India. The relationship of the officer with the men is often much more rigid in other armies than here. Naturally, one cannot generalize about these matters, but I have found here that when we have got 10,000 or 20,000 officers, it may be that some are very good; some are not so good; and some are bad. That is an individual matter. But taking it by and large, my own impression is that our officers get on very well with their men, and I have seen them not only get on well with them, but dance with them, sing with them, eat with them....

15. Gopala Rao wanted to know how close were the relations between the officer and the soldier in the army.

I was referring to another aspect of our Defence. I have said that ultimately the Army, or the Air Force, or the Navy has to be considered in the background of industrialization—not only industrial production of the things we need; that of course is there, but it is something much more than that. It is the mind; the technical approach; the technical mind, that we have to produce. In regard to that, if I may say so, the Defence Ministry has made astonishing progress. I say so, because Members ask: 'What have we done? We are static.' I mean Members on either side of the House. They get up and say; 'Oh, it is static; no progress is made.' I am surprised to learn it, because the progress we have made in that matter is really astonishing, and it is astonishing not in my own eyes, but in the eyes of others who have come from abroad and who have no reason to praise us. They are experts in this thing and they came here not only four or five years ago but revisited India two or three times after an interval of a year or two. They can evaluate things and they have expressed their great surprise at the continuous progress we have made in this business. I can give you figures in regard to the growth of our ordnance factories—not only in regard to the growth of our ordnance factories and other great industries that are in progress, but to the general progress. Take the Ambernath Machine Tool Prototypes Factory. It is a magnificent thing which can bear comparison with any factory of that type in the wide world. In fact building up of these things has produced another type of difficulties for us, of which I will make mention presently.

Take the ordnance factories. Apart from the numbers that have grown up—and the number has gone up very greatly—at the present moment, as far as superintendents etc. are concerned, these are highly technical jobs and it is not easy just to put anybody in a highly technical job, unless you have trained him for it. Now, we have got in these factories some twenty or so superintendents etc. At the time of changeover, there were very few Indians who were even foremen in these factories. There was only one Indian officer who had reached the rank of superintendent, and not even a handful of Assistant Works Managers, and very few foremen even were there. All were in the lower ranks. Today, all excepting eight superintendents are Indians. Most of the Works Managers and Assistant Works Managers are Indians and in all other appointments there is hardly a single foreigner found. The rapidity with which we have changed in these highly technical things is remarkable. If you go into production figures regarding steel and other things, they are also very interesting and show the rapid progress we are making....

There are design sections, but most certainly designs still come from England.<sup>16</sup> But at the same time, we have design sections and as our designs

16. Meghnad Saha wanted to know whether there was any design section in the armaments industry. His information was that all the designs still came from England.



grow, we do not take others' or we take them and compare them. We are passing through this transition because we have always to consider this, that we cannot allow our quality to suffer. It is an important matter that by merely sticking to a particular design that we produce, we should not have second-rate things. We must have first-rate things. What we are doing today is to purchase first-rate things. That is more important. So undoubtedly we go abroad for designs etc. but more and more designing work is being done here today....

Obviously, the attempt is always made to become completely independent.<sup>17</sup> That attempt is limited in some ways, because in highly industrialized countries, all kinds of small parts are manufactured in a hundred different industries. That is why I referred to the Ambernath Factory. Our difficulty is that when we do something we cannot rely upon that industrial background which England or America or France may have. They can produce certain things in civilian and other factories and take advantage of them. We have to produce every single item ourselves, which makes it slightly more costly. Apart from costliness it means, for example, getting a big machine to produce some small article. That machine may be occupied for, let us say, ten minutes a day and during the rest of the twenty three hours and fifty minutes it has not got any use. That is wasteful. So we have to balance these factors. One does not suddenly spend Rs 10 lakhs over a machine which would produce a small but very important component when we can get that small part better and cheaper elsewhere. Therefore, we have to coordinate civilian development and the general industrialization processes with this.

In regard to our ordnance factories or other defence factories, as some of the honourable Members have pointed out,<sup>18</sup> we have tried to utilize them to the best and the greatest measure and in the largest possible manner for civilian production also. It is not an easy matter to do all these things. I think my colleagues<sup>19</sup> mentioned to the House yesterday that for this very purpose we are appointing a high-power committee to consider and go into some detail about running the ordnance factories and other factories more efficiently, but more so to consider how to utilize them for civilian production, so that not only should there be greater production, but this awful question of retrenchment does not come before us. Retrenchment is bad. We do not want to retrench our

17. S.P. Mookerjee asked whether the ordnance factories were in a position to make all the essential parts or these still depended on supplies coming from England.

18. On 24 March, U.C. Patnaik (d. 1961) suggested that the work done by ordnance factories be properly examined "to see that the country gets the fullest use of them."

19. On 25 March, Mahavir Tyagi said that for effecting economy in defence expenditure, the committee appointed in December 1951 had in its report in April 1952 made certain recommendations which had been examined by Gopalaswami Ayyangar in consultation with the Service Chiefs and the Financial Adviser but certain decisions taken on the report were yet to be implemented.

people, and yet on the other hand, when we are told that we are doing nothing, what is one to do? So, if we can turn over, from time to time, to civilian production and utilize civilian production to produce some goods, that would be desirable. All these things cannot be done suddenly, but since the honourable Member asked me the question, I think it would be correct to say that in a very large measure we are manufacturing those things—not everything.

Here we come up against a very important thing—the basic thing about defence. What does defence mean? An honourable Member<sup>20</sup> yesterday—or was it the day before—referred repeatedly to the inadequacy of “fire power”. He repeated the words “fire power” quite a large number of times. I do not quite know what he meant by it, or what exactly he had in mind. What exactly do we aim at? If we talk about our defence, what do we aim at? Are we aiming at—let us put an extreme case—fighting the wide world? No. We cannot do it. No country can do it. Not even the greatest power in the world today can fight the rest of the world. Therefore, you have to keep in mind what exactly is the aim in view. Of course, you have to keep your resources in mind. They are limited. If we had unlimited resources, of course we can do many things. We can have many times over the fire power that the honourable Member referred to just to play with, not only in Army matters, but in fire-works—I mean occasionally letting off fire-works. I know that. But there is a limitation. Our resources are limited. We have to make the best use of our resources. But how? In this way, You have to determine how much of the resources available are going to be utilized, let us say, with immediate effect. That is to say, suppose we thought that war was coming six months hence—our planning will be completely different. The preparation would be for a war which is coming six months or three months later. We spend money immediately which we normally may not. We would even waste money, because we cannot be left unprepared for that. That would be wasteful expenditure, because if war comes, we should be as prepared for it as we can. If there is no such possibility, we will plan our expenditure in a different way.

Therefore, you have to think of how much you are going to spend on today's preparations and how much to lay the foundations of a higher and superior preparation for tomorrow and the day after. That is the problem in everything, whether it is our industrial development, or the Five Year Plan—today or tomorrow—but more especially in defence you have to do it.

Secondly, you have always to think—and that is a part of the first—in terms of how much you are going to spend on that basic thing which is more

20. Speaking on 25 March, Frank Anthony mentioned that the Indian defence continued to be tied down to British strategy which laid more stress on equipment owing to acute shortage of manpower. Therefore, he said, one should not talk “glibly in the House or outside of the fire power whose prerequisite was industrial power.”



important than anything in defence, that is, the development of industry, defence industry, if you like. If the last World War was won by the Allies it was on account of the greater production of that colossal apparatus of production of the United States of America than almost anything else. So everything that we spend for increasing our Army today increases our strength for defence in that particular sector immediately, true. But that much we take away from that basic strength which you would get by producing more goods, more equipment for defence. So we have to balance how much money we should spend on that basic industrial strength, how much for building up more regiments in the Army or more aircraft in the Air Force.

Then again, an important question comes up—the types of weapons, etc., that we should use. It is a difficult question which....

I am sorry the honourable Member is not trying to follow what I am trying to explain.<sup>21</sup>

... I would beg honourable Members to follow something.<sup>22</sup> I do venture to say in all modesty it is worth following.

... Speaking about our Army Budget or Defence Budget, I cannot give percentages now. But a fairly substantial part of it is going in building up that basic thing, the capital expenditure and the rest of it.

Now the question comes up as to the type of weapons. When I use the words "types of weapons or equipment" I include in it aircraft, ships, etc. What are we to have? The normal reaction of one is to have the best, of course, to have the latest. Somebody<sup>23</sup> asked yesterday why we were purchasing old junk: why not buy new ships? A very brave thing. Nevertheless, in some cases it is much better to buy an old thing than a new one. It depends what you are going to use them for. A new ships costs ten times as much as an old one. The latest type, the most modern type of aircraft, the jet aircraft, may cost a tremendous fortune. You may buy it—if you like, certainly. We may buy a bomber which can go two thousand miles. Of course, if we buy that, we do not buy a hundred other things that we might have bought with that money. You cannot go on expending like that. If we do, we give up something.

Secondly, we have to think in terms of the purpose for which we get these weapons. The more technically complicated weapons we get, the more difficult it is for us to maintain them, with the technical background we have; the more dependent we become on others for the spare parts and the rest, which we may

21. Gopala Rao asked what percentage of defence expenditure was allotted for defence industries or heavy industries.

22. Gopala Rao asked the Prime Minister to substantiate.

23. Gopala Rao said on 24 March that the "important ships like *Delhi*, *Rana* and *Rajput* are but a scrap of the British Navy. When they were about to condemn them our people ran and in some form or other, they repainted and renovated the ships, and our people were forced to buy...."

not get later on. We can have only a few of them and if by any chance they are destroyed we are helpless....<sup>24</sup>

Therefore, this question is a very important question.

Take the old Indian Army. What was it built for? It was an extension of the British Army in India, although manned by Indian personnel and other ranks. It was built as a coordinating branch of the British Army to help the British in its war—either small wars in the frontier, or big wars. So it was like an expeditionary force attached to the British Army. The whole conception of that Army was to assist the British Army in warfare. Obviously we gave up that conception completely. Today we have no expeditionary force at all. We do not think in terms of any expeditionary force. We think completely in terms of defence, not of going far outside our country. That makes a complete difference to our outlook, whether it is land force, or air force, or naval force. The Navy is meant to defend our sea coasts; the Air Force is to protect our frontiers, if necessary to go a little beyond them, but not far beyond them. Therefore, normally speaking, we will not get aircraft which, however wonderful they are, are supposed to go 2,000 miles out. We have no intention of going a thousand miles away to attack. If we get them, we get them at the cost of other things which are more useful to us, smaller planes and other things.

I am putting these things to the House, so that it may be aware of the method of our approach to these problems. Generally speaking, the more complicated apparatus we get today, it is more costly of course, but apart from being more costly it seems that much of reduction in the money we could have for really building up our own resources in future. So it affects our future strength—these new ships or aircraft that we may get.

Therefore, it is safer, if I may put it, to get to use a second-rate weapon which you produce yourself in the country than to rely on a first-rate weapon which you may not get, or may not be able to keep up and which ultimately does not help you in building up your strength. That is one aspect of it.

The second aspect is that in the modern age you cannot go very far with second-rate weapons, apart from the fact that it may mean producing a dangerous situation for you: it may mean loss of morale of your people, of your services, when they use second-rate weapons and find people round about them using first-rate weapons.

So you have to balance these things. Essentially the outlook is a long distance outlook of building up our industry, strengthening our defence industry, advancing our technological and scientific growth, thereby providing the real basis for defence. You may enrol people in the army and train them in six months or nine months and make them fine soldiers. But it is more difficult to train an officer. It is much more difficult to train a highly specialized technically

24. Gopala Rao tried to interrupt but was disallowed by the Deputy Speaker.



trained officer, or mechanic, call him what you will. It takes time. Suppose I want to increase my Air Force. It is not a question of my buying so many planes from abroad, quite apart from the fact that I try to manufacture my own aircraft. That will take time. We are beginning and we will go fast. But what is more important is that we have to train men to man that aircraft. That takes time. It is not such a simple matter as all that. Suppose we want to add a dozen squadrons. That process begins not by buying the aircraft, but by beginning to train the men for that and gradually getting them accustomed to that aircraft.

So that the matter has to be looked at from a large number of angles. In this matter of course we have to rely very largely on our experts. They are good people. We take advice where we can from foreign experts too. But ultimately naturally we have to rely on the experts that we have here. And we apply such mind and intelligence as we possess to the expert advice we get and then we decide. Therefore, I should like this House to consider this problem of Defence in all its wider ramifications that I have suggested today.

My honourable friend Mr Patnaik who takes a great deal of trouble and has thought a lot about these matters has put forward many ideas in the course of this debate and previously, many of which are worth pursuing. More specially he is interested in the Territorial Army, in the National Cadet Corps.<sup>25</sup> So are we. And certainly those ideas should be examined. I think it is important that our Territorial Army or our National Cadet Corps should become much bigger. They are far too small today. The difficulty of course arises because the question of expense comes in. Now, I think we shall have to solve that somehow. We have got, if I may say so, into rather bad habits from the British days, that is in regard to the expensiveness of a thing. We think in the old British expensive way, and so we get tied up with it. We shall have to get out of it. There is an Advisory Committee in regard to the Territorial Army and the Cadet Corps and I hope they will make some progress in that direction to expand them. And we shall welcome very much the ideas of Mr Patnaik, Dr Mookerjee and others on the subject. We shall certainly welcome them. I should like the Territorial Army to be bigger, and the National Cadet Corps to be bigger, certainly if you like as a kind of reservoir, but even more so because I think it is a good thing for our people, for our young men to have their discipline. It will be good for them physically; it will make them better men, better citizens, stronger and healthier people, and generally add to the strength of the country. So I attach a great deal of importance to that. But looking at it from the point of view of sheer defence there are many other factors which I have pointed out—Industry is one.

25. On 24 March, referring to the Territorial Army, U.C. Patnaik pointed out that formerly the University Training Corps was a part of the Army and then both were separated, Cadet organizations were built up through the National Cadet Corps Act of 1948. It was not integrated with the Territorial Army.

And finally may I say there is constant, frequent reference to what are called scandals in the Defence Ministry. One hardy perennial which is referred to again and again is what is called the jeep scandal and the other thing too—the ammunition scandal. The third to which Mr Jaipal Singh referred<sup>26</sup> a little while ago was the Sealand scandal.<sup>27</sup> Everything becomes a scandal!

So far as the Sealand is concerned my colleague the Deputy Minister gave the facts.<sup>28</sup> I hope he satisfied the House. Again the question was asked: Are the Sealands being employed in any other navy? And the answer was, as far as I know: No, they are not, but they are used by them for transport and other purposes. But the question is, for what purpose we require them. It is perfectly true, if you want to ask me: “Are they good for going in battle array against the enemy”, they are no good. But we want them for a limited purpose, for training purposes and we got them. They are no good for active warfare etc. If we get things for active warfare apart from our background, we have not got the aircraft carrier etc. So we get these and train our people accordingly.

And may I say this in regard to this hardy perennial, the jeep scandal, and the so-called ammunition scandal<sup>29</sup> and what Mr Anthony referred to as the mystery<sup>30</sup> surrounding the Defence Ministry. I really do not know what mystery he was referring to except the ‘mystery’ of our not placing on the table of the House and publishing in the newspapers the exact number of ships, their quality, the number of men, regiments, etc. We do not publish them. That is perfectly true and we do not intend publishing them. Because it does no good to supply this information to people who may take advantage of it against us. But there is no other mystery about these matters except the normal secrecy in war in

26. On 24 March, Jaipal Singh doubted the worthiness of the purchase of Sealand aircraft by the Navy.

27. In 1947, the Government of India chalked out a ten-year plan for the expansion of the Navy and approached the British High Commission in 1948 for the purchase of a few aircraft carriers for the fleet requirements. As the latter expressed its inability to equip the fleet requirements the Government looked for suitable alternative and purchased the Sealand aircraft. There was a strong criticism that their engines were outdated and not worthy of the purchase.

28. Surjit Singh Majithia said that the Sealand aircraft engines, though not new, were well proven and easy to maintain at a lower cost. For expansion, it was necessary to purchase these aircraft for training.

29. Speaking in the House of the People on 27 May 1952, H.N. Kunzru, referring to the purchase of anti-tank grenades by India from a London firm which had been supplying such goods to the British Government before, had asked why the Government paid a higher price when ammunition of good quality could be purchased from Belgium at a lower cost.

30. Speaking in the House on 25 March 1953, Frank Anthony regretted the reluctance of Mahavir Tyagi to spell out the number of squadrons in the Air Force and said, “I do not understand this shroud of secrecy.”



certain things, about the type of weapons we keep. Nobody publishes these things nowadays.

But again coming back to this jeep scandal, I suppose there are a few things or few questions raised in this House which have been so thoroughly enquired into, from every point of view, repeatedly, as this jeep purchase business, which began sometime in May 1948—five years ago, a long time ago. In fact it was the very first purchase on a big scale that was made after the transfer from the old India Office. They used to make our purchases before that. That was the first thing that was dealt with by our own people there. We have no apparatus, proper apparatus, in India House to deal with these matters, which we have now. It was a very difficult time. We were carrying on the Kashmir war. We were on the point of having the Hyderabad operations. We did not quite know the consequences of all those things. There was the most urgent need felt for jeeps. We sent frantic telegrams: get these jeeps anyhow, any kind of jeep. We were quite unhappy. We made mistakes in it. We lost money, admittedly. But you must look at it in that context of things. Do not think we are sitting in an office here issuing public tenders which may take months and years to be answered. Here was an emergency, a war-time urgency; actually war-like operations were going on and there were threatened operations. The question was: You will not get anything later, get something immediately. So in that hurry we made some contracts which were not adequate and which got us into trouble later on. And we have been trying to get out of them by other processes, and, by trying to do that, getting more entangled in the business. There it is. But they have gone through it very thoroughly. I confess mistakes were made, I admit. But I see nothing in it which can be called scandal or any corrupt practice. Mistakes have been made. Last session, I think, a statement about this was made, by the then Defence Minister, Shri Gopalaswami Ayyangar,<sup>31</sup> after this complete enquiry which he and many of us made. That applies even more to the ammunition business. We got the stuff ordered, and we got good stuff ordered too. There is no doubt about it. But certain procedures have been followed differently. So that I do beg of the House—I want the House to be as critical as possible, to scrutinize everything most carefully and not to be chary of criticizing anything—but I do beg of the House also to consider the context of things and not to run our own people down without being sure that they are deserving of them. If they deserve let us run them down. But this needless running down of hard working, honest people, who are doing the difficult job in difficult circumstances is hardly, I submit, desirable.

31. Expressing his inability to disclose the details regarding the purchase of anti-tank grenades by India, N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar had said on an earlier occasion in the House of the People that after an examination of the whole deal he was perfectly satisfied that there was no basis for the allegation of extravagant expenditure in that purchase.

I would finally beg to submit to the House that taking it all in all—I am not prepared to say that everything that the Defence Ministry has done is free from mistake or error, that it could not have done better here and there; all that is perfectly true; we can always do better than we have done, and we should do better than we have done—but taking it all in all, the record of the Defence Ministry is, I think, good and has been very advantageous to the country.





7  
FOOD





## 1. Tapioca as a Food Substitute<sup>1</sup>

When I was in Travancore, I was presented with a memorandum by some association.<sup>2</sup> This memorandum deals with a number of topics. Some of them are not important from the point of view of any action to be taken. There are one or two matters in it, however, which are interesting.

2. One of these is the suggestion<sup>3</sup> that some tapioca might be mixed with our wheat. The percentage of tapioca to be mixed may be anything from ten per cent to twenty five per cent. Even if ten per cent was mixed, and it would be desirable to mix only a little, it would mean a relief to our wheat stocks. I imagine that from the point of view of taste, this will not be objected to. I do not know what the nutritional value of this will be. *Prima facie* I can see no harm and indeed, possibly, it might be a good thing. I should like you to ask both our Health Ministry and our Ministry of NR & SR separately to have this matter examined from every point of view, i.e., both taste and nutrition as well as general health and to have their advice. You might also inform the Food Ministry of this.

3. The other point raised is that of colonization<sup>4</sup> in the Andamans, North Borneo or elsewhere. The Malayalee people are good colonizers and have initiative. I was told that even a brief announcement in the press about the possibility of colonization in North Borneo had brought thousands of enquiries. So far as North Borneo is concerned, I understand that we are sending a small team of officials to find out. I think you might draw attention of the Home Ministry to what the Travancore people have said.

4. In regard to the Andamans, we have almost always thought of the Bengalis going there, and they have not shown any great urge to do so. They have required well prepared land to settle in. The Malayalees would probably be willing to take a forest area and clean it up. I think there is a good deal of room for this type of colonization in the Andamans. This matter might be specially considered by the Home Ministry.

1. Note to the Principal Private Secretary, 1 January 1953. File No 31(35)/48-PMS.
2. On 28 December 1952, a memorandum was submitted by the Travancore-Cochin Chamber of Agriculture, the Kerala Round Table Group and the Travancore-Cochin Colonization Council.
3. The memorandum stated that if tapioca produced in Kerala alone was utilized as subsidiary food, at least 25 per cent of India's food deficit could be made good.
4. The deputation pointed out that the vexing problem of Travancore-Cochin was overpopulation. The pressure in congested rural areas could be reduced if the feasibility of colonization in Borneo and Andamans was considered on a high priority.



5. The question of village industries might also be thought of specially in connection with Travancore-Cochin State.

6. I am sending you a number of copies of the printed memorandum. You can send one to each of the Ministries concerned drawing attention to the particular part concerning them.

7. There is another proposal in the memorandum about a river project. This has not even been investigated. It might be desirable to have just a simple preliminary investigation of this to find out if it was worthy of further investigation. A map is attached to one of the copies of memorandum.

## 2. To Gulzarilal Nanda<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
January 5, 1953

My dear Gulzarilal,

In two or three days' time the Food Conference will meet here<sup>2</sup> and, among other matters, the question of the quantities of foodgrains required by them in the course of the year will have to be considered. I understand that a note from the Food Ministry was sent to the Planning Commission over a month ago.<sup>3</sup> Also to the Finance Ministry. In both places the note is still pending.

It is clear that some definite approach has to be made to this problem in the Food Conference. Therefore we should be clear in our minds what we have to say there. Naturally we want to import as little as possible. At the same time we have to supply obvious deficiency. Unfortunately in parts of Bombay State, more especially in Karnataka and Maharashtra, there are famine or near famine conditions prevailing and they will have to be supplied with perhaps more than was at first considered enough. Then there is the Rayalaseema area too which has been hard hit. The rice position is better than we expected. But it would be better to have a stand-by. The wheat in any event is not enough this year and will have to be imported.

1. File No. 31(87)/50-PMS.
2. A two-day Food Ministers' Conference in New Delhi was inaugurated by Nehru on 8 January 1953. Food Ministers from 25 States participated in the Conference presided over by Punjabrao Deshmukh. For Nehru's address to the Conference see pp. 333-35.
3. In his reply on 5 January 1953, Nanda clarified that no reference made by the Ministry of Food was pending with the Planning Commission and stressed the need to "arrive at as realistic an appreciation" of import requirements as possible, for the optimism "in the matter of internal supplies" expressed "on some occasions may not prove to be justified."

We may take up the attitude in the Food Conference that no fixed quantity is indicated at this stage for imports next year and we try to get the States to agree to the least quantity that they will take. To some extent of course the figure we arrive at will depend on the necessities of the situation—and not on our wishes.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

### 3. The Goal of Self-Sufficiency in Food<sup>1</sup>

I am more interested in intensive cultivation, as by effecting a little improvement in the land already under the plough, we can get enough foodgrains for our needs. Students, who have just received their diplomas, when they take up employment should not adopt the official mentality of merely giving orders from the chair and making their official weight felt all round. This was an old habit in India which has no place now in the changed circumstances.

You have to go out to peasants and understand their problems. You have to talk to them, live with them, and learn from them. You should also learn from peasants before you begin teaching them, otherwise what you say will not cut much ice with them.

It is essential that whatever is done by the Council should reach the peasant in the field. More and more attention should be paid to simplifying the method of informing the peasant about new techniques.

It is a very dangerous and harmful approach that on one side our intelligent young men should do research work, while on the other their formulations should not reach the peasants in the fields. In the absence of a proper relationship all research would become utter waste.

Research workers and others, while conversing with peasants, should do so in their particular dialect and not in their polished urban language. There should be no tendency on their part to mere ordering peasants or workers about.

I have often raised my voice against the tendency of considering manual labour as low and degrading because such a mentality is utterly useless. Day by day manual labour is being more and more honoured. No country today can prosper where manual labour is looked down upon or despised. So our young men should learn to use their hands and take pride in doing so.

1. Address to the third convocation of the Indian Council of Agricultural Research, New Delhi, 6 January 1953. From *The Leader*, 7 January 1953.



When I went to the United States I visited an agricultural college. A professor there told me about an Indian student who refused to milch a cow. The student had gone to learn modern dairy farming methods. According to the American professor, this student said that milching and such other work should be done by others. The professor expressed complete surprise over the student's attitude.

This is a case which shows how our minds have been adversely influenced about manual labour. It is a strange thing indeed, this hesitancy to do work with our own hands. You should completely wipe out this tendency. Otherwise, the progress of the country will come to a standstill.

The food problem is a very important one. Development of industries can be undertaken on proper lines only when the food problem is solved. The Planning Commission has laid special stress on this question.

Many people will remember that three years ago, I laid down a target date in 1952 for attaining food self-sufficiency. I had made this declaration in a forthright manner and stated our resolve not to import after this date whatever happens. It pained me a lot when we were not able to fulfil this resolve. I was also pained when the pledge we had given to the nation had to be broken. We were helpless because the circumstances were such that we could not fulfil it.

I now hesitate to fix another target date for achieving self-sufficiency. But I want to say again that we have to achieve it. I do want that in the remaining three years of our First Five Year Plan, we should fulfil this pledge of self-sufficiency in food.

The Planning Commission has expressed great desirability of achieving self-sufficiency within the course of the Plan's five years, but it has left the door open as regards imports under unavoidable circumstances.<sup>2</sup> But the endeavour should be to achieve self-sufficiency, as otherwise a lot of money will be drained out of the country. Achieving self-sufficiency should not be difficult. I consider intensive cultivation more important than extensive cultivation.

Though the Krishi Pandits<sup>3</sup> have been able to obtain high yields, it may not be possible to attain such high yields all over the place. But when these Pandits have been able to produce seventy maunds of wheat in an acre as against the average yield of eight or nine maunds, it should surely be possible for the average yields to be increased to fifteen or sixteen maunds.

With a little care in the selection of seeds and judicious use of manure, this can be made possible. If we increase the average yield of wheat from

2. The Five Year Plan assumed the need to import foodgrains amounting to three million tons a year during the Plan period.
3. During the convocation, the six winners of the all-India crop competition were awarded prizes. They had developed expertise through use of manure and other fertilizers to increase crop yield per acre of land.

eight to fifteen maunds then the whole question of food will be solved and we will have enough to eat and to spare.

Though I am not against the award of prizes to individuals yet it would be better that these prizes are instituted on the basis of a competition between villages. This will induce peasants to cooperate with one another in producing more. Prizes need not be in the form of silver or gold shields, but can be a building which the villagers may need. This will help the idea of competition to develop in a healthy way.

The agricultural experts must study the Japanese method of rice cultivation,<sup>4</sup> which is simple and yields very good results. Good seeds and a little commonsense alone are required and not tractors or special implements. If the Japanese method of rice cultivation enabled the yield of rice to be increased even by one fourth, the whole food map of the country will be changed.

I am not against the use of tractors or other agricultural implements. But in India every peasant cannot be provided at once with these machines. Where tractors can be used effectively, they should be used. But stress should be laid on increasing production through simple methods and simple implements which the peasants can easily handle.

4. The Japanese method of rice cultivation consisted in the farmers' raising thrifty rice seedlings for transplanting, adding adequate organic manures and fertilizers to the field, and taking care in the preparation of the land for transplanting. The Union Government had started 20,000 centres for training farmers in the Japanese method of rice cultivation throughout the country.

#### 4. Food Production and the States<sup>1</sup>

The time has come to make a strong and determined effort to end our dependence on other countries for food.<sup>2</sup> It is obvious from every point of

1. Speech at the conference of State Food Ministers, New Delhi, 8 January 1953. From PIB report and reports published in *The Hindustan Times* and *The Statesman*, 9 January 1953.
2. Though the crop prospects for 1952-53 were reported to be better than those in the preceding two years, there was still need for imports. The provisional target for 1953 had been set at 2.9 million tons as against 3.9 million tons in 1952 and 4.2 million tons in 1951. Out of the proposed target for 1952, rice constituted 600,000 tons, wheat 1.8 million tons and milo 500,000 tons.



view that the question of reducing food imports is of the highest importance, for if the world was faced with some crisis, dependence on imported food will be extremely dangerous.

The food position today is not so bad as it was about a year ago.<sup>3</sup> The need for imports still exists and near famine conditions prevail in some areas but by and large the position is much more hopeful than before. The import of foodgrains helps us to build up adequate stock both for meeting emergencies and for controlling prices. We are hopeful that within the remaining three years of the Five Year Plan period, the country will have completed the task of self-sufficiency in food. I do not want to make any more promises about achieving this self-sufficiency, but I am certain that if something practicable is aimed at, it will be achieved provided we try hard enough.

Sometimes there is a tendency on the part of States to look at the food question from their own parochial point of view. The States should consider the question of food from the all-India point of view as partners in a joint enterprise in which both the Centre and the States are vitally interested.

It is of vital importance that we should make a success of the Five Year Plan which in effect will be in operation over the next three years as two years of the Plan have already passed but the Plan may even go a little beyond. This is important both from the practical and psychological points of view. Nothing succeeds like success and nothing helps to raise the morale of the people as self-confidence. This means faith in ourselves.

While we welcome the reclamation of large areas of land for agriculture, we place greater importance on intensive cultivation of old areas. If we can increase their agricultural output by ten per cent, much can be achieved within a year. In fact, the yields reached by the six Krishi Pandits this year show how much production can be increased and this has to be emulated by others. It is very necessary to learn to manage with whatever food the country produces. It is necessary to change the eating habits, albeit gradually and slowly, as in a changing world it is unwise to go on living according to the habits of a bygone age.

The high demands of the States for foodgrains<sup>4</sup> are extraordinary and this is not a very helpful way of looking at the problems. The States should consider how they can restrict the imports to the minimum instead of going on increasing their demands year after year.

3. India had a stock of about 19 lakh tons of foodgrains at the end of 1952.

4. In 1952, Assam and Bihar imported 18,000 and 12,000 tons of rice respectively. Their demand for 1953 was 30,000 and 40,000 tons respectively. In 1952, Bombay distributed 274,000 tons of rice, out of which 155,000 tons were locally procured. It demanded 2 lakh tons for 1953.

Politically India's stock is very high but sometimes I am a little alarmed by this. In the ultimate analysis, the political stock of a country is based on its economic position. That is the reason why the Five Year Plan has laid great stress on agriculture, though the importance of industrial development is not forgotten.

## 5. To Thakin Nu<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
February 25, 1953

My dear Thakin Nu,

Please refer to your letter to me of the 9th February in which you wrote about the talk you had with our Food Minister about an allocation of Burma rice for India.<sup>2</sup> At that time it was suggested that this might be arranged on a barter basis, India supplying certain goods in exchange for the rice. I have consulted our Food Minister about this and I am writing to you at his instance.

When you discussed this matter in Delhi, you suggested, I believe, that the 1939 prices might be taken as the base prices for calculating the exchange of goods. We were entirely agreeable to a system of barter and to the proposal for fixing prices on the basis of 1939.

The proposal made in your letter now is that, if the system of barter is agreed to, the values will be worked out in respect both of the goods exported by us to Burma and of Burma rice at current prices; thereafter, negotiations to be conducted on the fixing of prices that will be acceptable to the two Governments, for both, the goods and the rice.

We are entirely agreeable to the system of barter. But if the basic price to begin with is fixed at the current rate, subsequent negotiations will be rather fruitless. Some indication as regards prices has to be given to form the basis of negotiation. Indeed, this negotiation itself can take place right at the beginning so as to decide this matter at the earlier stage.

If the 1939 prices are not considered a suitable basis, our Food Minister suggests that we might take the 1950 prices of both the goods and the rice as the basis for the barter. This might well be considered a fair basis.

1. JN Collection. A copy of this letter was also sent to Rafi Ahmed Kidwai, the Union Minister for Food.
2. India had been importing 15 lakh tons of rice from Burma, but conditions had since changed and India's needs could not be met by foreign imports because of the high price and non-availability of rice to meet the requirement. In 1951 the cost of importing rice was Rs 42.8 crores.



In the alternative, we might take the internal prices of rice in Burma and of our products in India as the basis of barter.

It does seem desirable that there should be some agreed standard according to which we can calculate the prices for barter. This standard can be the pre-war prices (as originally suggested), or the 1947-48 prices (when the allotment of export was made by FAO), or 1949-50 prices (when the Burma Government itself started making allotments for export), or the present internal prices.

I am very grateful to you for the interest you have taken in this matter and for your desire to accommodate us.

I have just received a message from your Ambassador about the proposed programme for our visit to the Naga areas. I am looking into it and shall let you know fairly soon. Unfortunately, our Parliament will be sitting throughout that period and it is difficult for me to get away. But I shall certainly try to do so.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## PARLIAMENTARY AFFAIRS





# 1. To Ravi Shankar Shukla<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
January 3, 1953

My dear Shuklaji,

Dr. Kailas Nath Katju was speaking to me the other day about his brief visit to Nagpur. In the course of his talk, he mentioned that the Governor, Dr Pattabhi Sitaramayya, was kept out of the picture completely by the Ministry in regard to the work of Government and that no papers were sent to him. I was surprised to learn that even Mercy Petitions were not sent to him. Apparently the only papers he has to deal with are Ordinances which he signs.

I was much surprised to learn this, because that appears to me to be contrary to the intention of our Constitution. Even apart from that, it does not seem to me desirable. As a matter of fact, this question has been discussed repeatedly at the annual conferences of Governors here and certain rules were laid down.<sup>2</sup> I remember writing to all Chief Ministers about this also.<sup>3</sup> In fact, I think I wrote to Dr Pattabhi<sup>4</sup> and you about it when Dr Pattabhi went to Nagpur. We have been trying to evolve some uniform practice.

There is of course no question of the Governor interfering in any decisions of the Ministry. But to keep the Governor completely aloof and ignorant of what happens in Government is to take no advantage of him at all.

I am writing to you more particularly because early next month there is going to be a Governors' Conference,<sup>5</sup> and, as usual, this subject will again be discussed there. I shall be glad to know what your practice is at present.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. A copy of this letter was sent to Kailas Nath Katju.

2. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 5, pp. 478-79.

3. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 4, p. 456; Vol 11, pp. 272-73 and Vol. 18, p. 610.

4. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 18, pp. 152-53.

5. On 4-5 February 1953.



## 2. The Citizenship Bill<sup>1</sup>

I think you might draft the conclusion as follows:

(1) For a variety of reasons, it was not desirable to hurry the passing of the Citizenship Bill. It could, with advantage, be held over for some time.

(2) It was desirable not to have anything in the Citizenship Bill which might give the impression that Pakistan was being discriminated against in comparison with other Commonwealth countries.

(3) It would probably be preferable not to have too many details in the Bill in regard to citizenship by registration (clause 5) and to authorize the Government of India to make rules prescribing the conditions and qualifications required for different types of persons for becoming citizens of India by registration. Thus, in the draft Bill, sub-clause (b) of clause 5 may be omitted altogether and Pakistan brought in under the existing sub-clause (e). Under clause 17 (power to make rules), a special provision might be made about making different rules laying down qualifications.

(4) Under clause 9 (termination of citizenship) the same language as used in Article 7 of the Constitution regarding the rights of citizenship of certain migrants to Pakistan should be used. As regards the various degrees of proof that would be required to show whether a person had really migrated to Pakistan or not and thereby lost his Indian citizenship, these should be set forth in the rules.

You can send these to Shri B.N. Rau<sup>2</sup> for his confirmation.

1. Note to the Commonwealth Secretary, MEA, 20 February 1953. File No 34(4)/56-PMS.
2. Constitutional expert.

## 3. To G.V. Mavalankar<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
March 5, 1953

My dear Mr Speaker,

In the House of the People today some Communist members raised the question of their forcible ejection from a certain house which they had occupied in

1. File No 45(22)/51-PMS.

Windsor Place.<sup>2</sup> This was raised as a motion for adjournment. The Deputy Speaker<sup>3</sup> quite rightly, if I may say so, ruled this out. There were some unseemly scenes and the Communist members walked out of the House after expressing themselves discourteously towards the Deputy Speaker.

As a Government we were not directly concerned with this matter. It was only yesterday that my attention was drawn by some Communist Members to this. On enquiry I found that you had passed an order.<sup>4</sup> I told the Communist Members, therefore, that this is entirely a matter for the Speaker to deal with and it would be highly improper for me to intervene in any way when the Speaker had in fact passed an order.

I informed the House to this effect because I do not wish Members of Parliament to feel that Government as such was directly concerned. Only a committee of the House appointed by you as the Speaker were in charge of this matter, and dealt with it.

I am sorry that in a matter of this kind there should be any feeling that there has been any discrimination and for my part I should like this to be removed. I am not fully acquainted with the facts, as I have deliberately kept myself away from this question; nor do I wish to interfere in any way. But I have thought it proper to draw your attention to this matter. I do not take it as a party matter but as one affecting your high position as Speaker and the rights and obligations of Members of Parliament. You will, no doubt, deal with it as you think best.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. H.N. Mukerjee had given a notice of an adjournment motion about the eviction on 4 March 1953 of several Communist Members of Parliament and their staff from No. 1, Windsor place, New Delhi. The original allotment of this house to R. Velayudhan was altered by mutual exchange with A.K. Gopalan, but it was not regularized. The same house was allotted to three other Members of the House of the People and one Member of the Council of States who now wanted to occupy it. On Velayudhan's writing to the House Committee that he did not want the house, the Estate Office cancelled the allotment and carried out the eviction order of the Accommodation Sub-Committee of the House Committee.
3. M. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar was in the chair.
4. Mavalankar, on 2 March, stated that after examining all the facts relating to the case, he had ordered that the house under unauthorized occupation be vacated and the House Committee carry out eviction notice of the Estate Office.



#### 4. To Rajendra Prasad<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
March 6, 1953

My dear Mr President,

I have received today, from your Secretary, a copy of a letter<sup>2</sup> addressed by him to the Ministry of Law as well as a copy of Chief Election Commissioner's letter dated 2nd March 1953<sup>3</sup> regarding the disqualification of certain members of the Vindhya Pradesh Legislative Assembly. Your Secretary has asked the Ministry of Law to prepare an order in accordance with the opinion of the Election Commission.

I have no desire to interfere with your discretion in this matter, but I would request that the matter should be given some more consideration before you decide finally. At an early stage, I referred this question to the Law Ministry and they were clearly of opinion that there was no disqualification.<sup>4</sup> The Election Commission has decided otherwise. It is not for me to say which opinion is correct, but there is obviously a difference of opinion. The consequence of the Election Commission's opinion is that twelve members of the Vindhya Pradesh Assembly have to vacate their seats because of some technical error, of which neither they nor the Vindhya Pradesh Government were conscious. The Government of Vindhya Pradesh undoubtedly acted in a perfectly *bona fide* manner and were supported by legal opinion. That of course is no justification for a breach of the Constitution. But such unconscious breaches are often rectified, if necessary, by legislation to that effect. I am merely writing from a layman's point of view. But I would submit that the matter requires further consideration by you and, if necessary, the Attorney General might be consulted.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No 24/53, President's Secretariat.
2. S. A. Lal, the Secretary to the President, had forwarded Chief Election Commissioner, S. Sen's letter and requested that an order in accordance with the views of the Commission might be submitted for President's signature.
3. S. Sen had, on a request from the President, considered the case for disqualification and also heard those twelve members of the Legislative Assembly of Vindhya Pradesh whose disqualification was sought. He opined that these members had become disqualified as a result of holding offices of profit under the Government of Vindhya Pradesh.
4. The Law Minister, C.C. Biswas, replied to Nehru on 9 March 1953 that as in this matter the President had to give his decision in accordance with the opinion of the Election Commission, the disqualification was imposed not under the Constitution but under Section 17 of Government of Part C States Act 1951 which attracted the provisions of Article 102 of the Constitution. He also questioned whether the membership of District Advisory Council was an 'office of profit'. Biswas wrote: "On the merits, there can be no two opinions that it should be undone", for which an appropriate procedure had to be evolved.

## 5. To G.V. Mavalankar<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
March 11, 1953

My dear Mr Speaker,

I should like to draw your attention to the fact that some Members of Parliament have deliberately started a movement of breach of laws in Delhi and that daily disturbances of the peace are occurring. The object aimed at is not a local grievance but a difficult constitutional and international issue relating to the Jammu and Kashmir State.<sup>2</sup> Indeed it is not in the power of Government even to accede to most of these demands, as they affect other countries.

The question which is troubling me is how far it is right for a Member of Parliament deliberately to encourage such breach of laws and disturbances. These breaches are against a policy which has been confirmed by Parliament. The agitation, therefore, is a challenge to the authority of Parliament and to its democratic functioning.

It might be desirable for this subject to be discussed in the House fully. But before this is done, I should like to have your advice in the matter as to how to proceed.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No 32(421)/53-PMS.

2. S.P. Mookerjee and N.C. Chatterjee were arrested on 6 March for launching satyagraha in Delhi and Pathankot in support of the Praja Parishad agitation in Jammu. Ram Narain Singh, MP, had filed a *habeas corpus* application in this connection.

## 6. To P.T. Chacko<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
March 27, 1953

My dear Chacko,<sup>2</sup>

Your letter of the 23rd March.

1. File No 32(195)/49-PMS.

2. (b. 1915); advocate; Member, Constituent Assembly, 1947-1951; Member, AICC 1948-49; Member, Lok Sabha, 1952-1957.



There is no reason why a Congress member should not ask for a half-hour discussion on any subject of topical importance, such as a cyclone in the South. That is a much better way of discussing a matter than the method of adjournment motions. We have got into a wrong habit in regard to adjournment motions and cut motions. As a matter of fact, a multitude of cut motions have no value left. This matter has been discussed repeatedly in the Party and, as you know, we have arrived at decisions in regard to it. I think that it should certainly be open to members of the Congress Party to suggest subjects for half-hour discussions. This matter could well be discussed in the Party Executive or in the General Council too. The list system has not worked very satisfactorily and we had a talk with the Deputy Speaker about it the other day. It was decided that the Speaker should not call the name of any member who is not present.

A list is only meant to help the Deputy Speaker by informing him of persons who are really interested in the subject and have studied it. The discretion lies completely with the Speaker. We came to the conclusion sometime ago that these lists should be drawn up with the names of members of the Standing Committee concerned. There can be mistakes occasionally. They should be rectified. If we give up these lists completely, the result is likely to be that the talented and industrious young men, to whom you refer, will get even fewer chances.

I quite agree with you that in this matter, care should be taken and there should be no discrimination or favouritism.

I am perfectly prepared to leave the discretion to the Speaker. Indeed, it is with the Speaker. But I am quite sure that this will lead to greater difficulties. We have made it perfectly clear to the Deputy Speaker that the list need not be supposed to be a final list, but only an indication.

Flattery is always bad form and does not help. But there is no reason why a member should not speak about the achievements of the Administration which are very considerable. Personal references should be avoided.

Party expenditure comes up before the Party or its committee and they can check it. If anything wasteful is being done, it is open to members to draw attention to this, as also to the other matters you have mentioned.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## COMMUNALISM





1. To K.N. Katju<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
January 1, 1953

My dear Kailas Nath,

I sent you a report of Master Tara Singh's speech in Lucknow.<sup>2</sup> I now learn that he has recently delivered a speech in the Jallianwala Bagh at Amritsar, in which he openly preached my assassination. We must take action in these matters and that also swiftly. I suggest the Home Ministry should immediately investigate this. I have written to Trivedi and Bhimsen Sachar<sup>3</sup> also, and I spoke to Pantji on this subject.

It seems to me that what Tara Singh has said is clearly against the written law and we should take action. The fact that this might have some untoward consequences should not deter us, because the other consequences are worse.

I understand that some of the speeches have been reported in the *Prabhat* newspaper.

Yours affectionately,  
Jawaharlal

1. JN Collection.
2. In a public meeting on 28 December 1952, Tara Singh said that the Kashmir tangle was moving to its climax. He asked Sikhs and Hindus "to prepare themselves to fight shoulder to shoulder against Pakistani menace."
3. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 20, p. 365.

2. To Chandulal M. Trivedi<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
January 1, 1953

My dear Trivedi,

The recent activities and speeches of Master Tara Singh<sup>2</sup> have crossed all limits of decency. He is railing almost like a lunatic. His politics become more and more like that of a mountebank. Unfortunately, this has a very serious result and there are enough foolish people in the world to be affected by it.

1. JN Collection.
2. In Patna, Allahabad, Lucknow and Bhopal, Master Tara Singh, while warning against Pakistan's likely attack on Kashmir, spoke of reunion of India and Pakistan to bring peace in the region. He also spoke about maltreatment of Hindu minorities in Pakistan.

You may have seen his speech in Amritsar which is monstrous. I am told that recently he spoke at a large meeting in the Jallianwala Bagh in Amritsar where he practically asked for my assassination. I should like full reports of these speeches of Master Tara Singh and others at that meeting. I think that we will have to take action in this matter. The whole atmosphere becomes more and more violent. The combination of the Akali Dal with the Hindu Mahasabha and the Jan Sangh, purely opportunist as it is, is bringing about the type of atmosphere we had about the time when Gandhiji was assassinated. Will you please look into this matter immediately? I understand that the *Prabhat* has given some kind of a report with big headlines of these speeches of Master Tara Singh and others.

We had decided that no meeting should be allowed in the Jallianwala Bagh.<sup>3</sup> Why then was this recent meeting allowed? I think we should apply our rules strictly.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. A resolution was adopted at a meeting of the Board of Trustees, Jallianwala Bagh Memorial Trust at New Delhi on 9 December 1952 that no public meeting of any nature should be permitted within the premises of the Memorial.

### 3. Disapproval of Communal Activities<sup>1</sup>

The Congress reiterates its faith in the way of peace and the methods of persuasion for the solution of outstanding problems, national and international. The Congress deplores the continuous reiteration by certain communal groups in the country of slogans tending to turn the thoughts of men to violent strife, more particularly in regard to Pakistan.

The Congress expresses its thorough disapproval and severe condemnation of the activities of certain groups in the country who are still persisting in propaganda of communal passion and emphasizing differences based on religion, thereby retarding the growth of good feeling and mutual tolerance among people professing different religions, to which the Congress is irrevocably pledged.

1. Resolution drafted by Nehru on 15 January for the Hyderabad Session of the Indian National Congress, 18 January 1953. JN Collection.

The Congress sympathizes fully with the plight of the refugees from East Pakistan and considers it the duty of the country to help in every way in rehabilitating them. It regrets that this question, which should be treated as a national issue, has been dealt with by some groups on party and communal lines, thereby making it more difficult to further their rehabilitation.

The Congress notes with deep regret the interference of certain leaders of communal politics in the affairs of Jammu and Kashmir State, which is fraught with grave evil, and hopes that the people of the State will not allow themselves to be deceived and misled by such propaganda, which can only lead to disintegration of the State and most unfortunate consequences.

#### 4. To Pratap Singh Kairon<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
January 25, 1953

My dear Pratap Singh,<sup>2</sup>

I do not like the look of things in the Punjab. I do not mean to say that I am agitated or alarmed about it, but I just do not like the look. What worries me particularly is the lack of activity on proper lines on behalf of the Congress. Here is the Akali Dal, RSS, Jan Sangh, etc., going full steam ahead and creating trouble, while the Congress functions at a very low tempo and is busy with its internal squabbles. That is a sure way of losing grip of the situation completely. I had hoped that the loss of the election of Nakodar<sup>3</sup> would have woken people up. I do not know how far it had that result. It is never any good blaming others for something that happens. Others may be to blame, but we must be strong enough to meet any situation.

The Jammu Praja Parishad agitation is obviously much bigger than it claims to be, and is drawing into its fold communal elements of all types, Sikh and Hindus. Its effect is spreading in the Punjab and in Delhi. We cannot meet this in a half-hearted way and we must be completely alert and vigilant about it. It is affecting Sikh politics and has certain all-India repercussions.

The first thing to be clear about is that on no account are we going to surrender to this communal agitation. We are going to fight it out at all levels. If there is any grievance of the people, we should remedy it. But we shall deal

1. JN Collection.

2. He was the Development Minister in Punjab at this time.

3. In the first by-election to the Punjab State Legislative Assembly in the Nakodar general constituency on 30 December 1952, Congress lost its seat to Harkishan Singh Surjit, Secretary of the State Unit of the Communist Party.



with that separately and not as a part of this agitation. This must be clearly understood by Government officers at all levels and by Congressmen and the public. I have an impression that it is not clearly understood. Indeed, I think that some of the Congressmen in the Punjab flirt far too much with communal elements. I think I wrote to you the other day about communal people being selected to Congress offices. I am informed that in the recent *hartal* at Pathankot, Congressmen who had shops closed them and participated in the *hartal*. Also that no attempt is made to meet the situation when a *hartal* is proclaimed.

You will, I am sure, realize that this kind of thing will have very bad effects not only on the Congress organization but on the Government in the Punjab. I therefore want you, Musafir and others to take a stout lead and not to be at all complacent. Any Congressman who clearly shows communal tendencies should be warned and even action taken against him.

I have no doubt in my mind that these communal organizations, when they are stoutly opposed, do not prosper and merely collapse. It is only when we are half-hearted about it or passive that they take advantage of the situation.

This is another struggle against the combined forces of communalism and we should meet it in an aggressive and combined way without giving in on any vital point. I hope you will utilize both the Government and the Congress in this matter.

I have written to Sachar also.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 5. To Gurmukh Singh Musafir<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
January 25, 1953

My dear Musafirji,<sup>2</sup>

I am enclosing a copy of a letter I have written to Pratap Singh. I need not

1. JN Collection.

2. Gurmukh Singh Musafir (1899-1976); member, Constituent Assembly, 1947-50, Provisional Parliament, 1950-52, Lok Sabha, 1952-66 and Punjab Legislative Council, 1966-68; Chief Minister, Punjab, 1966-67; Member, Rajya Sabha, April 1968-January 1976; President, Punjab Pradesh Congress Committee at this time.

therefore repeat it here. But I am very anxious that the Punjab Congress must be pulled out of any taint of communalism and must be made to function actively. There is far too much complacency. There is no doubt that the communal organizations like the Jan Sangh, RSS and the Akali Dal do much more work than the Congress. There is also little doubt that many so-called Congressmen sympathize with them sometimes and cooperate with communal elements. This must be put an end to clearly and emphatically. In selecting your office-bearers to the Punjab Congress, I have noticed a tendency for communal elements to be brought in. In selecting candidates for election there is the same tendency. A possible temporary advantage is sought to be gained at the expense of our basic principles and our larger strategy.

I hope you will look into this matter and discuss it with Pratap Singh and your other colleagues, because I am clear that there must be a determined effort to meet this menace of communalism.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 6. To Ramananda Tirtha<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
February 14, 1953

My dear Swamiji,

I learn that at a recent meeting of the Hyderabad State Arya Pratinidhi Sabha an anti-cow slaughter campaign was launched for the whole State.<sup>2</sup> The meeting of the Working Committee of the Sabha was presided over by Pandit Narendraji<sup>3</sup>

1. File No G-18/1953, AICC Papers, NMML.
2. On 8 February 1953, the *Hyderabad Bulletin* published the news about the meeting of the Arya Pratinidhi Sabha which had decided to launch a movement against the Congress Government over the issue of cow slaughter in spite of a general directive by the AICC in this regard.
3. Pandit Narendraji (Narendra Prasad Saxena also known as Swami Somanand Saraswati) (1907-1976); writer, journalist and Arya Samaj leader and a close associate of Ramananda Tirtha during freedom struggle; Secretary, Arya Pratinidhi Sabha, Hyderabad, 1940-45; President, Hyderabad District Congress Committee, 1949-53; President, Arya Pratinidhi Sabha for some years from 1950; Member, Hyderabad Legislative Assembly, March 1952-October 1956.

and Shri Vinayak Rao Vidyalkar,<sup>4</sup> Minister of Commerce and Industry, also participated. Pandit Narendrajī is, I understand, the President of the Hyderabad District Congress Committee.

I am told that in Hyderabad State cow slaughter hardly takes place and is practically prohibited.<sup>5</sup> These schemes for the stoppage of cow slaughter are essentially political and have nothing to do with the real question. They have been started by RSS organization for its own political and communal purposes. Because of this, the AICC has made it clear that Congressmen should not join them. I have spoken publicly about it.

I am surprised, therefore, that prominent Congressmen should participate in these activities and encourage them. I should like you to ask them for their explanation.

I do not want communalism to flourish under a Congress cloak.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. Vinayak Rao Koratkar Vidyalkar (1896-1962); lawyer and Arya Samaj leader; President, Arya Pratinidhi Sabha, 1930-50; Editor, *Arya Bhanu*, first Hindi weekly in Hyderabad, 1946; suffered detention in 1948; Minister, Government of Hyderabad, 1950-56; Member, Hyderabad Legislative Assembly, 1952-56, Bombay Legislative Assembly, 1956-57, and Lok Sabha, 1957-62; Founder-President, Hindi Mahavidyalaya, Hyderabad, 1961-62.
5. In Hyderabad State, cow slaughter was practically prohibited. Municipalities and district boards had done so under the rules that governed slaughter of horses.



MATTERS OF ADMINISTRATION



## I. DOMESTIC AFFAIRS

### 1. To Sri Krishna Sinha<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
January 3, 1953

My dear Sri Babu,

Your letter of the 29th December about the Bodh-Gaya Temple.<sup>2</sup>

Not having seen the various places mentioned in your letter, I can give no worthwhile opinion. If you are clear that the exclusion of the *samadhis*, the temple of the Pandawas and the Rest House will not come in the way of the proper administration of the main temple, then you can certainly go ahead with the settlement with the *Mahant* on the lines indicated. It would obviously be better to put an end to this litigation as soon as possible and to give effect to your legislation.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No 2(196)/1951, PMS.
2. A copy of this letter was sent to Rajendra Prasad. Sri Krishna Sinha wrote that the *Mahant* of the Bodh-Gaya Temple whom he had met was agreeable to withdrawing the title suit filed by him questioning the validity of the Bodh Gaya Temple Act if the Government assured him that the three *samadhis* of his ancestors, the idols of the Pandawas, and the Rest House were kept out of the control of the Temple Management Committee. Sinha felt it would be wiser to accede to these demands than fight out a protracted litigation.

### 2. To C.D. Deshmukh<sup>1</sup>

Hyderabad  
January 17, 1953

My dear Deshmukh,<sup>2</sup>

I have your letter of January 16th about the Taxation Enquiry Committee.<sup>3</sup>

Dr John Matthai<sup>4</sup> is of course an excellent and experienced person, but I

1. JN Collection.
2. Union Minister of Finance at this time.
3. The Taxation Enquiry Commission was set up in April 1953 mainly to examine the incidence of Central, State and local taxation and to look into the whole gamut of taxation system with reference to the resources required for development of the country. John Matthai (Chairman), V.L. Mehta, K.R.K. Menon, B.K. Madan, V.K.R.V. Rao and B. Venkatappiah constituted the Commission.
4. He was the Union Finance Minister till he resigned in May 1950.



rather doubt if his appointment as Chairman would be welcomed by all sections of the people, as you suggest. The whole question of taxation is not merely a technical matter, but has large social implications and depends greatly on, what might be considered the social outlook of the individual. A person intimately connected with big industry, even though he has the large outside experience such as Dr Matthai has, would inevitably have the social outlook of big industry. As I conceive it, your Taxation Enquiry Committee might consist of financial and like experts plus some people with a social outlook which is not necessarily orthodox in a narrow sense of the term. Indeed, politics and economics, in the larger sense of the terms, are greatly mixed up together and they produce gradually a changed social outlook in considering all these matters. It is because of this that I feel that Dr Matthai, good as he is, might not bring that viewpoint and would function in rather orthodox grooves with an inclination towards big industry. I know that he is not a big industrialist like others. Nevertheless, his life has been closely connected with big industry and industrialists and his outlook is necessarily considerably influenced by that.

You mention Neogy.<sup>5</sup> I had an idea one time that you had practically asked Neogy to be Chairman of the Committee, in fact that the original idea was for one Committee to deal with both these matters, i.e., the Finance and Taxation.<sup>6</sup> Then you gave up that idea and rightly so. Nevertheless, the great experience gained in the Finance Commission would be of obvious help in the Taxation Enquiry Committee. There is a certain overlapping. V.L. Mehta<sup>7</sup> was, I believe, in the Finance Commission and his inclusion in the Taxation Committee is good. I do not know the others, except Dr Madan<sup>8</sup> who is, I believe, a Reserve Bank man and is good. I do not know who Pyare Lal<sup>9</sup> is at all.

I should have thought that Neogy would make a good Chairman with his experience and his position in public life also. He is a very conscientious man

5. K.C. Neogy was Chairman, Finance Commission, 1951-53.
6. It was set up on 22 November 1951.
7. Vaikunth Lallubhai Mehta (1891-1964); Minister, Finance, Cooperation and Village Industries, Government of Bombay, 1946-52; Member, Finance Commission, 1952-53; Member, Taxation Enquiry Commission, Government of India, 1953-54; author of *The Cooperative Movement in India* (1918), and *Planning for Cooperative Movement* (1941).
8. Bal Krishna Madan (b.1911); Executive Director, International Monetary Fund, 1948-50; Economic Adviser to the Reserve Bank of India, 1950; Member, Finance Commission, Government of India, 1951-52; Member, Taxation Enquiry Commission, 1953-54; Executive Director, Reserve Bank of India, 1959-64; Dy. Governor, Reserve Bank of India and Vice-Chairman, Industrial Development Bank of India, 1964-67; his publications include: *Aspects of Economic Development and Policy* (1964) and *Towards Monetary Cooperation in South Asia* (1986).
9. Pyarelal Uppal, Member, Central Board of Revenue at this time.



AT MAHATMA GANDHI'S SAMADHI, NEW DELHI, 30 JANUARY 1953





GIVING A PRIZE TO THE WINNER OF THE SHANKAR'S WEEKLY CHILDREN'S ART COMPETITION, NEW DELHI, 1 MARCH 1953



and a hard worker and he certainly commands the goodwill and confidence of the people generally.

I do not quite know in what capacity you would associate foreign experts with this Committee. Again the question would arise as to who these experts are. If they are of the orthodox type, they might be good but they would pull in a definite direction. We live in changing times when old ideas are challenged. The average American necessarily thinks in terms of American economy and tries to reproduce something of its kind elsewhere, on a much smaller scale of course. As for Englishmen, it depends who you choose. Stafford Cripps used to say often the difficulty he had with his experts who worked in old grooves. All these questions require also some kind of a general outlook aiming at something. I feel that the Committee that we appoint should have representatives of what might be called the new approach to these questions as well as those who represent the more orthodox viewpoints.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

### 3. To N. Keshava Iyengar<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
January 25, 1953

My dear Keshava Iyengar,<sup>2</sup>

I am sorry for the delay in answering your letter of the 10th January.

I am glad to learn of the excellent work done by social service organizations in Mysore.

I think you are unfair to the Minister of Railways and the Minister of Planning in what you say about them. The two suggestions you make are *prima facie* good, but there is great difficulty in giving effect to them. You mention that an allowance of Rs 2 per day should be given to a boy or girl for work during the summer vacations, also free passage in the train. This payment is more than the average wage of a person doing that work and, probably, doing it much better than an untrained person can do. The work ceases to be voluntary

1. File No 32(195)/49-PMS.

2. (1903-1981); took part in national movement and suffered imprisonment; Mayor, Bangalore Municipal Corporation, 1950; Member, Lok Sabha, 1952-57 and 1957-62.

if this has got to be done. It has then to be considered on a normal basis of payment as wages.

Apart from this, the Planning Commission plans. It does not organize work directly. Nor does any Ministry of the Government do so. All such work in local areas is organized by the Pradesh Government. It is open to the State Government to make any arrangement it chooses. But even the State Government cannot pay allowances which exceed the normal wages.

The Bharat Sewak Samaj is meant to organize voluntary work. It has at present no money at all and each branch will have to collect money for its own work. Even if it has some money, it cannot possibly pay at the rates you mention. The most it can do is to provide food in the course of the day. Our own estimate of that food is much less even than eight annas.

As regards free passage in the train, the Railway Department has already told you that only half railway fares would be charged. This is the general rule that they are prepared to follow. They can hardly make some other rule which it will be very difficult to carry out and which would mean a great burden on them. It may be that in a particular area some special arrangement is made for the work to be done. That will have to be done by the Pradesh Government or some smaller authority. It cannot be done by the Railway Ministry.

You must distinguish between paid work and voluntary work. Paid work will be according to Government rules and it will be in charge of some local authority. Voluntary work cannot be converted into paid work, much less can it be made more expensive than paid work. Wherever voluntary work has been done, some special arrangement has been made. The Central Government or any Government can hardly undertake that arrangement.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

#### 4. Travel Concession to Students<sup>1</sup>

I think it is important that we should encourage boys and girls from schools and colleges to travel about India and see the country and learn from it. I believe you have some rule to give them certain facilities in railway travelling.

1. Note to the Minister of Railways, 25 January 1953. File No 32(195)/49-PMS.

Possibly you charge less. I think that we should go some distance in encouraging this. From the point of view of railway income it will not affect appreciably and it might not affect it at all. The concession might well be half fares. It should not be given to individuals, but to groups of students of schools or colleges authorized by their headmasters or principals.

2. The same rule might apply to persons who undertake to do work in our community centres or any other kind of labour in a national project. Distances in this case must inevitably be very small.

3. I should like you to consider this.

## 5. To C.D. Deshmukh<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
January 31, 1953

My dear Deshmukh,

...I wonder if we could separate the Police force. There are, in fact, at present two branches, the Armed Police and the ordinary Police. The Armed Police might well be with the Centre.<sup>2</sup>

But all this raises grave difficulties and it will be no easy matter to get the provinces to agree, unless some financial inducements are offered to them and they feel that the change will lessen the burden on them....

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. Nehru was reacting to a suggestion that the Centre should control all the Police forces in the Union. Though Nehru considered it important, he was reluctant to centralize on such a scale. He felt that despite some advantages, it would also result in a more distant, impersonal and bureaucratic force, which would not be in touch with the reality on the ground.



## 6. Compensation for Refugee Rehabilitation<sup>1</sup>

This may be placed before the Cabinet for discussion. I think that before the scheme is discussed in any detail, the question of direct Government grant for compensation has to be considered and decided. On this there is a difference of opinion between the Minister of Rehabilitation and the Minister of Finance.

2. It is a little difficult for me to go through the various statements made on this subject from time to time during the last three or four years. I think it is true that statements have been made on behalf of Government which have given an impression that Government will give some direct assistance. Though this has not been said very clearly and specifically, the impression no doubt was created. It was because of this impression that I stated forcibly at a meeting of Rehabilitation Ministers that it would not be right to expect compensation from Government directly and that the compensation could only come out of the pool of evacuee property or what might be obtained from Pakistan.

3. Thereupon questions were put in Parliament and the answer given was to the effect that compensation would come out of the evacuee property and the sum recovered from Pakistan. It was added that Government would give every additional help in rehabilitation to all those who had suffered losses.

4. As I understand this answer, it means that it was Government's responsibility to rehabilitate all those who stood in need of it. As for compensation, this would come from the two sources mentioned above, namely, evacuee property and any sum recovered from Pakistan.

5. I draw a distinction between expenditure on rehabilitation and compensation as such.

6. Even when compensation has been referred to, a saving clause has been added to the effect that this will depend upon the general financial position of the Government.

7. Obviously, the general financial position of the Government is not good. We have to meet urgent demands from all kinds including that of rehabilitation and we shall try to meet them. If we have more money to spare, we could use it to rehabilitate more people or in a better way.

8. If we leave out the question of rehabilitation, whatever the scale of that might be, compensation means something beyond rehabilitation, unless this compensation is itself supposed to be a part of rehabilitation.

9. In the case of the poorer people, normal rehabilitation will cover every

1. Note to the Cabinet Secretary, 2 February 1953. JN Collection. A copy of this letter was sent to Ministry of Rehabilitation.

kind of compensation even. The question then arises of compensating those who are better off. I confess that I do not see the justice of compensating the well-to-do, except insofar as the money that may be obtained from Pakistan or from evacuee property.

10. I appreciate that the proposed payments out of Central contribution are meant only for those who owned properties of small value. The question nevertheless resolves itself into one of proper rehabilitation.

11. A copy of this should be sent to the Ministry of Rehabilitation.

## 7. To C.D. Deshmukh<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

February 3, 1953

My dear Deshmukh,

I have just seen your letter rather late at night.<sup>2</sup> I am very sorry if you think that my confidence in you is less now than it was at any time. That is not true, I can assure you. I have the greatest confidence in you and your judgment. That of course does not mean that in some matters I might not incline to a somewhat different way. When this happens, I put them before you, as I put them before other Ministers. I would not like you, as you would not like me, to treat each other with a measure of hesitation and restraint. We should, as colleagues, be perfectly frank with each other and have confidence in each other, even though in some matters we may differ in outlook or give a different emphasis to something. That is always happening in public life and I am perfectly used to it. There is hardly anyone I know, even among my closest colleagues, with whom I do not differ occasionally and we even have considerable argument. But it never strikes us that that means an essential difference or a pulling in different directions.

The burden you have to face is heavy. But indeed it is a burden not of yours only but of mine and I want to share it with you. You refer to deficit financing.<sup>3</sup> I am not personally thinking of deficit financing so much. You are

1. C.D. Deshmukh Papers, NMML.

2. Deshmukh in his letter of 3 February had written that he had a feeling that Nehru had no longer confidence in his judgment and was not giving him his wholehearted support. In view of this, Deshmukh wanted to resign from his post of the Finance Minister.

3. Deshmukh pointed out that it seemed that on the question of the extent of deficit financing, Nehru felt that Deshmukh's judgment was wrong, even though Nehru could not claim to be an expert himself.



right in saying that I cannot take an expert view myself. But naturally, having given a good deal of thought to various matters, I can, I hope, understand the broad aspects of a question and sometimes put forward some views which can then be judged from expert standards.

The fact is that we in India, as people in other countries, have to face quite extraordinary problems, financial and other. There is little hope of normality returning within a foreseeable future. The tendency for some of us is to indulge perhaps in wishful thinking that normality will return and this is just a brief difficult period which might be passed over. If, however, this is a lengthy period, then one has to think somewhat differently and try to find, if possible, other remedies. I am not competent to find other remedies, but my mind is continually searching for them and sometimes to put out some ideas to be decided by those who know better.

You refer to the Rehabilitation Ministry.<sup>4</sup> Only yesterday I saw their paper which surprised me greatly. Personally, I have been opposed to this type of compensation at every stage. It is true that some ambiguous statements have been made from time to time. So far as the Food Ministry is concerned,<sup>5</sup> I was under the impression that the demands put forward by it are much less than in previous years. I do not know the exact position.

It is no good your telling me that you find the burden too great, as it would be no good my saying that. There is little escape for us from the burdens we carry.

When this Governors' Conference<sup>6</sup> is over, let us have a talk.

Yours,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. Deshmukh complained that the Rehabilitation Minister had wrongly thought that the Government had to contribute Rs 137 crore as the amount of compensation to be paid to the displaced persons besides the amount recovered from the sale of the evacuee property. Deshmukh felt that this was the result of an ambiguous clause in a decision of the Rehabilitation Committee taken during his absence.
5. Deshmukh also pointed out that the Food and Agriculture Minister was putting forward fantastic proposals and committing Government to large expenditure without consulting the Finance Minister.
6. The annual conference of Governors and Rajpramukhs held discussions on 4 and 5 February on problems of law and order in the States, their linguistic reorganization, the Five Year Plan with special reference to its financial and administrative aspects, the community development projects, and the educational system in the country.



8. To Mahavir Tyagi<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
February 7, 1953

My dear Mahavir,

... Merits apart, I confess that I do not like the way we are dealing with our problems. Here is this issue,<sup>2</sup> which is mainly one for consultation and discussion and decision. Instead, we hurl long notes at each other and function as if we were rival parties in some suit, each trying to justify his own position. The Government of India is an integrated whole, I hope, or, at any rate, it should be so. There are bound to be differences of opinion from time to time and they have to be ironed out. Ultimately one opinion prevails and that becomes the opinion for the action of the Government. Normally consultation is done at the secretarial level. Later at Ministerial level. If even that does not yield results, then at Cabinet level, I find that the amount of time that is spent in long notes, sometimes even on the most trivial of matters, is prodigious, when some kind of an agreement can be arrived at after a consultation. Naturally before a decision is arrived at, the facts should be clearly stated and for this there might be some note. But the process of considering another Ministry as some kind of an opponent to be defeated is hardly helpful. Your long note dealt with many matters which have no relevance at present. The result was that it was a little difficult to extricate the matters in issue now.

The Finance Ministry is of course interested in the expenditure involved in any proposal as well as the consequences of that proposal in regard to future expenditure. With these, they are intimately concerned, as the responsibility for providing the money falls upon them. In regard to other matters, which might be called internal arrangement, the Ministry concerned is normally the best judge, though of course Finance or any other Ministry has every right to advise.

I feel a little lost in this long noting. But, as I understand it, the principal proposal is that the prices of foodgrains should be kept as low as possible and that some adjustment should be made in prices for the famine areas and the other areas in regard to wheat. This adjustment involves no demand for subsidy this year. It appears to be *prima facie* justifiable that such an adjustment in favour of the famine area should be made....

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. The question of the prices of foodgrains and the issue of subsidy.

## 9. To Chief Ministers<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
13 February, 1953

My dear Chief Minister,

You have often to come to Delhi to attend conferences or for consultations and the like. Your Minister colleagues have also to come here from time to time. Sometimes it has come to my notice that some inconvenience is caused in regard to accommodation or transport. I was sorry to learn this because when you come here on work, it should be our business and pleasure to give you every facility. Many of the Chief Ministers or other Ministers stay with friends in Delhi or have made some other special arrangements, and possibly they would not like their present arrangements to be upset in any way. In any event, we should like to make some arrangements for the convenience of Chief Ministers and other Ministers who come to Delhi on official business in connection with State work.

Our Home Ministry is already making some such arrangements, but before proceeding much further with these arrangements, I should like to know from you if you would like us to provide accommodation or transport for you or your colleagues when you come here. Also what other facilities you would like the Central Government to provide. We can then consider this matter and try to make the necessary arrangements. We should like you to feel at home during your visit to Delhi and not to suffer any inconvenience.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. This letter has also been printed in G. Parthasarathi (ed) *Jawaharlal Nehru: Letters to Chief Ministers 1947-1964*, Vol. 3 (New Delhi, 1987), p. 241.

## 10. Health Insurance Scheme<sup>1</sup>

... Our ultimate objective should be for a complete health scheme for the entire country. We cannot do that now. But every step that we might take might well be a step in that direction.

1. Note to the Minister of Health, 17 February 1953. File No 28(51)/50-PMS. Extracts.



## 11. Harassment Caused to Christian Missionaries<sup>1</sup>

I have looked through some of these papers (not all). The subject has come up before us previously on several occasions, notably when complaints have been received by us, often through Rajkumari Amrit Kaur, of the harassment caused to Christian missionaries in Madhya Pradesh. The complaints received about Madhya Pradesh contained a number of charges or allegations. It was not quite clear to me how those charges were met except by the general statement that missionaries there were not behaving properly.

2. We have to consider this question from several points of view. There is the question of issuing visas to newcomers and the second question of allowing those who are here to function as they have been functioning. Then there is the question of our border areas and some tribal areas other than the border areas.

3. Missionaries in India have a number of institutions—educational and hospitals and the like. Sometimes a teacher engaged there goes away and is replaced.

4. It seems to me that it is difficult to lay down any general rule which is applicable to all these areas, and institutions and, to some extent, each has to be considered separately. In regard to the border areas, we should strictly discourage any foreign activity, missionary or other. Where there are some educational or like institutions there at present functioning, we may permit them to function, unless there is something reported against them which we can examine. In the very inner border areas, we should try to eliminate foreigners.

5. In the tribal areas, other than the border ones, there are a number of old missionary institutions, chiefly educational or health. I presume we do not intend to close them. Therefore, they should continue and where somebody replaced another person, this may be permitted subject to that person not being objectionable in any way. We should not agree to an extension of this kind of work unless there are very special reasons.

6. There is, I believe, a proposal, for instance, to start a large hospital on the biggest scale by some missionary organizations at an important centre. This proposal is *prima facie* one which we should accept, subject to full consideration of the proposal. Probably the finest hospital in India today is at Vellore which is run by a large number of missionary bodies functioning together. A famous T.B. Sanatorium in South India is also run by missionary bodies.

7. Normally, missionaries coming for educational or like work should be allowed to come if they have any particular place to go to. The objection that

1. Note to the Minister of Home Affairs, 23 February 1953. File No 33(III)/52-PMS.



arises is for purely evangelical work. Every such later case should be carefully examined and normally we should not encourage this purely evangelical work.

8. I am not attracted to this evangelical work in any way, but I do not see why we should be frightened of it. It has not produced any marked results in the past even when the missionaries were encouraged by the British Government. It is far less likely to produce any results now. Anyhow, we should not encourage additions to it. But where there are missionary institutions functioning, it seems to me a little difficult to put obstructions in their way. That is not a fair approach. Either we put a stop to them or we allow them to function. If they function wrongly, that is a different matter and we can deal with them then on that ground.

9. It is true, I think, that in the past missionaries have functioned in an anti-national way and encouraged separatist tendencies. Where any person does so, we should certainly take action. But our general outlook, I regret to say, is a narrow one and, I think, this has been evidenced by the way the Madhya Pradesh Government has functioned in this matter who, apparently, have rather harassed people there. They may have some grounds for it and, if so, these should be examined. But this does not affect the general policy we should pursue in this matter.

10. I should not like to produce some impression on a minority community in India that we are trying to suppress it in any way.

## 12. Age of Retirement of Civil Servants<sup>1</sup>

This file containing the proposal of the reemployment of Dr S.L. Hora<sup>2</sup> as Director of the Zoological Survey of India has just come up before me. I find that a proposal was made that he should be reemployed for a period of another three years or rather that he should continue as Director of the Zoological Survey of India for this period. A memorandum from the Home Ministry dated 13th February states that that Ministry is unable to agree to any extension of this employment of Dr Hora. This is based on his reaching the age of

1. Note to the Ministry of Home Affairs, 23 February 1953. File No 35(9)/56-66-PMS.
2. Sunderlal Hora (1896-1955); a well-known zoologist who joined the Zoological Survey of India in 1921 and served it for many years; was President, National Institute of Science of India, 1951-1952 and of the Indian Science Congress Association, 1953-54; his publications include *Zoogeography* and *Animal Ecology*.

superannuation. Presumably, this advice has been given by the Home Ministry after reference to the Union Public Service Commission though I am not quite clear about this.

2. A short while ago, the question of the age of retirement of civil servants was considered by the Cabinet and the Cabinet was generally of the opinion that this age should be raised by two years or so. The Home Ministry was asked to put up a paper on this subject for the final consideration of the Cabinet.

3. Previously, about two years ago, the Cabinet came to the decision that the age of retirement should not apply strictly or automatically to scientists, technicians and the like because a scientist or a technician often does his best work at a much later age than the present age of retirement and we are short of first-rate men who we can ill spare. There have been cases of our prominent scientists retiring here and being engaged by international organizations. We have thus lost their services.

4. The matter has obviously to be viewed from the point of view of the work to be done and not by some automatic application of a service rule of retirement.

5. Dr Hora is, I believe, admittedly our outstanding zoologist in the country. There is only other person of eminence in zoology in India, so far as I am aware, and he is at present the Vice-Chancellor of the Patna University. Our dispensing with the services of Dr Hora at this stage when the Zoological Department is being reorganized would undoubtedly be a blow to that Department and that work. The Union Public Service Commission may well advertise for another person, but eminent scientists do not hide their light under the bushel. They are well known in India and in zoology there are not many available. Indeed, so far as I know, and I have been connected with scientific development here, the only two competent persons are Dr Hora and Dr Bahl<sup>3</sup> of the Patna University referred to above. If we dispense with the services of Dr Hora, we may well have to think of employing some foreigner and that, of course, should be avoided. In these circumstances, it seems to me that we should give further consideration to this matter.

6. In any event, even the process of advertising, etc. is likely to take several months and at the end of it we may very well come to the conclusion that there is no other really competent man available and we come back to where we were. I think we should consider the importance of the work much more than this rule of retirement, more especially, when we have come to the decision

3. Karm Narayan Bahl (1891-1954); taught zoology in Lucknow University from 1921 to 1951; Member, University Education Commission, Government of India, 1948-49; President, Zoological Society of India, 1950-52; Vice-President, Indian National Science Academy, 1951-53.



that this rule should be extended and that scientists should normally be given an extension.

7. I shall be grateful if you will kindly look into this matter.

8. Dr Hora has a very high standing among our scientists and has been President of the National Institute of Science.

### 13. Participation of Defence Staff in Religious Functions<sup>1</sup>

The general principle that units of the Indian Army should not take formal part in religious or similar functions is a sound one. If they are allowed to take such part, then naturally we shall have to extend this to every religion. Any other course would be discrimination.

Then again, our Units may be composite and might not represent as a whole a particular religious faith. That would create difficulties.

Thirdly, the fact that the State forces have ceased to exist as such and have been integrated in the Indian Army is also an important factor bearing on this question. The sentiment that attached to the State forces participating in such religious functions is no longer applicable, or, at any rate, is very little applicable.

The only question was as to whether this practice should be suddenly ended or progressively stopped. I gather from these papers that this is no sudden decision now and that for the last three years there has been an attempt to lessen its scope.

I agree, therefore, that the orders issued already should stand. To go back upon them would make it much more difficult to bring about the change desired later.

A copy of this note should be sent to the Minister of States. Possibly his attention had not been drawn to the various factors referred to above.

I see that there is a telegram on the file from His Highness the Maharaja of Travancore. A letter should be written to him explaining in some detail the policy we pursue and the attempts that have been made to put an end to this practice gradually. While appreciating his desire to continue the old practice, it should be pointed out to him that this will lead to all kinds of difficulties in various parts of India. The Ministry of States should write this letter. They

1. Note to the Ministry of Defence, 26 February 1953. JN Collection.



might point out that this question has been considered carefully again by the Government of India and the Prime Minister has also been consulted.<sup>2</sup>

I take it that our orders relate to units as such participating in the functions. There is no ban on individual soldiers, who may not be on duty, seeing these functions. They will not take part in the formal processions, etc.

2. In a note to Mahavir Tyagi on 27 March 1953 (not printed), Nehru agreed to make an exception to this request in view of the "strong feeling aroused in this matter" and "repeated requests" made by the Rajpramukh which were supported by the Chief Minister.

#### 14. To William O. Douglas<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
February 28, 1953

My dear Justice Douglas,<sup>2</sup>

Thank you for your letter of January 21 and the cheque for \$ 10,00,00. I am very grateful to you for this friendly gesture towards the Indian trade union movement. I shall endeavour to have this money utilized as you have suggested, that is to enable one or more Indians to obtain education in trade unionism. I am sure that your gift will be greatly appreciated here. It is not merely the gift but the spirit behind it that we welcome and I agree with you that it symbolizes the growing friendship between the people of the West and our people here.<sup>3</sup>

With regards and all good wishes,

Yours very sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. A copy of this letter was sent to V.V. Giri, the Minister of Labour at the Centre.
2. He was Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, at this time.
3. Nehru wrote to V.V. Giri (not printed) on the same day asking for his suggestion as to how best to utilize this money.

15. To Homi J. Bhabha<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
March 2, 1953

My dear Homi,

Your letter of February 27 enclosing a letter from Julian Huxley.<sup>2</sup> I entirely agree with you that it is not possible for you to accept this post<sup>3</sup> and leave India for any length of time. Important as the post is, it is getting more and more entangled with national rivalries and intrigues. Personally I am not keen on any of our top-ranking men getting tied up with these.

Have you any suggestion about any other Indian for this post? I heard vaguely that Dr Lakshmanaswami Mudaliar's<sup>4</sup> name was being mentioned. I should have thought that a knowledge of French was rather necessary, apart from other qualifications.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No 42(2)/48-PMS.
2. A biologist and for sometime Director-General, UNESCO.
3. Director-General, Unesco.
4. (1887-1974); Professor of Obstetrics and Gynaecology, Principal, Madras Medical College, 1939-42; Member, Legislative Council, Madras, 1946-70; member, Indian Delegation, UNESCO, 1951-56; Chairman, Secondary Education Commission, 1952-53; Member, Executive Board, UNESCO, 1954-56; President, World Health Organisation, 1961-62; Padma Vibhushan, 1963; author of *Ante-Natal, Natal, Neo-Natal Mortality of Infants, Clinical Obstetrics*.

16. To K. Hanumanthaiya<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
March 4, 1953

My dear Hanumanthaiya,<sup>2</sup>

...Always in such cases<sup>3</sup> one has to consider not only the strict law but the effect on the public mind. When ryots are dispossessed, there is always criticism. If the matter goes to a court of law and people are convicted, then again there is further likelihood of public disapproval. Therefore, in all such cases care

1. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. Chief Minister of Mysore State at this time.
3. Nehru had received two letters from Hanumanthaiya regarding Mattedoddi ryots.

should be taken. Naturally we must not go against law and justice, but the attempt should always be made not to leave a trail of bitterness behind.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 17. Question of Direct Approach to the Prime Minister<sup>1</sup>

Normally it is not desirable to encourage servicemen to address the Prime Minister directly. Nevertheless, the door should always be open for a direct approach to the Prime Minister. I have often stated this in public and I do not wish to close it, whatever the rules and regulations might be. Therefore, no disciplinary action should be taken because the person concerned wrote a letter to me.

1. Note to the Principal Private Secretary, 5 March 1953. JN Collection.

## 18. To Mahavir Tyagi<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
March 8, 1953

My dear Mahavir,

I understand that you have been dealing for some time with a file regarding Ramakrishna Dalmia's transactions with the Bharat Insurance Company.<sup>2</sup> This indicates, so I am told, that the Bharat Insurance Company's monies are being used and misapplied in many ways for bolstering up Dalmia's other concerns; that Dalmia's other properties are sold at fantastic prices to the Bharat Insurance Company; that some of Dalmia's shares, which have no market value, are sold at face value to the Bharat Insurance Company; further that, for a certain period,

1. Mahavir Tyagi Papers, NMML.
2. An industrialist who was charged with criminal conspiracy and breach of trust for allegedly diverting the funds of the Bharat Insurance Company to meet the loans incurred by the Bharat Union Agencies for purchase of shares.



the Bharat Insurance Company disposed of the minimum Government Securities that they were supposed to possess, and other charges.

This is, of course, a serious matter and I hope that you will deal with it as rapidly as possible. As soon as you have looked into it, I should like to know how it stands, so that legal opinion can be taken.<sup>3</sup>

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Legal proceedings commencing against Dalmia in 1955 resulted in Supreme Court decision on 5 April 1962 sentencing him to two years' simple imprisonment.

## 19. Invitations under US Leaders Programme<sup>1</sup>

You sent me the other day a list of persons, which the US Embassy had given to you. This was of persons they intended inviting under the Leaders Programme to visit America. I have indicated that no Minister or Deputy Minister of the Central or State Governments should accept any such invitation. I would add that no official of the Central or State Government should accept it either.

2. I noticed in that list one name, which has come into some prominence in the UP recently. This was that of Shri Raj Narain.<sup>2</sup> He is a leader of an Opposition group in the UP Assembly. A few days ago, he had to be bodily removed from the Assembly Chamber, because of his disobeying the Speaker. It is obvious that such a person, against whom some action has been taken in the Assembly by the Speaker, would hardly be a suitable person to be invited by the US Government. I have no personal objection to his going, but I am merely pointing out that the choice made by the US representatives is often not very happy.

3. Sometimes they invite well-known communal leaders of India. This would inevitably make people to think that they wish to encourage the communal elements here, who are entirely opposed to Government and who are likely to run down the Government of India if they go to America.

1. Note to the Chief of Protocol, 10 March 1953. File No S/53/7061/70, MEA.
2. (1917-1987); Member, Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly, 1952-57; Member, Rajya Sabha, 1966-72 and 1974-77; Chairman, Socialist Party, 1961; President, All India Socialist Party, 1961-64; General Secretary, All India Socialist Party, 1965-66; Central Minister for Health and Family Welfare, 1977-79.

## 20. To K.N. Katju<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
March 12, 1953

My dear Kailas Nath,

I understand that Seth Achal Singh<sup>2</sup> led a deputation to you asking for a holiday for Mahabir Jayanti. I hope you will not agree to this. But you will remember that we have already agreed to the Baisakhi Purnima (Buddha Jayanti) being included in our list of holidays. I do not know if this has been announced yet.

Yours,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No 33(94)/50-PMS.
2. (1895-1983); actively participated in Bharat Jain Mahamandal and All India Mahavir Jayanti Committee activities since 1934; President, Agra City Congress Committee, 1969; Member, Legislative Assembly, UP, 1936-39 and 1946-52; Member, Lok Sabha, 1952-76; Member, Parliament Consultative Committees for Food and Agriculture, Commerce, Finance and Railways, 1958-66.

## 21. To C.D. Deshmukh<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
March 22, 1953

My dear Deshmukh,

Your letter of March 20th was placed before me this morning and I have just read it carefully. Thank you for taking so much trouble to explain the approach to this problem and the procedure which is followed.

I am entirely at one with you that we should exercise the fullest control on public funds. Also that we should not worry about popularity or unpopularity in a matter of this kind. Our responsibility is great and we cannot shoulder it by merely trying to please somebody or other at some time.

I am glad you are thinking of increasing your senior Financial Advisers in the other Ministries. I am sure that this is a step really towards economy.

You have mentioned the inevitable tendency of spending Departments to be somewhat irresponsible. It is obviously necessary for some check to be applied to this tendency. The difficulty, I suppose, is that the more the checks,

1. JN Collection.



the more the tendency for irresponsibility in the particular spending Department. In a small measure, that might be compared to the whole business of self-government. Too much control at the top breeds lack of responsibility below. At the same time, and more especially in regard to expenditure of public funds, we cannot take the risk of large-scale wastage or mis-application of funds in an attempt to develop that sense of responsibility. Therefore, some middle way has to be found which leads to the development of that feeling of responsibility in the Ministry concerned and, at the same time, provides effective checks against any real mistake being made.

I agree with you that mere allocation of money in a budget cannot be considered as adequate sanction. The scheme has to be examined from the financial, as from the other points of view. That examination and scrutiny will take place, of course, by the Financial Adviser and his staff. The question is whether this is enough or whether this has further to be examined in the Finance Ministry.

In the event of the Financial Adviser (I presume, he is a senior and experienced man) being satisfied after his scrutiny or his advice has been accepted by the Ministry concerned, is it necessary for the whole matter to be reviewed by the Finance Ministry? In the event of there being a difference of opinion on some major issue between the Financial Adviser and the Ministry concerned, then someone has to decide the matter. The Finance Ministry might well consider it more fully and ultimately the two Ministers may discuss it.

I am putting forward to you some thoughts that strike me immediately. They are not exactly suggestions because I am not fully conversant with the procedures.

Would it be possible to isolate rather major items of expenditure for a more detailed scrutiny by the Finance Ministry than need be applied to the relatively minor items? To some extent this might be so already, though I have had instances of small things being delayed. Thus, in regard to what I call the relatively minor items, the concurrence of the Financial Adviser should be adequate and no further reference need be made to the Finance Ministry. The major schemes should certainly be fully examined.

The general impression I have got is that far too many of the smaller items take up the time of the Finance Ministry and lead to delay. This delay may be very costly if it means, perhaps, hanging up some major scheme which is already functioning. In the case, let us say, of a river valley scheme, large sums are involved and the fullest scrutiny is necessary. But sometimes some petty proposal cannot be finalized on the spot and has to be referred to headquarters here. It goes backwards and forwards between the Ministry concerned and the Finance Ministry and probably takes a considerable time before it is finalized. It may well be that this delay has been very costly in the long run and some important work has been hung up. Some procedure might be evolved for responsible



men to decide it on the spot without reference to the Ministries here. I am referring, of course, to matters not involving heavy expenditure. This may be some petty appointment or some petty purchase.

The other day I saw a letter from the Chief Minister of Orissa. He said that the Advisory or Control Board of the Hirakud Project, of which he was a Member, could make little or no progress because every minor matter had to be referred for sanction to New Delhi. The Financial Adviser attached appeared to be a little nervous of giving sanctions without reference to Delhi. That delayed matters and produced some sense of frustration. On the one hand we are working almost round the clock in these major schemes with three shifts. On the other hand, some petty appointment holds up work.

People on the spot become more and more afraid of shouldering responsibility lest they might get into trouble. That is unhealthy development. The American Chief Engineers or Special Experts fume and fret because they are used to quick decisions.

Ultimately, it seems a question of giving greater responsibility to the Financial Adviser on the spot, presuming he is good, and of making some division between major items and minor items.

The instance you give about the Education Ministry is certainly a case in which the Finance Ministry appears to have been completely right.

As I said in my previous letter, two things worry me—the growth of financial irresponsibility in the Ministries and their feeling that they have nothing to do with this matter as Finance is looking after it and, secondly, the problem of delay which is costly and produces frustration.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 22. To G.B. Pant<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
March 24, 1953

My dear Pantji,

I enclose an extract from a letter<sup>2</sup> received from Bishop J. Wadkom Pickett. I

1. File No 2(238)/48-PMS.
2. In his letter of 25 February 1953, the Bishop referred to the police enquiries about the missionary activities and urged the Government to take action which would ensure that no harm was done to the Christian community.

shall be glad if you will kindly enquire into this matter. I do not like the look of this and I do not see why there should be an element of persecution on our behalf of Christians who are Indians. This has a certain international aspect also though I am much more concerned with the national aspect.

I also give a cutting from a letter which refers to the attack on a certain Mr Stephens<sup>3</sup> on the occasion of Holi and his death as a consequence.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. The *Crusader* of Delhi reported on 28 February 1953 that at Gorakhpur, on *Holi* day, a crowd threw colours on Stephens of Basharatpur while he was going to the hospital. In the ensuing scuffle he succumbed to his injuries.

## II. FOREIGN AFFAIRS

### 1. To N.R. Pillai<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
January 4, 1953

My dear N.R.,<sup>2</sup>

Some days ago R.K. Nehru<sup>3</sup> gave me the enclosed copy of a letter which had been addressed to you from our Embassy in Tehran. It is, I take it, a signed letter from a person in our employ. It is not normally proper for a junior officer in our employ to write directly in this way. Reading the letter, I am inclined to think that the writer is not a person to be relied upon. He makes sweeping allegations about everybody. At the same time I have a feeling of grave disquiet left in my mind. There are specific allegations and when such charges are made, we should not or cannot allow matters to rest where they are without enquiry.

2. How is one to conduct an enquiry? It would not be proper to have a special enquiry in regard to these charges. If junior officers had been concerned, we could ask the Ambassador to do it, but that is out of the question when the Ambassador himself is concerned. I think that we should have our normal inspection which should consist of an officer of our Ministry and an officer from Finance. They should inspect the office and the books and records fully. The officer of our Ministry might be privately told about these allegations.

1. JN Collection.

2. N.R. Pillai, Secretary General, MEA, Government of India.

3. Foreign Secretary, MEA, Government of India.



3. As a matter of fact, it seems to me essential that we should have regular inspections of this kind of all our Missions abroad. There have been some inspections in Europe, but so far as I can remember, there have been none in our Asian Missions and elsewhere also. We should definitely take this matter in hand. The inspection would be of course not limited to Tehran but should extend to other places also. As a result of that inspection and report, we can decide what else to do.

4. I think that we should also think afresh about various postings in our foreign Missions. This had been postponed in view of the proposed reorganization of our headquarters office. Both might be expedited and looked at together. Some persons have been holding a post for a considerable time and deserve a transfer. I do not mind an Ambassador going beyond the normal three years if he is doing really well, though normally too long a stay is not good.

5. I sent you a letter from Malik<sup>4</sup> from Paris in which he said that he had been away from India for about five years or more and wanted to come back. There is some justification in what he says. At the same time I do not quite know where to send him....

9. I should really like you to look at the whole list of our Missions abroad and see where it is necessary to make a change.

10. I am a little worried also about the senior officers in the Central Government here. We have often talked about changing them or sending some of them to the States. Everybody agrees that it is desirable to get fresh people from the States from time to time and to revert those who have served for a number of years in Delhi so that they might come into closer touch with State work. It is a bad thing for Central Government officers to be isolated more and more from the States. We tend to develop separate cadres, one lot who are fixtures in the Central Government and others who remain in the States. Those who had been here a long time should, I think, revert where possible and some fresh blood should be brought here from the States. C.C. Desai<sup>5</sup> has been here a fairly long time and for this as well as other reasons, it would be good to have a change.

11. I should like you and Sukthankar to consider this matter together and then we can have a talk. We have discussed this previously often enough, but

4. H.S. Malik was India's Ambassador in France and also Minister to Norway at this time.

5. Desai was Secretary in the Ministry of Works, Housing and Supply and Ministry of Production.



nothing seems to emerge out of these discussions. I think we should go ahead in the course of the next two or three months.

12. I might mention to you that I am not at all satisfied with the way the States Ministry has functioned in the past. I have no particular grievance against Venkatachar<sup>6</sup> or his associates there individually. But I have a sensation of slow and ineffective work. Matters are delayed and the outlook continues to be rather that of the old Political Department.

13. What about R.S. Mani?<sup>7</sup>

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. C.S. Venkatachar was Secretary in the Ministry of States.

7. P.R.S. Mani was Commissioner in Hong Kong in 1953.

## 2. To Asaf Ali<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
February 2, 1953

My dear Asaf,<sup>2</sup>

The Foreign Secretary has shown me your letter to him dated 23rd January.<sup>3</sup> I have read this with interest, more especially your account of the Consistoire which took place in St. Peter's on the 15th January.

I confess that I do not like the Vatican or the Cardinals expecting us to treat them in the manner they suggest. I am not prepared for that and I will have no hesitation at all in telling them so if and when opportunity arises. It is fantastic nonsense for us to be told that a Cardinal is above the Prime Minister and President. There is no question of skating on thin ice here but of telling them quite freely and frankly that we look at things in a different way. If a Cardinal comes to Delhi, we shall treat him, according to our protocol and not anyone else's and he will be no more than an Ambassador.

I do not see why we should allow ourselves anywhere, in India or outside,

1. File No 2(663)/53-PMS. Extracts.

2. He was India's Ambassador in Switzerland at this time.

3. Archbishop Gracias was appointed a Cardinal alongwith 23 others at the four-day ceremony in St. Peter's Basilica in Rome.

to take second place. As you have said in your letter, if we give any very special place to the Cardinals, there is no reason why we should not give that place to our Shankaracharyas, high priests, patriarchs and the like, who abound in this country. If the Indian Cardinal visits Delhi and wishes to see me, he will be treated exactly as any Ambassador and no more. In fact, he came to me in a deputation a little before he became a Cardinal and I treated the deputation with all courtesy, but exactly like any other deputation that might come to me.

The Roman Catholic Church has a way of pushing itself which I do not fancy. That is why I suggested to you in my telegram sent some time ago that you need not go out of your way on this occasion of the appointment of Cardinals. That is also a reason why we did not wish to raise the status of our representative to the Vatican.

We give the normal courtesies to Roman Catholic prelates here, because they represent, in a religious sense, a large community in India. We give exactly the same courtesy to other dignitaries of different faiths, but all of them have to realize that it is the State in India that is supreme and not any Church. This has to be stated in the clearest possible manner and if the Vatican does not like it, I am sorry I cannot help it.

When the Indian Cardinal visits Berne, as you suggest he might do, please see to it that you observe our protocol on the occasion, if necessity arises, and not the Vatican protocol. Bishops in this country have to keep their place, which is not very high and certainly they are not above Ambassadors. There are all kinds of Bishops apart from Roman Catholic ones.

When I received a deputation of Catholic Bishops headed by the Archbishop of Bombay (now the Cardinal), they raised the question of religious endowment legislation in Bombay and Madhya Pradesh. I made it clear to them that they will have to deal in this matter with the State Governments concerned, who would, no doubt, try to meet any legitimate grievances, but who would have to deal with this matter as something common to various religious faiths. We cannot have special rules for the Roman Catholic faith because of their canonical decrees and the like. If this question is raised before you again, you should refer them to the Government of India or even to the State Government concerned, who are autonomous in this respect.

In a previous letter, you said something about the British Ambassador referring to our swearing allegiance to the Crown. I think I sent you an answer to them. The question of swearing allegiance, of course, does not and cannot arise. As a matter of fact, we can go much further and we have made it clear to the authorities in London that, while we are in the Commonwealth, we are in an entirely different position from the other countries of the Commonwealth, because we are a Republic and owe no allegiance to the Crown of England. Therefore, we have not agreed even to participate in some formal ceremonies which indirectly might indicate that we are showing allegiance. You will



appreciate that this question raises a storm of protests in India. Some newspaper article in Bonn which was mistranslated here created a scene in Parliament as it referred to India's allegiance to the British Crown....

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

### 3. Cable to Asaf Ali<sup>1</sup>

Please refer to my letter dated 2nd February.<sup>2</sup> Position of Cardinal Gracias.<sup>3</sup> We are informed that nomination to Cardinalate is a personal honour within the Church and does not make any difference to his status here from the administrative and jurisdictional points of view. He will, therefore, continue to be treated here as previously as Archbishop of Bombay. As a matter of courtesy, he has been given precedence in Bombay on formal occasions immediately below State Ministers. We propose to maintain this position.

You will appreciate that any special status given to him would result in great difficulties in India where there are many churches and other heads of denominations. He will thus not have the position of an Ambassador as I had casually mentioned.

1. New Delhi, 7 February 1953. File No 2(663)/53-PMS.

2. See the preceding item.

3. Cardinal Valerian Gracias (1900-1978); ordained as priest, 1926; appointed Auxiliary Bishop of Bombay, 1948 and Archbishop of Bombay, 1950; nominated as Cardinal, 1952; President, Catholic Bishops Conference of India, 1954-71; awarded Padma Vibhushan, 1966; author of several books including *The Vatican and International Policy*, *The Decline of Public Morals and the Chief Duties of Christians as Citizens*.



#### 4. Political Appraisal of the Situation in Europe<sup>1</sup>

2. ... I should like to know what kind of reports have been coming from Paris and Rome as well as other places which I have not mentioned above. I want to judge of the quality of the reports. An Ambassador is supposed to send periodically a political analysis of the situation. That analysis not only helps us to understand a particular situation from the point of view of different capitals and from the point of view of the Ambassador concerned, but also helps us to evaluate the quality of the Ambassador and his work. That work does not merely consist of formal or social engagements, but of keeping in touch with currents of thought and opinion and forces at work. It is not enough to send a report containing a list of facts which can be gathered from the newspapers. The Ambassador should, of course, keep in close touch with the Foreign Office concerned as well as other important sections of opinion. These contacts should not only be on the strictly official level, but also informal which normally yield greater results.

3. I have an impression that some of our Heads of Missions do not fully realize what their duty is in regard to this matter. I propose to write to them, but before I do so I want to know what the position is in regard to the reports received from them.

4. Europe, in particular, is to some extent an organic unit from the political point of view and, in order to understand the position there, we have to view it from different angles. Therefore, it is important that we should have full political appraisals of the situation in Europe from every Mission in Europe, apart from the local situation in the country.

5. I want to have some idea also of what work a Mission does, that is, is the Mission fully occupied or not? Is it over-staffed or under-staffed from the point of view of work? If enough work is not being done and the staff is not occupied, it will have to be reduced.

1. Note to Commonwealth Secretary, 5 March 1953. JN Collection. Extracts.



## CONGRESS PRESIDENTSHIP





## I. PARTY AFFAIRS

1. The Danger of Disruptive Forces<sup>1</sup>

...The primary duty and responsibility of this Committee lies in carrying the Congress message to the masses and in developing close contact with them to win their confidence and support. In fact every effort must be made by this Congress Committee to combat the communal organizations and reactionary forces in the country and to counter their baneful propaganda which is being carried on by them to the great detriment of the country. As regards other rival political parties, except the Communists there can be no misgivings about their intentions or attitude towards the Congress.

All such organizations and movements like the Praja Parishad of Jammu, the Jan Sangh, the RSS, the Hindu Mahasabha, Master Tara Singh's Akali Dal and the anti-cow-slaughter movement are only intended to raise issues and bogeys to divert the public attention and make people communal-minded. The great success achieved in the difficult task of rehabilitation of refugees from Pakistan redounds to the credit of the Congress Government. It is no mean achievement, and even outsiders are full of praise for it. But the reactionary elements outside the Congress are constantly trying to discredit the good work of the Congress and present a distorted and gloomy picture of the country before the outsiders.

Merely indulging in self-condemnation day in and day out does not help. The UP State Congress must rise to the occasion and play its role worthily in shaping the destiny of the State and the country. The doors of the Congress are always wide open to welcome back those who have left the party, provided they return in a penitent mood, and are prepared to submit to the Congress discipline.

Congressmen must put forth every effort to create enthusiasm among the people for the Five Year Plan and win their full cooperation for its implementation.

Although the Congress organization is not altogether free from defects, every effort is being made to rid the Congress of its weaknesses and shortcomings. In this connection about twenty-six important Congress leaders in the country have been especially deputed to attend to the grievances and complaints in connection with the election of Congress delegates and other Congress elections. I want the State Congress to take steps to effectively check enrolment of bogus members as also other malpractices in connection with elections. The need for proper organization and discipline is essential...

1. Address at the meeting of the Uttar Pradesh Provincial Congress Committee, Lucknow, 3 January 1953. From the *National Herald*, 4 January 1953. Extracts.

## 2. The Responsibility of the Congress<sup>1</sup>

This is the first occasion when the annual session of the Congress is being held in an important city in the South. We are glad to see that the arrangements made by the Reception Committee are extremely satisfactory. In the past, resolutions passed by the Congress were mere expressions of opinion on a number of subjects. Later, the Congress became an active organization, working throughout the year. After passing resolutions, the Congress had also to carry them out. It had to take the lead for revolutionary or semi-revolutionary cause, for constructive activity or for launching direct struggle against imperialism. Gradually, however, the Congress started reverting to the practice of merely passing resolutions. I suppose we have to find a balance between the two because we have to express our opinion and act on major issues. It is for your consideration how far, not only here but afterwards, in the organization the Congress can function from now onwards as something infinitely more than a resolution-passing body.

The Congress is now charged with the responsibility of guiding and directing the Central Government and the State Governments. It is a tremendous responsibility. In the final analysis, the responsibility is held by the entire Congress Party, but to a lesser extent, by the All India Congress Committee. That responsibility cannot be discharged by merely passing resolutions. It should be borne in mind that the resolutions passed by the Congress have to be given effect to. Therefore, every resolution must be considered, first from the point of its urgent need, and secondly, from the point of its implementation. It is no longer a question of mere expression of opinion. Every question has to be examined not only on its merits but also on the impact it would have on other problems. It is necessary that we focus our deliberations on a few important subjects rather than involving ourselves in too many problems, major and minor.

At present, the world is torn with strife and threats of war and, therefore, all relevant issues have to be dealt with with utmost care and attention. All questions we take up have a bearing on hundreds of other problems affecting various nations.

The real problem is the national one and that, in the ultimate analysis, is the economic problem. The foreign policy of a nation should always be its strength and that strength itself is dependent on the economic condition of the people....

1. Speech at the Subjects Committee meeting of the Indian National Congress in Hyderabad, 15 January 1953. From *The Hindu* and *The Bombay Chronicle*, 16 January 1953. Extracts.



Even within a period of five and half years of independence, India's influence has been felt on world affairs. The influence of a country in world affairs is directly linked with the internal economic strength of the country. It is, therefore, important that the country's attention should be concentrated on the economic problems. The Five Year Plan has been prepared for improving the economic conditions of the people of the country.

The Five Year Plan is not something rigid but flexible and can be changed if necessary; but the very fact that such a plan has been prepared is being praised by many people in the country and abroad. It is the duty of the Congressmen to create a conducive atmosphere in the country for the implementation of the Five Year Plan. It is necessary that the energies and the attention of the nation should not be diverted to other issues.

### 3. Task Before Volunteers<sup>1</sup>

The great task of achieving freedom has been accomplished. A greater task of building the nation now lies ahead. The strength of India lies in the unity of her people. In this task the Seva Dal has no mean part to play.

The Seva Dal was formed about twenty-eight years ago and during this period there have been so many changes. In some States the Seva Dal has made admirable progress and in some it has not. Mr Hardikar<sup>2</sup> and some others have been in the organization from the beginning.

The country always needs service, but as times change the mode of service also changes. The volunteers should now understand what mode of service they have to render, and having understood that, they should perform it in a disciplined and systematic manner.

We are glad to hear that the Seva Dal volunteers are working in the community project centres. Our aim now should be that of building a new Bharat and this has to be accomplished by the millions of people living in this country. Everyone has to contribute his or her mite to this great task of building up a new India.

1. Address to Congress Seva Dal rally in Hyderabad, 15 January 1953. From the *National Herald* and the *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, 16 January 1953.
2. N.S. Hardikar, *Sanchalak* of the All India Congress Seva Dal, who guided the activities and functioning of the Seva Dal during the Congress Session at Hyderabad.

#### 4. Amendments to the Congress Constitution<sup>1</sup>

This Congress ratifies the changes made by the All India Congress Committee at its session at Indore in the Constitution of the Congress. In view of certain irregularities and malpractices that have been reported from some parts of the country in connection with the election of delegates for the AICC and in the enrolment of members, the Congress directs the Working Committee to review the entire question of enrolment of members, scrutiny of active members and candidates and other matters connected therewith, with a view to suggesting such changes in the Constitution that may be found necessary to maintain the integrity and efficiency in the working of the organization. The Working Committee may appoint a special committee for this purpose. The Working Committee will forward its own recommendations to the All India Congress Committee which is authorized to take necessary steps under Article 30 for the amendment of the Constitution.<sup>2</sup>

1. Resolution drafted by Nehru on 15 January for the Hyderabad Congress Session. JN Collection. On 19 January 1953, at the meeting of the Subjects Committee, S.K. Patil moved this resolution and Balwantray Mehta seconded it. It was passed at the plenary session on 18 January.
2. Speaking on the resolution, Nehru asked the Congressmen not to think that changes in the Constitution would result in a miracle. The people in charge of affairs must act in a responsible way. He further said that the questions of bogus memberships and other irregularities arose only in organizations exercising power. And, unless the whole atmosphere was changed and the people realized their responsibility, no rules, however strict, would be useful.

#### 5. Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan<sup>1</sup>


This Congress has learnt with great concern of the continuing illness of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, who has been kept in prison in Pakistan for the last five years. Khan Sahib's memory is cherished both in India and Pakistan as a man

1. Resolution drafted by Nehru and passed on 15 January at the Subjects Committee meeting at the Hyderabad Congress Session. It was adopted at the plenary session on 18 January 1953. JN Collection.



WITH K. KAMARAJ AND OTHERS AT THE AICC SESSION, HYDERABAD, 14 JANUARY 1953





ADDRESSING THE INAUGURAL MEETING OF THE ALL INDIA KHADI AND VILLAGE INDUSTRIES BOARD, NEW DELHI.  
2 FEBRUARY 1953

of truth and peace, and as one of the bravest and noblest soldiers of freedom, whose life has been a shining example of service and sacrifice, and who taught the brave Pathans the way of non-violence and peaceful struggle for righteous causes. It is a grievous and shameful tragedy that the man who helped us greatly in bringing freedom to India and Pakistan and whom any nation would have delighted to honour, should become a victim of the very independence that his labours helped to bring. In the days of India's subjection to foreign rule, he spent the best years of his life in the hard prisons of the North West Frontier Province. The same prisons have claimed him even after independence, and not even his continuing and grave illness has brought him release from this unending confinement.

This Congress sends its respectful greetings and homage to Khan Sahib.<sup>2</sup>

2. Commending the resolution, Nehru stated that it might be asked why the Congress had not adopted the resolution all these five years. It was felt that if "we talk about him, possibly, the authorities in Pakistan who have sometimes an extraordinarily wrong way of looking at things, would become suspicious and the resolution might defeat the very purpose for which it was passed. Any attempt to do so might have encouraged the governing authorities of Pakistan to make all kinds of false charges against him... i, however, feel that the time has come when we should express ourselves openly and fully on the subject."

## 6. The National Flag<sup>1</sup>

It is not appropriate that the National Flag be hoisted by each and every individual on all occasions. It can never be used in an agitation or a demonstration or at the time of elections. It cannot be used or displayed on every occasion. It cannot be just flown on a building, kept on a car or displayed in a shop. It then tantamounts to using the flag for serving personal ends. The National Flag has to be highly respected and could not be allowed to be used or exploited for a wrong purpose. If everybody displays the National Flag or uses it for self-aggrandizement, it is the most improper thing conceivable.

Therefore, strict rules have been made in India just as in other countries

1. Address at a meeting of the Subjects Committee of the Congress, Hyderabad, 16 January 1953. From *The Tribune*, 17 January 1953.



listing the names of the individuals who are entitled to use it on other days. In India the flag could be used freely on Republic Day, Gandhi Jayanti Day or such other dates fixed by the Government. Otherwise, specific individuals are allowed to use it.

From the speech of Shaikh Abdullah, it is now very clear that the Jammu Praja Parishad has no particular love for Union Flag. The flag they used at the Jammu Conference was not the Indian National Flag but the flag of the Maharaja.

## 7. Congress as Strong as Ever<sup>1</sup>

The Congress is not a weak organization as is alleged by some but a strong organization with a long record of service to the people.

Those who allege that the Congress is not strong are themselves neither strong nor steady. Some persons ask what the future of the Congress will be when there is a decline of spirit in the whole organization. While there may be some truth in this, I cannot agree that there is no spirit left in the organization. I have been touring various parts of the country constantly and meeting old friends and making new ones. In the past three days, the people have witnessed the strength of the Congress Party. The strength of the Party does not lie in the elaborate arrangements which have been made to receive the visitors, but because persons from different parts of the country have come here to suggest how best the organization is to progress in the future. A number of young men have come under the Congress flag. Does all this indicate that there is a lack of enthusiasm in the Congress?

The people who allege that the Congress is weak are themselves far from strong. With due apologies to the women volunteers and other women present, it is only women who use words like "weak". Please do not use such words.

The National Flag, represents the country and its history. With slight changes, the Congress flag became the National Flag, the *charkha* was replaced by the Ashoka *Chakra* which stood for peace and prosperity. When the country became free, they had to link the past, the present and the future. This has been achieved through the present National Flag. It represents the past period

1. Speech after unfurling the Congress flag at the meeting of the AICC, Hyderabad, 17 January 1953. From *The Hindu*, 18 January 1953. Extracts.



of struggle for the independence of the country, and is a sign of progress for the future.

Hyderabad too has a great history of its own. The Golkonda Fort is a symbol of this. In fact, there are many such historical places in the country which remind us of thousands of years of the country's history.

The people should think of themselves as citizens of the Indian Republic and not as people coming from a particular region of India, not because they belong to a particular State but because they are Indians.

The caste system in India is deplorable and its continuance will weaken the country. I appeal to the people to remove it altogether. Not only should the caste system go but also there should be some kind of social equality for the unity and progress of the country.

The Congress in the past had fought many battles for the freedom of the country and won them. This is because of its inherent strength. The history of the freedom struggle led by the Congress will be written in letters of gold in any attempt at writing the history of modern India.

## 8. Presidential Address<sup>1</sup>

I am here at your bidding. I need hardly tell you how very greatly I appreciate this honour and the confidence and affection that accompanied it. And yet, I feel a little unhappy that I should have been chosen once again as Congress President.<sup>2</sup> I agree entirely with those friends and comrades of ours who have objected to the high offices of Prime Minister and Congress President, being held by one and the same person.<sup>3</sup> I tried hard that this should not occur and pleaded with my comrades in the Congress to make some other choice, but their insistence and the circumstances were against me in this matter. I felt that for me to go on saying "No", in spite of the advice of so many of my valued colleagues, would not be proper. Facts and circumstances hemmed me in and I had no alternative left but to accept, in all humility, this position of high responsibility. I did so in the faith that you will help me to shoulder the burden

1. Fifty-Eighth Session of the Indian National Congress, Hyderabad, 17 January 1953. *The Hindu*, 18 January 1953.

2. Nehru was elected the Congress President for the sixth time.

3. For example, Purushottamdas Tandon, while resigning from the Congress Working Committee on 30 December 1952, strongly felt that the office of the Prime Minister and the President of the Congress should not be held by the same person.

and that our faith in the great tasks which face the Congress and the country will inspire me to put forth such strength and energy as still remain with me.

We meet after fifteen months. During this period, we have had our General Elections and new Governments have been formed at the Centre and in all the States of India. All but one of these Governments<sup>4</sup> owe allegiance to the principles and policies laid down by the Congress. This is a tremendous responsibility not only for those who are directly associated with these Governments, but for this great organization which has brought India's independence and which has to take us along the next stage of our long journey as well. Unlike all other groups and parties in India, we have to face our problems with our responsibility in Government and not merely negatively in opposition or in an academic manner which need pay little attention to the realities that face us. Because of this and because of the past history of the Congress, we cannot function along narrow and party lines. Always we must think in terms of the country as a whole and shape all our action with that larger end in view. Whenever we fail to do so and fall into the narrow grooves of party politics, or, still think of group advantage, we stray from the ideals that have given us strength and from the basic outlook of the Congress. We make ourselves less effective and less in tune with the spirit of our great national movement. We are, however, a party and we must have the discipline of a party. This is vital and essential. But we are much more than a party also, and must always keep their wider vision before us always.

Some of our old comrades have left us<sup>5</sup> and formed other groups and parties. Some who left us have come back to us and they<sup>6</sup> have been welcomed. We bear no illwill to those who might have left our ranks owing to differences of principle or of conviction. If their aim is to serve the causes which are dear to us, we shall always willingly cooperate with them and if they choose to come back to the Congress, they will always be welcome. Only those whose objectives or methods are completely alien to those of the Congress can find no place in this organization. We have been wedded in our domestic as well as our international policy to methods of peace. Those who believe in violence must go their own way and will have to be opposed by us with all our strength. So also those who believe in separatism of any kind, whether it is communalism or provincialism, have to be opposed, for they would break up the

4.

the general elections for the House of the  
1952. On 18 April 1952, following  
Front Ministry was formed

resigned from  
the



unity of India, obstruct and delay our progress and even imperil our hard-won freedom.

The General Elections bore evidence, which the world recognized, that democracy had deep roots in our country and that our people had discipline and good sense. The elections demonstrated, yet again, the faith of the people in the Congress and its ideals.

We have tremendous problems to face in our country and in the world. We would have liked to concentrate our energy on the development of our own country and the advancement of our people and, as far as possible, not to get entangled in international affairs. We have no ambition to guide others or for leadership elsewhere. Our own tasks are heavy enough to absorb all our energy and strength. But we cannot choose our destiny. India, free and independent, cannot escape from or ignore her responsibilities to the world or as a member of the comity of nations. Nor will the world ignore her or exempt her from such responsibilities. There is something of the inevitability of destiny in the way India is compelled by circumstances, even against our wishes, to take an ever-increasing part in the world affairs. We have to accept that destiny and try to live up to it. Even though we have no great power in the shape of organized armed might or great economic and financial power, India is respected more and more in the councils of the nations. It is only five years since we attained our independence. In these brief five years, India has built up for herself a position which commands respect and which brings additional responsibilities. There are hardly any instances in history of a country establishing itself in this way during the first five years of its freedom.

In the political sphere, from this larger point of view, we have succeeded to an extent which is not only surprising but is embarrassing to us. What of our internal conditions and our economic position? The basic strength of a nation does not come from political activity, but from economic strength. That is the key to its own security and its progress. It is out of that that political strength comes. We have many critics in our own country who tell us that little has been done and our pace is slow. I welcome criticism and nothing is worse in this respect than complacency. Even in our ranks of the Congress, there are many critics. It is right that we should never be satisfied with what we do and should ever aim higher and farther. And yet, it is significant that competent observers who look at India from afar, or who come to India and see what has been done, have expressed their astonishment at the progress made during these five years and have sensed a certain excitement at the way this ancient country is renewing her youth and building herself anew. Perhaps we are too near our own achievements to judge of them correctly. Those achievements stand out and, I have no doubt, will be recorded in history.

In the world today there is much disharmony, friction and conflict between nations and races. There is a disturbing lack of equilibrium. The ominous spectre



of war and mounting armaments are ever before us. Fear dominates men's minds and the policies of nations and the resources of the world are disproportionately allocated to preparation for or against war according to how one looks at it. Old empires fell before the advancing tide of nationalism or faded away. New countries came into existence and grew in strength and power. This fact was not easily understood or appreciated by people used to the old world which had passed away. They ignored facts and tried to struggle against them. Even now, some colonial powers cling on to the remnants of their empire, though it is patent that imperialism and colonialism are doomed, and that the urges and determination to win national freedom cannot be put down. Our place is with those who, like ourselves in the past, seek the freedom of their motherland.

The great revolutionary forces of science and technology have transformed human life and changed not only political, social and economic organizations, but have also changed even human thought. New philosophies develop and traditional beliefs fade away. Nevertheless, old traditions hold, even when they are demonstrably untrue, and superstitions flourish in this country, as elsewhere. In spite of the world becoming more and more one in many respects, national rivalries continue. Education spreads, but does not bring either wisdom or vision. Countries think that their policy or outlook is in the nature of self-evident truth and not to accept it is regarded as a denial almost of some divine law. And so, those who do not accept their views are considered wicked and almost enemies. It is curious that in this age of science, we seem to have less of the true spirit of criticism, of tolerance and receptivity to other views and ideas, which are the basis of scientific thinking. It has become an ominous possibility that science might lead to the extinction of the human race.

In the world today, the two largest and most powerful countries are the United States of America and the Soviet Union. From the point of view of population and potential resources alone, there are two other countries, China and India, both relatively undeveloped yet. East and South East Asia contain the largest aggregate of human populations, no longer quiescent but demanding the good things of life. These are basic facts from which far-reaching consequences flow.

The foreign policy of a country must depend on the facts of the world situation and on the strength of the country itself. Wishful thinking does not alter such facts or add to that strength. Our foreign policy is based on friendly relations with all countries and no interference with any. It is never easy to sustain such a policy and more especially when there is so much bitterness and mutual suspicion in the world and when every move by any one party is suspected. Nevertheless, I am happy to say that our relations with other countries are good. The only country which unfortunately is somewhat of an exception to this is our neighbour, Pakistan. One recognizes that it is not easy to forget

recent history or to heal the deep wounds caused during the past few years. We have, however, always held that it is essential to establish and maintain friendly and cooperative relations with Pakistan. This is in our mutual interest and would be an example to the world of good neighbourly relations and a contribution to peace itself. Despite disappointments and provocations, we have striven consistently to this end. Unfortunately the response from the other side has been disappointing and there is frequent talk even of war against us.<sup>7</sup> We cannot surrender to threats on any vital principle. In any event, we shall protect our territory and our basic interests if they are attacked.

Our policy thus has been one of friendliness as well as firmness, and we have avoided, insofar as we could, any action which might increase the tension between our country and Pakistan. Some critics of ours have called this as a policy of weakness and appeasement and suggest and demand what they call "strong" action.<sup>8</sup> This can only lead to a major conflict. That is a folly from every point of view, and I am glad that the great majority of our people are entirely opposed to it. We shall continue to pursue the policy to which I have referred because we think not only that it is the right policy, but that it yields good results both in the short run and in the long run.

We have four major points of dispute with Pakistan—Kashmir, the treatment of minorities in East Pakistan resulting in large numbers of refugees coming over, evacuee property, and canal waters. The Kashmir issue has been before the Security Council for five years and recently the Council passed a resolution which we could not accept.<sup>9</sup> During all these years we have waited patiently for a proper consideration of the problem, and yet it is most strange that the Security Council has never given thought to the basic issues underlying the Kashmir problem. Because the Security Council has ignored basic facts and tried to bypass fundamental issues, it has often gone wrong. Its last resolution to which I have referred was even contrary to some of the decisions of the UN

7. The failure of Graham's fourth attempt to effect demilitarization caused resentment and protest in Pakistan. The *Dawn*, on 14 September 1952, reminded that the hot blood of the Frontier tribesmen was boiling. At a meeting of the Muslim League on 13 October 1952, responsible leaders made some wild statements. For example, NWFP leader. Abdur Rab Nishtar, said: "Kashmir is ours and we will take it by all possible means. The battlefield is not the polling booth of an election, it requires men of bravery." India, on her part, reiterated that an attack on Kashmir would be treated as an attack on India.
8. On 28 December 1952, speaking at the All India Hindu Mahasabha session at Bhopal, N.C. Chatterjee, its President, called upon Nehru to redeem his pledge given to the Hindus of East Pakistan and give up his policy of "drift and vacillation" towards Pakistan.
9. Vijayalakshmi Pandit, who was leading the Indian delegation to the Security Council, rejected the resolution on 8 December 1952. In her speech, her concluding remarks were: "We are always, as hitherto, willing to extend our cooperation to, and indeed to explore ourselves, every avenue which may lead to a peaceful solution of the problem."



Commission itself.<sup>10</sup> It is also opposed to the pledges and assurances we have given and from which we cannot resile. It has distressed us that two great countries should have sponsored such a resolution, which appears to us to be grossly unfair. We took this issue to the Security Council on the basis of Pakistan's aggression. Our territory had been invaded. We proposed on our own initiative a reference to the people. Even though part of our territory was in enemy occupation, we proposed a ceasefire and gave effect to it immediately. We proposed to Pakistan that both countries should make a no-war declaration.<sup>11</sup> This was refused. Constant threats of war against us have been made and we have not retaliated. The whole history of these years shows how patient and peaceful we have been in spite of aggression, invasion and continuous provocation. We have adhered to every assurance that we have given, because we have been anxious to secure a settlement by peaceful methods. We propose to continue this policy, because we are convinced that this is the right policy. But we could not keep the Jammu and Kashmir State in a condition of political and constitutional inertia waiting for something that does not eventuate because of no fault of ours. Therefore, a Constituent Assembly was convened.<sup>12</sup> This Assembly is in the process of framing the State Constitution in tune with the Constitution of India and has already passed important laws affecting land reform.<sup>13</sup> In spite of the travail that Jammu and Kashmir has gone through, the State has made progress in many directions.

Unfortunately there has been an agitation in Jammu Province which ostensibly aims at a closer union with India but, in fact, has the contrary effect.

10. The UK and the US representatives made their resolution unacceptable to India by interpolating many deviationary suggestions in their introductory speeches. For instance, the 15 July 1952 formula of the United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan on demilitarization had envisaged an armed civil force on Pakistan side and an armed military force on the Indian side, but Gladwyn Jebb, the British delegate, declared in the Security Council on 5 November 1952 that Britain never thought that such a difference in status "was consistent with a really free plebiscite." He also revived the suggestion to post "neutral" force in Kashmir which was rejected by India.
11. Nehru wrote on 17 November 1952 to Nazimuddin suggesting a joint no-war declaration, which the latter not only refused to endorse but also accused India of not observing the spirit of Nehru-Liaquat Agreement of 1950. He listed a number of hardships experienced by and atrocities committed on a number of Muslims in India, particularly in West Bengal. Nazimuddin also drew the attention of Nehru to the fact that while no communal disorders occurred in East Bengal this could not be said of India. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 20, pp. 349-54.
12. Elections took place on 15 October 1951 and the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir was convened on 31 October 1951.
13. Since the enactment of the Big Landed Estates Abolition Act, landlords had been divested of about 1,937,000 kanals of land in Kashmir State. Of this nearly, 1,350,000 kanals had been passed on to nearly 150,000 tillers and the rest had been kept by the State Government.



It is a disruptive agitation which can only do good to the enemies of the State and of India. I recognize that the people of Jammu have certain legitimate grievances and that economic conditions there are difficult. These matters should be attended to cooperatively and peacefully. The present agitation is basically communal and encouraged by communal organizations. It strikes, therefore, at the very root of the policy according to which we are trying to build up our new India.

We know that Pakistan was the child of communalism and the recent report of the Basic Principles Committee of the Pakistan Constituent Assembly makes it clear that the present leaders of Pakistan intend it to be a medieval theocracy, where non-Muslims may perhaps be tolerated but will have no equal or honourable existence.<sup>14</sup> That also makes it evident what the basic difficulty of non-Muslims in Pakistan is. It is not surprising that they are unhappy in the present and look to the future with apprehension. It is not for me to criticize the internal policies of Pakistan. But we cannot shut our eyes to a policy which creates problems for these minorities and for us. Behind this narrow communal outlook, lies a wider policy which is utterly different from that pursued by us in our country. This is evident in many ways, most noticeably in the fact that one of the bravest soldiers of freedom and peace and reconciliation, has been in prison in Pakistan for about five years.<sup>15</sup> Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan was not only our great leader but the leader of those also who live in Pakistan now and his continued incarceration is a tragedy and a portent of the first magnitude. Our hearts go out to him.

How then are we to meet this situation? Not by war or threats of war, because that is no policy but a failure of policy, and will not solve any problem, much less bring relief to those with whom we sympathize. It will only bring disaster to them and to all concerned.

Nor can we adopt the communal policy of Pakistan in retaliation or as a corrective. That policy is bound to fail in any country which adopts it, because it is wrong and out of tune with the modern age. It is strange that certain organizations in India, which raise their voices loudly against Pakistan, tend to become themselves more and more replicas of the Pakistan communal organization. Evil cannot be conquered by evil. Our policy may appear slow

14. No non-Muslim could be a member of the Muslim League, the ruling party in Pakistan. The Basic Principles Committee of the Pakistan's Constituent Assembly had laid down that Pakistan's Constitution would be based on the principles of Islam and that the Head of the State would always be a Muslim.

15. The incarceration in Pakistan of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan continued after his having been sentenced to three years' imprisonment by a local court in 1948. The Pakistan Government had declined to bring him for trial before the High Court where the charges levelled against him could be fully examined.

and might not bring immediate results. That is the fate of many a problem in the world today, but delay in achieving our objective does not mean that we should, in our excitement, adopt evil or wrong courses of action and bring about disaster. In respect of those who suffer in Pakistan and with whom we are profoundly in sympathy, it is both a wrong and a dangerous course to seek to excite others and raise expectations when we are in no position to render effective assistance. Such a course of action on our part would only render worse the position of those who already suffer.

There is the problem of evacuee properties which affects millions of people.<sup>16</sup> It is distressing that even this problem has not been solved yet. It is eminently a problem which can be dealt with dispassionately and even judicially. But all our proposals to this end have been rejected by Pakistan.

The canal waters issue<sup>17</sup> again should depend for its decision on facts and a correct appreciation of the situation. This also is capable of easy solution if the proposals we have made are accepted. I am glad that an attempt is being made now with the help of the International Bank to get at these facts. Meanwhile, entirely false charges are continuously being made in Pakistan, accusing us of having stopped the flow of water through the canals. It is unfortunate that all these questions, which raise national and international issues, should be exploited for party purposes by communal organizations in India.

The plight of the refugees is a matter which concerns the whole of India. It is not a party issue and all of us should join together in trying to help them and rehabilitate them.

The Kashmir issue has become entangled in the web of international affairs and power politics. It is not considered objectively or dispassionately and it will take all our strength and patience to resolve the entanglements.

It is an issue which requires unity of national outlook on our part. Some of our people and our communal organizations, referring often to India's culture of the past, forget the very basis of that culture, which was a long tradition of tolerance. From Buddha to Gandhiji, all the great souls of India have reminded us that it is through following right means that we achieve right ends, that it is

16. The problem of evacuee property was becoming difficult day by day, so much so that the two countries had not even agreed on a common formula for the valuation of the properties, moveable or immovable, left behind by the displaced persons on either side. Referring to India's suggestion of taking up the evacuee property issue before an international tribunal, one of Pakistan's Ministers said on 7 November 1952 that Pakistan stood for taking "all matters to the International Court of Justice."

17. The canal waters dispute over the volume of water each country could rightly claim for its canals from the Indus basin had reached a crisis point, despite the 4 May 1948 agreement by which India promised to maintain the pre-Partition quantum of water supply to Pakistan.



through tolerance and compassion that people really advance. India is a country with a basic unity, but of great variety in religion, in cultural traditions and in ways of living. It is only by mutual forbearance and respect for each other, as the great Asoka taught, that we shall build up a strong, stable and cooperative community in the whole of India. Any other approach means disruption and disaster, apart from giving up the basic tradition of our rich heritage.

Some people talk of one nation, one culture, one language. That cry reminds me of some of the fascist and Nazi slogans of old. We are one nation of course, but to try to regiment it in one way will mean discord and conflict and bitterness. It will put an end to the richness and variety of India and confine and limit the creative spirit and the joy in life of our people.

We have fourteen languages of India listed in the Eighth Schedule of our Constitution. They are all great languages, from the ancient magnificent Sanskrit, which has still so much life in it, to the other languages nurtured by our ancestors in the soil of India. We have rightly decided that Hindi should be the national language of India, because Hindi, more than others, fulfils the qualifications of a national language for this country.<sup>18</sup> We must encourage it in every way and make it a fitting vehicle for modern thought and a suitable instrument for our work and creative activity. But at the same time, we have to encourage the other great provincial languages also. There should be or need be no rivalry between them. I have been surprised to hear voices raised against Urdu. Urdu does not compete with Hindi now. It only claims a place which is its right by inheritance in the large household of India. It is our language, nurtured in our country, adding to the cultural richness of our people. Why should we reject it or consider it as something foreign? It is this spirit of intolerance, this parochial outlook, which is more dangerous for our cultural and other growth than anything else that can happen to us.

In the name of culture, we hear slogans and loud cries which have no relation to culture or the growth of the mind or spirit. In particular, the communal organizations are guilty of this narrow outlook which kills the spirit and the mind and weakens the nation. In a sense, they represent some medieval mentality; they stand for reaction in the political and the economic field, even though sometimes they talk in terms of some advanced social doctrine. They

18. Article 351 of the Constitution lays down that "it shall be the duty of the Union to promote the spread of the Hindi language, to develop it so that it may serve as a medium of expression for all the elements of the composite culture of India and to secure its enrichment by assimilating without interfering with its genius, the forms, style and expressions used in Hindustani and in other languages of India specified in the Eighth Schedule and by drawing, wherever necessary or desirable, for its vocabulary, primarily on Sanskrit and secondarily on other languages."



are the replicas in this country of what was known in Europe as fascism and Nazism.

<sup>19</sup>A considerable number of newspapers in the country are steeped in communalism. These newspapers often write that there is no communalism in the country and ask why does Nehru keep on talking of communalism? These papers are full of communalism. But in the name of fundamental rights they want complete licence to publish all kinds of falsehood and to incite people to communal activity. These papers stoop down to the meanest level in indulging in falsehoods. It amazes me how any newspaper or newspapermen can descend to the degrading level of creating dissension among people. It is a dangerous thing for any person or group of persons to try to disrupt the work of building up the country. It is for the people to determine not to encourage such papers as they cannot be properly dealt with by law alone. The organizations of responsible newspapers and newspapermen have also a responsibility in this regard.

Some newspapers in Delhi and Hyderabad are full of utter lies. It appears that these newspapers are not newspapers but factories to manufacture lies on a large-scale. What they mostly publish is not even rumours or wrong news but something which is the creation of the minds of the editors of these papers.

Language is both a binding force and a separating one, and we have to be very careful in the matter of languages in India, lest in our enthusiasm for unity we might not encourage disruption. We have seen how powerful are the sentiments for linguistic provinces. There is reason behind that sentiment. At the same time, provinces cannot be carved out merely on the basis of language. There are other very important factors which have to be taken into consideration. It is true that where there is a powerful demand, we should pay heed to it, unless there are some insuperable obstacles in the way. It must be remembered that political changes delay others kinds of progress. A multiplicity of governmental machinery means more expense and less efficiency. The formation of linguistic provinces means the diversion of our energy and resources from the major economic tasks of the day. If we get entangled in this business now, what happens to our Five Year Plan? And if, in addition, such attempted redistribution involves conflict and bitterness, then, indeed, the ultimate result will be much worse. We are a mature people and we should not allow ourselves to be led away by sentiment without giving the fullest consideration to every aspect of the question.

We have stated that where there is a well-established demand and the proposal meets with the general consent of those concerned, we should give effect to it. We have decided to do so in the case of Andhra and steps are being taken to that end. I earnestly hope that this will be achieved cooperatively

19. Hereafter, Nehru did not read from the written text before him. The next two paras constitute an extempore speech.

with the least disturbance possible. Even so, there is going to be a great deal of upset, and our meagre resources will have to be spent in other ways than intended. The decision to form the Andhra State has led to a renewal of demands for some other linguistic provinces.<sup>20</sup> Some of these demands can probably be justified. Others have no such justification. But, in any event, it had to be realized that any widespread and more or less simultaneous change in the political geography of India will create very great problems and will strain our resources to the utmost. It would mean definitely our putting a stop to any real progress in accordance with our Five Year Plan. It might weaken national unity which is the foundation for everything else. Therefore, I would earnestly suggest that while establishing Andhra State, we should wait to see the consequences that flow from it and then take into consideration any like problems elsewhere. We should concentrate now on the Five Year Plan and having accomplished it, we can then go ahead with added strength to solve other problems.

There is talk of the disintegration of Hyderabad State.<sup>21</sup> Such disintegration would upset the whole balance of the South and lead to innumerable new problems. To all these we should give the most careful consideration and due time. For the next few years at any rate we must postpone consideration of such problems and concentrate on economic advance. We dare not play about with our country or do things that weaken it when the world hovers on the brink of war.<sup>22</sup>

I have been greatly pained at the death of Mr Potti Sriramulu. We had decided to proceed in the matter of formation of the Andhra Province months before Mr Sriramulu started his fast. I was in correspondence with some leaders on this subject even when the fast had not been commenced by Mr Sriramulu.

I had written to Mr Rajagopalachari about Andhra much before this fast began. Rajaji agreed with me that the Andhra Province should be formed when Mr Sriramulu was not in the picture at all, and suggested that ways and means should be found to do so.

I had also said at the time Mr Sriramulu began his fast that we are willing to form an Andhra State. But I did not want anyone to compel us or coerce us into taking any action. I said that a measure of agreement must be arrived at

20. The Communist Party of India was using the formation of Andhra State as a base to extend the process of the formation of linguistic States. Agitators in the Karnataka districts of Bombay State were demanding separate statehood and the Communists were behind attempts to linguistically fragment existing States like Hyderabad.

21. Division of Hyderabad State into various segments each comprising a different linguistic majorities people had been sought since 1948. On 4 January 1953, the All India Linguistic Committee, which met under the chairmanship of Lanka Sundaram, expressed the opinion that the purpose behind the proposed formation of Andhra and other States could be defeated if Hyderabad was not divided.

22. The next three paragraphs were also spoken extempore.



between some of the leaders concerned before a decision could be taken. This is how that our mind was working on the formation of the Andhra State long before Mr Sriramulu undertook his fast.

We have a large number of States in the country. Part A States have a great deal of autonomy. Part B States are approximating to the Part A States and before long there will be no major difference left.<sup>23</sup> Part C States are generally small. The integration of Part B States has been a great achievement and has brought improvement in many ways to them. But it has also brought a higher scale of expenditure on the machinery of government<sup>24</sup> and this is a great burden. The addition to the number of States and thereby to the expenditure on governmental machinery will add to this burden and will result in reducing standards, when we are anxious to improve them. We should think rather in terms of reducing the number of States or in having some common features in States which would lessen the expenditure at the top. We have to choose between the development of the country and balkanization and consequent continuing low standards of life.

The major and most urgent problem for us today is that of economic advance, advance not only for the nation as a nation but in the conditions of masses of people who live in it. We have to fight poverty and unemployment and improve the conditions of living of our people. Our resources are limited, even though our wish to progress is great. It is for this purpose that the Five Year Plan has been evolved, after a great deal of thought and consultation. The Plan initiates a process of balanced economic development of the country with a view to raising the standard of living and bringing about an increasing measure of economic equality and opportunities for employment. I shall not discuss this complicated Plan here, because the argument is given in the Plan itself, to which I would invite attention. That Plan is not based on any doctrinaire approach and is not rigid. It is modest in a sense, and yet it has far-reaching consequences. I have no doubt that if we succeed in implementing this Plan, we shall then be in a position to go ahead at a much faster pace. The Plan does

23. In fact, the objective of financial integration was that the financial relations between the Centre and Part B States should be exactly the same as the financial relations between the Centre and Part A States. The people of Part A and Part B States ought to contribute to the Central revenues on the same basis and receive the same benefits, thus paving the way for a uniform federal finance system throughout India.

24. Part B States administered federal services and retained revenues which, under the Constitution, were federal. In most cases, the federal revenues thus retained by Part B States and used by them, were larger than the share of federal revenues apportioned to Part A States.



not limit our growth in any direction. Although there is a private sector, our stress is laid on the public sector which should progressively expand.

Though the development of industry is exceedingly important, special stress has been laid on agriculture,<sup>25</sup> because that is the basis of our economy. In particular, we must make our country self-sufficient in food. From recent statistics and results obtained, I have no doubt that we can do so in the course of the next few years. Our object is to prevent monopoly control and to limit private profit, so as to bring about a distribution of economic power. Our great river valley schemes are magnificent examples of what we can do. They have been admired by all who have seen the work done there.<sup>26</sup> But it is not by a few major schemes that we will ultimately be judged, but rather by the general improvement all over the country. Our great national laboratories have laid well the foundations for future scientific advance. Great factories have also sprung up in various parts of the country for basic and key industries. Even last year our industrial productivity increased by about ten per cent. It is our pride and good fortune to take up this Five Year Plan now and make it a full success.

I have referred to agriculture. That depends upon land policy. We have to complete the abolition of the zamindari, jagirdari and like systems as rapidly as possible. We have to put a ceiling on land and we have to encourage cooperative farming. In industry we have to encourage, by all means in our power, village and cottage industries. That is the surest and swiftest method of relieving unemployment. There is no conflict between that and the big industry that we wish to develop. But this big industry will not solve the problem of unemployment except for a relatively small number of persons. Hence the importance of small and village industries.

A very important part of our Five Year Plan consists of the community centres which have been started in various parts of India and which is intended

25. The outlay for agriculture and irrigation in the Draft Five Year Plan had been increased in the final Plan from Rs 474 crores to over Rs 750 crores, which was more than a third of the total outlay of the Plan. This difference was accounted for by the additional outlay of Rs 50 crores for the multi-purpose projects on which work was undertaken, Rs 40 crores to start work on new projects and Rs 20 crores more for the State projects. The community development projects had been allocated Rs 90 crores, which was a new item in the final Plan. There was an addition of Rs 47 crores for agriculture, which included Rs 30 crores for minor irrigation and Rs 10 crores for medium and long-term loans to agriculturists. Besides, Rs 15 crores were provided for local works and another Rs 15 crores for scarcity-affected areas.

26. For example, an Iranian press delegation which visited the Bhakra project said that "we consider the Bhakra and Nangal project as the symbol of new and progressive India."

to increase every year.<sup>27</sup> Through them we hope not only to increase production in rural areas but more especially to raise the level of community life in every direction. Their success, as indeed the success of the whole Five Year Plan, depends largely on voluntary effort and the spirit with which our people take up this great task of building new India.

We live in an age of what is called cold war, which, at any moment, may develop into something worse. In this world of conflict, the only guarantee of our safety and our freedom is our own strength. That strength ultimately depends upon the economic condition of the people. The Five Year Plan is an answer to the challenge of the times, and on its success, depends our survival as a great nation. Those who criticize that Plan and wish to be merely onlookers, when this great work calls for endeavour, do little service to the country. If the Plan does not go far enough, let us try to improve it and take it further. Nothing prevents us from doing so except our own lack of resources or incapacity. If we can do more or go ahead faster, we should certainly attempt it.

We talk of the possibility of war, but, as a matter of fact, wars are going on in various parts of the world—in Korea, in Indo-China and elsewhere. They are serious enough, though from the world point of view they may be limited in scope. As you know, we have been intensely interested in the promotion of peace. We have not tried to interfere and we have no desire to play a dramatic role. But quietly and persistently, for a long time past, we have sought to help in some way so that the tension in East Asia might be relieved and the threat of world war might lessen. Unfortunately, the major changes that have taken place in East Asia during the last three or four years have not been fully appreciated yet by many people who still try to hold on to their conception of a world that no longer exists. The emergence of China as a great unified and vital country has completely changed the balance of power in East Asia and, to some extent, in the world. The revolution in China was no sudden development, although the final change appeared to be sudden and unexpected. That revolution had nearly forty years of history behind it, during which period this great country suffered from invasion and civil war. The non-recognition by some countries of this new people's Government of China was a refusal to see one of the major and obvious facts of the age. That refusal has led step by step to grave consequences. There cannot be any final settlement in East Asia without the full recognition of this new China. This is not a question of likes and dislikes. A country or a Government is recognized because it exists and functions

27. The scheme of the community development projects had been spelt out in the First Five Year Plan. The 500 community centres, envisaged under the Plan, were to undertake house-building, road-making, canal-digging, school construction, medical and health units, cooperative farming, multi-purpose cooperative societies, cottage industries and a host of other schemes.



effectively, not because the political or economic structure there is approved or liked by others. The world can only carry on if there is acceptance of the fact that each country has freedom to develop according to its own way of thinking and there is no interference with it. There is far too much interference today and attempts to impose one country's will on another.

During the last sessions of the General Assembly of the United Nations, a resolution was put forward on our behalf in regard to the Korean war. That resolution was ultimately passed by a very great majority, but unfortunately two great countries, China and the Soviet Union, did not accept it.<sup>28</sup> And the result is that the deadlock in Korea continues. Our resolution was meant as a proposal to show a way out of this deadlock. It was no mandate and it was based entirely on the Geneva Convention, about which so much has been said. It did not recognize voluntary repatriation of prisoners, nor was there any question of prisoners being asked whether they wish to return or decline to do so. It did not recognize the right of asylum for prisoners of war which applies to political refugees. There was to be no screening of prisoners. It ensured that all prisoners would be released from the custody of the detaining side in neutral territory. The presumption was that they would go back to their country of origin. In fact, repatriation would have begun as soon as these prisoners were released from detention. The resolution did say that if an individual prisoner of either side refused to go over to his country from the neutral zone, force would not be used or obliged to be used against him. This is fully in accordance with the Geneva Convention which does not lay down an obligation to lift a prisoner of war physically and put him on the other side in spite of his opposition.

I did not wish to argue about this resolution. Our purpose was not to raise legal quibbles, but to help in arriving at a settlement. We made an honest attempt and we failed. I think, however, that even though we failed then our attempt did some good and may perhaps lead to a more fruitful result later. So far as we are concerned, we shall gladly help in every effort which might lead to peace.

While there is cold war between great nations, there is also something very much like a race war developing in Africa.<sup>29</sup> The policy of the South

28. The Indian resolution in the UN General Assembly on 12 December 1952 in regard to the repatriation of the prisoners of war ensured the freedom of choice by providing for the exercise of that right before a Repatriation Commission. The United States and its allies remodelled India's proposal to suit their own purpose. Russia and China, on the other hand, rejected it.

29. The continent of Africa was in the throes of a crisis in the wake of resistance to French rule in Tunisia, the problem facing Britain and Egypt over the future of the Sudan, the racial policies in South Africa, the prospect of federation with terrible forebodings in Central Africa, and the grim fight between the British Government of Kenya and the forces of nationalist resistance called the Mau Mau.



African Government has been opposed by us in so far as people of Indian origin are concerned. That policy has progressively emphasized racial discrimination and indeed the overlordship of one race over another. The movement in South Africa has now become widespread and the Africans are taking a leading part in it. It is being carried on peacefully in accordance with the technique discovered by Gandhiji in South Africa itself long years ago. While passive resistance is taking place in South Africa, in East Africa a very different situation has developed.<sup>30</sup> On the one side, there have been terroristic outrages, on the other, severe and widespread repression. I have no desire to balance these, but I am concerned at the grave consequences that are already flowing from this conflict.

I am exceedingly sorry that some people in Kenya took to methods of violence which can only do them harm and will not strengthen their cause in any way. They have suffered long and I can understand their feeling of utter frustration and despair. But they will not achieve anything by methods of violence. On the other hand, repression will never solve the problem of Africa and the grave danger is that something in the nature of a race war will develop and bring disaster in its train. I earnestly hope that a wiser and a more positive approach to these problems will be made. It must be understood quite clearly that no doctrine based on racial inequality or racial suppression can be tolerated for long. There will be no peace in the world if one race tries to dominate over another or one country over another.

We have to deal with our own internal problems in the Congress. The mere fact that our organization is strong and widespread and controls Governments, has brought many evils in its train. They are the evils of success and we have to be very careful, lest we allow these evils to corrupt and enfeeble the Congress. During recent Congress delegate elections, many such evils came to light. We tried to tackle them and have taken stern measures in many places. We propose to be vigilant in this matter and I must ask your fullest cooperation for this purpose. Some amendments to the Congress Constitution will be placed before you which are intended to help us in removing some of these evils.<sup>31</sup>

30. African leaders had been put on trial in Kenya (East Africa) as a result of rioting caused by growing local discontent.

31. The amendments approved by the Congress Working Committee on 31 December 1952 stated that (1) the primary members should have a year's standing before they could participate in the elections; (2) active members should submit quarterly reports of their constructive activities; (3) candidates should notify their intention of standing for elections at least four months before the date of election; (4) and the Congress President had either to nominate a new Working Committee or set up a Steering Committee to deal with the resolutions that would come up before the session.

Recently, in the Patiala and East Punjab States Union, certain developments took place which have distressed me greatly.<sup>32</sup> They are a warning to all of us. During the last forty years or so of my public life, I do not know of anything so disgraceful and so degrading in our public life as these recent happenings in Pepsu. If in our passion for power we forget standards of public behaviour and the principles that have guided us in the past, then indeed we are doomed and we deserve to perish. But we must not judge the whole of our organization by these instances. I am sure that there are all over the country any number of earnest Congressmen of high integrity who are carrying on their work without expectation of reward or profit. They are the backbone of the Congress and are in our true tradition. It is they who gave strength and life to this organization of ours.

During the past five years we have been trying to build up our new Republic. We have failed in many things and we have not succeeded in others in the measure that we desire. But I think I am justified in saying that our record has been a creditable one, which can bear comparison with any elsewhere. Let us remember our failures and try to avoid them in the future, but let us also keep in mind our successes which have raised the reputation and credit of the country all over the world. We have now to carry on this process and build up in a more conscious, deliberate and planned way. The path has been chalked out. The journey, however, is not an easy one. But then let us remind ourselves constantly that we have not been used in the past to soft living or easy reward. We have to develop that old spirit again, that temper which forgets self and is not depressed by any difficulty or temporary lack of success. I invite you all to march along this path with grid heart and faith in the destiny of our country.

32. Political conditions had been unstable in Pepsu since the general elections. After the budget meeting in 1952, the State Assembly had not remained in session for more than seven days altogether because of the shifting alliance of the members. The second session of the Assembly, summoned on 1 November 1952, was scheduled to last ten days, but was adjourned on 25 November at the request of the leader of the House, Gian Singh Rarewala, conveyed privately to the Speaker. The session was again summoned on 22 December 1952 by the Speaker without consultation with Rarewala. On the eve of the meeting, two members of the Opposition crossed over and were sworn in as minister and deputy minister and a no-confidence motion was rejected. The House was subsequently prorogued without transacting any business.



## 9. The Real Strength of the Congress<sup>1</sup>

The Congress must take every possible step to see that undesirable elements do not get into the Congress. The Congress today is in power and all sorts of people may like to join it. And this can spell danger to the organization and obstruct the true functioning of democracy.

As the Party in power and the organization that brought about freedom to the country the Congress has a great responsibility and has to fulfil its mission. That cannot be done unless the organization is fully free from corruption and malpractices.

Individuals in an organization cannot be ignored. In the best days of the Congress, it was one man who changed the entire atmosphere. Mahatma Gandhi with his greatness had brought about a revolutionary change that changed the face of the entire country.

I do not think that there is all-round corruption in the Congress. It will be wrong to suggest that all Congressmen have become corrupt and there are malpractices everywhere. But the AICC has received complaints that bogus members have been enrolled in some of the provinces, and that there have been malpractices in election of delegates to the session.

If such deplorable things happen, the entire public life of the country would become corrupt, because what happens in the Congress is bound to have its repercussions elsewhere.

The strength of the Congress lay not in the number of members it has. In those days when the Congress was bravely resisting the mighty British rule the number of its members was not very big. But it had its influence over the entire people.

It was because of this fact that the Congress under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi had been able to create an atmosphere that could carry the people with it. A tremendous amount of confidence in the Congress had been created, and therein lay the real strength of the organization.

The Congress executives must thoroughly discuss the question in its entirety and forward their suggestions to the Working Committee. A special committee may be appointed by the High Command to go into the matter and then suggest the necessary amendments to the constitution for approval by the AICC.

1. Speech at the Open Session, Hyderabad Congress, 18 January 1953. From the *National Herald*, 19 January 1953.



## 10. Carry the Message to People<sup>1</sup>

Carry the message of the Congress to the people in your areas. On them lie the task of strengthening the great organization which has made history in India, whose offspring you are and under whose shadow you have grown up.

The Congress has been a strong weapon in your hands for serving the people. Mahatma Gandhi sharpened this weapon and brought the country freedom. We have today allowed this weapon to become a bit rusty. It is our duty now to make it once again shining and strong, so that we can serve the people more and more.

There was a time when the Congress through its service and sacrifices had made the history of India. We wrote this history with our tears and blood. Now the question is whether any strength and stamina are left in it to make the history of India in the future also to serve the people and take the country forward. Congressmen could do it if they purified themselves, followed the right path, and worked honestly.

The resolutions that have been passed in the session must not remain just on paper. On your return to your constituencies you should explain the resolutions to the people and ensure implementation. Remember the task you have agreed to carry out. The message of the session is hard work. Implement the Five Year Plan, root out communalism and narrowness, and the future will be glorious for us.

The world today is changing fast and it is difficult to keep pace with it. In a revolutionary world where rapid and vital changes are taking place all round, problems are also created. It often seems that they are very difficult, may be impossible. But still efforts have to be made and we have to be on our feet.

It is the duty of every Congressman not only to discourage communal forces but also to fight it out. As one delegate has pointed out, everybody has to search his own heart. Maybe, the very evil we condemn is lying hidden in us.

We regret that India's relations with Pakistan are not satisfactory. The Government of India has not committed any wrong in its relations with Pakistan. We have always tried to be friendly and have done everything humanly possible to maintain the best of relations with Pakistan. We may have erred here and there, but certainly it was not deliberate. But Pakistan has not followed the same policy.

1. Concluding address to the 58th Session of the Congress, Hyderabad, 18 January 1953. Based on the reports from *The Hindustan Times* and *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, 19 January 1953. Extracts.

The solution to the Indo-Pakistan problems lies in pursuing the same policy—a policy of goodwill and mutual consultation.

This is also the only way to cultivate real friendship with the people of Pakistan. Ultimately the question has to be decided by the people of the two countries. We have no ill will against the people of Pakistan. Many of them have been our comrades in our fight for freedom. We suffered together and worked under the same flag....

## 11. Congress and Nation-Building<sup>1</sup>

Mr Chairman, sisters and brothers,

When Algraiji<sup>2</sup> first mentioned this meeting and the conference to me, there was no argument about it because I rather liked the idea that I should have an opportunity of meeting all the office-bearers of the District Congress Committees. Therefore I am happy to be here today and meet you. I can see many old faces and some new ones before me. I feel sad that we are not able to get together very often because it is very essential as it has always been, and particularly so now, that we should discuss the nation's problems. I am here today and will spend about an hour with you. Then there is a meeting after which I shall return to Delhi. I cannot say much during the short time given to me. Nor do I wish to touch upon many of your internal problems though they are very important. It is not that I consider them to be unimportant but because you are bound to discuss these matters among yourselves. You should do so and arrive at some decision.

Now in any organization, particularly a great one like the Congress, it is very essential that it should function smoothly, that it should be clean, there should be no ills, no internal weaknesses, etc. in it. These are very important matters and I could say a great deal about them because they are of fundamental importance. We will not go very far by merely adopting great goals and ideas if our organization fails to work on an even keel. If our workers fail to do their job, mere ideals will not help. I include everyone in this, irrespective of which

1. Address to the Conference of the UP Congress Committee and office-bearers of District Congress Committees, Meerut, 20 March 1953. AIR tapes, NMML. (Original in Hindi)
2. Algrai Shastri (1900-1967); a Congressman from UP; member, UP Legislative Assembly 1937-52, Constituent Assembly, 1948-52, and Rajya Sabha, 1956-58; General Secretary and later President, UPPCC, 1950-55.



party they belong to. There would perhaps be very few people in this world who talk so loftily as we do. We talk of our great principles and goals. There is no dearth of that. But we often fall far short of trying to reach those goals.

Therefore, it is obvious that the first thing is for us to strive to cleanse the Congress and strengthen it. The Congress has a very long history going back from sixty-five to seventy years. It grew from small beginnings into a mammoth organization and then it became a revolutionary party and brought about great changes and upheavals all over the country, though we did it all in peaceful ways. Many of you present here have participated in all that and may remember those times and the vitality that the Congress had. It attracted the best people from all over the country into its fold, the truest, the most intelligent of people became part of it. After all it is human beings who make an organization. We had a great leader in Mahatma Gandhi. But apart from that, there was a fire in us, a commitment to our cause; we were not there for office and we were not embroiled in internal squabbles. The fact of the matter is that we were caught up in the whirlpool of history....

So the strength of the Congress lay in the fact that it was instrumental in performing historic tasks. We became partners in writing, in making the history of India which was evolving. Such things cannot be done artificially. What I mean is that no matter how hard we try, we can get nowhere if it is not the demand of the time. We cannot achieve something revolutionary, which brings about great upheavals in a country. Thus many things got mixed up....

That process came to an end, and the purpose for which the Congress had been established was achieved, India became independent. That had been its goal. But the work of the nation was by no means over with independence. There were demands which remain unfulfilled, a hunger which remained unappeased. Or, you may say that the nation needed an organization to complete these tasks. People may work as individuals but a country needs organizations to do that work. There are many parties, organizations in the country, but ultimately you come round to the Congress as the strongest, whether you look at its past history or present set-up, and the one from which you can have great expectations. This does not mean that others cannot do so. But the fact remains that if the Congress ceases to function as an organization and all of us get scattered into different parties, our capacity for organized work will be lost. Even if all of us do excellent work separately, the nation's cohesiveness will be lost....

Now take for instance the issue of Andhra Pradesh, though you are not directly concerned with it. It has no ambiguity about it and there is no doubt that we accept the formation of Andhra Pradesh on principle. But the moment we try to implement it, there is so much heat generated around the issue that it begins to seem as though we belong to different countries, and anger and venom begin to cloud it. It is really strange.



The second example as you know is of communalism. Apart from its other evils, it divides us. It was necessary for us to create unity in order to achieve independence for in that lay our strength. The history of India shows that in spite of all our great and noble qualities, the one weakness we suffered from has been lack of unity. A neighbour would not help another, one state would not help another and so, standing apart, they would lose to the enemy. We won in our struggle for freedom to the extent that we forged a spirit of unity and gained strength and the ability to work together. Mahatma Gandhi laid great stress on this. People of different provinces and religions, speaking different languages, belonging to different castes, began to work together for their goal.

It is more than ever necessary to be united in order to face the challenges before us. Earlier there was an enemy whom we could identify, a foreign power which ruled over us. It was easy then to be united and fight against a common enemy. But we cannot see the enemy within—it is difficult to combat our own weaknesses. It is easier to combat an enemy outside....

We must be clear about the direction in which the Congress must go. Right from the beginning, the Congress has attracted people from all walks of life, tied together by a common bond—the desire to free the country. Now that is fulfilled, you find that the different strands in the Congress with their different viewpoints have begun to pull in different directions. The issue which creates the divisions is about the elections, about who should be given tickets and what not, and so a weakness has crept into the party. The fact of the matter is that the Congress has lost its unity of purpose, an emotional and intellectual bond. The Congress leaders may still display that in a sense, but the millions of workers in the Congress do not have a clear sense of where they are going and what they must do. That too creates a weakness because strength comes from the mind being razor sharp as it was during our freedom struggle. It was a simple and straightforward matter. The British rule had to go. There was no argument about that. Very few disagreed with that. But complications arise when other questions come to the fore and the mind is not razor sharp. That leads to conflicts and the Congress gets weakened. People lack a sense of unity of purpose because those who get elected do so on local issues....

Strangely enough, success is a very dangerous thing for an organization because so long as it does not succeed, the people who join it are not motivated by greed, they come for the sake of principles, for the challenge it offers. But once an organization succeeds and the path becomes smooth, then more and more people come in who merely want to jump on the bandwagon. This is a problem which is not peculiar to the Congress but dogs the footsteps of all organizations in the world, even the most revolutionary of them. We are facing this problem now and trying to deal with it. We have been appointing committees every year and are seriously thinking of changing our Constitution. There are frequent deliberations about how to keep the party clean and free of

hangers-on and time-servers. Nevertheless, we have not achieved the result that we want because ultimately, merely putting things down on paper does not take us very far. It depends on the people who are in charge of the Congress, in every province, district and town in the country. The responsibility of seeing to it that the Congress functions smoothly rests squarely on them. We learnt from the experience of the last general elections that wherever the Congress had done good work, we were in a strong position. We lost in the other areas....

Therefore, it is futile to think that the Congress will go on no matter how its members function. The Congress will go on only till such time as its workers are hard-working and are men of principles. If the people get the idea that the Congress is full of self-serving, self-seeking individuals the Congress will become weak and rapidly lose its hold over the people. The Congress owes its strength today to the laurels it has won in the past, but that will not last forever. We have to prove ourselves again and again, by our hard work and dedication. Therefore, everyone must seriously think of cleansing the party by amending its Constitution. The workers must serve the people and above all, a new thinking, a fresh outlook is essential for the rejuvenation of the party. Any organization which ceases to think lags behind.

India is changing rapidly and so is the world, even if we cannot perceive it. And if we lack the ability to keep pace with the changing world and instead are content to remain in the old grooves of thinking, we cannot go very far. Mere slogans will not help. Most people fail to realize how rapidly the world is changing. Even though we are all part of the changes. We do not realize the momentum of the changes all around us. We fail to see the picture in its entirety. Things are happening on a very large scale in India. In fact, I am prepared to go so far as to say that perhaps in no other country are things happening on such a large scale.

We often hear only the complaints and I am sure they are justified, but we must look at the other side of the coin too. I would like to tell you the various developments which are happening in the country. Some of them are on such a large scale that the whole country will benefit. I am referring to the large dams, the Bhakra Nangal in the Punjab, the Damodar Valley in Bengal and Bihar, Hirakud in Orissa, Tungabhadra in Andhra and Hyderabad and others in Mysore, Madras, Bombay, Uttar Pradesh, etc. Then there are huge factories where we are making aeroplanes, railway engines, etc. A huge fertilizer plant has come up in Sindri. I have just visited the Damodar Valley.<sup>3</sup> You have to see this progress to understand what is happening because no matter what you read, you cannot imagine it....

3. Nehru inaugurated the Tilaiya dam and the Bokaro thermal power station on 21 February.



Let me tell you about the other events that are happening in India. I had recently gone to Ambernath<sup>4</sup> in Bombay where a huge factory for producing machine tools has been set up. There are two or three types of goods. One is consumer goods like textiles and so on. The other is heavy industries which produce machines. For instance, we have a number of textile factories but there was no factory to produce the machines to be used in those factories. We had to import them from the United States, Germany, Japan or England. We can never become self-reliant even if we have a few factories here and there so long as we do not produce the basic machinery needed for the infrastructure. This is what we are not trying to do, through the Five Year Plan.

There is one problem in trying to build an infrastructure. The results are not immediately visible. Take steel for instance. It takes as many as five years to set up a steel plant and an investment of crores of rupees. We will not reap the benefits for years. The same thing happens with machine tool factories, and factories producing railway engines and aeroplanes. In a sense we are merely sowing the seeds by making heavy investments. The benefits will accrue later. But a good foundation is very essential for strong edifice. We have been paying attention to these things in the last few years. The results will show in a few years. If you read about the Russian revolution, you will find that in the fifteen to twenty years after that, they had pitted their entire strength into building the infrastructure. The people had to tighten their belts, to starve and what not, to lay the foundations of Russia's strength. They had no democracy and so did not have to worry about elections. The government was strongly entrenched and backed by the armed forces. Therefore they could force the people into a course of action.

Anyhow, the Soviet Union laid the strong foundations over ten or fifteen years on which they could build a strong edifice. That is how they became a very great power. People who witness the power of the Soviet Union and the United States today forget that those countries were not built in four or five years. It took nearly two centuries for the United States to reach where they are today. It took the Soviet Union thirty five years and out of that the first ten to fifteen years were spent in laying the foundations. Then they found it easy to build the edifice. So, we are constantly faced with the challenge of laying the foundations of a strong India which will in future generate power and wealth for the country... Secondly, we have to have a set of priorities though it may be our desire to do everything at once. If we are short-sighted, the whole country will starve in the future. We can please the people by taking some steps to provide short-term benefits. But we will have to pay dearly for that in the future.

4. Nehru opened the Machine Tools Prototype Factory at Ambernath on 13 January.



The task before us is to eradicate poverty and that can only be done by generating new wealth. What is wealth? It is what we produce from our land and in our factories. Buying and selling is not wealth, that is trade. What a farmer or a factory worker produces is wealth. The United States is extremely wealthy because they produce ten, twenty times as much as we do from our farms and factories. We too must increase production in every sector. The Five Year Plan aims at precisely this, increasing production. The allied question is of distribution, to ensure that the wealth which is produced is distributed equally among the people....

Now take another question. In my opinion, the Five Year Plan has been of great benefit to the country because for the first time it has drawn the attention of the people in a concerted manner to the problems we face. It presents a broad picture. We have to function within our resources. We can augment those resources. But merely wishing will not take us very far. We want to transform the country, eradicate poverty, generate wealth and bring happiness. But we have to take concrete steps to ensure all that. Then there is a conflict of ideologies, capitalism, socialism, communism, Gandhism and what not. We have to go beyond passing resolutions in the party meetings.

We have passed a resolution that zamindari should be abolished.<sup>5</sup> We can pass another resolution that the income of the farmers should be doubled. But that cannot happen until and unless we take some concrete steps to ensure it. We cannot eradicate poverty or unemployment by merely passing resolutions. These are complex issues. Therefore, I feel that the Five Year Plan will for the first time present a broad picture of the nation's problems, its social and economic problems. There may be shortcomings and lacunae in the Plan. But it is a very big step to consider the picture in its entirety and look at the problems of crores of human beings. We have the right to study, criticize and comment on the Plan. But, not only the Congress and the Government, but all the parties in the country, will have to acknowledge that the Five Year Plan will lay the strong foundations of the country's future. That is something everyone will acknowledge. Let us discuss the Plan in its various aspects and try to improve it. But merely talking in the air will not take us very far.

The Congressmen have been trained by Mahatma Gandhi right from the beginning not to talk in the air but to do constructive work. We learnt to act with a sense of responsibility to some extent though we did not always do so. We certainly want to go ahead as quickly as possible. But when you are actually holding the reins of government, you begin to realize the problems and futility of indulging in airy-fairy theories. We are called upon to deliver what we

5. The Karachi Congress Resolution of 1931 on Fundamental Rights demanded abolition of intermediary tenures like *zamindaris*, *jagirs* and *inams*. See *Selected Works* (First Series), Vol. 4, p. 513.

promise. Other parties do not have any responsibility. So they are free to say what they please. But we cannot take the country very far by making tall promises which we cannot fulfil. We must learn to be realistic and not indulge in slogan-mongering and rabble-rousing.

We must implement the Five Year Plan with all our might. Two years are already over. We have the right to make changes even at this stage. But we must refrain from getting bogged down in theories because that way lies ruin. We have to implement the Plan. Ninety to ninety-five per cent of it has to be implemented by all means. We will be judged by the extent to which we succeed in implementing the Plan. People outside India are often of the view that we Indians talk big but do little. The Congress had grown in stature because it had acquired the reputation of being a party which did constructive work. We will come across new ideas and new ways as we implement the Plan and its size will grow. We will find concrete ways of improving the Plan which in turn will add to our strength and wealth.

The Five Year Plan is not the responsibility of the Congress alone though obviously the Congress has to shoulder the burden since it holds the reins of power. History teaches us that it is time when we all realized that we have to shoulder great responsibilities. But at the same time I must warn you that I am not fully convinced about the speed at which we are progressing. We must accelerate our pace. I do not wish to go into the details but am merely giving you a hint that we must constantly refresh our minds and our thinking. People's thinking everywhere, and particularly so in India, tends to become stale and there is difficulty in accepting new ideas and new ways of working. I am not suggesting that we forget our past. But at the same time, we must learn to imbibe new ideas for only then can we remain in the mainstream of history. All of us have an equal share of responsibility in fulfilling these tasks. It is not enough for a few men at the top to think about all these things. Ultimately the strength of the Congress depends on its ability to think and to function. On balance perhaps a little more of creative ability is required because that itself generates new thinking whereas mere thinking may not lead to action. Then it remains at the level of intellectual debates. You must bear in mind that the next few years are extremely crucial for us, for India, and the world.

I am not thinking of the elections which will take place after four years. We shall see what happens at that time. It is possible that we may not last out the four years if we are found wanting. But elections are not the only moving force in the world. There are other forces which make the world go topsy turvy. Those who think that they can continue in their old ruts and yet get re-elected when elections come around are mistaken. The modern world is a merciless one and there is no place for slackness in it. So you can forget the elections and pay attention to the new avenues which are opening out, new ideologies which beckon. Mahatma Gandhi had a simple ideology and faith



and he would adapt his policy to suit the work at hand. You and I and the Congress will be judged by the work we do. Then, the other yardstick will be whether we are bogged down in petty matters or have the grit and determination to take on big tasks. It is obvious that those who are immersed in petty concerns will remain small in stature and the world will go on while you lag behind. The same is true of a party too. I am giving you an example of the yardstick by which people and parties are judged.

There is a movement going on these days about Jammu. The Jan Sangh, Hindu Mahasabha, Ram Rajya Parishad and behind the scenes the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh have made Delhi and Pathankot their base. I see what goes on there. Most of the people who come to Delhi are from UP but the movement is not generating much interest. A few volunteers have come from Gorakhpur, Mainpuri and some other places. I think they are being brought. Yesterday I think twenty or twenty five men staged a satyagraha and were arrested—twenty of them were from UP.<sup>6</sup> They did not even seem to know why they were there. It is a farce and above all, this kind of movement is wrong apart from the fact that communalism itself is absolutely wrong. I am amazed that people with even an ounce of sense should fail to understand it. Or perhaps they have another hidden motive. All I can say is that the men who are behind this are absolutely useless.

It is a strange farce. People are trying to start a movement about something over which I have no control. It is an international issue which is not entirely under control of the Government. The United Nations and Pakistan are involved. Wars have been fought over such issues. We have fought a war in Kashmir and the dispute is still going on. It is obvious that if things had been under my control, I would have resolved the problem. I cannot understand how it can help if a handful of people from Mainpuri come and stage a *dharna* here. The whole thing is childish, stupid and shows narrow-mindedness. It is getting us a bad name in the world. There are tremendous obstacles being created in solving the Kashmir issue. So you can imagine how much damage is caused by communal thinking. People get carried away. Anyhow, it cannot work. I don't feel concerned.

We must have clear thinking on this subject. People must understand the issues involved. I have no doubt in my mind that if the communal parties are allowed to sway public opinion, it will lead to disaster. The country will be broken into fragments. Civil wars will completely break up the country's unity. They talk of *Akhand Bharat* but what they are preaching spells divisiveness. If you go to Madras, you hear voices raised against the North for trying to build

6. Thirty-six people including five women were arrested in Delhi on 19 March while offering satyagraha in support of the Jammu agitation. The joint satyagraha was started by the Jan Sangh, the Hindu Mahasabha and the Ram Rajya Parishad on 6 March.



an empire and there is talk of secession. India is a vast country. Yours is a large province but you are not India. There is Madras, Bombay, Bengal and the North-East and what not. It is a country of myriad hues. The moment a voice of dissent and disunity is raised, whether it is in the name of religion, culture or language, people get inflamed. Moreover, any attempt at coercion will only lead to disaster. No adult, thinking human beings, ought to be taken in by all this talk of *Akhand Bharat*. That is why I am warning you against that danger.

One thing which perturbs me is the kind of poison being spewed by the media, especially the Hindi and Urdu newspapers from Delhi and the Punjab. Strangely enough, Urdu newspapers are the most serious advocates of Indian culture and Hindi. They talk loudly about Hindi culture in the Urdu tongue. I am amazed at the lies and the vituperation spewed by these newspapers. We had passed a law in connection with the press a couple of years<sup>7</sup> ago but it was so weak and colourless that it is not really effective.

Recently, the *Pratap*, a Delhi newspaper, published a news item saying that the Government is bringing in the Muslim police force from UP to suppress the Hindus in Delhi. That is a complete pack of lies. We have not brought in any police force, Hindu or Muslim. But a lie is enough to provoke the people and create tensions. We have issued a contradiction<sup>8</sup> but feelings run high when such false rumours are spread. But nobody knows if anyone has read the contradiction. There have been protest meetings in many parts of UP against sending the UP police elsewhere. This is a deliberate attempt on the part of the media to create dissensions among the people. How are we to combat this? The Government will think of the ways, of course. But it is up to all of you also to remain vigilant and try to explain to the people that it is a pack of lies.

There is one thing more. You must have read in the newspapers report of my meeting a couple of days ago with Jayaprakash Narayanji. There were long statements published in the press. It has always been my desire to foster unity among the people so that they can put their entire strength into building a new India. I am not concerned about what happens four years hence. We want to create an upheaval in the country and usher in changes. Each one of us must participate in this task to the best of our ability. I have spent a lifetime in the Congress. In fact, I have been moulded by the Congress. I adore this party.

7. The Press (Objectionable Matters) Act directed against the encouragement of violence or sabotage and certain other very grave offences and against the publication of objectionable matters had been enacted on 23 October 1951 and came into force on 1 February 1952.
8. On 11 March, *The Hindustan Times* reported that inquiries had revealed that the report that police had been brought from outside to deal with agitation in Delhi was baseless.

But it is not my aim to perpetuate the Congress in power. The Congress is a powerful tool which must be used in the task of nation-building. I want the help of every wise, able and thinking individual in this task.

I want that we should march in step with our old colleagues like Jayaprakashji and Narendra Devaji and Kripalaniji. I am not worried about their parties. I would like to benefit from their ideas. Perhaps they may imbibe something from us. Please do not think for a moment that there is any dissension between us. I want that all of us should work together. There are some parties like the Communist Party with whom we could have nothing in common because they believe in change through violence and divisiveness, which is fundamentally wrong. But with all the other parties we can find something in common. We must find opportunities for cooperating because ultimately our goal, no matter which Party we belong to, is to build a new India. It is not our personal glory or any sense of false pride or feeling of superiority which motivates us. Nor are most of us in search of big posts, etc. The challenge before us has been to evolve a policy which would enable us to progress quickly. Therefore, I hope that some members of the Working Committee will meet Narendra Devaji and Jayaprakashji and find a common meeting ground.

I want you to remember that the next few years are absolutely crucial for India, and the world. The slightest slackness or show of weakness will result in our lagging behind for no country will wait for anyone. The nation will not wait for the Congress either. We will become backward if we do not join the mainstream of present-day world. *Jai Hind*.

## II. ORGANIZATIONAL MATTERS

### 1. To Purushottamdas Tandon<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
January 1, 1953

My dear Purushottamdas,

... It is possible, and I believe it is true, that there is difference of opinion between us in regard to several matters. But it is not clear to me what differences there have been or are in regard to the manner of the working of the Congress organization.

I entirely agree with you that it is not desirable for the Prime Minister to be also the President of the Congress. I have felt this all along and I stated as much before the Working Committee on more than one occasion. Indeed, I

1. JN Collection. Extracts. A copy of this letter was sent to Balwantray Mehta with the letter in original from Purushottamdas Tandon.



had decided that I would not be President, but I have been subjected during the last few months to enormous pressure from all sides. Almost everyone of my colleagues not only in the Working Committee, but in Provincial Congress Committees, had been pressing me. I confess that I was not strong enough in the end to resist this pressure. It is not merely a question of strength of mind, but a feeling gradually grew within me that perhaps, at this stage, if I refused to agree to this widespread request of our friends and comrades, this might result in certain difficulties and other unfortunate consequences.

You can well imagine what a terrible burden I have had to carry. Fortunately my health and capacity for work are fairly good. I have utilized them to the utmost. Nothing could please me more than to be relieved of as many of the burdens that I carry as possible.

You refer to the Credentials Committee. The Credentials Committee was abolished, because most of us thought that it did not serve the purpose for which it was intended. You know well even while it existed what we had to face. There may be two opinions about this, but all of us were aiming at a procedure which would lessen irregularities or worse. We have discussed for years past how to overcome these difficulties and have tried various expedients with more or less success. After all, success depends not so much on rules and regulations as on the human beings who make them work. I might say that while we rightly discuss and condemn corruption or irregularity in the Congress organization, the same type of problems and sometimes worse ones, are in evidence in large political organizations elsewhere.

There has been much talk of bogus membership and other irregularities in the recent Congress elections. I have no doubt that this talk is justified. Nevertheless, I would like to say that at no time previously, to my knowledge, have we striven so hard to find out and correct where possible, these irregularities. The AICC Office has sent out scores of competent observers to many States. They have supervised elections, corrected errors, and generally prevented the grosser form of irregularities. You know that we have taken severe action in the whole State of Bihar, thereby unfortunately punishing many innocent people. You do not know, perhaps, what other action we have taken or are taking in many States.

In spite of this, I think, I can say with some justification that Congress elections all over India this year have shown a marked improvement in regard to these practices. Of course, we are not satisfied and we are continually searching for better ways. We now intend making some other proposals for the amendment of the Constitution, which we hope will bring these elections more under proper control.

We live in difficult times and are surrounded all the time by novel and intricate problems. Indeed, our country is not peculiar in this respect. Every country has to face the same fate. All one can do is to strive one's utmost to



meet and solve these problems. Success does not always attend one's efforts, but one has to strive on whatever the result.

Yours affectionately,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 2. Bogus Memberships<sup>1</sup>

I had a visit from Shri Sumat Prasad Jain of Muzaffarnagar today. He mentioned the delegate elections there and said that a very large number of bogus membership forms had been put in a sack and were lying in the Congress office there. Our representative who went there did not see them.

Nevertheless, our representative, so far as I remember, strongly criticized the elections and did refer to bogus membership. The matter has been referred to the UPPCC. I asked Shri Sumat Prasad Jain to go to the AICC Office and see you.

I feel that we must not allow this Muzaffarnagar matter to be hushed up. If there has been all this bogus membership, we must take action about it, even though some kind of a compromise might be arrived at there. Muzaffarnagar has been a difficult place for some time past.

1. Note to the General Secretary, AICC, 11 January 1953. File No G-25(ii)/1953, AICC Papers, NMML.

## 3. To Sooseya Morais<sup>1</sup>

16 January 1953

Dear Friend,

Your letter of the 15th January.<sup>2</sup>

I agree with you that the activities of some Congressmen have created a

1. File No G-57/1952, AICC Papers, NMML.
2. S. Sooseya Morais, Secretary of the Congress Youth League, wrote that there was considerable confusion among the youth in the Congress regarding the Communist sponsored Peace Movement, particularly since some local Congressmen were partaking in the movement and criticizing the Congress leaders and the Government. He requested Nehru to "do something to clear the confusion."

great deal of confusion about this so-called 'Peace Movement.'<sup>3</sup> The persons you refer<sup>4</sup> to are not, I believe, in the Congress now though they used to be in it.

We can have no objection to people declaring their adherence to peace, but I feel that in this 'Peace Movement' there is a good deal of politics and condemnation of others. Their approach is very far from being a peaceful one. Some time ago, I stated that it would be better for Congressmen not to associate themselves with it.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. The All-India Peace Council started a Peace Movement to "protest against the dangerous policy outlined by the US President". The Council called upon the people and the Government of India "to halt the attempts by the US President to extend the Korean war, to demand an immediate ceasefire in Korea and the opening of negotiations between the great powers for the conclusion of a pact of peace."
4. J.C. Kumarappa, and Sunderlal of Allahabad.

#### 4. Publicity for Congress Resolutions<sup>1</sup>

Dear Comrade,

The Hyderabad Session of the Congress was a success from many points of view and showed the vitality of this great organization. I was particularly glad to notice many new and young faces among the delegates.

We have now to follow this Session up with organized and continuous work. The first thing is to give full publicity to these resolutions all over the country. This publicity does not mean merely circulating resolutions, but explaining them to the public fully in public meetings and otherwise.

The four principal resolutions which require to be dealt with in this way related to:

1. The Five Year Plan
2. Disapproval of communal activities
3. Redistribution of States; and
4. Foreign policy

1. 21 January 1953. Circular letter to the Pradesh Congress Committees, File No G-67/1952, AICC Papers, NMML.



I hope that your Pradesh Congress Committee will take immediate steps to this end.

The next step is to organize the Congress for constructive work both in furtherance of the Five Year Plan and otherwise.

You will notice that the Congress has again tried to tackle the question of our Constitution with a view to prevent irregularities and malpractices creeping in. The Working Committee has been directed to look into this matter and to report to the AICC. I shall be grateful to you if you will consider this matter immediately, keeping in view the experience we have recently had, and suggest such changes as you may consider necessary. It is not desirable to upset the whole Constitution frequently and therefore the changes suggested should be such as fit into the present Constitution without doing too much violence to it. But our aim necessarily is to make the organization as free from malpractices and as effective in working as possible. I shall be glad if you will write to the AICC Office giving your own and your committee's views on the subject.

In doing so, I should like you to consider the recent delegate elections, more particularly, where irregularities have occurred. There should be full enquiry and if necessary we shall have fresh elections there. There is no reason to accept wrong-doing merely because it has taken place.

I shall be glad if you will take early action in this matter.

## 5. To S.K. Patil<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

January 21, 1953

My dear Patil,<sup>2</sup>

I was so fully occupied during the Congress Session at Hyderabad that I could not have a talk with you. Towards the end of the Session I tried to get in touch with you, but you were on the point of leaving. I understand that my message only reached you at the aerodrome.

The matters I wished to talk to you about were important and had a public aspect. I could not, however, put them before the Steering Committee and, in any event, I wanted a talk with you first.

Some time ago, I read a report in the *Free Press Journal* of a speech you had delivered to what is called the Democratic Group of the Indian Merchants' Chamber. This was, I believe, early in January, probably on the 7th. In the

1. File No P-5/1953, AICC Papers, NMML.

2. He was President, Bombay PCC and a Member of Parliament at this juncture.

course of this speech you were highly critical of the Bombay Government<sup>3</sup> and, indeed, of our whole Constitution.<sup>4</sup>

Subsequently you gave an interview to the *Current*<sup>5</sup> which also was a condemnation of the policies of the Bombay Government.

I am not going into the details of these speeches, nor do I challenge the right of criticism of the Government. Much depends on the way things are done. But the general impression created not only in my mind, but in the minds of large numbers of others, both in the Congress and outside, is that you are deliberately trying to undermine the prestige of the Government, more especially the Bombay Government, and encouraging such elements in Bombay as are hostile to that Government. Newspapers have commented on this and many persons in Hyderabad (apart from Bombay) spoke to me about it. I confess that all this has surprised and distressed me because that is not the way we advise our colleagues in the Congress to function. More particularly, a senior person in your position has to set a good example. What you have been reported to have said undoubtedly tends to encourage disruptive tendencies and leads people to believe that you want to embarrass the Government as much as possible.

I noticed a report also some days ago, just before the Hyderabad Congress, of a formal reception that you gave at Congress House, Bombay, to V.P. Menon<sup>6</sup> who delivered a speech on that occasion. That speech, as reported, was also surprising. V.P. Menon or anyone else who has retired from Government service can express his views as he likes. But to do so officially under Congress auspices and to criticize the Government in the way he is reported to have done, is not the sort of thing that has been done in India in the past or that should be done

3. On 7 January 1953, speaking at the Democratic Group meeting in Mumbai, S.K. Patil remarked: "I honestly believe that if the democratic two-party formula existed in the State, there would not have been the taxation—presumably the Multi-Point Sales Tax—of which you are complaining." He also felt that the policy on prohibition would perhaps have met with a different fate.
4. Patil said that he was proud "but not happy of our (the Congress Party's) huge, elephantine eighty to ninety per cent majorities." The ideal party system would be to have only two main political parties both of them being almost equally strong. Such a system would result in having a strong Opposition.
5. In his interview to *Current*, Patil criticized the Motor Vehicle Tax on heavy transport, the Multi-Point Sales Tax and other measures of the Bombay Government.
6. At a reception held at the Congress House in his honour by S.K. Patil on 12 January, V.P. Menon said that the Government should revive the practice of appointing non-party advisers to the various ministries to "safeguard the interests of all sections of the public." Menon said that Sardar Patel had adopted the practice to ensure an objective solution to many problems and the present-day difficulties could also be avoided had the practice continued. Besides, such a system would also help in checking any possible abuse of power by Ministers.



in the future. If V.P. Menon had said that on any other occasion, that was his responsibility. But to be specially honoured by the Congress and then to give expression to such views there, appears to me to be improper from both the Congress point of view and V.P. Menon's.

The *Current* weekly has not got a good reputation and has usually indulged in all kinds of false statements and charges against the Congress and the Government. It is considered to be one of the least responsible of periodicals. Indeed, the editor,<sup>7</sup> is at present involved in a case in court<sup>8</sup> about something that he published. To patronize this periodical by giving it a special interview on political matters is to encourage it and show it favour when it does not deserve either.

I am writing to you rather briefly about these matters, but this will indicate to you how I have felt about them. Each separate incident produced a reaction in me and others. The cumulative effect has been considerable and I cannot make out what exactly your purpose was in following this policy. All this can hardly be accidental or casual.

I shall be glad to have your explanation of these various matters.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

7. D.F. Karaka was the editor of *Current*.

8. The reference was to the "Blitz Forgery Case" in which R.K. Karanjia, the editor of *Blitz*, was charged with abetting "person or persons unknown" in the preparation and use of forged documents so as to harm the reputation of the American Ambassador, Chester Bowles. These documents were later printed in the *Current* weekly.

## 6. To S.K. Patil<sup>1</sup>

January 25, 1953

My dear Patil,

Your letter of the 22nd January.

I attach no importance to your not seeing me in Hyderabad.<sup>2</sup> Obviously you could not have done so when you received my message, rather casually, actually at the airport, when you were leaving.

1. File No P-5/1953, AICC Papers, NMML.

2. On 22 January 1953, Patil wrote that he got Nehru's message while he was explaining and it was noticed by some pressmen in the crowd which prompted him to issue the "correction slip" on 20 January that he could not meet Nehru as he got the "casual" message late.



When I stated in my letter that there appeared to be some purpose or object behind what you were doing, I was not thinking in terms of a Ministry or a Chief Ministership, but I was thinking in terms of a deliberate attempt to discredit the Bombay Government and more especially Morarji Desai.<sup>3</sup> I could not understand why repeatedly you acted in a manner which could only encourage the opponents of the Bombay Government. Indeed, that is a widespread impression, as you can see for yourself by the comments in the newspapers, cartoons, etc. A man of your ability, I would imagine, could not possibly allow himself to act in a manner which produced these undesirable results. I had thus to think that it was your deliberate purpose to discredit the Bombay Government and more especially Morarji Desai.

You refer to my "persistent dislike" for you.<sup>4</sup> I am not aware of having any dislike for you in the ordinary sense of the word. I have appreciated and admired your capacity for organizational work. It is true, however, that I could not understand often enough what you did and that I heard numerous complaints about you. I do not give credence to complaints unless they have some obvious justification. Therefore I try to shut my mind to them. But when even people like Sardar Patel, who was not ill-disposed to you at all, mentioned to me that there was something in these complaints, and when B.G. Kher also complained, then I confess that my mind was influenced. Nevertheless, I tried not to allow that to come in the way of my work or your work, because I felt that I would not be justified in doing so unless I had something much more positive and definite before me. If I had had that, I would undoubtedly have written to you frankly and asked for your explanation.

Another thing that has had some influence on me had nothing to do with personal behaviour but rather with policy. I noticed on some occasions that you favoured a certain policy in regard to foreign affairs which I thought was not correct and not in keeping with our general policy. I know that you have spoken in favour of our policy also. Indeed you have proposed or seconded resolutions to this effect in the Congress itself.

You refer to some matters in which you have had serious differences with the Bombay Government's policy. I do not propose to discuss them here as I am not fully competent to do so not knowing all the details. But in regard to one matter, namely crossword puzzles,<sup>5</sup> I must say that I have long been of opinion that this racket should be ended. Indeed I should like it ended not only in Bombay but in other places in India.

3. He was the Chief Minister of Bombay Province at this time.
4. Patil wrote that "in the beginning I had ruled Parliament out of my consideration because of what I wrote to you in one of my letters, viz., your persistent dislike for me."
5. Patil criticized the "strange attitude" of the Bombay Government in regard to crossword puzzles. The restrictions in Bombay "have taken these crosswords, either to Calcutta or Delhi."

I do not quite understand what you mean by the "arbitrary powers" of the Chief Minister.<sup>6</sup> The same might well apply to the Prime Minister. Neither has arbitrary powers, but it is true that in the system of Government which we have taken from the UK, the Prime Minister or the Chief Minister has a very special position. Naturally, he has to carry his party with him. That is no small check. As for public opinion, it is a little difficult to say what this is. In any matter which affects various sections of the public, one group may agree with something and another group may disagree. This agreement or not will depend on how their particular interests are involved. It is all very well for all to agree in a question, let us say, independence. But when you come to economic issues, disagreement is inevitable, where interests conflict and we have to consider whose interest is the more important from the larger point of view and our ideals. It may be that a considerable number of merchants in Bombay might disapprove of something and yet a much larger body of public opinion may approve of it.

I confess I still do not understand why it should have been necessary for the Congress to entertain a retired public servant like V.P. Menon.<sup>7</sup> He has done good work when he was in Government. But to give him a special position on behalf of the Congress seems odd to me. In the result he took advantage of this position and spoke irresponsibly.

I am not myself very selective about my interviews with the Press. But I draw a line somewhere. I could never think of giving an interview to a number of papers of India which are known to be of a very low standard. The *Current* is among them. The Editor of the *Current* at the time was actually being prosecuted. Apart from this, to deal in a periodical like the *Current* with criticisms of Government is something, I could never imagine, was possible for a leading Congressman. You must remember that your position in the Congress organization is a very high one, and what you say must necessarily attract attention and carry weight. In effect your interview in the *Current* created something of the nature of a sensation.

I would like you to consider the general effect that has been produced by these recent statements of yours. It is clear that that effect is prejudicial not only to the Bombay Government but to the Congress generally.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. Patil reminded Nehru that at Indore he had asserted that he should create "some liaison machinery between the wings of the Congress so that the arbitrary powers of the Chief Minister can be brought under some check. At present there is no check whatsoever."

7. See *ante*, pp. 424-25.



## 7. Bihar Congress Elections<sup>1</sup>

I think that Shri Khandubhai Desai<sup>2</sup> will be a very good choice to conduct and supervise the enquiry into Bihar Congress elections.

2. This enquiry cannot be left to the Bihar PCC. The Working Committee resolution on the subject certainly stated that the enquiry should be conducted by the PCC. But the real stress was "under the supervision of the AICC." Any enquiry largely left to the PCC would again result in complaints of partiality, etc. Therefore, the AICC supervisor must function very effectively and directly. He should be given some persons to assist him from the AICC Office. Thereafter, he should get in touch with the PCC and organize the enquiry with the help of the PCC and the persons chosen jointly by him and the PCC.

3. We do not wish the PCC to feel that we are bypassing them, but in effect the responsibility must be that of the AICC representative.

4. We may have to conduct the enquiry in all the districts of Bihar, but we should select, to begin with, some of them only which, *prima facie* or because of serious complaints, indicate malpractices and irregularities. It would be desirable to have a thorough enquiry in those districts. In the other districts, some kind of a preliminary enquiry might be held to begin with. If these result in any evidence of major malpractices, then fuller enquiry might be held. Generally speaking, our representative should decide. If we try to hold a full enquiry everywhere, our representative will not be able to supervise properly and we shall have to face complaints later.

1. Note to the General Secretary, AICC, 25 January 1953. File No P-4(A) 1953, AICC Papers, NMML.
2. (1898-1975); Member, Bombay Legislative Assembly, 1937-39 and 1946-50, Constituent Assembly, 1946-50, Provisional Parliament, 1950-52 and House of the People, 1952-57; Union Minister for Labour, 1954-57; Member, Rajya Sabha, 1959-68; General Secretary and President, INTUC; Governor of Andhra Pradesh, 1967-75. He was deputed by the AICC to enquire into the Congress Party elections in Bihar.



## 8. To Sri Krishna Sinha<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
February 6, 1953

My dear Sri Babu,<sup>2</sup>

I have your letter of the 5th February about the enquiry in the Congress elections in Bihar.<sup>3</sup> The instructions sent from the AICC Office were at my instance and after consultation with me. I really do not understand why or how any objection is taken. Apart from any decision of the Working Committee, the AICC can always make such arrangements for enquiry. The Working Committee was anxious to have as full an enquiry as possible with the cooperation of the PCC. You will appreciate that, in existing circumstances, an enquiry, in which the AICC does not take full part, may be challenged and prove infructuous.

I should have thought that the PCC would welcome every help that is given by the AICC in this matter. To my surprise, they resented. That is a bad beginning. I regret I am unable to revise the instructions sent by the AICC Office. I do not see why there should not be full cooperation between Shri Badri Nath Varma<sup>4</sup> and Shri Khandubhai Desai.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No P-4(A) 1953-54, AICC Papers, NMML.
2. He was the Chief Minister of Bihar at this time.
3. The Bihar PCC protested against the AICC decision to themselves held an enquiry into the allegations of the enrolment of bogus members and irregularities in the delegates election.
4. He was Minister of Education of Bihar at this time.

## 9. To Govind Ballabh Pant<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
February 11, 1953

My dear Pantji,

I have today issued the Working Committee list.<sup>2</sup> I have included Rafi Ahmad

1. File No G-11/1953, AICC Papers, NMML.
2. Names of only nineteen out of the 21 members allowed under the Party's Constitution for being nominated as members of the Working Committee were announced. These were: Jawaharlal Nehru, Abul Kalam Azad, C. Rajagopalachari, G.B. Pant, B.C. Roy, Jagjiwan Ram, Rafi Ahmed Kidwai, Nabakrushna Choudhury, Khandubhai Desai, Manikyalal Verma, N. Sanjiva Reddy, A.V. Kuttimalu Amma, K.R. Madhavan Nair, Devakinandan Narain, Gurmukh Singh Musafir, Morarji Desai, S. Mallaiah, Balwantray Mehta and Shriman Narayan Agarwal.

Kidwai in it although at present he is not a member of the AICC.<sup>3</sup> I hope, however, that steps will be taken soon to elect him as a member from the UP. Other PCCs have offered to elect him, but I would like him to come from the UP.

Yours,  
Jawaharlal

3. Rafi Ahmad Kidwai, the Union Minister for Food and Agriculture, was defeated in the election to the AICC from UP on 31 December 1952.

## 10. To Sri Krishna Sinha<sup>1</sup>

Camp: Jamshedpur  
February 22, 1953

My dear Sri Babu,

... I am anxious, as you must be, to see the Congress flourish in Bihar as it used to do. Khandubhai Desai told me, and I entirely agree with him, that there are large numbers of very good Congress workers in Bihar, probably more than in any other Province, but unfortunately they have not been pulling their weight because of conflicts and controversies. That is a great pity and it should be our first endeavour, therefore, to put things on a right basis and turn all this wasted energy in the right direction. In this matter I rely upon you more than anyone else.

It is patent that a proper enquiry can only be effective if the Bihar Congress takes a lead in it. Any imposed enquiry would not serve the main purpose we have in view. At the same time, it has seemed to me, as I wrote to you, that, unless the AICC is closely associated with it, the effect produced will not be satisfactory and it will be open to some people to object and protest. Fortunately we have got Khandubhai Desai to help in this on behalf of the AICC. He is a very good man for this kind of work.

I hope you will come to the Working Committee meeting on the 8th March. In view of the enquiry that is taking place now in Bihar, I did not think it suitable to include a Bihar name in the Working Committee at present. I want to do that a little later and I have kept a vacancy for it. But in any event please come to that meeting on the 8th March.

I need not point out to you the fact that is obvious. But this obvious fact has been impressed upon me more than ever by this visit of mine. This area in

1. File No P.4(A)/1953-54, AICC Papers, NMML. Also available in JN Collection. Extracts.



Bihar, largely comprising Chota Nagpur, is fast developing, together with a part of adjoining Bengal, as the great industrial centre of India. Bihar thus has a great future before it, provided we prove worthy of it. I wonder how far our colleagues in the Legislative Assembly or in the Congress here fully realize this tremendous responsibility that is being cast upon them. They should be made to appreciate this. Bihar may be a great agricultural State, but it is also becoming a great industrial State and this has always to be kept in view. It requires often enough a different and more sophisticated outlook.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 11. To N.V. Gadgil<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
March 11, 1953

My dear Gadgil,<sup>2</sup>

Thank you for your letter of the 11th March and your note which I have read.

I have been surprised and distressed to learn that you have been talking to a number of people, including pressmen, about the proceedings of the Working Committee. I find that all kinds of rather distorted versions are being talked<sup>3</sup> about. It is embarrassing to come across these versions which contain some truth and some error. Any attempt to explain what happened is to reveal the proceedings of the Committee. It becomes difficult to have a frank discussion in the Working Committee if its proceedings are revealed to others.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. N.V. Gadgil Papers, NMML.
2. Congress Member of Parliament. He was present in the Working Committee meeting held on 8 March by special invitation.
3. The Press reporting the deliberations of the Congress Working Committee held on 8 March had stated that during discussions on Andhra State, the Tamil leaders, including Rajagopalachari and Kamaraj Nadar, opposed the temporary location of capital of Andhra in Madras city while Andhra Congress leaders like Sanjiva Reddi wanted Madras city as temporary location, and in the face of strong Tamil opposition the Government of India might not accept the report of Justice Wanchoo recommending Madras city as temporary capital of Andhra. It was also reported that the Working Committee discussed the question of redistribution of States and decided that factors to govern the redistribution would be not merely language but others too as indicated in President's Address in Parliament.



### III. CONGRESS-PSP COOPERATION

#### 1. To V.N. Tivary<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
March 16, 1953

My dear Venkatesh Narayan,<sup>2</sup>

Thank you for your letter.<sup>3</sup> You are one of the invisible MPs whom nobody sees, unless presumably he goes to the Library.

I would very much like to have the cooperation of the Praja Socialists, even if they keep as a separate organization. But I fear this is not likely at the present state to the extent I desired. It may be of course that subsequent events may bring them nearer. As you know, I have been trying to work to this end.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No 32(195)/49-PMS.
2. (d. 1965); a senior Congressman from UP and a Member of the House of the People.
3. In his letter of 16 March, V.N. Tivary congratulated Nehru for his efforts to bring back the Praja Socialist Party to the Congress and stated that bringing back dissident Congressmen into the fold and seeking cooperation of all the progressive forces wedded to the Congress ideology was necessary to defeat the reactionary forces in the country.

#### 2. To Jayaprakash Narayan<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
March 17, 1953

My dear Jayaprakash,

I received your letter of the 4th March from Gaya some days ago. I did not reply to it as you were coming to Delhi, and yesterday we had a talk.<sup>2</sup>

1. File No G-59/1953, AICC Papers, NMML.
2. The talks for a coalition between the Congress and the Praja Socialist Party were initiated by Nehru who thought that the inclusion of leaders from the PSP would help in fighting communalism and speed up the process of development and change. The PSP was asked to indicate the terms and conditions under which it would be willing to offer its cooperation "at all levels". Because of the wider issues integral to the PSP programme, the talks between Nehru and Jayaprakash Narayan on 16 March 1953 proved infructuous.

Reading your letter,<sup>3</sup> I realized not only how much we had in common in regard to our basic outlooks, but also the differences in our approach. It may be that those differences are partly at least due to our viewing our problems from different angles. It is fairly easy to make a list of what we would like to have. It is more difficult to get that done in the proper order of priority. To attempt to do many things at the same time sometimes results in nothing being done.

After all, our Five Year Plan is an attempt to look at the picture as a whole and lay down certain priorities.<sup>4</sup> It is quite possible that that Plan itself may undergo improvement and variation with experience and further consideration, but the basis of it will, no doubt, remain.

In your letter you complain that I have often dealt with some points repeatedly in the same language.<sup>5</sup> Probably you are right, because one can only proceed to discuss a thing from one's own point of view. Of course, if, in the course of talk, other aspects come up, they are dealt with accordingly. I have a sensation of basic dynamic changes taking place in the world which are really affecting human life in every aspect—political, economic, social, etc. Mostly these result from the pace of technological advance. I do not think these changes are all to the good, but there they are. I have also the feeling that all of us, if I may say so, are apt to be left behind in our thinking by these changes.

Take the question of war. All of us want peace. But in spite of us, war may come with all its terrific consequences. The Communists shout loudly of peace. But there is little of peace in their shouting. The rival group also talks of peace and prepares for war. Whatever attitude we might adopt may not ultimately prevent some catastrophe from occurring which will upset the present-day world and all our thinking.

You say that the goals and values of socialism are unalterably fixed for you and you define these goals as the creation of a new society in which there is no exploitation, in which there is economic and social equality, and in which

3. Jayaprakash Narayan, with this letter, forwarded to Nehru a programme which he expected the Congress Party to accept before there was collaboration between the two parties. The programme mainly dealt with issues like land reforms, abolition of Upper Houses, organization of village industries on cooperative lines, further nationalization of industries and reforms in the administration.
4. Jayaprakash in his letter had pointed out the inadequacy of the Five Year Plan for the development of small industries, which, he thought, should play a predominant part in the industrial development of the country.
5. Jayaprakash wrote that Nehru did this because in his mind they were doctrinaire socialists sticking to outdated formulas and added that had Nehru been aware of the evolution of their movement and ideas he "would not have found the need of impressing upon us the empirical and changing process of socialist reconstruction."



there is freedom and well-being for all. Surely, there is hardly any intelligent person in the world who will not agree with that goal or those values. Certainly I accept them completely. I accept further the necessity for trying to achieve them in the soonest possible time. The question is how to proceed about it and there we come up against all manner of uncertain factors, including the human material we work with. I am inclined to agree with you that a sense of urgency is lacking in the country generally and in our policies also I should like to increase that sense of urgency. I confess that I have a feeling of groping forward step by step, even though the goal might be clear.

But I do not wish to argue these matters, because there is no end to argument and it does not usually lead anywhere. When people understand each other, even though they may differ somewhat, they do not require a novel argument.

My own purpose in having talks with you, as well as with Kripalaniji and Narendra Deva, was to bring about as large a measure of cooperation in our activities as possible.<sup>6</sup> Also to infuse that very sense of urgency, as well as a clarification of our goals. You will remember that I have been trying to meet you for many months past. This was no new urge due to any new occurrence. Long before you undertook your fast,<sup>7</sup> I wrote to you<sup>8</sup> and suggested that you might see me. But this could not be arranged, because of your fast and subsequent convalescence. Thus my desire to discuss these matters with you was not related to any new happening, but had been present in my mind for a long time past. It was obviously due to a feeling that we have big things to do in this country and we should approach them with our joint effort. I feel that the next five or ten years are crucial in our existence. I am not satisfied, if I may say so, with the rate of our progress or advance. I wanted to hasten it and I wanted your help to do so.

I did not think of any precise method of doing so. It was rather the general approach that mattered. That is why when you or Kripalaniji asked me for greater precision, all I could say was that I was prepared to consider this question at all levels. I had not really thought of it in that way. This was not a question of course of any offices being offered or accepted, but rather of a mutual realization of the necessity of cooperation from which many things could flow. I had not thought even of what is called merger of parties.

Our talks have resulted in good deal of speculative publicity, much of it

6. In fact, the move for cooperation was opposed by the Praja Socialist leaders, J.B. Kripalani, Narendra Deva and Rammanohar Lohia.

7. Jayaprakash Narayan undertook self-purification fast from 22 June to 14 July 1952 following the failure of negotiations with the Government of India regarding payment of wages to postal workers for the period of strike.

8. See *Selected Works* (second series) Vol. 18, p. 235.

wide of the mark.<sup>9</sup> That should be cleared, though it is never possible to prevent people from giving vent to their own thoughts.

I feel after reading your letter and after my talk with you that, perhaps, any kind of a formal step at the present moment would not be helpful. We have to grow into things, not to bring them about artificially. You have sent me a draft programme which includes, among other things, basic constitutional changes. Now, obviously it is not easy for me to bring about these changes, even though I may not be opposed to them. You refer to all kinds of other changes of law and legal procedure and administration and reorganization of the map of India, etc. To each one of these, considered separately, I have little objection and I would be happy to give thought to them. But, surely, it is beyond me both as Prime Minister and as the President of the Congress to deal with such vital matters and give assurances in regard to them. Many of these may be logically justifiable and yet there may be other reasons which come in the way. Again, one can hardly take all these things in a bunch.

At the same time, from your point of view, you are perfectly justified in putting forward what you consider your immediate programme to be.

There lies the difficulty, and it is because of this that I feel that it is better for us not in any way to tie each other down, but rather to try, to the best of our ability, to develop both the spirit and the practice of cooperation. I am quite sure that this is possible over a large field. That should not come in the way of your pursuing your particular aims and objectives or pressing for any changes in our programme. It is the spirit and the approach that count. If that spirit and approach are there, then we will influence each other in our policies and gradually come nearer. At a later stage, we might be able to take further steps towards closer cooperation.

I agree with you, therefore, that for the present we should drop this idea in its more precise forms and make this clear to the public, in as friendly a way as possible, in order to put an end to public speculation. On the 20th of this month I am addressing a meeting of the UP Pradesh Congress Committee, as well as some office-bearers of Congress committees, in Meerut. I might take advantage of that occasion to say something on this subject.<sup>10</sup> I am separately noting down what I might perhaps say about this.

I do hope that we shall meet frequently to discuss common problems, and there are so many of them, and try to help each other to understand them fully. Certainly, I would welcome your help, as well as Kripalaniji's and Narendra

9. For example, *The Statesman* on 4 March commented: "While several Praja Socialist Party representatives were anxious to join the Government at the cost of their political individuality the Congress is in need of outside votes to maintain itself in office."

10. See *ante*, pp. 418-19.



Deva's. Indeed, perhaps, it might be better to do so without being tied down to any particular approach or formula.

Yours affectionately,  
Jawaharlal

### 3. To S.N. Agarwal<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
17 March 1953

My dear Shriman,<sup>2</sup>

I had a talk with Shri Jayaprakash Narayan last evening. As a result of this talk I felt that we could not pursue these conversations much further on the lines we have thus far taken. Jayaprakash agreed. I am writing a letter to him, a copy of which I enclose.<sup>3</sup>

On the 20th of this month, I am going to Meerut to address a meeting of Congressmen. I propose to say something about our talks then. I have put this down so that Jayaprakash might know what line I am going to adopt. I am sending this to Jayaprakash and I enclose it for your information.

I am also sending a copy of Jayaprakash's letter of the 4th March to me and the draft programme he sent me.

I think it will be a good thing if we, both in the Congress and the Planning Commission, consider this draft programme for ourselves and see in what measure we can gradually give effect to it. This is not with a view to further conversations on this subject with the Praja Socialists.

I am sending a copy of this letter and other papers to Gulzarilal Nanda.

Please show this to Balwantray Mehta.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No G-59/1953, AICC Papers, NMML.

2. Shriman Narayan Agarwal, Member of Parliament and General Secretary of the AICC at this time.

3. See *ante*, pp. 432-36.

4. To Jayaprakash Narayan<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
March 18, 1953

My dear Jayaprakash,

I have been so fully occupied all day that I could not find even a few minutes to send you the corrected paragraph to which you referred this morning. On my return home rather late this evening, I read the statement which you had issued, to the Press today.<sup>2</sup> I also got your letter of today's date.<sup>3</sup> Of course, you can issue your previous letter to me to the Press if you so wish it.<sup>4</sup> I have no objection whatever. I am sorry that the press people should indulge in foolish criticism.

I had told you that I would speak about this matter at Meerut day after tomorrow, but in view of developments, that seems rather far off. I have, therefore, decided to issue a statement to the Press. I enclose a copy of it.<sup>5</sup> Probably, it will appear in tomorrow morning's papers.

As for the fourth paragraph at page 2 of my letter to you dated March<sup>6</sup> 17th, I suggest the following change.

The original paragraph to be replaced by the following:-

I did not think of any precise method of doing so. It was rather the general approach that mattered. I had not thought of, what is called, merger of parties. I felt that if there was a mutual realization of the necessity of cooperation, other things would flow from it. When you or Kripalaniji asked me for greater precision, I said that I was prepared to consider this question at all levels, including both popular and governmental. It was left at that and we did not discuss this particular matter any further.

1. File No G-59/1953, AICC Papers, NMML.
2. Jayaprakash Narayan in his statement stated that during their talks on 16 March, Nehru appreciated the viewpoint of the Praja Socialist Party in putting forth a minimum programme for five years as basis of cooperation with the Congress but felt that tying each other down to any specific commitments would not be useful. Jayaprakash thought that without a common programme the experiment in cooperation particularly at Governmental level would fail. In view of this difference in approach the question of cooperation at all levels raised by Nehru was dropped.
3. Jayaprakash Narayan in this letter sought Nehru's permission to publish the letter he had written to Nehru on 4 March.
4. This letter was released to the Press on 20 March.
5. See next item.
6. See *ante*, pp. 432-36.



If it is at all possible for you to see me tomorrow, I shall be happy. I do not wish to discuss the matters referred to in our correspondence. I would like to meet you any way. Apart from this, I should like, if that is possible for us, to meet you and some of your colleagues from time to time to discuss various policies, for instance, some things that you have mentioned in your suggested programme. Such discussions can prove helpful.

Yours affectionately,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 5. Meeting with Jayaprakash Narayan<sup>1</sup>

There has been a good deal of speculation in the press and in the public mind in regard to some talks which I have had with some leaders of the Praja Socialist Party, notably with Shri Jayaprakash Narayan, Acharya Kripalani and Acharya Narendra Deva. Much of this speculation is entirely wide of the mark. I should like, therefore, to take into my confidence not only Congressmen but others also.

It has been natural for me to meet, whenever opportunity offered itself, my old colleagues, some of whom are leaders of the Praja Socialist Party. The fact that they are not in the Congress and, as members of another Party, have often opposed the Congress, could not come in the way of my personal regard and affection for them. They are not only our old comrades but tried soldiers in the struggle for India's freedom.<sup>2</sup> Whatever differences may have cropped up between them and the Congress in recent years, there has always been a very wide plane of agreement on basic issues. Indeed, that was natural because we have worked together for the greater part of our lives.

The formation of separate parties either with some ideological difference or placing greater emphasis on certain matters, is a natural development to which, I for my part, have no objection whatever. In a democratic set-up, it is desirable that every opportunity should be given for the development of ideas and the education of the public in them. With the coming of independence,

1. Statement to the Press, 18 March 1953, File No G-59/1953, AICC Papers, NMML. This appeared in the Press on 19 March 1953.
2. In February 1948 the Congress Socialist Party seceded from the Congress with which it had made common cause during the freedom struggle.

this development was perfectly healthy and natural, even though it brought some political conflicts in its train.

The parties, as they exist in India today, apart from the Congress, may be divided in four groups. There are certain political parties with an economic ideology. There is the Communist Party with the allied organizations. There are the various communal parties under different names but essentially following a narrow communal ideology, and there are a considerable number of local parties and groups having only a provincial or even narrower appeal.

The Communist Party, with its views of a monolithic structure both of the Party and the State, and its close association with methods of violence, is necessarily far removed from the basic structure and ideology of the Congress and its peaceful methods and democratic objective. The communal parties represent an outlook which is completely opposed to what the Congress has aimed at and struggled for during its long existence. They are disruptive and sometimes to some extent revivalist and totally reactionary. The provincial and local groups have no great importance from the all-India point of view.

Of what might be called the political or economic parties, apart from the Congress, the Praja Socialist Party is far the most important. Whatever other differences there might be, there is a considerable field of common approach and methods between the Congress and the Praja Socialist Party. It is natural for them to cooperate in any field of activity, whenever opportunity offers itself. I have often thought, therefore, that we should enlarge these fields of cooperative activity. More particularly, when reactionary and communal forces divert people's attention into wrong channels, and when the country demands constructive work of all kinds to build up the new India, I have naturally thought that we should cooperate. I feel that the next five or ten years are going to be crucial in our country's history.

With these thoughts in my mind, I invited Shri Jayaprakash Narayan to meet me. The invitation was sent some six months ago or possibly more, but it was not possible for him to come to Delhi to meet me. When at last he came, we had long talks about all kinds of subjects. I discovered, what I knew already, that there was a wide area of agreement between us. I put it to him, therefore, that we should try to explore the possibility of closer cooperation. I had not thought of any precise ways of cooperation, because I wanted the background and the approach to be made clear. If this was cleared, then details could be discussed. I suggested that such cooperation could be at all levels, the popular level of course and also the Governmental level. We did not discuss any details about this and talked much more about wider policies. I did not suggest the merger of the Praja Socialist Party with the Congress. I thought that we should begin our cooperative efforts in a relatively small way, which could easily develop later, if circumstances proved to be favourable.

Jayaprakashji wrote to me at some length afterwards and we met also later.



We felt that probably the time had not come for any commitments to be made at this stage about minimum programmes etc., although there might be a good deal of agreement between us. As a consequence we decided not to pursue this particular line of action at present. That of course does not mean that we should not cooperate to the largest possible extent whenever opportunity offers itself. Indeed I very much hope that this will be so and that we shall frequently meet and discuss common lines of action.

Our meetings have been exceedingly friendly and frank as they were bound to be between old friends and colleagues. There is no misunderstanding between us and I would greatly deprecate criticisms or any attempt to cast blame on anybody.

## 6. To Gulzarilal Nanda<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

March 19, 1953

My dear Gulzarilal,

Your letter of March 19.<sup>2</sup>

I am sorry if Jayaprakash had any idea that I changed my mind, because I met some Chief Ministers or others. Nothing happened at the Working Committee which made me change my mind and I did not discuss this matter with any Chief Minister separately. All that the Working Committee did was to give me some idea of the difficulties of the situation.

It was Jayaprakash's letter to me that made me feel quite clearly that nothing definite was going to come out of these talks at this stage. Having felt so, I acted upto that and did not go in for detailed discussions.

I am quite clear in my mind that we have to think hard about basic issues. My own mind is continually, though rather vaguely, concerned with them. I wish I could sit down for a few days somewhere away from my normal work and do some reading and thinking.

I have invited Jayaprakash and his colleagues to come and discuss matters with us from time to time either in a small group or in our full Working

1. JN Collection.

2. Gulzarilal Nanda in his letter had written that on 19 March when Jayaprakash Narayan met him, he got the impression that the latter had accepted the inconclusive outcome of the talks with Nehru calmly but felt that Nehru changed his mind and decided not to pursue the idea of cooperation with Praja Socialists further because of his meeting the Chief Ministers separately during the Working Committee meetings.

Committee. That should apply to the Planning Commission also. I do not mean vague talk about everything but specific talk about definite issues and approach.

For some time past, I have had an idea in my head which I want to share with you. This is to invite Rao Saheb Patwardhan<sup>3</sup> to join the Planning Commission. You know him well enough and so I need not say anything about him. He is at present a member of the Press Commission, but that is not a continuous work.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. P.H. Patwardhan who was engaged in Vinoba Bhave's *Bhoodan* movement.





THE KOREAN PROBLEM





## 1. Chou En-lai's Statement on Indian Resolution<sup>1</sup>

... I suggest that you might see the Chinese Ambassador<sup>2</sup> and draw his attention to this statement<sup>3</sup> by Chou En-lai and say that we deeply regret these statements being made about the Indian Resolution and associating it with everything that occurs. What the US Government might do or might not do is their lookout and we do not agree with much that they have done in the past or are doing in the present. To imagine that they are governed or encouraged by the Indian Resolution seems to us completely unjustified. To think that the Indian Resolution could have this result has also no basis in logic or reason. This repetition on behalf of the Chinese Government and in the Chinese Press is naturally not liked in India. We have refrained from saying a word in answer to these repeated criticisms in China because we are anxious to maintain our friendly relations with that great country. We shall continue this policy. But we expect a friendly country to refer to us in more friendly terms.

I think we should send a telegram to Raghavan also. I give separately a draft for your consideration.<sup>4</sup>

1. Note to the Secretary General, MEA, 23 January 1953. File Nos 12/62/NGO-52 and 12/64/NGO-52, MEA. Also available in JN Collection. Extracts.
2. Young Chung-hsien.
3. N. Raghavan, India's Ambassador to China, informed New Delhi on 22 January 1953, that Chou En-lai in a statement issued in Beijing on 21 January had protested against UN incursions into Chinese territory holding US responsible for them which according to the statement had occurred on 28 November, 8 and 13 December and 12 January. The statement also said: "Encouraged by the Indian Resolution passed by the UN General Assembly the US Government has for the past two months been engaged in preparations for enlarging the risk of war in Asia."
4. See *post*, p. 452.

## 2 Referring Indian Resolution to International Court<sup>1</sup>

Krishna Menon has suggested that we might perhaps suggest, through our Ambassador to the Soviet Government, that we are perfectly prepared to refer

1. Note to Secretary General, MEA, 23 January 1953. File Nos 12/62/NGO-52 and 12/64/NGO-52, MEA. Also available in JN Collection.



our Korean Resolution, in the context of the Geneva Convention, to the International Court. It is our case that our Resolution carries out the spirit and letter of the Geneva Convention. The Soviet Union and China criticize it as a breach of that Convention. We are prepared to abide by the interpretation of the International Court. That, at any rate, should put an end to this argument.

It would do no good to put this forward to the Chinese Government because they are not represented in the International Court, and anyway they are likely to follow Russian advice in the matter. It might be worthwhile to suggest this to the Soviet Government through our Ambassador. If this is done informally and tactfully, it need not have any evil results, even though, as is likely, the suggestion is rejected.

We might anyhow put this to K.P.S. Menon and leave it to him to act up to it at his discretion.

The Soviet Government have got a judge<sup>2</sup> in the International Court, though, I believe, he has not attended it for a considerable time.

2. S.A. Golunsky.

### 3. To Thakin Nu<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

January 25, 1953

My dear Thakin Nu,

You have, no doubt, been following the developments in international affairs, more especially in regard to Korea and China. As you know, we put forward a Korean Resolution in the United Nations General Assembly. We did this after full reference to the Chinese Government.<sup>2</sup> They did not commit themselves to it, but they remained quite silent and gave us the impression that they had no serious objection. Therefore, we proceeded with it. But at a later stage the Chinese Government rejected it.

1. JN Collection. Copy of the letter was sent to Secretary General, Foreign Secretary and Commonwealth Secretary, MEA.
2. India had sounded China about the proposal as early as April 1952. K.M. Panikkar, India's Ambassador to China, had met Chou En-lai and had received firm indication that on principle the proposals were acceptable to the Chinese, though there would have to be negotiations at a gradual pace about the modalities of control over prisoners during the period of interviews and talks with them.

I have little doubt that this was done under pressure from the Soviet Government who did not approve of our taking a lead in this matter. Unfortunately, it appears that Soviet influence has increased lately in China.

Since then both the Soviet and the Chinese Governments have been trying to run down this Resolution and, indeed, describing it as some kind of a trick.<sup>3</sup> This has pained me greatly because for our part we have been trying to develop friendly relations with China, and had no desire to do anything against their wishes. However, there it is. It is not always easy to understand the motives and springs of communist behaviour.

Incidentally, the Chinese Government has been criticising our Government in this connection. Lately this has toned down somewhat and our normal relations more or less continue. Our policy is to be friendly and at the same time firm. We do not wish to retaliate by criticizing openly the Chinese Government. At the same time we do not give up any vital matter or principal and continue our course of action.

I do not at all know what is going to happen at the next session of the United Nations General Assembly in regard to Korea. On the whole, we propose to wait and see. Unless there is some special reason, we shall not take the initiative. Much depends on the United States and the line of action they might adopt. If this is likely, in our opinion, to worsen the situation, we shall oppose it.

I have noticed a certain tendency in China for the Government there to try to separate Burma from India in regard to foreign policy. I have no doubt that this must have come to your notice also. They are trying to do this in regard to some other countries in Asia also. They have not done much so far but there is that tendency and we should be rather careful about it. I am sure that Burma and India should, as far as possible, function together in foreign matters. I should like as many countries in Asia as possible to keep out of these war camps and thus declare an area in Asia which, we hope, will be kept free from war even if, unfortunately, a big conflict breaks out elsewhere. Apart from any idealistic reasons, I am quite sure that this practically is the right course for our countries. If we take sides, we become immediately arenas of warfare. Burma would suffer considerably if this happens. Of course, nobody can be certain as to what developments might take place and what the Soviet or the Chinese Government might do on the one hand and the US, etc., on the other.

3. On 24 November 1952, the Russian delegate to the UN, M. Vyshinsky, rejected the Indian Resolution on repatriation of prisoners which the US had accepted. He said: "At best, you Indians are dreamers and idealists; at worst, instruments of horrible American policy." On 14 December 1952, Chou En-lai denounced the Resolution as void, illegal, unfair and unreasonable. The Communist Powers stated that the Resolution was the product of a subtle American move, through Britain, to use India against China.



But if we declare our neutrality in such a war, there is a fair chance of our remaining outside it and being able to exercise some influence as neutrals.

You will have seen the reports that Pakistan might join what is called the Middle East Defence Organization sponsored by the USA and the UK.<sup>4</sup> I have no doubt that things have gone pretty far in that direction, but the Pakistan Government is rather nervous<sup>5</sup> of its own public opinion which is very much opposed to any such step.

If Pakistan joins that organization, it becomes immediately a possible theatre of war. That means that war comes right on the western border of India. This is a matter of concern for us and that is why I referred to it recently in public.<sup>6</sup> My reference has had a good effect both in India and Pakistan and, to some extent, even in the US and the UK. The Arab countries have also become rather alert. With Egypt we have at present very friendly relations.

I have written this letter to you to keep you in touch with various developments.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. American thinking on a defence alliance in West Asia including Pakistan originated in 1951-52, but Indian opposition to the move was decisive in its being put on hold then. On 15 December 1952, the *Washington Post*, quoting official sources in Paris, had reported that the United States and Britain were discussing the possibility of including Pakistan in the proposed Middle East Defence Organization plan. *The Observer* (London) reported that "Pakistan has indicated her willingness to take some part in the defence of the Middle East. At the same time, the US Air Force is said to be negotiating for bases in Pakistan which would be vital to Middle East Defence."
5. In fact, on 17 January 1953, Nazimuddin, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, stated that he knew nothing "officially" that Pakistan had been invited to join MEDO.
6. Nehru had twice, in the course of the Congress Party's annual session at Hyderabad, voiced India's concern on this subject. "Obviously", he said, "if any such development takes place it means the region of cold war comes right up to our borders. We have to be concerned with any matter which directly or indirectly concerns our country. See *post*, pp. 491-93.



#### 4. Cable to N. Raghavan<sup>1</sup>

Your telegram 19 dated January 22nd.

We are not concerned with Chou En-lai's protests against US incursions into Chinese territory. We have no facts to judge and this is a matter entirely between Chinese Government and the US. But we are very much concerned at the repeated reference to Indian Resolution on Korea as being the parent of evil. Secretary General is seeing the Chinese Ambassador here to point out that these references and criticism are not fair to India. Chinese Government can hold any view they like about the merits of the Indian Resolution, but to accuse us in the way that is frequently done is most unfair and creates a bad impression on the Indian public.

You might informally, when occasion arises, point this out to the Chinese Government adding that it is our desire to continue to maintain our friendly relations with China and we have, therefore, consistently avoided any argument about Chinese attitude to our Resolution. But constant references in China to it and statements that it was based on some evil intention are not only most unfair, but lead to other difficulties.

As I have told you, our attitude to Chinese Government must continue to be both friendly and firm. I would not like you to lose contact with them. It is desirable to maintain as many contacts as possible even though you might not discuss matters with them at any length.

1. New Delhi, 25 January 1953. JN Collection.

#### 5. To V.K. Krishna Menon<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
February 1, 1953

My dear Krishna,

... Conditions in the Far East become more and more complicated and the

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML. Extracts.

news today that Eisenhower is issuing some directions to the 7th Fleet of the US not to come in the way of any attack from Formosa on the Chinese mainland (while preventing an attack on Formosa), opens out a whole series of dangerous developments.<sup>2</sup> We shall have to wait and see what happens. I do not know what the UK Government will say or do about it, but I imagine that they will privately protest strongly, publicly express mild disapproval and generally accept this as some unfortunate occurrence which cannot be avoided now.<sup>3</sup> Anyhow, all this is bound to have a powerful effect on the situation in the Far East and on the fate of any other approach in the UN we have still two weeks to watch these developments....

I have received information from Canadian sources, casually given, which might be exaggerated, but which still was not very comforting. Some Canadians employed in the External Affairs Ministry at Ottawa have gone about saying that Krishna Menon kept himself aloof from his own Delegation and spent practically all his time with the Canadians. Further that members of the Indian Delegation had to go to the Canadians to find out sometimes what Krishna Menon was going to do. This kind of impression among foreigners, even though it might not be justified, is not good....

Yours affectionately,  
Jawaharlal

2. On 2 February 1952, President Eisenhower told a joint session of the Congress in his first State of the Union Address that he was "issuing instructions that the 7th Fleet no longer be employed to shield Communist China" from attack by Chinese Nationalists in Formosa. He wanted "to make crystal clear this order implies no aggressive intent on our part. But we certainly have no obligation to protect a nation fighting us in Korea." He noted that in June 1950 the 7th Fleet "was instructed both to prevent attack upon Formosa and also to insure that Formosa should not be used as a base of operations against the Chinese communist mainland." His message left the implication that the fleet would still guard Formosa. But he said that "there is no longer any logic or sense" in making the US Navy "assume defence responsibilities on behalf of the Chinese Communists, thus permitting those Communists, with greater impunity, to kill our soldiers and those of our United Nations allies in Korea."
3. The British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, told the House of Commons on 3 February that protests against deneutralization of Formosa and failure to consult Britain had been conveyed to the US by the British Embassy in Washington on 28 and 31 January. The protest warned that the plan might "have very unfortunate political repercussions without compensating military advantages." Eden said that President Eisenhower's action was a "unilateral decision" amending former President Truman's "unilateral decision" in neutralizing Formosa, and the British Government owed no responsibility for such a decision.

## 6. To V.K. Krishna Menon<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
February 2, 1953

My dear Krishna,

I have received your airgram of the 29th<sup>2</sup> January. I wrote to you yesterday about Eisenhower's statement regarding the Seventh US Fleet in the China Seas. That statement is going to be made today and I have no doubt it will lead to all manner of consequences, though they might not be sudden.

We have been informally told by the US Embassy here that the US Government do not intend to bring any condemnatory resolution in regard to Korea at the General Assembly of the UN. In fact it is not their intention to bring any resolution at all and they would like other countries also to refrain from putting forward any resolution. They want to leave things as they are, so far as the UN is concerned. In our informal reply to them we are telling them that we are glad that no condemnatory resolution is going to be put forward. As for what might have to be done in the UN when this meets, it is difficult to say anything definite now. Everything will depend on the position then existing. Our purpose, as that of other countries, is to help in maintaining peace and, if possible, to bring about a settlement. How this can be done has to be continually kept in view. We have no definite ideas on the subject at present. President Eisenhower's statement has added to the complexity of the situation and may lead to developments. It is therefore not possible to make any commitment as to what we might or might not do in the UN.

Yours affectionately,  
Jawaharlal

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML.
2. Krishna Menon, among other things, had written that there was not "much talk about Korea yet; but the firm feeling is that we should think round and see what opening is possible." He added that US policy in the matter was not known as yet.



## 7. Cable to N. Raghavan<sup>1</sup>

Your telegram 35 of February 6. Chang Han-fu's argument is repetition of old theme.<sup>2</sup> Real alternative before UN was either to pass aggressive US Resolution which would immediately have worsened situation or to proceed with our Resolution. Soviet Resolution had no chance whatever. If we had withdrawn our Resolution at late stage, US Resolution might have been put forward.

2. The fact that US try to exploit our Resolution to suit their own purposes does not alter real nature of our Resolution. To call it illegal has no meaning, nor is there any question of rescinding it. It was a proposal to find way out of deadlock. As Chinese Government have not accepted it,<sup>3</sup> there the matter ends and Resolution cannot be given effect to. It is not correct to say that Resolution has strengthened US position. Without it, situation in Far East would undoubtedly have deteriorated more rapidly.

3. Mere repetition of Soviet proposal obviously takes us nowhere, if any agreement is sought. Position now is one of deadlock and we have no further proposals to make at present. We shall await developments.

4. Eisenhower's recent statement has undoubtedly worsened situation. That has nothing to do with our Resolution. We have viewed this statement with much concern. Our information is that it is entirely related to American domestic situation and activities of China lobby there. We do not expect any important development in Far East as a consequence of it. But of course it has had very bad effect on people's minds.

1. New Delhi, 7 February 1953. JN Collection.

2. Raghavan reported that in response to his letter enquiring about American violation of Chinese territory, Chang Han-fu, the Chinese Vice Premier, had written on 5 February that the US had done this due to "direct encouragement" from the Indian Resolution on Korea adopted by the General Assembly. Complaining that the "said illegal Resolution" had strengthened American hands, worsened situation in the Far East, and affected friendly India-China relations, Chang Han-fu suggested that it should be revoked and action taken as proposed in the Soviet Resolution in the Assembly.

3. When the President of the UN General Assembly communicated the text of the Indian Resolution, as approved by the UN Assembly, to Beijing and Pyongyang, the Chinese and North Korean authorities rejected it. They characterized the Assembly's action as illegal and void because it was based on the so-called principles of voluntary repatriation, all of which, in their opinion, involved forcible retaining in captivity of the prisoners of war. China also contended that as the UN was a party to the dispute, the final disposition of the prisoners could not be left to it. Besides, she maintained that China was not bound by any decision of the UN as she was not represented on it.

## 8. To V.K. Krishna Menon<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
February 7, 1953

My dear Krishna,

I have your two airgrams dated 3rd and 4th February.

I am surprised to learn that you have been to Oslo.<sup>2</sup> Some message appeared from Oslo the other day about what you said there. This was in relation to the Korean Resolution and something to the effect that we would be taking some step. The Norwegian Minister came and expressed some apprehension. I thought that you had not gone to Oslo, but some Oslo newspapers must have interviewed you in London.

I think it will be better if you do not throw out any hints about our future action. Every little phrase is given great prominence as if we are on the verge of doing something dramatic. We get enquiries from all over the place here as well as from foreign countries. Our reply is that we are just awaiting developments and have no proposals to make at present.

Indeed, I feel more and more that we should be very cautious in our approach to this problem and that we should take no positive step unless we are sure of our ground. Negative steps, we cannot avoid.

Eisenhower's statement about the Seventh US Fleet has queered the pitch. I suppose it was meant for domestic consumption to please the China lobby in Washington and no particular action was intended. But that makes little difference and the effect on the public mind in various countries is inevitably great. It adds to the tension and expectation of an extension of the war. In China it had a powerful effect.

Two or three days ago, Chang Han-fu, the Chinese Vice-Minister, wrote to Raghavan at some length criticizing again our Korean Resolution, calling it illegal, opposed to the Geneva Convention and evidently meant to encourage the US. He said it should be rescinded.<sup>3</sup> There is of course no question of rescinding it or going back upon it. The Resolution is over and nothing more has got to be done about it, except that it might be a stepping stone to something else if occasion arises.

You refer to UK reactions<sup>4</sup> to Eisenhower's statement. I am afraid I am

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML. Extracts.

2. Krishna Menon, on an invitation from a Norwegian Students Union, went to Oslo and spoke before them about India's foreign policy on 31 January and returned to London on 2 February.

3. See the previous item.

4. Krishna Menon wrote on 3 February that he felt that the UK Government would, in a restrained way, but nevertheless firmly state that they were against action that would provoke extension of war or create further tension.



not very much impressed by what the UK Government says about these matters. They protest, express their disapproval and then submit. It may be that an occasion may arise when they do not submit. But it is difficult to rely upon this.

I do not know what Dulles said to Eden,<sup>5</sup> but I can make a very good guess. He must have said that this statement was largely due to domestic reasons and that they had no intention of extending the war in the Far East. He must have assured Churchill and Eden about this.<sup>6</sup> I find this business very unsatisfactory. The UK will go on saying that they will not be parties to any warlike adventures in regard to China or Russia, but they will be dragged step by step by the US. Each step might well be a small step, but they will all mount up.

I have read your long report<sup>7</sup> of the talks you had with Elmore Jackson.<sup>8</sup> This is interesting and helpful, though there is nothing very new in it. We have covered this ground in various ways repeatedly with Graham. We get more and more into a tangle from which it is not easy to extricate oneself...

Yours affectionately,  
Jawaharlal

5. Dulles, the US Secretary of State, and Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, discussed Eisenhower's plan of deneutralization of Formosa on 4 February in London.
6. On 5 February 1953, after discussions with the US Secretary of State in London, Anthony Eden told the House of Commons that he perceived no reason for panic concerning American Far Eastern policy and that President Eisenhower's decision to deneutralize the Formosan Straits did "not mean that grave events will necessarily follow."
7. After returning from Oslo, Krishna Menon met Elmore Jackson, advisor to Frank Graham, the UN Representative in Kashmir, and ascertained Graham's thinking on the subject. He reported: (1) Graham would like to have a preliminary exploration on the spot of conditions for a plebiscite after which a general plebiscite or any other form of it would be recommended; (2) plebiscite could not be held except in conditions when there was no danger to the security of the State; (3) for holding the plebiscite, Administrator Nimitz would be replaced by another non-American; (4) in the matter of demilitarization, Pakistan's forces and effective control of them would be reduced; and (5) as regards the proposed "Azad" forces, no Pakistan officers would be allowed in it and it would have to be a local force under UN control for maintenance of law and order. Answering Jackson's question, Menon told him that a meeting between two Prime Ministers would not be helpful but Graham's meeting with each of them might help.
8. Elmore Jackson (1910-1989); representative of Friends' World Committee for Consultation, a non-governmental organization having consultative status; advisor to US delegations in UN General Assembly, 1961-64; Special Assistant to US Secretary of State, 1964-66.



## 9. Cable to N. Raghavan<sup>1</sup>

Recent statements<sup>2</sup> made in America and rumours of Formosan troops landing at Amoy<sup>3</sup> have undoubtedly worsened situation and created much apprehension in people's minds. In China, excitement and apprehension must naturally be great.<sup>4</sup>

I do not myself think that US Government intends to take any aggressive step and I know that UK Government and some others are wholly opposed to it and might even break with US if latter deliberately extends war operations.

In any event, we have to be vigilant and keep perfectly calm. Whatever might happen, our officers and others must remain at their post of duty. There is no question of anyone, official or private, thinking in terms of leaving. This must be clearly understood.

We disapprove thoroughly of recent tendencies in US and have made our position clear. Parliament meets tomorrow and no doubt these questions will arise there and we shall give suitable answers.

1. New Delhi, 10 February 1953. JN Collection.
2. A White House study of proposals for a naval blockade of China was reported on 6 February 1953 by Dewey Short, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. A blockade by the US alone, if necessary, was endorsed on 7 February by William F. Knowland of the Senate Republican Policy Committee. Senate majority leader, Robert A. Taft, said on 8 February that a blockade would be "desirable", as would bombing of Manchuria, if it could be worked out without causing a rift among the Allies. He added on 9 February, after a meeting with President Eisenhower, that it might be wiser to persuade Britain to cut off trade with China through Hong Kong than for the US to apply a naval blockade in defiance of friendly countries.
3. In the beginning of February, rumours spread in Tokyo that Chinese Nationalist troops had made a landing in Amoy, an island in the estuary of the Kinling river in South China—150 miles from Formosa.
4. On 4 February 1953, the Beijing radio charged that "now that the war of aggression in Korea met with ignominious defeat", President Eisenhower, by deneutralizing Formosa, was planning to extend it "to the entire Far East." On 5 February, Chou En-lai said that the Chinese Communists would mobilize their entire manpower and fight "to the last" if Eisenhower chose "to extend the war."

## 10. To B.G. Kher<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

February 10, 1953

My dear Kher,

Thank you for your letter of the 6th February.<sup>2</sup> I have just read it and it helps me to have this background in order to understand events...

Nye Bevan arrived here early this morning. I saw him for a few minutes, but I shall see more of him later. The press surrounded him and he expressed himself at some length in criticism of the US policy in the Far East.<sup>3</sup>

Whatever Eisenhower's plan might have been, his statement about the 7th US Fleet and Formosa has created the deepest apprehension. Sulzberger, the proprietor of the *New York Times*, has been here<sup>4</sup> and he said that this statement was made purely for domestic consumption and does not mean any change in policy. It was largely to soothe the China lobby. It may be so, although even so it is exceedingly disconcerting, because the China lobby is about as bad as anything can be. But the fact remains that this has increased tension all over the world and you can well imagine the effect on China...

Sulzberger told me quite frankly that many important people in America were not keen on a truce in Korea because that would release Chinese troops for possible aggression in Indo-China, Burma, etc. That is a feeble argument, but it shows that there really is no desire in the higher circles of the US for a truce or a settlement in Korea.

So far as we are concerned, it should be made perfectly clear to the UK Government or any other Government that we view these developments with the gravest concern and in no event are we going to be involved in them, even though we might displease the US.

1. File No HC's file (1953), MEA. Also available in JN Collection. Extracts.
2. B.G. Kher, the High Commissioner of India in UK, had written about developments within Labour Party, the domestic policies of Churchill Government, Anglo-US relations, England's relations with various countries of West Asia, UK's policy towards East Asia, the proposed Central African Federation, anti-Semitism in Soviet Union and British Press reaction to the new Constitution of Pakistan.
3. Aneurin Bevan, the British Labour Party leader who came to New Delhi on his first visit to India after attending an Asian Socialist Conference in Rangoon, in a press interview on 10 February, denounced the unilateral action of the US Government in withdrawing the 7th Fleet from Formosan waters and said: "Two interpretations can be placed on it. It is intended as a serious opposition to Communist China for the purpose of establishing the Chiang regime in their place. It is a sure precursor to a third world war. Secondly it may be intended to deviate the Chinese from the Korean theatre."
4. Arthur Hays Sulzberger (1891-1968); publisher of *The New York Times*, 1935-61, arrived in Mumbai on 3 February on a two-week visit to India. He came to New Delhi on 6 February and met Rajendra Prasad and Nehru.



The UN General Assembly will meet in about a fortnight's time<sup>5</sup> in New York. Vijayalakshmi will be going there and Krishna Menon to represent us. Korea is the principal topic. Oddly enough, the US Government would prefer that the UN did not discuss this. How they propose to prevent this discussion, I do not know. I think it is bound to come up. So far as we are concerned, we have no particular proposal up our sleeve. All we can do is to wait and watch developments and decide later.

Parliament begins tomorrow for the Budget session.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. On 24 February 1953.

## 11. Efforts to Localize Conflict<sup>1</sup>

We should certainly give continuous thought to the line we should take up on Korea in the General Assembly of the UN.<sup>2</sup> But it is very difficult to come to any definite decision in a situation which is very fluid and changing, more especially after Eisenhower's statement. We have to wait and see.

2. I think that we should avoid putting forward any fresh resolution. Our old resolution has only a historical significance now. There is no point in our saying much about it. We have in effect to wait for any initiative from the US or the Soviets. Probably the US will not take any initiative because they do not want the matter to be discussed by the General Assembly. The Soviets are

1. Note to the Foreign Secretary, 12 February 1953. File No 12/62/NGO-52 and 12/64/NGO/52, MEA. Also available in JN Collection.
2. R.K. Nehru, the Foreign Secretary, while forwarding a letter from R. Dayal, Permanent Representative of India in the UN, on developments in UN on Korea had written in his note of 11 February that Korea was bound to be discussed in the General Assembly when Russia would bring up their resolution about an immediate ceasefire. They might say something on Eisenhower's new orders about deneutralization of Formosa and might move a new resolution condemning the Americans for instigating attacks on the Chinese mainland. R.K. Nehru felt that consideration about the line India should take on these matters should start.



likely to take the initiative. Indeed there is some Resolution still on the agenda,<sup>3</sup> probably a Polish one. Therefore, the subject is bound to come up for discussion. For our part, we may state negatively that we cannot possibly support any Resolution which encourages aggressive action. In this we shall be on solid ground and might get a good deal of support even from the UK, Canada, etc.

3. The question of an immediate ceasefire, however desirable, was totally unacceptable to the countries having forces on the UN side in Korea. They were afraid that this would result in their prisoners being kept indefinitely in China and they could not face their own public opinion if this was done. Whether a limited ceasefire is possible at this stage, I do not know. I rather doubt it. But the matter might well be privately considered.

4. The basic fact appears to be that neither party, for different reasons, is particularly anxious for a ceasefire. On the whole China is in a fairly strong military position. Russia has no reason to be dissatisfied with the fighting going on. Both the US and their allies think that a ceasefire without something more would result in very great strengthening of the Chinese and North Korean position in North Korea.

5. Apart from this, important governmental circles in the US appear to hold the opinion that it is desirable to carry on this fighting in Korea and thus prevent China from consolidating her position and strength and possibly helping Indo-China or attacking Burma. This is what Mr Sulzberger told me. There was also a hint in what he said that sudden stoppage of the fighting might have adverse consequences on US economy.

6. The consequence of all this is that the chance of any kind of a resolution passing by agreement of the rival factions is very remote. Our trying to push through a resolution by a majority is not worthwhile or desirable unless, by a miracle, a real chance offers itself. But we must prevent the US from exploiting our position or our past Resolution and we must make it quite clear that we can be no parties to any action like blockade. Of course an actual attempt at invasion or bombardment from the air on the Chinese mainland is much worse and has to be opposed.

7. I do not like the idea also of the US being left free to do anything they like which involves the UN and thereby casts, to some extent, responsibility on all the UN members, even though they might not approve of it.

8. It is always easy for any country to put forward some idealistic solution but that does little good, if it ignores realities, and leads nowhere. As far as one can see at present, one has to check aggressive action on the part of the

3. Three draft Resolutions concerning the repatriation of prisoners of war were presented. The Mexican and the Peruvian draft Resolutions were withdrawn by their sponsors on 9 March 1953. The Polish draft demanded the return of all prisoners "in accordance with international practice."

US. In some measure this might also be the policy of the UK and other countries.<sup>4</sup> To that extent, we could cooperate with them. Perhaps we might express ourselves a little more forcibly than they would. But it is desirable to cooperate as far as possible without in any way giving up our own position.

9. I think it is probably true that Eisenhower's statement was largely for domestic consumption. But that does not lessen its significance or the effect it might have and indeed has had. In China, the effect must have been very powerful indeed. Then came Taft's speech which talked openly about blockade and also said that the war with China was on. Taft probably does not wholly represent Eisenhower but is nevertheless a very powerful figure in Republican politics in the US and undoubtedly represents strong and aggressive elements.

10. Even Eisenhower has often said something to the effect that Asians should fight Asians.<sup>5</sup> The only Asians who are likely to fight there are the Formosans and later perhaps the US thinks of utilising the Japanese. But that is a long cry at present. The US also appears to think that South Koreans properly equipped, trained and financed might gradually replace Americans. Probably US policy will aim at reducing American manpower in Korea on the land and concentrating on air power as well as sea power.

11. There does appear a possibility, though one must not bank on it too much, of the UK and some other countries in Europe as well as Canada taking up a strong line against the US on the Far Eastern issue. If so, we should encourage this by our own policy.

12. What Vyshinsky is reported to have said, according to the Polish Delegate,<sup>6</sup> that is, his fear that the Americans might subsequently misuse our Resolution could not make much difference at that stage. Every party is eager to exploit a particular situation and it was clear that the US would try to profit by our Resolution, if it failed.

These papers might be shown to Mrs. Pandit. A copy of this note of mine should be sent to Mr. Krishna Menon.

4. On 9 February 1953, the London Foreign Office stated that Britain opposed a blockade of China because of the danger of serious clashes with China and Russia, disapproval of such a move by the South East Asian countries and the risk of a communist attack on the British "listening post" of Hong Kong. The British contended that a blockade would not reduce China's war potential substantially because only 25 per cent of its commerce was seaborne.
5. On 2 October 1952, Eisenhower told a meeting that there was no sense in the US bearing the brunt of the Korean war when South Koreans could be trained to defend themselves. "If there must be war let it be Asians against Asians with our support for the support for freedom."
6. Reported to R.K. Nehru by Rajeshwar Dayal.



## 12. Cable to K.P.S. Menon<sup>1</sup>

Your telegram 19 dated February 12th.<sup>2</sup>

When you meet Marshal Stalin,<sup>3</sup> please convey my greetings to him and good wishes for his health. Tell him that our Government has anxiously and consistently worked for peace and propose to continue to do so. Naturally, we function in our own way and with our background derived largely from Gandhiji and our own national movement. We avoid denouncing any country even though we may disagree with its policy because we feel that this increases fear and tension in the world. Regarding our Korean Resolution, we tried our utmost to find way that was honourable, and in conformity with international practice. That was a proposal and by no means a mandate. We regret that we did not succeed. There was and is no question of alignment by us with any group of Powers. If any nation exploits that Resolution to justify its own action, that is not our fault.

You will have seen our President's reference to recent statements in America about Formosa, etc., in which he expressed his grave concern at these developments. We shall certainly not do anything which encourages this tendency. Our information is that UK and many other countries are equally apprehensive, even though they might not publicly say much. This has already exercised restraining influence on US. In any event, we shall continue to act for peace to the best of our ability.<sup>4</sup>

Your message is not being circulated here to avoid possibility of premature publicity. I suggest you might avoid this also.

1. New Delhi. 13 February 1953. JN Collection.
2. In this cable, K.P.S. Menon asked for instructions regarding anything special which he should mention to Marshal Stalin who would receive him in the very near future.
3. When Menon met Stalin on 13 February 1953, he sought his reactions to possible new Indian proposals for an armistice in Korea.
4. During the interview Stalin told Menon: "Soviet Union is against extension of hostilities. So is Government of India. But there are people in America who are in favour of continuing and widening conflict for the sake of profit. It is no use preaching morals to them. They are bent on making profits even at the cost of blood."



### 13. Deneutralization of Formosa<sup>1</sup>

There is widespread fear that deneutralization of Formosa may cause a worsening of the situation. I am still studying the situation brought about by the withdrawal of the 7th Fleet and I am anxious to do anything possible to decrease tension and bring peace. We have to watch developments in Korea and help in any way which may bring about peace or relieve tension.

I do not know what instructions I would send to our representatives at the United Nations relative to the Korean war situation. It is still too early. It is not clear what the withdrawal of the 7th Fleet means. But there is no doubt that the general impression in many countries is that it might lead to a worsening of the situation.

India was not consulted by the United States before the Seventh Fleet withdrawal orders were issued.

I do not want to go into detail on major problems since I must answer questions on foreign policy and other big issues during the Parliamentary debate beginning today on the President's message.

I am willing to meet with Pakistan Prime Minister Khwaja Nazimuddin to discuss mutual problems including the explosive issue of the future of disputed Kashmir. Why fix an agenda?<sup>2</sup> An agenda is used for the United Nations or other meetings, but when two men sit down, they talk about matters of common interest. I would be willing to meet to discuss any matter of common interest. I cannot comment on the possible outcome of the Kashmir issue while talks on it are still in progress in Geneva.

Economic development is the biggest problem facing India. We must increase the well being of the people. We are stressing food production and making progress. The past year we imported less food than previously and expect to import less this year and still less next year.<sup>3</sup> Food shortages exist in some areas because of lack of rain. But there is no famine and no one is permitted to die of starvation.

1. Remarks in an interview given to Earnest Hoberecht, UPA correspondent, New Delhi, 13 February 1953. From *Amrita Bazar Patrika* and *The Hindu*, 15 February 1953.
2. The Prime Minister of Pakistan, Khwaja Nazimuddin, during an exclusive interview with the United Press of America on 11 February in Karachi, said that he would be willing to hold a face-to-face meeting with Nehru if the subjects to be discussed could be agreed upon.
3. The Food imports for the period 1951-1953 were (figures in million tons): 1951—4.7; 1952—3.9; and 1953—2.0.

## 14. India's Policy towards Korea<sup>1</sup>

With reference to the attached telegram<sup>2</sup> from Indiadel, New York, you should write a note and send it to Dayal. In this note you should say that in view of the changing situation in the Far East and more particularly in regard to Korea, we cannot say at this stage what line we are likely to adopt. We shall have to watch these developments carefully. We do not intend to be just passive spectators. We have become involved in this matter too deeply and it is far too important for us to remain passive and quiescent. But we cannot decide at this stage. Much depends of course on what the US does. Recent trends of US policy have been disapproved not only in India<sup>3</sup> but in the UK<sup>4</sup> and other countries. In so far as this is concerned, we should of course cooperate with others who agree with us and make it clear that any step which heightens the tension or appears to lead to war has to be opposed.

We shall naturally keep the Arab-Asian group informed.

1. Note to the Foreign Secretary, 14 February 1953. JN Collection.
2. In his cable of 13 February, Rajeshwar Dayal, the Permanent Representative of India in the UN, reported that since the Arab-Asian group in the UN during a meeting to consider the agenda of the forthcoming General Assembly session had requested India to keep the group in confidence in regard to any proposals on Korea India had in mind, some indications on this might be conveyed to him.
3. On 3 February 1953, the press in India denounced deneutralization as it would extend the fighting constituting a challenge to the People's Republic of China to attack Formosa.
4. On 1 February 1953, Aneurin Bevan denounced deneutralization on grounds that the US "has no right to take any action that imperils the UN operations in Korea without first consulting" the UN. He opposed drawing Britain "into a third world war merely in order to fulfil Chiang Kai-shek's morbid and squalid ambitions on the mainland of China."

## 15. To V.K. Krishna Menon<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

February 14, 1953

My dear Krishna

I have just received three letters from you dated 9th and 11th February as well as an airgram dated 10th February.

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML. Extracts.



I did not want you to take all this trouble to send me detailed information about what you did in Canada or Oslo. I informed you<sup>2</sup> about these matters as I had heard of them from Canadian sources as well as from the Norwegian Minister here. They had not said this in criticism, though the Norwegian Minister was slightly perturbed as to what we might do in regard to Korea. It was because some Canadians had said so that I thought I should write to you.

Since you wrote, there has been agreement in regard to the Sudan.<sup>3</sup> We are now asked to send an Election Commissioner. We shall probably send our chief man. The general impression we have been given is that the elections will take place very soon, in May next. That hardly tallies with your expectation that the Constituent Assembly will take about three years.

From all the information that we get, it appears that General Neguib<sup>4</sup> and his colleagues are very much under American influence. Indeed, Americans go about boasting about this.

As for the Middle East Defence Organisation, there is no doubt that Pakistan has been discussing this for some time past. Undoubtedly they have done so with the Americans. I cannot say about the British. Indeed, the Pakistan Government has practically stated that they are likely to agree to this. They are only a little afraid of their public opinion.

About Korea, I see no light and so all we can for the moment think of is, not to take any active step in the Assembly. The Arab-Asian group at the UN has been meeting and asking us what we propose to do. We are telling them that we are just waiting and watching. The original Korean issue of prisoners of war has gone into the background. It is probably true that Eisenhower's recent statement was meant for domestic consumption. Nevertheless, it has produced powerful reactions. And then there is Taft who goes much further.

I suppose Dulles gave all kinds of assurances to Eden and, for the moment, the UK Government was satisfied. This kind of thing happens again and again while the situation gradually deteriorates.

2. See *ante*, pp. 450 and 453. Krishna Menon in response had denied the allegation that he was keeping aloof from the Indian delegation and spending all his time with the Canadians. He also said that he went to Oslo to fulfil a long-standing engagement with the Norwegian Students' Association after informing R.K. Nehru, the Foreign Secretary, and spoke to the students informally on Indian foreign policy in a general way.
3. After months of negotiations, Britain and Egypt signed an agreement in Cairo on 12 February 1953 granting self-government to Anglo-Egyptian Sudan within a three-year transition period during which the Sudanese would choose whether they wanted independence or some form of link with Egypt.
4. Mohammed Neguib (1901-1984); Commander-in-Chief of Egyptian Army, 1952; Prime Minister, Minister of War, Commander-in-Chief of Army and Military Governor of Egypt, 1952-53; President of Republic of Egypt, 1953-54.



It may interest you to know that, according to K.P.S. Menon, Vyshinsky has been exceedingly cordial to him and talked quite earnestly about India and the Soviet cooperating in a larger measure for peace. From China we have had no further indication of anything. There appears to be some kind of an outward lull in China ever since Eisenhower's statement. They have been powerfully affected by that statement; mentally conditioned as they are, they probably expect a sudden extension of the war. I think they are mistaken, but the fact that they believe this is, I think, correct....

Yours affectionately,  
Jawaharlal

## 16. To G.L. Mehta<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
February 19, 1953

My dear Gaganvihari,

... I am afraid, I do not see much light in regard to the matters before the UN this time, more especially the Korean issue. According to our information, the US outlook is far from satisfactory. It is much too aggressive an outlook which can yield no good results. We cannot support any action taken on those lines. Anyhow, I hope that you will keep in continuous touch with our delegation in New York....

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Copy of this letter was sent to Secretary General and Foreign Secretary, MEA. Extracts.

17. Cable to Vijayalakshmi Pandit<sup>1</sup>

Your telegram 43, dated February 25th. I have considered also Krishna Menon's airgram, dated 16th February.<sup>2</sup>

I agree generally with your analysis and it might be desirable to suggest resumption of negotiations at Panmunjom immediately. But, would such proposal be acceptable to Chinese? Communication<sup>3</sup> from Chang Han-fu to Raghavan contains nothing to encourage hope that Chinese would prefer this alternative if Russian Resolution was also in the field. There is a new factor. According to Tokyo report, a letter has been addressed by General Mark Clark<sup>4</sup> to Chinese and North Koreans asking them to begin negotiations immediately for repatriation of sick and wounded prisoners of war.<sup>5</sup> Some time ago, we were informed that British Government also wanted to put forward some such proposal on basis of Geneva Convention. When this matter was raised at Red Cross Conference last year, Chinese rejected it, as they considered it application of principle of voluntary repatriation. Presumably, they would reject it again.

Resumption of negotiations at Panmunjom would result immediately in

1. New Delhi, 27 February 1953. File Nos 12/62/NGO-52, and 12/64/NGO-52, MEA. This cable was also sent to V.K. Krishna Menon.
2. Krishna Menon had written that China in her reply to Lester Pearson's letter sending the UN Resolution on Korea passed by the Assembly had among other things suggested immediate resumption of negotiations at Panmunjom. This proposal of China should be supported by India in the UN, since revival of Panmunjom negotiations would prevent the Resolution promoted by India "becoming in effect a bar to negotiations" and reinforce India's efforts towards seeking all avenues of peace besides "weakening the mischievous suggestion that India aligned herself with the US."
3. Chang Han-fu, the Chinese Vice-Premier, in a letter given to N. Raghavan on 5 February alleged that US was planning extension of war as a result of "direct encouragement" from India's Resolution on Korea passed by the General Assembly and if India wanted armistice in Korea and peace in Far East, the only procedure to be followed should be to rescind the said illegal Resolution and ask US to resume armistice negotiations at Panmunjom. After bringing about complete armistice the question of repatriation of prisoners should be referred to the commission as proposed by USSR in the UN.
4. Mark Wayne Clark (1896-1984); US army officer; Commander of US Ground Forces in Europe, 1942; Chief of US Forces in Austria, 1945-47; Commander-in-Chief of the UN Command in Korea and Commanding General of the US Forces in the Far-East, 1952-53; publications include: *Calculated Risk* (1950), *From the Danube to the Yalu* (1954).
5. General Mark Clark had suggested on 22 February 1953 that the two Commands should exchange the sick and the wounded among the prisoners. In their reply on 28 March, the Chinese and the North Korean authorities not only agreed to the proposal, but also expressed the hope that this move could "lead to the smooth settlement of the entire question of prisoners of war." An agreement on the exchange of the sick and the wounded was eventually signed on 11 April 1953.

proposal for exchange of sick and wounded prisoners. Chinese might well think that this was further attempt on our part to put them wrong with world opinion.

I would like both of you to consider all these factors and then come to decision. You will no doubt keep in touch with other Delegations and find out what support you are likely to get. Any step which, instead of helping, might lead to further complications, should be avoided.

## 18. Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon<sup>3</sup>

Your telegram 52 dated 3 March just received.

We agree that you should not put forward any Resolution or try to modify Resolution proposed by any other country.<sup>2</sup> Any such attempt will lead to unsatisfactory results and will needlessly entangle us in position not entirely of our choosing.

We agree that you should make statement as suggested in para 6 of your telegram.<sup>3</sup> Statement should be as brief as possible. Suggest your omitting from your statement any reference to clause IV paragraph 6, that is, "that we do not subscribe to partial repatriation". We do not wholly understand this and in any event consider it unnecessary.

It would be better not to make any reference in your statement to recent developments in Far East.

In view of Stalin's serious illness and possible death you should consider any new situation that might arise.<sup>4</sup>

1. New Delhi, 4 March 1953. This cable was sent to Vijayalakshmi Pandit also. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML.
2. Krishna Menon wanted to know whether he should "maintain the position of no resolution" in regard to a resolution on Korea proposed to be tabled by the group of South American States in the General Assembly or try to modify the same to make it as little harmful as possible. He also thought that he should not move any resolution, proposed earlier by him, calling for resumption of Panmunjom negotiations as terms and conditions to be laid down for resumption by the two sides would be irreconcilable.
3. In his statement in the General Assembly, Krishna Menon proposed that the Indian Resolution passed by the Assembly was only a proposal and not an ultimatum, it did not aim at negating or modifying Geneva Conventions and the purpose behind the Resolution was to bring about conciliation and commencement of negotiations in any form.
4. The UN General Assembly debate on the Korean truce issue ended on 7 March 1953 with US and Soviet spokesmen reiterating their views. India, whose Resolution was rejected by the Communist Powers, announced that it had no new proposals to offer. The Assembly then passed a Resolution by fifty-five in favour and five opposing it (Soviet bloc opposed it) on 11 March approving UN efforts to rebuild the Korean economy. It rejected by 54 against 5 votes a Soviet proposal to disband the UN Command for unification and rehabilitation of Korea.







## I. GENERAL

1. Changing Situation in Afro-Asian Countries<sup>1</sup>

It is not particularly easy for a person like me in an official capacity as a Foreign Minister to talk much about the Asian situation.

I have often felt that too much talk is not helpful. I do not mean to say that people should not discuss live issues. It is everyone's duty to understand them and help if possible. But persons who are placed in some responsible position of authority in regard to foreign policy sometimes have a chance of being misunderstood—it is inevitable when we discuss highly controversial issues. What one says might be pleasing to some, and not so pleasing to others and instead of leading to an atmosphere of calm consideration, it might often lead to heat.

The present *impasse* in international affairs is a big subject. All kinds of developments have happened in the world upsetting the old political and economic orders. The process has sprung out of the First World War and has gone on at an ever-increasing pace. How that happened is another matter. How far it is due to the increasing effect of the industrial revolution and technological developments, which have undoubtedly affected human thinking, way of life and environment, is again another matter. But, gradually, countries spread their influence over other countries, leading to a conflict among themselves and, subsequently, conflict between them and the countries where they went to.

But I do think that basically we are up against an extreme manifestation of the industrial development which affected so much the people's lives. So we find on the one side this very high development of technology continuing at an even more rapid pace leading to a certain type of civilization which brought enormous benefit to humanity but also tended to introduce a rather mechanised type of thinking. That is to say, while, on the one hand, the machines which man brought into existence work like human beings, at the same time much more, the human beings are becoming machines and perhaps thereby gaining something and losing something of the individual creativeness which is his peculiar privilege.

The importance of the individual has in a sense lessened, and people think more as organized groups and lead a kind of standardized life. This is done in totalitarian regimes deliberately, but where it is not done deliberately, the

1. Address to the Council of World Churches, Lucknow, 3 January 1953. Based on reports in *The Hindu*, 4 January, and the *National Herald*, 5 January 1953. The Council of World Churches represented 220,000,000 Protestant Christians belonging to forty-seven countries.



tendency of modern civilization is to do it. The human being thus approximates more to a machine—a generalization not to be taken too far.

Going back to the First World War and before that, Europe was the centre of political activity in the world. Of course, the USA was important. Nevertheless, Europe affected the world more than the USA, greater as it was, and there was a certain balance of power in Europe. There were occasional wars in Europe, sometimes for the spoils of colonial territories, but then the First World War upset that balance considerably. Then there was some kind of interregnum between the two World Wars, which created other problems.

Meanwhile, other countries of Asia stirred up themselves, giving rise to all kinds of nationalist movements and struggles for independence and freedom. Moreover, the USA has become much more important after the First World War. The Second World War came and finally upset the old balance.

Look at it completely objectively, and try to see the picture before the Second World War. So far as the military might is concerned, Russia and Germany were the strongest countries. We were faced with this problem that, from a strictly practical point of view, taking into consideration military factors, it was difficult to defeat either without the help of the other. In Asia, the strongest country was Japan. The USA was also a very strong country. Ultimately Russia aligned herself against Germany with the USA and England, and Germany was defeated.

Certain changes have taken place after the War. Nobody today is so strong as to change the world according to his liking. He has to take into consideration other factors. Therefore, after the end of the War there have been new conflicts and talks of fresh war, though this idea is disliked by everybody. We blame the politician and the statesman without realizing that they are bound by certain conditions.

Another factor which came into existence after the War was the emergence of Communist China. It is totally immaterial whether you like Communist China or not. This shook the balance of power in Asia and East Asia, and I think much of our troubles arise because we have tried to ignore certain basic facts which refuse to be ignored.

Other factors have also arisen with the achievement of independence by India, Pakistan, Burma and other countries, which do not directly affect the world issues, because none of them is an aggressive country, nor has the capacity for aggressiveness. But the withdrawal of European powers from these countries is a big factor. Some of these countries in Asia are potentially strong and can grow into powerful countries, given time and opportunity.

Look at the world in another way. Two great countries, the biggest in the world, are the USA and, opposed to it, Russia, both with considerable population. But two other countries with even greater population are China and India, industrially backward but potentially strong. But from the population

point of view we have these four countries, two relatively backward and two advanced. These are factors which may not occur to many, but in the course of ten or twenty years, when these backward countries develop, they will affect the balance, if you think in terms of balance of power.

To try to change this balance by resort to war is a very serious matter. When a war is fought to gain an objective by removing the obstruction in the way, you do not gain that objective even though you win the war. Thus the position becomes somewhat different. Victory, naturally, becomes the immediate objective. But by the time that victory is won, the main objective is put in the shade completely by the problems arising from the enormous expenditure of energy for war.

So political or economic objectives are not likely to be gained by war. The reasons for which wars were fought in the past are not present. They were fought for something which one people had and the others did not have. If this essential something is available to all, this immediate urge for that type of war lessens. Scientifically, it is possible; the world is in a position to supply the urgent needs of everybody.

I am quite sure very few people in the world, in any country, like war or want war. In spite of this fact, we almost inevitably tend to go in the direction of war. It is really fear that is in the background, the fear that the other country will attack and so let us attack before we are attacked. The result is the same kind of a feeling that induces a wild animal to attack a human being. But no wild animal attacks a human being unless it is afraid, or unless it is hungry.

It is the psychology of fear that makes people not only prepared to attack but possibly start an attack before the other party attacks them. I do not know how one can deal with this matter easily. But one thing we can do, whatever we are, whether in a position of authority or not; we can use language which will not inspire fear, and sometimes even express our strongly-held views as moderately and inoffensively as possible.

A major fact of the present situation is that the new China is powerful and active, not only potentially but actually. Not that it can function in other parts of the world but within its domain, it is a great power and likely to grow stronger. Some people think it will break up, but all the information one has points the other way. The Chinese people have a tremendous capacity for hard and continuous work. They are likely to go far ahead of all the people I know. For the first time in forty years, they now have a centralized and strong administration and internal order. China after forty years of civil war finds a measure of order, a measure of government functioning, and it is a tremendous relief to the people. Many Chinese people in other countries, who are by no means Communist, have a sense of pride in China today, that she is not kicked about by other countries. They have a national feeling of pride.



In the Korean situation, it is very difficult for any country, especially for us in India, to say anything. We avoided any active interference even by advice. Nevertheless, we felt that the situation was so dangerous that it might lead to much worse developments, and so we tried quietly without even saying anything publicly.

We have no desire to play any big role of peace-makers in international affairs. We were in favourable position as we have friendly relations with all the countries concerned, and talked to them in a friendly way, not with *aides-memoire*. There was a certain response. So, for a long time we tried in a small way to explore methods to discuss these issues. It did not come off ultimately. The question had resolved itself to the prisoners of war issue. This type of issue is completely novel because in the old days such issues did not arise. The prisoners were sent back to their countries without anybody finding out what they wanted. But now other conditions are arising which make it difficult to force people against their will to go when they do not want to go. I have no doubt also that among the prisoners, there were a number of people sent to them to influence them from President Syngman Rhee<sup>2</sup> and Marshal Chiang Kai-shek's<sup>3</sup> forces.

We did not move our Resolution in the UN formally without trying to find out what the other countries thought about it. Politicians like lawyers do not commit themselves. We did get the impression that opinion was favourable. Other developments took place that aroused fears and once you start thinking in that line you can be swept away. I believe that in spite of what has happened subsequently, the Resolution was worthwhile, because it was not the type of Resolution which would have made the situation much worse. It was a kind of basis which could be explored in future for a way out. The questions were narrowed very much by this.

In western Asia, which some people call the Middle East, a change is taking place. Whatever might happen, it is going to be a big change from the old order. These countries may not be strong by themselves, but even the weakest among the subject countries is strong enough to take up an attitude of defiance against any imperialist control.<sup>4</sup>

2. He was President of the Republic of South Korea at this time.

3. He was President of the Nationalist Government in Formosa.

4. In Iran, the Anglo-Indian Oil Company tried to control the fortunes of the country with the help of feudal elements. But the progressive and nationalist forces had their plans and as a result the UK lost both its prestige and large holdings in Iran. In Iraq, opposition parties had demanded more powers for Parliament, agrarian reforms and abrogation of the Anglo-Iraqi Friendship Treaty of 1928. The result was that the non-party Cabinet headed by Mustafa Umari resigned on 22 November and General Nureddin Muhammad took over as Prime Minister, proclaimed martial law, and arrested opposition leaders.



The situation in Africa is alarming from the long range point of view. I feel that Africa is to be a very important question in the near future. We have had our own problems, the problems of Indians in South Africa. I leave them out for the moment, though the very important basic principle of racial equality is involved in them. In the world of today, it is quite impossible for any country to carry on on a basis of racial inequality.

Apart from that, in West Africa and Nigeria, the British Government have taken some steps which are much in advance of steps taken in other parts of Africa. A limited measure of self-government has been given and I think it is a very good thing, and the other parts look up to this.<sup>5</sup> In other parts of Africa, other developments have happened. Secret societies<sup>6</sup> have been formed by the people but I think they are very badly advised to employ force that way. But if you deal with them in such a way as to arouse antagonism and fear, it would be a failure. No doubt the administration has to normalize the situation; you cannot allow murders to take place. But in doing this, we should not do something which appears to a large number of people as unjust, something which is meant to crush them.

The situation in Africa has disturbed me very much because it has been worsening for the last few months and a great deal of fear and other passions have been aroused. I am afraid Africa will have a bad time.

We have quite enough of our own problems, but in solving our own problems we are indirectly helping others to solve their problems. We recently proposed a Five Year Plan. Two years of the five years are over. The plan is really for the next three years. This is something distinct from planning in totalitarian countries, where it is on a different basis. We have deliberately not put down all we want to do; the resources and realities of the situation have to

5. The constitutional reforms introduced in Gambia on 18 September 1950 by the Colonial Office had provided for (1) the nomination of an African as Vice-President of the Legislative Council; (2) increase in the number of nominated members of the Legislative Council; and (3) a full electoral system for the town of Bathurst and Gambia colony. In Nigeria, a new Constitution promulgated on 29 June 1951 had (1) replaced an advisory Executive Council by a Council of Ministers with legislative and executive powers; (2) a Central Legislature with 136 elected members; and (3) a Regional Executive Council and a Regional House of Assembly for each region.
6. The Mau Mau secret society, pledged to drive out the white settlers from Kenya, gained influence on the Kikuyu tribe and launched a campaign against European settlers and African collaborators from August 1952. On 1 October, the Kenya Legislative Council empowered the State to control the press, impose restrictions on the movement of Mau Mau supporters, increase penalties for acts of sedition, and allow the police to arrest any suspected person without warrant. On 20 October, the Government declared a state of emergency in Kenya. Between 20 October and 15 November, 8,500 persons were arrested in Kenya.

be considered. Moreover, we have to face a big country, a very varied country, with forces working for unity and disruptive forces everywhere.

We have based our Constitution on a secular basis which does not mean anti-religious bias, but rather here all the religions have complete freedom. Sometimes, however, we do not act upon that because nationalism has a tendency to be a narrowing force. It is sometimes strong enough to become an aggressive force and look out for conquest, as in European countries. It is an exciting prospect to build up this vast country.

## 2. The World Situation<sup>1</sup>

The Congress views with deep concern and grave anxiety the ever-growing tension and the deepening crisis in the relations between the Great Powers who have aligned themselves in rival power blocs engaged in a cold war and poised to strike with their unprecedented armed might, ever mounting to greater dimensions and intensity, and threatening destruction to themselves and to the rest of the world.

While nations and governments are not seeking war and the people of the world, including those of the countries in the rival blocs, earnestly desire peace, the accumulation of and race in armaments continues. The campaign and the psychology of hatred and distrust, and the acceptance, as the basis of their policy by the Great Powers, and that preparation for large scale and total war alone can lead to peace or to the prevention of war, has resulted in grave, incalculable and present risk to world peace. This has also rendered the desires of the common people for peace not only ineffective, but has increasingly turned the minds of nations and peoples to the acceptance of war preparations as necessary and war itself as almost inevitable. Thus their thoughts and minds are oriented in the direction of war.

It is necessary that attempts should be made to bring about a change in the opposite direction, creating a climate of peace, and the Government and people of India should devote their unceasing endeavours to that end. Further, a change in the approach of nations<sup>1</sup> and governments to each other or as between groups of them, in the direction of reconciliation rather than conflict

1. Resolution drafted by Nehru on 12 January for the Hyderabad Congress Session and passed on 18 January 1953. JN Collection.



and balance of power grouping, is urgent and essential if the great objectives embodied in the Charter of the United Nations and its original purposes may be attained and war prevented.

To this end, greater interchange and freedom of intercourse between nations, particularly between those who now stand separated by the cold war and by other conflicts, should be encouraged. Progressive and positive action to bring about a degree of disarmament, cessation of hostile propaganda and campaigns of hatred and suspicion are necessary. Definite initiatives should be taken to resolve at least some of the outstanding issues which stand deadlocked in world affairs, such as, for example, the broadening of the United Nations Organisation by the admission of States whose applications have been pending for many years, and the representation of China being regularized by the real government of China taking its place in the United Nations. These are essential first steps of grave urgency.

The Congress recognizes the considerable achievements of the United Nations Organisation in the social, economic and humanitarian fields, even though they fall far short, measured against the needs and distress of mankind on the one hand and the potentialities of the earth and the advance of human knowledge on the other.

The Congress recognizes that considerable advance has been made in the colonial field during the last few years towards the liberation of subject peoples and for their welfare and progress. This advance, however, is inadequate and existing forms of colonialism, inevitably accompanied by race hatred and mutual conflict, exploitation and international rivalry, are continuing. These are causes of war and human misery which should be ended.

The Congress records its appreciation of and support to the Government of India in pursuing steadfastly the policy of peace and international cooperation unhindered by setbacks, inducements and provocations, the policy of peaceful cooperation and of non-alignment with power blocs, and urges the Government to continue to pursue this course which alone enables it to make positive contribution towards international understanding and world peace. It records its appreciation of the peace efforts of the Government of India in regard to the Korean war on the basis of international law and non-partisanship, and urges the Government to continue its efforts to ensure peace in Asia and to contribute to world peace.

The people of India with their rich heritage and traditions and their newly-won freedom, have in this time of world crisis a duty to the cause of world peace. That duty they will best discharge by ridding themselves and their national life of all complexes of fear, intolerance, distrust and hatred and by freeing themselves of economic dependence on others. By the performance of this duty they will not only serve their own country but will also serve the large causes of the world.



### 3. A World Overburdened with Fear, Anger and Hatred<sup>1</sup>

... May I, to begin with, say a word about our general approach. The honourable Member opposite, Prof Hiren Mukherjee, quoted the words of Oliver Cromwell: "I beseech thee, in the bowels of Christ, think for a moment that you might be wrong." Well, I can assure him and the House that whether it is a question of foreign affairs, or any other question, speaking for myself, and I think for my Government, we have no feeling of unfailing rectitude. We have no feeling of having a monopoly of virtue and we frankly confess that we try to see the light to the best of our ability and where we see it and where it shows that what we have done has not been the right thing we have the courage to change it. So, there is no question of our imagining that in foreign policy, or in domestic policy, we are unfailingly and undoubtedly right, and no more can be said about it.

But frequently as we debate this question of foreign policy, I have found almost always that it takes a certain direction in regard to some honourable Members, in whose opinion foreign policy is confined to that particular outlook in that particular sphere. Honourable Members who are Members of the Communist Party view it in one light and with unfailing regularity and commendable endurance they go on repeating that.

The honourable Member opposite, Dr Syama Prasad Mookerjee, thinks, that foreign policy is essentially the policy dealing with Pakistan, and lately essentially the policy dealing with Jammu; so, foreign policy ultimately revolves round Jammu.

And so, the conception of foreign policy changes very much with the Member who speaks about it. I am reminded of a certain definition of a politician when I think of the speeches of some honourable Members opposite. The definition was that they were prepared to consider every new idea with an open mouth. Or, to put it differently, we find first-rate minds, absolutely first-rate till they are made up; but when they are made up nothing enters them and nothing can enter them any further. They are made up long ago and there they remain. I have that feeling.

I am accused of a certain, perhaps, shall I say, pride in the foreign policy. There is no question of pride in changing it. Any person who thinks of foreign policy or any policy in terms of unchangeability is likely to be wrong at any time, more especially in a dynamic and changing period like the present. But I do feel that many of our critics—not all—look at it in these very terms

1. Statement in Parliament, 17 March 1953, *Parliamentary Debates (House of the People)*, *Official Report*, 1953 Vol. II, Pt. II, cols 2229-247. Extracts.

of an unchangeable viewpoint and outlook. I submit that whether that viewpoint occasionally may be right or may be wrong, it gives a wrong perspective and therefore the results that flow from that approach are likely to be right or wrong.

I have to choose whether I should enter into a large number of details which have been referred to in the course of the debate or rather concentrate on certain major facts. One thing I might say. The honourable Member, Mr. Jaipal Singh, said something about appointments or delegations, and something about our foreign policy not being a party policy.<sup>2</sup>

Well, I entirely agree with him. A foreign policy can hardly ever be, if it is at all fully thought out, a party policy. It may be wrong: that is another matter. But it can hardly be a policy which is a purely party policy. Otherwise, no country can have any consistency in its policy. There has to be a certain continuity, at the same time a certain flexibility in that policy. I would submit that the kind words that many honourable Members have said about me in regard to this matter of foreign policy are rather beside the point. I am grateful to them, of course, for their sentiments.

I am convinced that whoever might have been in charge of the foreign policy of India during these years could not have but followed more or less the broad policy that we have pursued, because it did not come of my head or anyone else's head; it came out of the circumstances in which we live and the background of our history and the present context of events. It is the inevitable policy, barring variations here and there, barring certain emphasis here and there. There could be no other foreign policy and I am quite convinced that if by some remote and unlikely chance, honourable Members opposite have the sharing of this policy, or the conduct of it, they would inevitably have to follow something like this foreign policy—the emphasis might vary. I am rather doubtful if that statement would apply to the honourable Members of the Communist Party opposite. It is possible that they may vary.

Let us consider this question of foreign policy not in a party sense, but really in a national sense and to a certain extent in an international sense. After all we live in a rather difficult and trying period of history, and seeing the changes from day to day, it is not an easy matter even to keep up with those changes. It is an extraordinary thing that while almost everything that we see around us in this world is ultimately the product of human minds,

2. Jaipal Singh of Jharkhand Party said on 17 March during the debate that foreign policy "is above party politics", and it was a "national policy." He also found Members guilty of dealing with the foreign policy as a party affair. He further said that: "Again and again I see that there are certain types of people who are sent abroad and others are completely neglected... We must see to it that every deputation is of the right type when it is sent abroad."



nevertheless human minds lag behind their own products. Events take place, changes take place and the average human mind remains behind it, cannot catch up with the very thing that it itself has created. Whether it is the developments due to the pace of technological progress, which are tremendous today, or whether it is other things, we lag behind: even the so-called advanced countries lag behind, mentally speaking: much more than other countries, who, technologically speaking, are not advanced.

That applies very much to the political sphere at present. It is a good thing to judge of a statement or a speech and find out if that speech would have been in keeping with events, say, ten years ago, or five years ago. I think one will find that many a speech delivered might well have been the same five years ago, or ten years ago. The passage of time or circumstances has made no difference. That itself means that there is a certain static character about the thinking behind it. It is not in keeping or in turn or parallel with reality. Therefore, let our foreign policy be considered as a national policy, as a continuing policy except for the inevitable variations and changes that may come into it from time to time....

Now, if I may take up one or two relatively small matters and dispose of them before going on to the wider issues, Professor Hiren Mukerjee referred to the controversy about the death of Shri Subhas Chandra Bose. I was glad to see his interest in this matter. He also referred to something appearing in the papers about some funds which Shri Subhas Chandra Bose apparently possessed and which have disappeared.<sup>3</sup>

So far as the question of his death is concerned, during the last five years we have made every effort to enquire into this matter, which efforts included sending men from here to Tokyo to enquire. We have had long reports of all kinds of persons, some first-hand, some second-hand witnesses; and if the House will remember, a year or little more ago we issued one or two of those reports. Now, we have enquired into it from every possible angle that was open to us. And so far as we are concerned, we are convinced about it. There is no doubt about it in our minds. Some people indulging in wishful thinking, if I may say so, go on repeating that they get messages from the occult world to tell them that that is not true. Sometimes also, some newspaper correspondent or other gives out some story which is, I think, very objectionable in the sense that it is libellous to others. We cannot go about, from our personal knowledge, denying all kinds of stories that appear. It is an embarrassing thing. But I do

3. Hiren Mukerjee asked the Government to find out whether towards the end of the Second World War there were serious disagreements between Subhas Chandra Bose and the Japanese Government, whether Indians in South Asia and East Asia doubted the reports about the alleged death of Subhas Bose and whether certain persons allegedly appropriated large sums of money belonging to the India Independence League.



submit that in a matter of this kind, generally and more specially in a matter affecting a very famous and beloved personality of India, we should not be so irresponsible in our statements.

About these funds, some time before I became a part of this Government, that is to say early in 1946 I happened to go to Singapore; and from that day I was interested in these funds which were supposed to belong to the India Independence League or like organizations. I saw some people in Singapore who knew something about them. In fact, with great effort I managed to get some of the money. It is not very much. I forget the amount, it is under a lakh, 70 or 80 thousand in Singapore dollars, in gold, in fact. It was rather difficult to get it, and I happened to get it. I could not have got it by myself, but I got it with the help of the then British authorities there, or, to mention the name, Lord Mountbatten who happened to be at the time there.<sup>4</sup> I did not take the money myself; I could not. My suggestion was that that money should be kept there as a trust to help the old INA people; and a trust was created. I was one of the trustees, and the others were old INA people in Singapore. I also got a purse in Singapore at the time possibly amounting to a lakh of rupees, which I added on to that trust. And we left it there. That was the beginning of my interest in these funds. We have tried to enquire in Singapore, in Rangoon, in Bangkok, in Tokyo, and we have been unable to trace much. We have got some bits of gold, some bits of jewellery; some odd things like that we have got. But we totally failed. I cannot say of course what funds there were or what has happened to them. But I am merely informing the House that we have made every effort to trace them and get them.

And this is all that we have got. I may say about the trust that was created in Singapore that a part of the money was utilized in helping the INA people. Later, after several years, my co-trustees there suggested that this might be used for another purpose and I agreed, that purpose being to give scholarships to Indians studying in the University of Singapore, which was recently established. And it is being used for that purpose. For the rest we have here some other bits of gold and a little money—not very much—which came recently from Tokyo. It is locked up somewhere in the bank. We do not quite know what to do with it. So much for that matter.

I should like, if the House will permit me just to refer to a matter which was adequately discussed a month ago, although my honourable friend, Dr Syama Prasad Mookerjee, has dealt with it again, about this Jammu matter. I will say this that Dr Syama Prasad has been good enough to assure us that if the situation worsens in the country he will stand shoulder to shoulder with all

4. Mountbatten was the Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia Command at this time.

of us.<sup>5</sup> Now, that is a very comforting assurance for which we are grateful. Meanwhile, it would be worth thinking whether it is desirable, before the situation worsens very much, to do everything in one's power to worsen it. Because, I say so with all respect, I cannot conceive—speaking nationally or internationally, speaking more particularly in regard to Kashmir, speaking if you like, more especially in regard to Jammu—of anything that worsens that situation more, makes it more difficult to solve it, makes our international position more difficult, than the activities indulged in by those who bring up this subject of Jammu so often.

The honourable Member, Mr Chatterjee, spoke feelingly and strongly about the failure of our propaganda abroad, more especially in regard to Kashmir.<sup>6</sup> Has it ever struck him that what the honourable Member does is also propaganda abroad—to our disadvantage? Very much so. It is very easy to find out; one need not search for it, one need not spend much time in searching for it as if it was hidden somewhere. It is a patent and obvious fact. Let the honourable Member try to find out the effects of the agitation with which he is himself concerned, whether it is in the world or whether it is in India, on the Kashmir problem. How does it affect, whether it is in the valley of Kashmir or in any other part. Therefore, it has surprised me enormously that such a patent fact should not be obvious to the highly gifted minds and brains of the honourable Members, and so I came to the conclusion that this must be a case of those first-rate minds till they are made up, and after that, apparently, they do not function....<sup>7</sup>

Honourable Members have referred to this little report issued by the Ministry of External Affairs and criticized it for its baldness and for its lack of content. The criticism would have been justified, of course, if it pretended to be anything other than it is. Some two years back it was—I forget whose idea it was—but we accepted it, that very brief reports from each Ministry should be circulated at the time of the Budget debate just to give a broad outline and figures. In fact, many Members did not like to be encumbered

5. S.P. Mookerjee said on 16 March 1953: "Let us consider the issues which have been roused with regard to Jammu and Kashmir. The issues are political, economic and administrative. Let us discuss these issues with a cool and dispassionate mind, and let us see whether it is possible for us to come to some agreement, so that we can prevent any serious international difficulty arising so that we can avoid difficulties and commotion for the whole country."
6. N.C. Chatterjee said on 17 March 1953: "Our policy and propaganda machine has been a dismal failure and I think, to my very great regret, Members of Parliament should be told and the Prime Minister should acknowledge it, that India has been beaten by Pakistan on this Kashmir issue."
7. S.P. Mookerjee remarked here: "Why do you refuse to discuss? You are only describing yourself. We are willing to discuss, but you are not."



with heavy tomes. So, this was precisely meant to be not a discussion of our foreign policy. How can a report do that? But it gives certain salient facts partly in regard to the expenditure, partly in regard to offices—where they exist, where they were closed and that kind of a thing—it is not meant to be anything else. Of course, if it is required that the External Affairs Ministry should issue a bigger book on the subject which might perhaps help honourable Members to consider the various aspects of foreign policy, it might be considered. I myself am rather doubtful about that venture because, one does not, officially at least, deal with foreign topics in this way. One gives out broad outlines. One cannot deal with foreign policy as frankly in public as perhaps it might be done in a committee or in books. Other people write about it no doubt, but I am not at all sure that it is the practice of foreign offices to issue or publish works giving in some detail their problems, and I am at a disadvantage myself in this matter.

Honourable Members opposite or even Members this side can speak with a certain lack of inhibition about countries and matters affecting foreign policy. They have the right to do so, within limitations, I hope. Naturally, as the Foreign Minister, I cannot do that or refer to other countries in that way. I may differ with a country's policy very much. Even so, I would indicate that difference in a rather moderate language. In any event, it is not customary either in publications or in speeches—although there are more and more exceptions to this in the modern so-called diplomacy—to run down other countries. In fact in the old days the strongest word used against a country's policy was that that is "unfriendly to us." That was the height. Let the House think what we have arrived at now, the words that we use now. In fact, to say that the policy, or some activity, was unfriendly was almost a prelude to the declaration of war: the next step was war. Now we bandy words and very strong language. And may I express my extreme regret that a Member of this House, in regard to Pakistan, used words which I consider exceedingly objectionable.<sup>8</sup> That is not the word to be used but it can be expunged. I am surprised that a Member of this House should entertain that idea; and what that lady Member stated before in praise about our policy had no value left after we saw what she thought of that policy when she uttered that word. So, I think, naturally whether in this report or elsewhere, the language used has to be moderate, restrained. You can see behind the restrained language the policy. A policy is not to be judged by the language which perhaps some of us may use at a public meeting.

8. Tarkeshwari Sinha of the Congress Party said on 17 March: "I admit that we are not in a position to declare war just now on Pakistan, but at least we should immediately cut off diplomatic relations with Pakistan. Pakistan is not a fit country with whom diplomatic relations can be maintained. And we definitely know that when we are stiff to Pakistan, Pakistan is bound to come down on her bended knees to our feet."



Honourable Members referred to Ceylon or other places. Mr Jaipal Singh referred to Burma.<sup>9</sup> I confess I could not quite follow that. I may be mistaken but he talked about loans to Burma. There have been no recent loans to my knowledge. Of course, a large sum is owed to us by Burma after the partition and there were some loans some years ago, I believe, but nothing recently. But I should like to say that if Mr Jaipal Singh or any Member of this House thinks that Burma is treating us in any hostile manner, I think he is not right. With Burma our relations are very friendly. The House knows that Burma has had to face great difficulties and has still to face these difficulties. There is disorder in parts of Burma. In north-east of Burma, a tremendous problem has existed for sometime because of some of the so-called Kuomintang troops having come in, unwelcome as they were, and squatting there and creating mischief there. So Burma has had to face all these grave difficulties and throughout this period, I should say that our relations have hardly ever been quite so cooperative and friendly with Burma as they are now. It is true that we have had to pay heavily in the past for our rice purchases from Burma. We hope that we shall be able to arrive at a suitable understanding with them whether it is in regard to barter of goods or in other ways.

Then again, honourable Members seem to have suggested in regard to Ceylon that we should show strength.<sup>10</sup> Well, this reference to strength is frequently made. Exactly how we can exercise that strength in regard to Ceylon is not quite clear to me. The difficulty of a place like Ceylon, more so than others, is the fear that Ceylon has of India. The use of strength means more fear on the other side: not less. Here is a great big continent lying astride north of Ceylon and they are, I am sorry, I think unreasonably just afraid of being swamped or swallowed by India or by the Indian people. So far as I am concerned, and I am quite sure, so far as this House is concerned, there is absolutely no reason for the Government or the people of Ceylon to have any such apprehension. We have absolutely no kind of wish or desire to interfere in Ceylon in the slightest. We certainly are interested, and deeply interested, in the fate of large numbers of people of Indian descent who have gone there in the past, who have worked there, and if I may say so, who have helped in building up the prosperity of Ceylon in the past.

I remember the first time that I went to Ceylon more or less officially, although I was not an official; it was in 1939. I went there to discuss these

9. Jaipal Singh said that Myanmar had taken a loan from India, but she preferred to buy tea from Sri Lanka when India's tea industry was passing through a serious crisis. He said that the country's foreign policy should be reflected in trade and commerce with other countries.

10. Ramachandra Reddi said on 16 March that it was necessary that a stronger attitude should be taken by the Government in regard to Sri Lanka where Indian nationals were being harassed and their citizenship rights were curtailed.

Indo-Ceylonese problems with the Government there. I went there really in my capacity as the Congress President, I think. The Government of Ceylon were good enough to meet me and fully discuss these matters. At that time, I delivered a speech where all the notabilities of Ceylon were present, I said that a time will come, I hope, when the people of Ceylon will put up a statue in Ceylon to the Indian labourers who came here and built up Ceylon.

So I have been interested in this matter and personally involved in it, and for fifteen years at least, I have closely followed it. I have seen that the real difficulty one has to face is the psychological difficulty of the people of Ceylon—who have, otherwise, very friendly feelings towards India, which is, to large numbers of them, a sacred land, from which their religion and culture sprung—a fear that this great and big continent of a country might overwhelm them, and that fear and that apprehension comes in their way.

So my effort has been to try, insofar as I can, to remove that fear and apprehension from their minds. Any attempt to adopt what are called strong measures increases the disease, and does not remove it. What is war? Strong economic measures you may say. If they injure them, they injure us too. We drive them to other hands to carry on their trade, etc. Therefore, we have pursued this policy of firmly insisting on certain things, but at the same time, always doing so in a friendly manner and remaining friendly. Remember this also, that it is a curious situation. Because, in the ultimate analysis, each country decides for itself who its citizens should be.<sup>11</sup> Suppose somebody here in India insisted, or some other country insisted, that so-and-so must be an Indian citizen, you will not like it; I will not like it. That is for us to decide who will be a citizen of India: not for anybody else to tell us as to who should be. But, it is also true there is a history behind this settlement of Indians in Ceylon; it goes far back. It is not a new matter. Because of that history, the Government of Ceylon cannot dispose of it merely by saying that it is just their lookout and nobody else's or by throwing out 100,000 or 200,000 persons, and making them Stateless.

Then again, an honourable Member, getting angry with Pakistan for what it has done, said that we should cut off diplomatic relations. How exactly that helps us is not clear to me. It may result in the exact opposite of what that

11. The Indian and Pakistani Residents Citizenship Act of 1949 enacted by Parliament of Sri Lanka removed names of voters of Indian origin from the electoral registers but laid down that those Indians who would apply for Sri Lankan citizenship before August 1951 would be eligible for voting. However, only a small number of total applications submitted by Indian settlers could be dealt with before the May-June 1952 elections. The Act of 1949 laid down that an applicant, as proof of his intention to make Sri Lanka his home, should have his wife and dependents "ordinarily resident" with him—a requirement which was interpreted by the Commissioner of Registration in such a manner that only a few Indian settlers could become eligible for citizenship.



Member possibly thought. This question of Pakistan has been discussed here on many occasions. I should not like to take up the time of the House much with it. But, I should like to say a few words about the general approach to this question, because we are accused of appeasement and not being stern and strong enough. Whenever we have asked as to how we can show strength, some suggestions have been made, which appeared to me then, and which appear to me now, as totally impracticable and undesirable as this suggestion about breaking off diplomatic relations.

Look at the picture of Pakistan today. What is happening there, in West Punjab especially and to some extent elsewhere? It is not a pleasant picture.<sup>12</sup> I am not concerned with their arguments there as to who is right as it is none of my concerns to interfere there. But, that picture is interesting from two points of view to me. One is that if we in India fall a prey to that narrow bigoted outlook which prevails in Pakistan, we shall also equally suffer. It is well to remember that. Because, it is the same type of mind, although it may use different words, and different slogans, the same narrow bigoted type of mind which has brought Pakistan to this difficult pass in which it is today, politically, economically, in every way.

I have ventured to suggest to this House in the past that we must not mix up the Government or the governmental policy of Pakistan with the people of Pakistan. The people of Pakistan only a few years ago were the people of India. There is not much difference between them and us, and their failings or their virtues. And if, after the Partition, horror overtook us, it overtook us in both places, and both places had plenty of misbehaviour, to use a very mild word. Geography has thrown us together even though—whether it is due to our mistakes or folly, if you like, whatever it may be due to, or to circumstances—we parted. Nevertheless, they are there as our neighbours, and there they are going to remain.

Therefore we have to think of any policy that we may have to pursue, not in terms of the anger and passion of today, but looking a little further ahead, just as, if I may refer to something entirely different, if we have to think of any policy that we may have to pursue in regard to the Chinese State, we have to remember that we have a frontier of roughly 2,000 miles with them,

12. Demonstrations against the Ahmadiya community, an Islamic reform sect, were quelled in Karachi on 1 March 1953, but continued in West Punjab where 12 deaths were reported in the first week of March. The rioting broke out after the Government refused on 26 February a demand by the All-Muslim Parties Convention for (1) the relegation of the Ahmadiyas to a minority status; and (2) the resignation of the Foreign Minister, Mohammed Zafrullah Khan, a member of the community. Police in Karachi arrested 300 demonstrators between 27 February and 1 March before rioting subsided. The West Punjab Government, on 28 February, banned the publication for one year of the Ahmadiya paper *Al-fazl* and *Azad*, the extremist Ahrar organ.



and we are neighbours today, tomorrow and in the future. Therefore, whatever other countries do, whatever policies they may have—and I am not going into that question—we have to consider our policy in regard to China remembering not only whatever past we may have had, but the present and the future, that we have to live together in peace and friendship and, I hope, cooperation.

Coming back to Pakistan, we have to look a little ahead and not be swept away by the passion of the moment or by some ill-deed that we hear about from there, and thereby adopt policies which may bedevil us in the future. We have to solve this problem of India and Pakistan. It is better to solve it at leisure than to break it in haste. It is a difficult problem. Almost every problem is a difficult problem in the world of today.

Honourable Members ask me what have we done in South Africa or in some other places.<sup>13</sup> It is perfectly true that we have been unable to do anything in South Africa except to express ourselves in the United Nations or otherwise. But what am I to do in South Africa? Let us think of that calmly. It is not a matter of my or honourable Member opposite beating argument by argument. We have, all of us, got to face these questions, and these questions are not of high policy—we agree—but of the method of reaching a certain result. I confess I do not see any solution of the problem in South Africa in the near future—certainly I cannot bring it about—except a gradual development of situation in the world which bring enormous pressure. That situation has been developing. I regret that the Government of the Union of South Africa is so constituted that it seems to be impervious to any such reasoned approach. As it is that Government has to face a difficult situation. I have no doubt that it will have to face a much more difficult situation, and the time may come when other countries of the world will have to choose definitely as to what policy they are to adopt in regard to a country like South Africa where this policy of racial inequality, discrimination and suppression is applied in the way it is done. I confess at the present moment to a feeling of disillusion at the way a number of important and great countries quibble about these matters. They cannot openly support this kind of policy, of course, because practically no reasonable person in the world can support it. All that they can say is, raise some legal argument: "Oh, this is a domestic issue. Let us not interfere. Let us not make matters worse. It will be settled gradually." They may say that as an excuse. They cannot support it. But that is not good enough, because it is a vital matter, not a thing today for the few hundred thousands of Indians who live in South Africa, but for the millions of Africans, who have a much greater

13. N.C. Chatterjee said on 17 March that "Indians are being driven out, maltreated and illtreated and disfranchised, not only in South Africa, not only in East Africa, but also in Ceylon and Burma, and everywhere. How is our foreign policy successful?"

right to that country than any Indian. Fortunately, I am happy that the Indians in South Africa and the Africans there have cooperated in this matter together.

I think that this kind of half-hearted attitude of some of the important countries does not do credit to them in this matter. It is all very well for some countries to divide up the world into the so-called western bloc and the eastern bloc, and the Communist world and the non-Communist world, and try to label everybody by these labels. We have refused to be labelled, and what is more, we refuse to consider these questions in terms of those labels, whether it is a racial issue in Africa or whether it is a national issue, a question of national freedom anywhere. It is no good telling us that we have to support some colonial power because, if we do not, colonialism will win there. The answer to that, the obvious answer to that is this, that whatever may happen if nationalism comes in there, one thing is certain, that if you go on supporting colonial authorities there, something very much to your disadvantage will happen. That is dead certain. And it amazes me that intelligent persons and Governments cannot see this simple lesson of history and do not understand the minds of people in Asia or Africa today. It just does not matter what country you may take. This simple lesson holds: if you support colonial authority, if you support colonial domination and colonialism, apart from doing the wrong thing, you encourage and strengthen the very forces you apparently think you are contending against.

Honourable Members say to me, why do you not go out in the market place, if I may say so, and condemn this and that country? Well, I do not and I cannot, because I happen to be a responsible Member of a responsible Government. I cannot behave in a manner of raising slogans against countries, but I can state policies as I have done now, and as I have done previously. These policies can be interpreted easily by those who take the trouble to interpret them.

Again my colleague, Mr Shiva Rao, referred to NATO and how this NATO which started as a defence organization for the defence, it is said, of the Atlantic community, has gradually developed into something much more.<sup>14</sup> First of all, it has gone beyond the Atlantic community, and others are coming within its scope which have nothing to do with the Atlantic. Secondly—I do not know—but sometimes one gets the impression that some of the smaller countries, smaller or bigger, attached to NATO think that this organization of the Atlantic community will cover up and shelter and defend their colonial domains. Again, if that is an implication of NATO, then obviously everybody who is interested in putting an end to colonialism naturally will react strongly

14. B. Shiva Rao said on 16 March 1953 that though the role of NATO was intended for the collective self-defence of its members, its expressed purpose was "to create an Atlantic community for purposes going beyond the defence of Western Europe."



against it. If NATO is the defender and protector of colonialism, then it has put its wrong foot forward. At first, it talked about the defence of a certain Atlantic community. They have every right to defend themselves. They have every right to fight any aggression that may come to them. But if in this business, they think that in order to do this, they have to participate and to help in keeping down and suppressing the freedom of colonial territories, then not only have they misunderstood the temper of the people of Asia and Africa today, but they are going against the obvious lessons of history. Today the person or the group or the country which is going to be welcome anywhere must go there as a liberating force, not as a repressing force.

And in this connection, may I say that in relation to what we called the foreign pockets in India, much has been said? I would only say this again, that I am not aware—I shall be glad, if honourable Members would enlighten me sometime or other—what exactly they expect me to do, short of declaring a war against those who own those foreign pockets. We have declared our policy quite clearly and firmly.<sup>15</sup> It is unthinkable for us, for any foreign pocket to continue in India, for a variety of reasons. It is manifestly absurd that when the great British Empire of India should cease to be, a little bit of some other Empire should remain in bits of India. That is manifestly absurd and wrong. And this new theory, to which Mr Shiva Rao referred yesterday, of calling these bits of territories as metropolitan areas—not as colonial areas, but as metropolitan areas—is not going to help in this matter.<sup>16</sup> By changing a label, they do not change either geography or the essence of colonialism. Now it should be clearly understood—our policy is clearly understood, but I wish to add something to it, and that is this—that if any parts of any of these foreign pockets in India are treated as any kind of a base for operations elsewhere, which are against our policy, we shall have to consider that act as an unfriendly act to this country.

15. India's policy towards foreign enclaves had been spelt out by Nehru in *aides-memoire*, statements in Parliament and in public speeches. For example, on 9 October 1952, he had said that "it is fantastic for anyone to imagine that bits of the Portuguese or French empire can continue in India... Because of our love of peace we have waited patiently for a peaceful solution of this problem. And we did not wish to force ourselves on anyone and would let the people to decide by plebiscite... It is India's policy, and it has been so, that there should be nowhere in the territory of India a foreign foothold." See *Selected Works* (second series) Vol. 19, pp. 677-78.

16. Shiva Rao said: "At the last session of the General Assembly, I was greatly surprised when the French delegate declared that it was France's mission to uphold and spread French culture and French traditions in all parts of metropolitan France. He said that "overseas territories, though separated by thousands of miles of land or sea from France are, nevertheless, integral parts of France..." A similar statement was made by a responsible spokesman of the Portuguese Government."



But again, how do we solve these problems? How do we solve any problem in this world? Honourable Members say, 'You protest and protest and do nothing'. What do other countries do? The other day, the newspapers reported that an aircraft belonging to the United Kingdom was shot down by Soviet bombers or whatever they were.<sup>17</sup>

I am not going into the merits of it. I do not know who is right or who is wrong, but there was a very, very serious incident. In peace time many people die. What do Governments do? Protest. Do you expect the UK Government to declare war against the Soviet Union because of that? What of the numerous protests that have been made in East Asia both by Chinese Government or the Russian Government or the American Government against each other? In spite of the fact that they are carrying on a war in Korea, they make protests for infringement of territory. But nobody increases the sphere of war. Honourable Members think rather lightly of this business of war or of sanctions etc. It is not a matter to be thought of in that way....

I should like to say a few words about this question of our membership of the Commonwealth. I am surprised continually—honourable Members will forgive me for saying so—by the lack of understanding shown by some Members of what this business is of our being in the Commonwealth... So far as we are concerned, ever since—and even before—we became a Republic, our relationship with the Commonwealth has been completely different from the relationship of any other country in the Commonwealth. Legally and constitutionally there is no relationship; leave out the question of allegiance to the British Crown—but there is none, of course—both legally and constitutionally, there is no relationship in the sense that our own Constitution makes no reference to it. There is nothing in it. It is a relationship by understanding—by agreement—if you like—which we can discontinue or put an end to when we choose or they choose—either party. It is a little difficult to understand that relationship because there is no precedent for it. We react—many of us, if I may say so—on grounds of sentiment as to why should we have anything to do with the Commonwealth, first of all, which used to be or which is the British Empire, secondly, a Commonwealth in which there is South Africa or some other country which is misbehaving. I can understand that reaction. But, that reaction applies or should apply to our being in the United Nations. There are plenty of countries we dislike there too. And, in being with the United Nations, we undertake upon ourselves certain obligations and certain burdens, by subscribing to the Charter. Every country does.

17. A British bomber aircraft was shot down on 12 March 1953 by a Soviet MIG jet fighter near Lueneburg. Four of the seven crewmen were killed when the bomber crashed.

In being associated with the Commonwealth what burdens or obligations do we take up? I should like the House to consider that. I will submit to the House that our association with the Commonwealth, novel as it is—for this is a novel way of countries associating with each other—shows the way for the future association of nations with each other without any obligation, without coming in the slightest in the way of each other's independence—yet some kind of friendly association which leaves you free to do what you like.<sup>18</sup>

What are the different types of alliances, agreements with other countries. Every alliance between independent countries is normally a give-and-take affair. You give something. If it is a military alliance of course, you are bound hand and foot. Otherwise you give something and take something. There are obligations attached to those alliances. It is no obligation to us because we are in the Commonwealth, of the slightest kind—leave out military or economic or any type of alliances. Please do not get mixed up between two things... Do not get these two things mixed up. We may not be in the Commonwealth at all and yet we may or may not have economic relations with them. On the other hand we may not have those economic relations and be in the Commonwealth. The two are separate. They have nothing to do with each other. We have certain economic relations with England because we think they are to our advantage. That is the long and short of it. If at any moment we think they are not to our advantage, it is open to us to put an end to them or to vary them. It has nothing to do with our being in the Commonwealth or not being in the Commonwealth. It is a separate thing. Whether they are to our advantage or not is a matter I am not going into now. I am merely putting it to you that this has nothing to do with our being in the Commonwealth.

Suppose we are in the Sterling Area. We can emerge out of it the moment we decide that it is not to our advantage to be in that area. If we have in the past thought it is to our advantage we may next develop some other relations with some other countries. Therefore, please separate these two ideas. Certain things we have inherited—naturally not policies—but certain economic ties and things from the past. It is open to us to break them when we liked. But, if we think they are at all to our advantage, we continue them, but the power is with us and with nobody else whether to continue them or to break them. All that economic business apart, this has nothing to do with our being in the Commonwealth. Our association with the Commonwealth stands apart.

18. Referring to the London Agreement of April 1949, according to which India decided to maintain her association with the Commonwealth, Nehru had said: "It is in the belief that India could more effectively pursue the policy of encouraging peace and freedom, and of lessening the bitter hatreds and tensions in the world, that I willingly agreed to the London Agreement."



I do submit to this House that our being associated with the Commonwealth does not first of all, in the slightest degree come in the way of our independent action anywhere. You may say, if you like, that an economic tie may occasionally come. Let me say that you may put an end to the economic tie. But our being in the Commonwealth by itself does not affect us in any sense, except if you like that it means a certain friendly approach. We meet each other. We discuss.

We have an equally, and if I may say so, even a stronger friendly approach to our neighbouring countries like Burma. Burma is not in the Commonwealth. There is no other tie. But we are much more intimately connected with Burma—not formally, I mean informally—than with the Commonwealth countries. We may be intimately connected with any other country in Asia, but nothing comes in our way. Nobody binds us. This is more or less, what I would say, the negative side of it.

I think we have gained positively by being in the Commonwealth. Definitely so. During the past five years specially, many avenues have opened out to us which may not have been open if we had not been there. An avenue opened out does not mean that we are forced to go that way or do a particular thing. Secondly, I think that we have somewhat affected world policies, not only directly insofar as we can, but to some extent indirectly also, through the Commonwealth, and I think that that is to our and the world's advantage. Anyhow, I cannot see how any valid reason can be advanced for our cutting away<sup>19</sup> from a relationship which is the best form of relationship in the sense that there is no obligation on us or on the other party, except the obligation of occasional friendly approach and friendly talk. It is, as I said, a new relationship. You have precedents, of course, in history, but it is a new type of association which we should like to develop, at any rate, I should like to develop—leave out the Commonwealth. I should like that approach between several Commonwealth nations and ourselves, and between us and the Asian nations. Nobody prevents us from doing that.

I have not referred, and I do not now refer, to the big questions that face us in the world, which can only be viewed, I think, not only in the world context but in the context of history—of history being made. It is a tremendous picture—changing, confusing. I confess to honourable Members opposite that I have no surety of vision about it, or assurances as to what will happen or what will not happen. It happens very often one does not quite know what is the right step to take. The only test there is, is to try not to take the wrong

19. Sucheta Kripalani said on 16 March: "I am one of those who do not see any advantage for us in remaining within the Commonwealth." In fact, the House of the People rejected on 17 March 1953, by 278 votes to 49, an Opposition motion that India relinquish her links with the Commonwealth.



step. That is something. Of course, I find that wrong steps are frequently taken by others. They are in a hurry to take a step and they repent at leisure. When we feel that a step has to be taken—and it is a right step—we take it. Otherwise, we do not take it. It is not perhaps a very brave or dramatic attitude to adopt, but in this matter we want to show no courage. We want to show as much wisdom and tolerance as possible, because we feel that in a world which is so overburdened with fear and apprehension, anger and hatred, perhaps a little quiet wisdom and tolerance may do some good.

## II. RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN

### (i) PAKISTAN AND DEFENCE ALLIANCE

#### 1. Pakistan and Middle East Defence Organization<sup>1</sup>

It is not for me to say much about the reported move to include Pakistan in the Middle East Defence Organization<sup>2</sup> at this stage except this, that it is a matter of grave concern to us what takes place in regard to the Middle East Defence Pact and Pakistan, because that may very well affect all kinds of balances and equilibrium in this country and Pakistan and in South Asia. Therefore, it is not a matter of little concern to us. We have been following this with close attention and we shall naturally have to adapt ourselves to changing conditions and developments.

Obviously as a responsible organization, we do not pass resolutions making it clear to this country and that country that India would consider the inclusion of Pakistan in the defence pact as an unfriendly act, or issue warnings, etc. These academic exercises can hardly be indulged in by a responsible

1. Speech at the AICC Subjects Committee meeting during the discussion on the foreign policy resolution, Hyderabad, 15 January 1953. From *The Hindu* and *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, 16 January 1953.
2. The Communist propaganda to win over the Middle East countries, and the failure of British diplomacy in that region, made the US policy makers conscious of the necessity for an early establishment of a Middle East Defence Organization. Discussions were held between the US and Britain in 1952 for setting up this organization in which Pakistan was to be included. Meanwhile, visits of many responsible US Service Staff to Pakistan, particularly since the beginning of 1953, had taken place in this connection.

organization like the Congress. Therefore, I could not allow that amendment.<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless, the subject matter of the amendment is, of course, of high importance.

The foreign policy resolution contains a brief reference to the peace efforts of the Government of India in regard to the Korean war. This is a recent event which all of you, no doubt, have followed with interest and some anxiety, because it involves grave issues. At first it was my intention to invite our representative who dealt with this matter in the United Nations, to tell you something about these developments there, not only about the Korean war but about other matters connected therewith. Perhaps, it will be better for Shri Krishna Menon to do so in the open session rather than here. Fortunately, Shri Krishna Menon is here today. I propose to invite him to speak on this resolution, although he is not a delegate in the open session.

I feel a little bashful while speaking on the foreign policy resolution because it is my own department. The speakers before me seemed to connect foreign policy with me in a personal sense. It is true that I have been in formal charge of the foreign policy of this country, but obviously no individual can impose his wishes or will in such an important matter. The foreign policy of our country, first of all, is the natural outcome of the foreign outlook and policy of the Congress during the last generation or more. It flows not only from the resolutions that we have passed but from our way of thought and action and everything. Secondly, the foreign policy that we pursue is the result not of my thinking but of the thinking of all those associated with me. It is a joint thing, not something separate, proceeding from one individual.

3. An amendment to the resolution on foreign policy and world situation by Probodh Chandra of Punjab sought "to make it clear" to the Anglo-US powers that "India would consider the inclusion of Pakistan in the West Asia defence pact as an unfriendly act." This was disallowed.



## 2. The Enlargement of War Zone<sup>1</sup>

I reiterate and amplify what I had said earlier about the reported possibility of Pakistan being invited to join the Middle East Defence Organization.

The other day during the debate in the Subjects Committee, a delegate had moved an amendment on the basis of the report in the newspapers about what was called as the Middle East Defence Organization in which it was stated that Pakistan was likely to join or was being invited to join. I did not know anything about it except what I had read in the papers. So I did not accept that amendment as I thought it was not proper on my part to refer to it. But since the subject was raised, I said a few words in that connection.

Apparently my words were interpreted by some people as interfering in somebody else's business.<sup>2</sup> Well, I have no desire whatever to interfere in anybody else's business just as I do not want any one else to interfere in my business. It is not for me to come in the way of Pakistan or the USA or the UK who are free to take any steps they like in this matter. So I do not complain or interfere.

What I said was that this matter is of grave concern to us naturally, and that we have to consider carefully what we have to do in our country and how to adapt ourselves to it. Obviously, if such a thing occurs, the region of cold war comes right up to our borders. That is to say, if Pakistan joins such a thing it can certainly do so; we do not come in the way—but it does make a difference to us either in cold war or if something worse, some other type of war happens.

It affects us when something happens on our borders in any matter. It is not the possibility of war between India and Pakistan but it is the possibility of world war coming right up to our doors and it is a matter of concern to us.

That is what I stated; and whether I stated it or not, the fact remains that any person who shoulders the responsibility of our Government here must concern himself with these matters. I do not know why other people should imagine or should not like the idea of our being concerned with such a vital matter. Obviously, we have to be concerned with this or any other development which directly or indirectly affects our country.

1. Speech on the foreign policy resolution at the plenary session of the AICC, Hyderabad, 18 January 1953. From *The Hindu*, 19 January, *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, 19 January and *National Herald*, 20 January 1953.

2. *London Times*, for example, in an editorial on 15 January criticized Indian comments on possible association of Pakistan with the proposed MEDO and stated: "The Government of India is rightly proud of its independence. It will not brook admonition—let alone pressure from other countries on its management of its affairs. Yet it does not seem to recognize that other countries feel and are entitled to feel the same."

### 3. Concern at Pakistan's Inclusion in MEDO<sup>1</sup>

As you know, I made some reference at the Hyderabad session of the Congress to Pakistan joining the Middle East Defence Organization. I made it clear that we have no desire to interfere with what Pakistan or the UK or the USA did. But it was obvious that if Pakistan joined this organization and thus became a part of one of the major blocs, this would affect us in several ways. It might lead to the probable war zone coming right up to the borders of India in the West. Therefore, we were naturally interested.

There has been much comment on the press release about this matter<sup>2</sup> as well as my statement. I think that it will be desirable for our High Commissioner in Karachi to see the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, or whoever might be functioning in his behalf, and repeat more or less what I said in Hyderabad. That is to say, that newspapers in foreign countries as well as in Pakistan had referred repeatedly to the possibility of Pakistan joining this defence organization in the Middle East. We had no desire to interfere, but as it was obvious that this would create a new situation, we would like to know what the position was. Up till now we had considered Pakistan, like India, Burma and some other countries, as outside the normal war zone in the unfortunate event of war between the rival blocs taking place. But if Pakistan joined the MEDO, this would cease to be so and Pakistan would have to be considered in the probable war zone. We were naturally concerned about this and would, therefore, be grateful to know what the position was.

I think that our High Commissioner should also draw the attention of the Pakistan Government to the recent statement made by Mr Yusuf Haroon,<sup>3</sup> who was till recently High Commissioner for Pakistan in Australia and who is now

1. Note to the Secretary General and Commonwealth Secretary, MEA, 20 January 1953. JN Collection.
2. The PTI release on MEDO to the Indian Press on 12 January stated that press reports appearing in UK, USA and Pakistan had confirmed the belief that inclusion of Pakistan in MEDO had reached an advanced stage of probability and that danger to India from this development would not be from Pakistan's increased military strength but of her becoming a major theatre of war in the event of an East-West conflict. The *Dawn* on 14 January commented: "Any attempt on the part of Bharat to seek to influence our decision in any such matter is sheer insolence...."
3. Yusuf Haroon Abdullah (b. 1917); Mayor, Karachi Municipal Corporation, 1944; President, Sind Provincial Muslim League, 1944-48; Premier of Sind and leader of Muslim League Party in Sind Legislative Assembly, 1949-50; Pakistan's High Commissioner in Australia, 1950-53; Vice-President, Pakistan Muslim League, 1953.



the Vice-President of the Pakistan Muslim League. Mr Yusuf Haroon is reported to have said that war between India and Pakistan was a 'close probability'.<sup>4</sup>

4. On 12 January, Yusuf Haroon said in Karachi that war between India and Pakistan over Kashmir issue now appeared to be "a close probability".

#### 4. Cable to Khwaja Nazimuddin<sup>1</sup>

Thank you for your top secret telegram 373 dated 25th<sup>2</sup> January. I shall await your detailed reply to my letter. Meanwhile, I hasten to send you this brief reply.

2. Tomorrow is the anniversary of the establishment of Republic. That day is a great day for us because it means the fulfilment in some measure of what we had long struggled for. The struggle for the freedom of India was a joint struggle of all the communities, Hindu, Muslim, Christian, Sikh and others, who inhabited undivided India in those days. Fulfilment came to us at the end of a long period, but unhappily it brought division and much ill will in its train. We cannot undo history. We must accept it with good grace and try our utmost to put an end to those evil effects of ill will, fear and suspicion that have pursued us these many years.

3. Every thinking person in India desires that the tension between India and Pakistan should end and that the relations of these two countries, which have a long period of a common inheritance, should be friendly and cooperative. Indeed, not only history and tradition but geography demand that. In the world today, so full of fear and talk and preparation of war, it becomes doubly incumbent upon us to try to stop this rot, insofar as we can, and to settle our differences. I am sure that all reasonable people in Pakistan are of the same opinion.<sup>3</sup>

4. I am convinced that war anywhere is a calamity, that a world war will be a disaster of unimaginable proportions, that a war between India and Pakistan would be even worse than normal conflicts between nations because it would have something of the nature of civil war because of our past close associations.

1. New Delhi, 25 January 1953. JN Collection.
2. Nazimuddin in this cable promised to send a detailed reply dealing with the points raised by Nehru in his cable to him on 19 November 1952.
3. Nazimuddin had mentioned that India and Pakistan had "so far lived in an almost continuous state of tension and antagonism...and removal of this antagonism is the central problem of statemanship confronting us both."

Therefore, it becomes incumbent on all of us to avoid this uttermost folly and disaster. I am prepared to do my utmost to this end. I am sure that if we approach this question in the right spirit, we can achieve results.

5. I do not wish to enter into any argument at this stage or to cast blame for anything. But I would beg of you to consider what is so frequently said and written in Pakistan on this subject of war with India. I have drawn your attention to this frequently because it has distressed me greatly. There are constant demands for war against India and newspapers and public statements by persons presumed to be responsible demand war. I would like you to compare this atmosphere in Pakistan to the one that prevails in India, where there is hardly any reference to these subjects. It is true that a few persons belonging to our Opposition here talk irresponsibly. We have condemned them in public in the clearest language. But, generally speaking, there is no stress or strain in India in regard to Pakistan.

6. In Pakistan, as I pointed out to you in previous communications, responsible persons and great organizations like the Muslim League speak in terms of war. Only recently, your late High Commissioner in Australia and the present Vice-President of the Muslim League has said repeatedly that war is the only solution and that war is very probable in the near future. You can well imagine the reactions to this both in Pakistan and India.

7. You refer to the correspondence I had with your predecessor,<sup>4</sup> the late Mr Liaquat Ali Khan. I would draw your attention to my answers to his letters. We would gladly refashion the world to our hearts' desires. But our power to do so is limited. Therefore we have to proceed step by step towards our goal. I had suggested the first step, and it was a big step, that both our countries should formally and solemnly renounce any resort to war or armed forces in settling our disputes. If we did that, as I earnestly hope that we will even now, that would immediately create an atmosphere which would help in the solution of our problems.

8. I agree with you that there are other applications of force which can be destructive of peace and justice, though nothing can be quite so bad as war.<sup>5</sup> We should, therefore, avoid such applications of force also.

9. On the eve of our Republic Day, I venture to address this appeal to you again.

4. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 14 Pt. I, pp. 31-34, 65-67, 70-71, Vol. 15 Pt. I, pp. 316-317, 322-326; and Vol. 15 Pt. II, pp. 303-07.

5. Nazimuddin in his cable had stated that war between India and Pakistan would bring ruin to both and that war was not the only means of settling disputes. He also stated that application of force in settlement of disputes whether by war or by any other means was equally repugnant to him.



5. To M.S. Mehta<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
February 3, 1953

My dear Mohan Sinhaji,<sup>2</sup>

... The Indian press reference to Pakistan and MEDO might have been worded differently and less dramatically. The PTI put it across in their dramatic way and newspapers gave it great prominence,<sup>3</sup> which naturally attracted a good deal of attention here and abroad. But, apart from the manner of presentation, I have no doubt that something had to be said on this subject. Indeed, I did make a brief statement at the Hyderabad Congress. That was officially said and that can be quoted.

I see no reason to apologize to the Pakistan Prime Minister or his Government for what we have said. This is a matter of highest significance to us and indeed to the whole of South-East Asia and we cannot allow matters like this to pass unnoticed. We have to make it perfectly clear to the world at large what the effect of this will be in a large part of Asia. I expressed myself moderately and clearly stated that we had no desire to interfere in Pakistan's decisions in any way, but the fact remained that any such decision would have far-reaching consequences. Not to make this clear at this stage would have been unfortunate and we would have been accused of quietly acquiescing in developments of this magnitude.

In spite of what the Pakistan newspapers might say in some anger,<sup>4</sup> I rather doubt if most of the people in Pakistan have not been alerted to this danger and would like to avoid it if possible.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. A copy of this letter was sent to the Commonwealth Secretary. Extracts.
2. M.S. Mehta, the High Commissioner of India in Pakistan, while pointing out that the Press in Pakistan had expressed displeasure over comments in the Indian Press as well as on Nehru's comments on Pakistan and MEDO, stated that Indian Press release on the subject was not happily worded. He felt that at the initial stage instead of critical and condemnatory statements, show of sympathetic approach in a constructive spirit by the Indian Press would have been the better.
3. See *ante*, p. 494.
4. The *Dawn* in an editorial on 28 January declared "...if an opportunity comes for us to participate in such an organization (MEDO) ... it would be an act of folly on our part to miss it."

## 6. To Khwaja Nazimuddin<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
March 15, 1953

My dear Khwaja Nazimuddin,

I must apologize to you for the delay in answering your letter of the 28th January 1953. That delay was caused because you had referred in your letter to a number of incidents and I had to make enquiry about them from the persons concerned. I have now received replies from our Minority Minister, Shri C.C. Biswas, from the Chief Minister of West Bengal, as well as from others, in regard to these incidents. I do not propose to burden this letter with a detailed reply in regard to these matters. But, as the information conveyed to you has been manifestly wrong in some respects, I am sending separately a note<sup>2</sup> about these incidents.

2. Since I received your letter, we have exchanged telegrams. Those telegrams have, in part, dealt with the matters contained in your letter.

3. I do not think it will serve any useful purpose for me to send you an argumentative letter dealing with the major points in issue between India and Pakistan. We know, more or less, our respective positions and, unfortunately, they differ. I am not interested in a lawyer's or a politician's argument. I am interested in solving these problems and in putting an end, insofar as I can, to the disputes that have embittered relations between India and Pakistan to their mutual disadvantage and injury. I have no doubt that this can be done, provided we approach these questions with a fixed determination to solve them. It is obvious that neither India nor Pakistan stands to gain by tension and conflict between them.<sup>3</sup>

4. It is true that some of these disputes deal with matters of national interest and sometimes these interests conflict. Hence the difficulty in solving them. Nevertheless, we should be far-seeing enough to realize that this continuation of tension is bad for all concerned.

5. I am quite sure that the vast majority of the people, both in India and Pakistan, would welcome a solution of our problems. When we are fortunate

1. JN Collection.

2. See *post*, pp. 517-19.

3. Nazimuddin had stated in his cable of 28 January 1953 that mere expression of desire to settle Indo-Pakistan disputes peacefully or condemnation of war talk would not "take us very far until we remove the causes of the bitterness... This can only be done if we find an effective method of ensuring that disputes that now divide us and create bitterness among our people will be peacefully resolved." He appealed to Nehru to consider "our proposals in that behalf or if they are not acceptable, favour me with your suggestions as to an alternative method of settling our disputes."



enough to bring this about, a burden would be lifted from them. It is also true that there are some people both in India and in Pakistan who are narrow and bigoted in outlook, and who prosper in an atmosphere of hatred and conflict. They generate a lot of heat. But what I had ventured to point out to you previously is this: No responsible person in India connected with the Government of India or outside it, encourages these tendencies or makes statements in the public press or otherwise which encourage communal passions and the tension between the two countries. What has pained me is that responsible persons in the highest positions in Pakistan constantly indulge in attacks on India, in veiled or open references to war, and, in general, keep up this unfortunate tension. Neither you nor I can control all our people or stop all mischief-makers, but we can work earnestly and even effectively as Governments and as responsible persons to minimize and put an end to these wrong and harmful tendencies. I regret that the impression I have gained is that leading and responsible persons in Pakistan do not function in this way. I am stating this not with a view to blame, but as a fact which should be borne in mind in order to understand our present difficulties.

6. As a Government, we have set our face against communalism. I do not deny that communalism exists in India, but we fight it with all our strength and succeed in keeping it in check. But I regret to note that the policy of the Pakistan Government is different.

7. I have no doubt that the vast majority of the Indian people desire a friendly understanding with Pakistan. I have equally no doubt that the great majority of the people in Pakistan have a like desire. It is a natural desire and a right one, for our main problems are economic problems and we can help each other greatly in solving them if we cooperate.

8. I had suggested a "No-War Declaration" by both our Governments because I am convinced that that by itself would go a long way in lessening the tension between our countries and in producing an atmosphere which would facilitate our coming to grips with and solving our problems. Unfortunately, you have not thought fit to accept this proposal for the reasons you have stated.<sup>4</sup> Those reasons do not convince me. In any event, so far as we are concerned, we have unilaterally made that "No-War Declaration" in regard to Pakistan, and we shall hold by it.

9. I am convinced that a solution of our problems will not come through the agency of any outsider, but by our facing them directly. I am prepared to do that in regard to each one of our problems without any previous commitments or limitation.

4. Nazimuddin declined the offer of Nehru to make a no-war declaration jointly with him, because, in his view, such a declaration had no value unless it was linked with the settlement of Indo-Pakistan disputes.

10. There has been a great deal of talk and wholly unjustified criticism in Pakistan on the canal water issue. This is being dealt with through the good offices of the World Bank. I am prepared to continue that and arrive at a settlement that way. If a direct approach is preferred, I shall accept that too. You will recollect my previous proposal, which did not exclude a reference to a mutually agreed international authority if necessity arose for that. But surely, the right course would be for us to deal with it directly. If we fail in any particular matter, we can then consider the next step.

11. The Prime Ministers' Agreement of April 1950 brought great relief to our countries. I would be agreeable to a review of this agreement, so that its practical working may be improved, and such other measures might be taken to give the minorities a feeling of full security and partnership in the political and economic life of their respective countries.

12. In regard to trade and commerce also, we are perfectly prepared to discuss these questions with you. I believe some such step is being taken.<sup>5</sup>

13. If you are agreeable, details of how these issues can most conveniently be dealt with could be worked out jointly by our two Foreign Offices for our consideration. In the same way, we may take up other issues later on.

14. Ultimately, all these approaches depend on two factors—an earnest desire to find a way out and an acceptance of the *bona fides* of the other party. I can assure you, in so far as we are concerned, that we have that earnest desire and are prepared to consider all these questions in all friendliness.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. A trade delegation from Pakistan arrived in New Delhi on 15 March and held talks with the Indian delegation for four days. On 20 March, an agreement between India and Pakistan regulating principally the trade in jute and coal was signed. Under this agreement, India agreed to buy at least 1.8 million bales of raw jute from Pakistan during the next three years and to speed up coal supplies to Pakistan. Both countries also agreed to drop discriminatory levies charged by them earlier.



## 7. To the Nawab of Bhopal<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
March 16, 1953

My dear Nawab Saheb,<sup>2</sup>

Thank you for your letter of the 15th March.

I have no doubt that some time or other India and Pakistan will have to think of joint defence as of so many other joint and common activities. But I rather doubt if just at present this matter can be discussed. So far as the question of an approach being made, I have been suggesting to the Prime Minister of Pakistan that we should discuss every matter directly and without the intrusion of others.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.
2. Hamidullah Khan (1894-1960); Chancellor, Aligarh Muslim University, 1930-35, Chancellor of Chamber of Indian Princes, 1931-32 and 1944-47.

## (ii) CANAL WATERS ISSUE

### 1. Supply of Canal Waters to Pakistan<sup>1</sup>

For the last two or three months or even more, we have had a barrage of propaganda and complaints in Pakistan about our cutting off or reducing canal waters, which go to Pakistan from India.<sup>2</sup> Whenever I have seen this, I have

1. Note to the Minister for Irrigation and Power, 11 January 1953. File No F(31)-CWD/52, Ministry of Irrigation. Also available in JN Collection.
2. On 8 November 1952, the Punjab Provincial Muslim League at a conference in Lyallpur passed a resolution calling upon the Pakistan Government to take steps against Indian interference in supply of waters to West Punjab. On 15 December, the *Civil and Military Gazette* also alleged reduction of water supplies to the canals running into Pakistan. The *Dawn* on 3 January 1953 also complained of reduction in canal water supplies resulting in a shortfall in wheat production.

enquired what the facts were<sup>3</sup> because I know nothing about our doing any such thing. It is an extraordinary thing that all my enquiries have not elicited a satisfactory response yet. Vague answers have been sent. Sometimes we have been told that enquiry is being made from the Punjab Government. Later we are told that nothing has been done contrary to the Agreement arrived at in May 1948.<sup>4</sup> Now there is nothing in that Agreement, this way or that way, about this matter. Again it was hinted that something is being done here in accordance with some previous Agreement between engineers from the two countries. That Agreement has no validity as it was denounced by Pakistan immediately after. We can have no action whatever on that Agreement.

2. From all this it appears rather vaguely that the canal water supply to Pakistan by us has been reduced in quantity. To what extent, I do not know. I have been told that even according to the engineers' agreement,<sup>5</sup> the reduction made has been greater.

3. Who is responsible for all this curious state of affairs? The canal waters issue is one of the major issues between India and Pakistan. Almost daily there is reference to it in Pakistan. It is connected, unjustifiably, with the Kashmir issue and, indeed, with all our relations with Pakistan. This is not a matter to be dealt with on the official level at all by any officer of the Ministry or any engineer. The political consequences are far too serious. I am gravely concerned about it and I have a strong feeling that the officers in your Ministry have been acting in an improper way in dealing with this matter. I therefore

3. On 17 December, an enquiry was made by the Prime Minister's Office from the Ministry of Irrigation and Power regarding complaint appearing in the *Civil and Military Gazette* on 15 December about reduction of canal waters by India. Similar enquiry was again made on 9 January 1953.
4. The Inter-Dominion Agreement signed on 4 May 1948 conferred no advantage on India but gave Pakistan all the water it needed as a matter of urgency in return for the deposit of the small sum of Rs 1.2 million a year in escrow with the Reserve Bank of India.
5. On 18 April 1948, the chief engineers of the two Punjabs met in Shimla and concluded an agreement providing for continued supply of water to Pakistan canals for a limited period. It also recognized India's claim to the Upper Bari Doab Canal System and Ferozepur headworks as a result of Radcliffe Award and in accordance with the terms of agreement on Partition. The Pakistan Government however declined to ratify the agreement and called for a discussion at inter-Dominion level.



want you to find out exactly who is responsible for these various decisions and when were they taken and what was the result. It is a most extraordinary thing that I should go on for weeks and months asking for definite replies about facts and that these should not be forthcoming. Meanwhile, I have made statements in public, in Parliament, etc. denying the fact that we are cutting off canal waters. I am thus put in a most embarrassing position. Will you please enquire into this?

## 2. Further Approach to Canal Waters Issue<sup>1</sup>

... I agree that the canal waters issue is really one which affects the people greatly on the other side just as the East Bengal issue and the evacuee property issue affect the people on our side. So far as the canal waters issue is concerned, it is actually being dealt with by the two Governments in cooperation with the International Bank. Even so, I am perfectly prepared for any further approach to this problem....

1. Note to Secretary General and Commonwealth Secretary, MEA, 7 February 1953. JN Collection. Extracts.

## 3. Cable to Khwaja Nazimuddin<sup>1</sup>

You were good enough to write to me a letter dated 28th January in which you referred to various points to which I have been giving careful attention. I was hoping to send you an answer soon. Meanwhile, I have been astonished to see an intensive propaganda being carried on in Pakistan on the canal waters issue accusing India of deliberately following a policy to cause deep injury to Pakistan by withholding canal waters. Charges have been made not only in

1. New Delhi, 17 February 1953. File No DW-57(1)-CWD/53, Ministry of Irrigation. Also available in JN Collection.

the public press but also by responsible Ministers<sup>2</sup> that we are cutting off canal waters supply to Pakistan. While this propaganda has been going on for some time and we have drawn the attention of your Government to it, so far as I know, no official complaint has been made to our Government. Indeed after full enquiry I have found that the complaints referred to in the public press have no substance. There has been no question of our cutting off canal waters supply, and certain diminution has been due on both sides to local causes like drought. In any event it is very extraordinary that such propaganda should be carried on without even any reference to us on the subject. It is still more surprising that this should be done at a moment when engineers designated by our two Governments are jointly investigating the problem in cooperation with World Bank officials and have made some progress in their investigations.<sup>3</sup>

I now find that the Pakistan Government has issued an official handout on this subject. I have not seen this yet but from reference to it in a number of Pakistan newspapers it appears that this handout contains statements which are very far removed from facts and makes totally unfounded accusations against India.<sup>4</sup> I must express my great regret that this policy should be followed by the Pakistan Government when it has been our joint desire to promote better understanding between our two countries. You will agree that it is difficult to bridge the gaps which unfortunately separate us when constant attempts are made in Pakistan to widen them.

2. On 13 December, Mumtaz Daultana, the Chief Minister of West Punjab, said in the Legislative Assembly that if India did not desist from throttling the economy of the Punjab by cutting off its canal waters then methods other than peaceful should be adopted. On 26 January 1953, Abdus Sattar Pirzada, Pakistan's Minister for Food and Agriculture, told the Deputy Director General of FAO, H. Broadley in Karachi, that drastic curtailment of water supply to canals in Pakistan by India had resulted in a serious situation. In an exclusive interview to a Dutch daily, *Het Parool*, released in Karachi on 6 January, Nazimuddin alleged that India had been planning to divert the waters to her new schemes thereby jeopardizing the whole economy of Pakistan.
3. The team of officials to draw a comprehensive plan for effective use of Indus waters consisted of Indian designee N.D. Gulhati, and Pakistan designee M.A. Hamid, and World Bank Representative R.A. Wheeler to assist the two sides. It met in Karachi from 1 to 10 December 1952 and exchanged data required for formulation of the plan. The team also visited works and areas in the Indus Basin in both countries and met in Delhi from 24 to 29 January 1953 for further talks and exchange of more data. It then decided to meet again in Washington in September.
4. In an official handout, "The Indus Basin Irrigation Water Dispute", released by Pakistan Government on 13 February 1953, it was alleged that before and since March 1952 India by not releasing Pakistan's share of canal waters had dried up eleven canals and reduced supplies to three which irrigated five million acres in the Punjab (Pakistan) and Bahawalpur State causing great hardship to Pakistan. Government of India on 22 February in a press note denied the charge as "totally unfounded".



#### 4. Short Supply of Water to Pakistan<sup>1</sup>

I entirely agree with you that an enquiry should be held as to why on some days water was diverted to the Indian side from the Pakistan side.<sup>2</sup>

2. This was bad enough, but what appears to me worse is the way we have been deliberately misled in this matter by somebody. I do not know who is responsible for this. I think the Ministry of Irrigation and Power should be informed that we take a serious view of this and we are very much surprised that this should have escaped their notice and that in spite of repeated requests from us, no proper information was sent.<sup>3</sup> This kind of thing has had serious consequences and might well have led to even graver difficulties....

1. Note to the Secretary General, MEA, 25 February 1953. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. In a note on 13 February, N.R. Pillai, the Secretary General, wrote that from the report received from the Ministry of Irrigation and Power on Pakistan's complaints about short supplies of waters to her canals, it was noticed that since Partition, Pakistan had received short supplies on three occasions, the latest instance of this occurred during 17-25 November 1952 when water was diverted to Indian side from Pakistan side. On 5 February, the Chief Engineer of East Punjab Government had been directed to enquire and ensure against repetition of such occurrence.
3. See *ante*, pp. 501-03.

#### 5. Lapses by the Engineers<sup>1</sup>

I do not approve of this draft<sup>2</sup> as a whole, although there is no objection to parts of it. I am not at all satisfied at the way this canal waters dispute has been handled in the past and, apparently continues to be handled. Even more so, I am gravely dissatisfied at the action taken by some engineers or others in regard to the supply of water to Pakistan during the last few months. Repeatedly,

1. Note to the Ministry of Irrigation, 4 March 1953. File No F-1(1)-CWD/49.
2. This was a draft of the protest note sent to Pakistan in the middle of March pointing out that the statement made in the Pakistan handout of 13 February to the effect that the India-Pakistan Agreement of 4 May 1948 on canal waters had "long since expired" was wrong as India was honouring it by implementing the same. In case there was any doubt about the validity of the Agreement, India was prepared to accept international arbitration on the issue.

I have asked for information on this subject and I have not been supplied with that information. It is extraordinary that even the Prime Minister should be kept in ignorance of facts. Very gradually, we have had to find out odd facts and, even now, I have not got the full picture before me. In a matter of international significance, this way of dealing with it is of the most serious consequence. Is there any one responsible for this and, if so, who is that person or persons? It has come to this, that I cannot trust any one to take any step in this matter without reference to me. In a separate note addressed to Secretary General, I have asked immediately for further particulars.<sup>3</sup> If they are not fully forthcoming soon, it may be necessary to appoint an enquiry committee to find out who is responsible for certain grave lapses. This kind of thing cannot be allowed to rest where it is. No one appears to be responsible. So far as the draft is concerned, it seems to be forgotten that, repeatedly in the course of our long correspondence with Pakistan, I have made many proposals. The draft limits these to some kind of arbitration on the validity of what is called the Water Treaty of May 1948. That agreement is undoubtedly important and it is right that we should lay stress on that. But we seem to forget that this question is a much bigger one and does not revolve round some legal interpretation. It is a political matter essentially, apart from its other aspects.

2. To say as in paragraph 5 of the draft, that "the Government of India are not aware that apart from the question of the validity of the Water Treaty of May 1948, there is at present any other matter of legal dispute regarding the waters of the Indus Basin which would lend itself to adjudication" may be strictly accurate in the present context, but it is not really correct. The agreement of May 1948 itself says in paragraph 4, that "apart, therefore, from the question of law involved, the Governments are anxious to approach the problem in a practical spirit." There is, thus, some question of law involved in it. Paragraph 1, the legal question, is stated.

3. But I do not wish to enter into this discussion here. All I wish to point out is that the Government cannot behave like a petty attorney in a matter of international significance. It has, of course, to protect its legal rights.

4. The first four paragraphs of the draft letter should stand.

5. Paragraph 5 should be deleted and should be replaced as follows:

3. See *ante*, p. 505.



The Government of India have repeatedly in the past put forward various proposals<sup>4</sup> for a settlement of the canal waters issue in keeping with the spirit of the Treaty of May 4th, 1948. Unfortunately, the Government of Pakistan have not accepted any of them. The Government of India are still prepared to proceed along any of the lines indicated previously for the peaceful and cooperative settlement of this issue or to seek a decision on the validity of the Water Treaty of 1948.

6. Paragraph 6 should run thus:

As the Government of Pakistan are aware, investigations are taking place in this matter by the Indus Basin Working Party consisting of the representatives of the two Governments and with the good offices of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The Government of India are fully confident that the comprehensive plan now being worked out by this Indus Basin Working Party should provide enough new sources of water supplies for both countries to enable the two Governments to reach agreement on a joint plan of development of the water resources of the Indus Basin. This will be to the advantage of both countries and will put an end to this unfortunate dispute. The Government of India trust that such an agreement will be reached before long. If, however, the Government of Pakistan so desire, the Government of India are prepared even now to discuss other methods of dealing with this problem, as referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5 above, which might be undertaken in the event of the two Governments unfortunately failing to reach agreement on the basis of the comprehensive plan to be prepared by the Working Party.

4. In July 1948 Inter-Dominion Conference, India agreed not to withhold canal water supplies to Pakistan for a period of seven years required by her to tap alternative sources of supply. At the Inter-Dominion Conference in August 1949, India proposed a joint survey of Indus basin with Pakistan to formulate a plan for equitable distribution of waters between them. On 15 September 1950, India proposed constitution of an *ad hoc* tribunal consisting of two judges of the highest judicial standing from India and Pakistan to resolve the canal waters and evacuee property disputes. On 27 October 1950, it was suggested to Pakistan that in case of equal division of opinion among judges of the tribunal, the two Governments themselves must first try to settle those parts of disputes which had not been settled failing which they may take resort to arbitration or adjudication either by a mutually agreed special agency or an international organization recognized by both Governments.

## 6. Cable to Khwaja Nazimuddin<sup>1</sup>

Thank you for your telegram 1225 dated March 4th.<sup>2</sup>

I do not wish to enter into any controversy on this subject as I entirely agree with you that we should approach this matter as cooperatively as possible and settle this dispute as well as other disputes between the two countries to the satisfaction and mutual advantage of both.

I trust that the efforts of the engineers of both countries with the good offices of the World Bank will lead to a settlement of the canal waters dispute. You can rest assured that the assurances given and the agreements arrived at between us will be honoured by us fully.

I deeply regret that owing to a variety of causes there should have been a food shortage<sup>3</sup> in Pakistan. We have ourselves experienced heavy shortages in past years and realize fully the consequences which follow from this and can thus sympathize with you. In the matter of food, as in other matters, a spirit of cooperation between the two countries would be helpful to both.

1. New Delhi, 5 March 1953. File No DW 57(1)-CWD/53, Ministry of Irrigation. Also available in JN Collection.
2. Nazimuddin in response to Nehru's cable of 17 February stated that the handout was issued by his Government in order to tell the people of Pakistan, agitated over the threat of famine, the extent of food shortage caused by reduction of canal waters supplies. Public statements in this regard were made without referring the matter to the Government of India since Pakistan had immediately intimated the World Bank about the shortage and the Bank was in touch with the Government of India in this regard. Nazimuddin also denied the allegation that the statements made in the handout were not factual.
3. Nazimuddin stated that during May 1952-April 1953, wheat shortage in Pakistan would be 9.5 lakh tons and the shortage would be greater in the next year.

## 7. To Bhimsen Sachar<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
March 18, 1953

My dear Sachar,

I have written to you previously about the dispute with Pakistan in regard to the supply of water to West Punjab from East Punjab. I have been greatly exercised over this matter for some months past. Repeatedly I tried to get at facts, but somehow facts have eluded me. Any number of senior officers have considered this matter at length. Letters have been sent to the Punjab

1. File No F-31(2)-CWD/53, Ministry of Irrigation. Also available in JN Collection.



Government and the Punjab engineers.<sup>2</sup> The International Bank has come into the picture<sup>3</sup> and generally an impression has been created that we have not kept to our word and our assurance in this matter.

This was bad enough at any time. It is much worse when a third party like the International Bank is concerned. What has troubled me greatly is the difficulty in getting at the facts. I have written several strong notes about it and suggested that the persons responsible for this mess ought to be dealt with fairly severely.

After much enquiry, we have found that the right proportion from the Ferozepore headworks for Pakistan canals should have been 79 per cent of the divisible supplies. Against this, the supply actually made in the *Rabi* sowing season of 1952, i.e., from October 16 to December 4, 1952 was 69 per cent and that for the *Rabi* sowing season, i.e., from December 5, 1952 to February 12, 1953, was 72 per cent. This was an appreciable reduction over a long period. During this period, constant complaints were received by us and passed on to the Punjab authorities. I wrote numerous letters and notes. Nevertheless, this reduction continued.

I can only conclude that this reduction was not accidental, but was deliberate. I do not know who was responsible for it, but I am given to understand that this was done under orders from some high authorities in the Punjab.

This is a very serious matter involving our honour and our reputation and we shall have to go into this very thoroughly. We have also to make sure of the future and we can afford to take no risks whatever.

In fact, the International Bank has actually suggested keeping one of their own engineers there to watch.<sup>4</sup> We may not agree to this, but it is a grave reflection on our *bona fides*. You will be coming here soon and I shall meet you. I am writing to you to keep you informed of what the situation is.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. On 18 December 1952, the Ministry of Irrigation and Power informed the superintending engineer, Upper Bari Doab Circle, Amritsar and the chief engineer and Secretary to the East Punjab Government about Pakistan's complaint of short supplies of canal waters to Pakistan and sought detailed reports in the matter.
3. About the end of December 1952, Pakistan complained to the President of World Bank in Washington that India had reduced water supplies to the Pakistan canals. The Government of India received a copy of the complaint on 27 January 1953.
4. At Pakistan's insistence, the President of the World Bank deputed B.K. Nehru, the Indian Executive Director with the Bank to Delhi to secure consent of the Government of India to the Bank posting its engineers at various points on the Sutlej and the Ravi rivers. Nehru, however, disagreed with the Bank's proposal when it was decided by the Government of India to appoint a Special Commissioner for canal waters to keep watch on regulation of canal water supplies by East Punjab.

## 8. To Gulzarilal Nanda<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
March 23, 1953

My dear Gulzarilal,

After our long conference this morning on the canal waters issue, we settled what should be said to the International Bank people on our behalf.<sup>2</sup> We also decided that we should have some representative of the Central Government to keep in close touch with the supply of water, etc., to Pakistan from East Punjab.

There are two aspects of this question, however, which continue to trouble me. We are told that some local people in charge of the head-works were responsible for reducing supplies for Pakistan.<sup>3</sup> It is hinted also that, possibly, some Punjab Ministers encouraged them to do so. Even accepting this, the fact remains how and why our Central supervision was so slack that this could have happened for any length of time, more especially when there was a loud agitation going on in Pakistan and I was constantly asking for facts. This can only mean that there is not enough Central contact. Apparently all that our people here did was to write messages to the Punjab Government or the Punjab engineers. This shows a complete lack of awareness of the seriousness of this business. The least that could have been done was for someone immediately to go there and enquire personally and report and put matters right if necessary.

It is not very easy in dealing with these complicated figures for different canals and for different periods to make out one thing or the other. In order to understand the position, one has to delve much more deeply into this business. It has taken you a long time and a great deal of labour to find out the facts, such as they are. But it should not have been difficult for a person fully

1. JN Collection. A copy of this letter was sent to Secretary General, MEA, also.
2. It was decided to reject the World Bank's proposal to post its engineers at various points on the Ravi and Sutlej in order to watch the regulation of canal water supplies between India and Pakistan. To prevent any over-zealous officials in East Punjab from meddling with regulation of water supplies, the Government of India decided to appoint a special commissioner for canal waters to ensure against any such lapse.
3. The Ministry of Irrigation and Power, for the first time, scrutinized the deliveries of water made to Pakistan from 1948 to the middle of January 1953. Until then it was understood to be a matter for the East Punjab Government to deal with and it was entirely left to them. The scrutiny revealed that East Punjab local officials in charge of regulation of canal waters did not have any clear-cut instructions for day-to-day water supplies and hence there were short supplies to Pakistan canals since the *Rabi* sowing season of 1952.



acquainted with this problem to do so with fair rapidity. I gather that Gulhati<sup>4</sup> has been intimately connected with this throughout and he knows all about it. Why then should he not have known what was happening or not have intervened as soon as his attention was drawn to it?

Some of Gulhati's answers at our conference today struck me as not only vague, but thrown out on the spur of the moment without full responsibility. Thus, he said that the new canals that Pakistan has dug could have been used to supply the water deficiency. Now, that was a very important statement. When we cross-examined him a little further, the statement was watered down considerably and ultimately meant nothing much. That is not the type of answer one would accept from a responsible person.

Gulhati appears to me to be a competent officer and he has devoted a good deal of time during the last three or four years to this issue of canal waters. He ought to know this from A to Z. Indeed, he has shown so much enthusiasm about it that sometimes I have a feeling that he has ceased to be objective.

There is another question and that is about certain proposals to build new dams or canals or tunnels on our side.<sup>5</sup> It seems to me that these are put across rather casually, regardless of their implications, financial or other. Possibly, these matters may be raised at the meetings with the International Bank and some kind of commitments made. We have to be careful about that.

The result of all this is to produce a sense of uncertainty in my mind about what takes place in these head-works and canals in East Punjab. I feel that I cannot fully rely upon the statements made by some of our engineers. I do not mean to say that they intend to delude us in any way, but they appear to have a tendency to emphasize some aspects and to ignore the others and thus we did not get a full picture which should enable us to judge what is happening or what should be done. It is important that we should have reliable reports. Therefore, some procedure has to be devised for this purpose.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. Niranjan Das Gulhati (1904-1978); served between 1945 and 1961 the Central Board of Irrigation and the Ministry of Irrigation and Power, Government of India in various capacities and finally retired as Secretary; led Indian delegation during negotiations with Pakistan and the World Bank prior to signing of Indus Waters Treaty, consultant, World Bank, 1962-63, ECAFE, 1966; his publications include: *Development of Inter-State Rivers* (1972) and *Indus Waters Treaty: An Exercise in International Mediation* (1973).
5. It was decided to build Harike Barrage in East Punjab to utilize Chenab waters through the proposed Marhu tunnel. Work on the construction of new distributaries from Upper Bari Doaba Canal and Bhakra Canal System was also going on in East Punjab.

### (iii) OTHER ISSUES

#### 1. To M.S. Mehta<sup>1</sup>

January 4, 1953

My dear Mohan Sinha ji,  
Begum Bashir Ahmed<sup>2</sup> from Lahore has been here in connection with the MRA<sup>3</sup> people. As you know, she is the sister of Begum Shah Nawaz.<sup>4</sup> She said the other day that the judgment in the military conspiracy case<sup>5</sup> in Pakistan had been delivered and sent on to the Pakistan Government. According to her, two of the persons had been acquitted, some had been convicted to life imprisonment and two had been sentenced to death. Among those sentenced to death was Sajjad Zahir.<sup>6</sup>

Sajjad Zahir is the brother of Ali Zahir who is now a Minister in the UP and who was our Ambassador at Teheran. Ali Zahir is naturally very worried about this matter. Husain Zahir,<sup>7</sup> another brother, recently went to Pakistan and, I think, interviewed Sajjad Zahir as well as his lawyers. He told us afterwards that there was not a shred of evidence against Sajjad Zahir. I do

1. File No 34(334)/51-PMS.
2. Begum Geti Ara Ahmed.
3. The Moral Re-Armament Movement was started in 1938 by Frank Buchman, an American, to achieve transformation of individuals by stressing four basic principles—honesty, unselfishness, love and purity. Buchman with a team of two hundred supporters from twenty-five countries came to New Delhi on 3 December 1952 to propagate the principles of the movement through staging plays and holding group discussions.
4. Begum Jahan Ara Shah Nawaz (b. 1896); first woman member of the All-India Muslim League, woman delegate to the Indian Round Table Conference, 1930-32 and the Third Round Table Conference, 1933; member and Parliamentary Secretary, Punjab Legislative Assembly, 1937-43; member, Pakistan Constituent Assembly, 1947.
5. A conspiracy to overthrow the Government of Pakistan in favour of military dictatorship to eventually set up a Communist State was discovered in December 1950. The persons arrested included the Chief of Pakistani Army Staff, Major-Gen. Akbar Khan, and his wife—the daughter of Begum Shah Nawaz, Air Commodore Juneja, Faiz Ahmed Faiz, a well-known Urdu poet and journalist, and Sajjad Zaheer, Secretary of the Communist Party of Pakistan.
6. As per the terms of the judgment delivered on 5 January 1953, one officer and one civilian were acquitted and all others were sentenced to various periods of imprisonment. In fact, Sajjad Zahir, one of the civilian, accused was sentenced to four years' imprisonment.
7. (1901-1975); scientist; member, Indian National Congress, 1935-47; Director, Regional Research Laboratory, Hyderabad, 1948-62; Director-General, Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, 1962-66; ex-officio Secretary, Ministry of Scientific Research and Cultural Affairs, 1963-66.



not know how far this is true and, in any event, evidence did not count. Sajjad Zahir is a prominent Communist.

Obviously we cannot do anything in this matter. But I should like you just to keep in touch and inform us of any developments that take place so that we can inform Ali Zahir.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 2. To Khwaja Nazimuddin<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
January 8, 1953

My dear Prime Minister,

I should like to draw your attention to a letter sent from the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India to the Secretary,<sup>2</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, Government of Pakistan. This letter is dated 13th October and it deals with the question of immovable evacuee property left behind in both India and Pakistan. This letter was an important one and made certain proposals. We have had no reply to this letter, although nearly three months have passed. I enclose a copy of this letter for ready reference.

In view of the fact that there is no possibility of the return of the evacuees from either country to their original country of origin, and the evacuee properties are deteriorating rapidly, the Government of India made certain proposals. These were to the effect that the two Governments should take over the urban evacuee immovable property left behind in their respective territories and compensate the evacuee owners according to the principle which may be decided upon by negotiations between the two Governments. It was hoped that these negotiations would yield satisfactory results. In the event of lack of agreement between the two Governments as regards method of valuation etc., it was suggested that this matter be referred to arbitration or to an impartial tribunal agreed upon between the two parties.

This was a proposal which, it seems to me, was fair to both Governments and the large number of individuals concerned. If we adopt it, it will put an

1. File No P II/52/67833/1-2, MEA. Also available in JN Collection. A copy of the letter was sent to A.P. Jain, the Union Minister of Relief and Rehabilitation.
2. Akhtar Husain.

end to a very long standing dispute which has affected the lives of millions of evacuees and refugees.

I shall be grateful if you could kindly look into this matter and let us have a very early reply.<sup>3</sup>

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. The Government of Pakistan, however, did not accept this proposal. One of Pakistan's Ministers had said on 7 November 1952 that it was "only another method of saying that the question of evacuee property be dealt with on a governmental level." His Government, he stated, "stands for taking all matters to the International Court of Justice." In fact, the Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth Relations, Government of Pakistan, in his letter of 5 March 1953, rejected the proposal of the Government of India since it would "amount to violation of the existing agreements and in effect will mean expropriation of the property of the Muslims in India."

### 3. To B.C. Roy<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
January 20, 1953

My dear Bidhan,

As you know, we have had a good deal of trouble in regard to the Indian enclaves in Pakistan territory and the Pakistan enclaves in Indian territory. These are mostly situated in Cooch-Bihar and in East Bengal. We can hardly reach our enclaves or deal satisfactorily with them, and the people there suffer a great deal of inconvenience...

I understand that there are 130 enclaves of Cooch-Bihar with an area of 20,957 acres and a population of 12,602 (mostly Hindus) in East Bengal. On the other side, there are 93 enclaves of East Bengal with an area of 12,152 acres and a population of 11,000 (mostly Muslims) in Cooch-Bihar.

In March 1951, our Cabinet agreed in principle to the exchange of these enclaves on the following basis:

- (a) that East Bengal should transfer, in addition to the area covered by their enclaves in West Bengal, an additional area of 8,805 acres adjoining Indian territory to equalize the territory to be exchanged.

1. JN Collection. Extracts.



- (b) that since an exchange of territories would also result in a change in the nationality of their residents, the residents of the enclaves, if they so desired, should be enabled to retain their nationality by bringing them in the revised territorial limits of each State; in other words, in order to effect the exchange, there should be an exchange of population.

There has been little progress since then. In June 1951, the West Bengal Government asked the East Pakistan Government to obtain the Pakistan Government's approval to the principle of exchange. In answer, the East Pakistan Government in February 1952 asked for proposals formulated by the West Bengal Government. The latter replied that no proposal had so far been formulated because the agreement of the Pakistan Government to the principle was awaited.

On the 16th December 1952, the Pakistan Foreign Office has written to the External Affairs Ministry asking for information about "the terms and conditions which the Government of India would suggest for the proposed exchange."

We have thus to put forward some definite proposals. We can presume that the principle of exchange is agreed to. It seems to me clear, however, that if we put forward the conditions mentioned in our Cabinet resolution, the Pakistan Government will not agree to the transfer of the additional area of 8,805 acres. Is it worthwhile, therefore, our putting forward this proposition?

It seems to me that we should suggest a pure exchange of the enclaves as they are. If there is some petty corner on the border which might conveniently be transferred to us, we might suggest that also. But I doubt very much if even that is going to be agreed to.

The only feasible course appears to be to exchange the enclaves as they are, making some special arrangements for the populations. It may be that Indian sentiment might not like the handing over of 8,805 additional acres to Pakistan, although the area is really small. The alternative is to allow things to remain where they are and this is most unsatisfactory.

Before I put this matter up before our Cabinet, I should like to have the views of your Government.

Yours,  
Jawahar

#### 4. Border Incidents<sup>1</sup>

It is difficult to say that there has been a decrease.<sup>2</sup> From the answer<sup>3</sup> given the number of incidents appears large but the House will perhaps observe that serious incidents are few and mostly they are cases of cattle-lifting. If these incidents had taken place inside the country nobody would have taken notice of them except the Police. Now that they have taken place on the border they assume national interest. There has been a large number of minor incidents but it is true that sometimes serious incidents occur. It is difficult to say; at the present moment I believe there have not been any incidents at all except the one about two weeks ago.<sup>4</sup> Nothing has happened since then...<sup>5</sup>

They have been partly demarcated. Perhaps there is already an answer to the question whether it has been demarcated. It has partly been demarcated and the rest is being done...<sup>6</sup>

I cannot answer it. But, normally speaking, I should say they are normal incidents that occur on the border. There are two types of incidents; one is the criminal type, by persons wishing to go across for the satisfaction of having done something. The other is the non-criminal type, by the people on the border who are in a nervy state; and when an ordinary person crosses over, they call out to the patrolman on duty who thinks he is a 'spy' and thus gets him into trouble.

1. Statement in Parliament, 4 March 1953. From *Parliamentary Debates (Council of States)*, *Official Report 1953*, Vol. III, Nos 12-24, cols. 1680-81.
2. B.C. Ghose asked whether incidents on Indo-Pakistan borders had been decreasing as a result of the action taken.
3. Lakshmi Menon, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Prime Minister had, while answering a question, said that during 1952, 91 border incidents were reported in areas on the borders of West Bengal and East Bengal.
4. On 16 February, two persons in Nandpur Village in Ramgarh area of Jammu District were killed in a raid by armed Pakistan nationals.
5. B.C. Ghose further asked about the position of the demarcation of boundaries.
6. C.G.K. Reddy asked whether the border incidents just happened at the spur of the moment or these were inspired by Government or some organizations.



## 5. Incidents of Violence in West Bengal<sup>1</sup>

The facts of the Malda incident are as follows: Some Hindus were severely oppressed in Bholahat PS of Rajshahi District, East Bengal, and on migrating to Malda District in India, they retaliated by looting the houses of some Muslims of Sukhnagar near Ahio, Habibpur PS. The Police immediately put a stop to this and made arrests on the spot. Two or three persons received minor injuries. All the Muslims who had left their villages returned within a short time. In another village, Muslims injured a dedicated bull, thus provoking the Hindus. Thereafter, some Muslims, who after the introduction of the passport system had decided to migrate to Pakistan, set fire to eight of their own huts on leaving the village....

2. In a telegram dated the 28th October 1952, the West Bengal Government replied that one or two persons had received slight injuries and that eight Muslim huts had been burnt by the owners themselves....

3. The Government of East Bengal took no action to contradict the unverified reports which were circulating about the incident. On the other hand, on the 30th October 1952, the *Morning News* of Dacca came out with the following headlines "Mass attack on Muslims in Malda villages, girls molested, houses burnt, inmates assaulted, mosque converted into a temple, total loss over Rs 15 lakhs." The paper also said that a Muslim who protested against the desecration of the mosque had been murdered with the assistance of the police. On the 31st October 1952, the *Morning News* repeated the allegations in an editorial, "Massacre at Malda."

4. Indian newspapers in West Bengal sometimes do publish information which is later found to be incorrect or exaggerated; but when this happens, the West Bengal Government issues Press notes giving the correct version after verification. The East Bengal Government do not seem to be following a similar practice....

12. It appears from the Pakistan Prime Minister's references to the incidents in India that the full facts about them have not been placed before him. In the Agartala incident of the 12th July 1952, a party of five Muslims armed with deadly weapons attacked an unarmed Hindu family consisting of the father, a son of eighteen, a minor son and a son-in-law of twenty who had gone to erect a hut on a disputed piece of land, and murdered the elder son. The

1. New Delhi, 14 March 1953. Note to Khwaja Nazimuddin in reply to his letter of 28 January, JN Collection. Extracts. See also Nehru to Nazimuddin, 15 March 1953, *ante*, pp. 498-500.

sequel was simply and solely the result of the murder. Even Mr Ahmad has not denied the fact that Muslims had murdered a Hindu; his attempts to exonerate the Muslims by alleging premeditation and conspiracy on the part of the Hindu family and other Hindus have been fully dealt with in paras 4-6 of Mr Biswas's letter of the 8th September 1952. About this incident, the East Bengal Press let loose a campaign of vicious falsehood and hatred against India.... Far from the East Bengal Government's taking any action to curb such flagrant breaches of the Delhi Agreement, the Chief Minister of East Bengal himself joined in the anti-Indian outbursts in his speech at Darosh, as reported in the *Morning News* of the 17th July 1952.

13. The incident in June 1952 in village Seori, Midnapur District in which 17 Muslim huts were set on fire was due entirely to the provocation given to the Hindus by the slaughter of a cow by Muslims. Prompt action was taken by the authorities to restore normal conditions, while the affected Muslims were helped in the matter of rehabilitation by the local Hindus...

14. The incident in Silchar, Assam on the 16th July 1952 arose out of a petty quarrel in the bazaar between a Muslim seller of rice and a Hindu buyer. The immediate disturbance was promptly controlled by the police in a few minutes, but owing to the spread of rumour, two or three Muslims were later stabbed in a different part of the town, one Muslim unfortunately succumbing to his injuries.

15. As regards the incidents in Cooch-Behar and the alleged oppression of Muslims travelling by train, the propaganda in the East Bengal Press has, as usual, been built up on the basis of petty incidents. For example, on the 2nd November 1952, five Hindu *goondas* robbed two Muslim families in a train. The *goondas* were promptly arrested by the local people and the stolen property recovered. In the East Bengal Press and even in the East Bengal Government telegram to the West Bengal Government dated the 29th November 1952, this appeared as: "All Muslims in a third class compartment were killed."

16. The facts of the Mankachar incident of the 1st December 1952 are that the Muslims surreptitiously arranged for cow slaughter on Mir Jumla Hill containing a mosque and the grave of Mir Jumla, a Mughal General. There is a shrine of Kali on a hill opposite. Cow slaughter on Mir Jumla Hill had never been done before in local history. The arrangement to do so, in such a way that the slaughter would be visible from the Kali temple, seems to have been made to provoke the Hindus as a counter-blast to the anti-cow slaughter campaign. On hearing that cows were to be slaughtered, the officer in charge of the Mankachar Thana deputed police to the spot. The Muslims slaughtered three cows in the presence of the policemen, (all orthodox Hindus), falsely alleging that they had received permission from the officer in charge. The policemen, with great restraint, did not interfere with the Muslims but returned to the *thana* in an infuriated state of mind and assaulted the officer in charge.



Thereafter, local miscreants went to the bazaar and committed stray assaults on Muslims and caused slight damage to some property. It is incorrect that any Muslim was severely injured or that women were molested or that a mosque was desecrated. Eight Muslims sustained simple injuries; some bamboo fencing around the grave of Mir Jumla was damaged. It is quite untrue that the Indian police had anything at all to do with the assaults on Muslims. The reference to Government servants being involved show that once again the correct facts have not been placed before the Pakistan Prime Minister in spite of their having been supplied to Mr. Ahmad. The Pakistan High Commissioner in New Delhi has in a note to the Ministry of External Affairs gone to the length of associating the Indian Army with the incident.

17. It is not possible to accept the Pakistan Prime Minister's statement that since the Prime Ministers' Agreement, there has been a net influx of 1½ million Hindus into East Bengal and an equal net influx of Muslims. Our figures are as follows:

<u>7.2.50 to 8.4.50</u>	<u>Hindus</u>	<u>Muslims</u>
From EB to India	855,902	6,847
From India to EB.	65,537	372,548
Net	790,365	- 365,701

<u>9.4.50 to 15.11.52</u>		
From EB to India	58,44721	2,629,405
From India to EB	53,36608	2,655,394
Net	508,113	- 25,989
Total	1298,478	- 391,690

<u>7.2.50 to 12.11.52</u>		
India to West Pakistan via Khokrapar	-	348,797
West Pakistan to India (UP)	-	23,998
Total	1,298,478	716,489

### III. NEPAL

#### 1. To B.K. Gokhale<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
January 1, 1953

My dear Gokhale,<sup>2</sup>

... General Bijaya<sup>3</sup> came to see me this morning and gave me a message from the King. The King was worried about the addition of Counsellors.<sup>4</sup> I am referring to this matter in my reply to the King.

I quite agree with you that the visit of a large delegation on behalf of Nepal to the Queen's Coronation in London is not desirable.<sup>5</sup> However, I do not wish to interfere. But if I am asked, I would certainly suggest, on grounds of economy if for nothing else, that this should be reduced.

I do not personally think that any Cabinet or team of Counsellors will be able to function if all kinds of groups are represented in it. There will be no team work and there will be constant conflicts. Tanka Prasad<sup>6</sup> is a fool. I do not know what influence he has, but wherever he is put, he will be a nuisance. D.R. Regmi<sup>7</sup> apparently represents very few persons.

If the two groups of the Nepali Congress can get together and cooperate (there is some possibility of this), then it will be easier to deal with the situation. As a matter of fact, I am beginning to think that nothing much can be done till Mahabir Shumshere<sup>8</sup> is out of the picture. He is a very bad influence on the King.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. India's Ambassador in Nepal.
3. Major-General Bijaya Shamsher Jung Bahadur Rana, Nepalese Ambassador in Delhi.
4. An Advisory Council composed of thirty-five non-party leaders was first formed in October 1951 for assisting the Government of Nepal until an elected Parliament was summoned. Following M.P. Koirala's resignation on 10 August 1952 as Prime Minister, King Tribhuvan took over the administration and reconstituted the Council to increase its strength to fifty-six.
5. The Coronation of Queen Elizabeth II took place on 28 May 1953.
6. Tanka Prasad Acharya was a Minister in M.P. Koirala's Government.
7. He was a leader of the Nepali National Congress.
8. Major-General Mahabir Shamsher Jung Bahadur Rana, who was the Minister for Development and Public Works in M.P. Koirala's Ministry, was a member of the Advisory Council at this time. He was considered close to King Tribhuvan.



## 2. To the King of Nepal<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
January 1, 1953

My dear friend,

... Your Majesty mentions that you would like some training in diplomacy for the second and third Princes.<sup>2</sup> The idea is good. But there is no such thing as a short course in diplomacy. The persons we take into our Indian Foreign Service are selected after they have passed a very stiff examination. After that, they are supposed to have about two or two and a half years' training partly in India and partly in a foreign country. It is only then that they join as apprentices in one of our foreign missions for some work and further training. In fact, the training continues, though some work is attached to it even later. You will thus see that this is a long and difficult course. In fact, training in diplomacy is based on first having a very sound grounding in a number of subjects, including foreign languages. After that, it is really experience that counts. For our Foreign Service, we choose the brightest of those who pass our administrative examinations.

I should imagine that in any event it will be a good thing for the Princes to have some military training. This brings discipline, which is essential for any subsequent activity. After that, they could have some administrative training and experience. It might be possible for them to have some experience of the working of our Foreign Office.

This morning, your Ambassador, General Bijaya, came to see me and told me of his talks with Your Majesty in Calcutta.<sup>3</sup> He referred, more especially, to the difficulty of adding to the Counsellors, because such addition might displease those who had not been taken in and also introduce conflicting elements in the team of Counsellors. I realize these difficulties and feel that they should be avoided as far as possible. There must be cooperative working in order to produce results, and if any person cannot cooperate, he should not be taken in.

As for various groups, it is not possible of course to have every group represented. Some emphasis has to be placed on one or two, which are considered important. In any event, the point I wish to emphasize is that a popular element should be brought in. The present team of Counsellors very

1. JN Collection. A copy of this letter was sent to B.K. Gokhale, and Secretary General and Foreign Secretary, MEA. Extracts.
2. In his letter of 22 December 1952, King Tribhuvan expressed his desire for arrangements in India to have some training in diplomacy for the second Prince Himalaya Bir Bikram and the third Prince Basundhara Bir Bikram.
3. King Tribhuvan had come to Calcutta in December 1952 for medical treatment.

largely represents the old Rana group, which might be considered a conservative rightist group with vested interests. What is necessary, therefore, is to have a more representative and advanced people. It would be very unfortunate if the people generally begin to think that the present regime is a reactionary Rana regime and that there is no change from the old order.

What I ventured to point out to Your Majesty when we met<sup>4</sup> was that while good work must be done, certain appearances had also to be maintained. When the country requires money for urgent work, the strictest economy has to be practised and no unnecessary expenditure should be encouraged. This applies even to the private lives of those in authority. If the people see that Your Majesty's Counsellors are extravagant in their personal lives, a bad impression is created.

In Nepal, as elsewhere, it is necessary to have a new psychological approach, apart from political and economic changes. The people must feel that this new approach has come.

General Bijaya mentioned to me that Your Majesty might care to come here for a further talk with me. You are always welcome here. But I would suggest that frequent visits here should, on the whole, be avoided. We have recently had a long talk and any further matters can be discussed by correspondence. I am only here for a few days and then I have to go to Hyderabad for the annual session of our National Congress.

With all good wishes for the New Year.

Yours very sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. King Tribhuvan visited New Delhi from 4 to 7 September 1952 and discussed the situation in Nepal with Nehru. See for Nehru's note on his talks with the King of Nepal, *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 19, pp. 567-73.

### 3. Enlistment of Gurkha Soldiers in Nepal<sup>1</sup>

The UK High Commissioner<sup>2</sup> came to see me today and referred to the question

1. Note to Secretary General, MEA. 7 January 1953. JN Collection.

2. Alexander Clutterbuck.



of enlistment of Gurkha soldiers in Nepal.<sup>3</sup> He referred to his previous conversation with me when I had told him that while it was clear that this kind of enlistment could not be expected to go on indefinitely, as there was bound to be a growing public criticism of it, we would certainly advise the Nepal Government to go slow in the matter and not to upset the UK arrangements too much. He said that the UK Government had been encouraged by this and had addressed the Nepal Government on the subject.

2. The reply of the Nepal Government had come as a bit of a shock to them. That reply had suggested that the agreement for this purpose should be for five years with the proviso that it might be extended with the consent of both Governments.<sup>4</sup> Further that, even in the course of the five years, it should be open to either Government to give one year's notice of termination. This last clause had rather upset the UK Government because it was difficult to make any arrangements when there was fear of termination within a year or so. Normally the period of agreement should have been seven years and that should have been a fixed period subject to extension by further agreement. Anyhow, they might accept five years. But the clause authorizing either party to give year's notice at any time within the five years brought about a measure of uncertainty about the future which would make it difficult to go ahead with any plan.

3. I told the High Commissioner that I had spoken to the King about this matter when he came here last. In fact the King had mentioned it. The King had also pointed out that there was some criticism in Nepal from various parties and he was a little nervous of this criticism. He realized that it would be improper to try to end the arrangements suddenly and thus upset the UK's plans. Further he realized that if this was done, it would affect the economy of Nepal and might well create a law and order situation if large numbers of Gorkha soldiers in the British employ now came back and became unemployed. For both these reasons he would not like to take any sudden step to this end.

3. By a Tripartite Agreement, signed on 9 November 1947, Britain, Nepal and India agreed to the continued employment of Gurkha officers and men in the Indian Army and the HMG Gurkha regiment. India had agreed, "as a temporary measure", to permit the UK Government to recruit Gurkhas on Indian soil near the Indo-Nepalese border. However, in September 1952, the Government of India informed the UK Government that recruitment of Gurkha on Indian territory could not be continued but was prepared to consider the question of transit facilities through India being continued. See also *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 19, pp. 635-36.
4. The reply of the Government of Nepal to the Government of UK contained the following provision: "The Government of Nepal, are agreeable to the opening of recruiting depots in Nepal by the UK Government. These depots should be situated near the Indian border and recruitment should only take place there and not in the interior of Nepal. This arrangement may last for five years, subject to a reconsideration at the end of that period or at any time within that period at twelve months' notice at the instance of either Government."

At the same time, there was no doubt that public feeling generally was opposed to this. He felt also that it would not be proper for him, during this interim period, to come to a binding long-term agreement before a Ministry came into power. He looked upon the present regime as an interim caretaker regime.

4. I explained to the High Commissioner that there was much force in the King's arguments and while he had no desire to end the Gorkha enlistment by the UK abruptly and, indeed, had no particular objection to its continuing for some time, he had to do something which he could explain and justify to his own people. Also there was always the question of Tibet or China across the border which might take advantage of any step which could be utilized for public agitation in Nepal.

5. The High Commissioner said that he appreciated these arguments but, at the same time, this year's notice was very difficult for them to accept. They could hardly build up anything on that basis. I pointed out to him that in the world today, and in Nepal today, any long term agreement had no particular value. It was quite possible that any turn of events or a new Government would refuse to abide by it. The best thing was to accept this present position and continue it as long as one could. In fact, if this became a subject for much public argument, then it would become still more difficult to have an agreement at all for any period. The chances were that the agreement could be carried on.

6. The High Commissioner asked me if he could see our Secretary General and discuss this matter with him to find out if there was some way out of this difficulty. I told him that he could certainly do so, though I did not myself see how any major change could be made. This was, of course, a matter for the Nepal Government to decide and we did not wish to come in their way.

7. I asked him if he had seen the Nepalese Ambassador. He said 'No'. He had seen him, however, at a much earlier stage. He wanted to have my reactions first before he discussed the matter with the Nepalese Ambassador.

8. Secretary General might see the High Commissioner if the latter seeks an interview. He might also send for the Nepalese Ambassador and explain to him the conversation I had with the UK High Commissioner.



#### 4. To the King of Nepal<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
January 7, 1953

My dear friend,

Your Majesty's Ambassador here came to see me two or three days ago and gave me your message. I gave him a brief reply which, no doubt, he has conveyed to Your Majesty.

Since then I have given a great deal of thought to the position in Nepal. Such information as reaches me confirms your opinion that conditions are not satisfactory there at all and are in fact deteriorating. What troubles me especially is the criticism of Your Majesty which many people are indulging in. As I have said, Your Majesty is the one biggest stabilizing factor in Nepal. It would be unfortunate indeed if anything happened which weakened that stabilizing factor.

Shri C.P.N. Singh, our ex-Ambassador in Nepal, has been here in connection with talks about his next post.<sup>2</sup> It was natural for me to discuss Nepal affairs with him because of his intimate knowledge of them. He is, of course, not officially connected with this matter in any way now. But as a friend he knows conditions and people in Nepal well, I thought it advisable to have a talk with him on this subject, more especially as he had the advantage of seeing Your Majesty and others in Calcutta recently.

He is going to Calcutta again on private business as his family is there. He is likely to see Your Majesty as well as others connected with Nepal who are there at present. He will give you some idea of the talks we have had and how I feel that a passive policy in Nepal is not desirable now. A more active and definite approach should be made to deal with the grave problems that confront us there.

I hope Your Majesty is keeping well.

With all good wishes,

I am,  
Yours very sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection.

2. He took over as High Commissioner in Sri Lanka on 25 October 1952.

## 5. To B.K. Gokhale<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
January 7, 1953

My dear Gokhale,

I have been receiving a good deal of information from Calcutta from various sources about the doings of the King, General Mahavir and others there. This has distressed me greatly and it seems to me that we have to adopt a more positive policy in order to improve this rapidly deteriorating situation.<sup>2</sup> As it is, if the King goes to pieces, Nepal will also go to pieces. I have even heard odd suggestions made that the King cannot serve any useful purpose now and should be removed. I do not at all agree with this. But this shows the way the wind blows.

I have come to the conclusion that nothing much can happen in Nepal unless General Mahabir goes i.e., does not hold any responsible office. He is a very bad influence on the King and much of the King's unpopularity is due to his intimate contact with Mahabir. It will be a difficult matter to wean the King away from Mahabir, as he relies so much on him. Merely trying to take him away without some positive alternative is not good enough.

What positive alternative can we have? I confess that I see none which is satisfactory. We have, therefore, to think of something that is second best. No group in Kathmandu is big enough or strong enough by itself. The strongest still, I suppose, is the Nepali Congress, provided it pulls together and the rival factions are combined. So far as the Gurkha Dal is concerned, I rule it out completely, because it is wholly reactionary.<sup>3</sup> In fact, I think, we should clearly try to keep out the Ranas from this business except some individual Rana who is really competent at the job.

1. JN Collection.
2. The regime of the Advisory Council was alleged to have failed to fulfil democratic aspirations and check the rapidly deteriorating economic conditions, corruption and nepotism. While the discontent among the landless peasants was increasing in the Terai region, there was hardly any contact between districts and the Capital and rumours of plots to overthrow the Government were spreading. Foreigners also encouraged reactionary elements. Those who welcomed the take over of the administration by the King had now become critics. The Government of Nepal appeared to watch the situation passively.
3. The Gurkha Dal, which was banned after the attack on Home Minister B.P. Koirala's residence in April 1951, was reorganized as Gurkha Parishad in February 1952. It sought to rally behind it the support of the people in the hills by exploiting their fears and distrust of non-Gurkha elements in the Terai and the Kathmandu valley. As most of the Gurkha Parishad leaders had been closely associated with the Rana regime, they were necessarily drawn into conflict with the Nepali Congress leaders.



I have received some information from Calcutta that the Nepali Congress people are gradually becoming wiser.<sup>4</sup> They have realized that they can be dispensed with and that if they carry on their petty quarrels, all of them will be lost. Pressure of circumstances has brought some wisdom to them and I believe there is a very fair chance of their coming to some agreement. That agreement might now be a little more real than might have been the case previously.

If this is so, then some way out appears. Some Nepali Congress people (leaving out of course Mahabir) plus Terai representatives, a representative of the Hills and possibly even Regmi also might put up some kind of a joint show. They are all feeling down and out and therefore are in a mood to come together.

I see no other alternative. The King plus Mahabir cannot carry on without ultimate disaster. All this depends of course on several factors which are still rather uncertain. The first one is the King's reaction to the elimination of Mahabir. The second, how far the Nepali Congress gets together and is prepared to take some others in? If these things work out properly, I imagine the first step should be for an entirely new set of Counsellors to be appointed by the King, consisting of these people. These can later be transformed into a Ministry. Anyhow, that is how my mind is working at present. There can be no certainty till we know much more about developments.

How is all this to be brought about? I do not want these people to come to Delhi for me to talk to them. I would like to see the Koirala brothers and some others of the Nepali Congress. But even that should be done only when some preliminary spade work has been done and the way is clear. The King, Mahabir and in fact the whole crowd is sitting in Calcutta.<sup>5</sup> I have no idea why they have stayed on so long and how long further they will stay there. If some of them go back to Kathmandu, it will be a little more difficult to deal with them as a whole. It is difficult to entrust this work of talking to anyone who is not fully acquainted. Only a person with full knowledge and with a certain intimate approach to the parties concerned can take any effective step.

4. At the instance of the King himself, who had come to Calcutta for medical treatment in December 1952, fresh attempts were made in January 1953 for a solution of the problem. In the first week of January the King himself met the leaders of the dissident groups. At one stage it seemed that the two brothers, M.P. and B.P. Koirala, had resolved their differences after meeting Jayaprakash Narayan, the Indian Socialist leader. Their differences, however, remained, although the two brothers agreed in principle that unity in the Nepali Congress was essential.
5. M.P. Koirala, former Prime Minister of Nepal, Subarna Shamsher Saroj Prasad Upadhyaya, representing the Koirala group, Bhadrakali Misra, former Transport Minister and leader of Nepal Peoples' Conference and M.B. Shah, former Commerce Minister and General Secretary of the Koirala group were with the King to discuss the political deadlock in Nepal.

Recently C.P.N. Singh was in Calcutta making arrangements for his departure for Ceylon. In fact, his family is there. The King sent for him and he saw the Koiralas also. I asked him to come here in connection with his Ceylon appointment. Now he is going back to Calcutta and the King is likely to see him again. So, I thought that I might as well utilize him for this purpose. I do not like the idea of anyone else except our Ambassador dealing with these matters, but, in the circumstances, there appeared to me no other way out. I could not ask you to go to Calcutta for this purpose and I do not wish to delay matters. I have, therefore, asked C.P.N. Singh, to whom I have given a brief letter for the King, to have a talk with the King and with the Koiralas, etc., and to come back and report to me before I go to Hyderabad. I shall be leaving on the 13th morning for Bombay and Hyderabad.

After having his report and your own advice in the matter, I should like to come to some decision about future steps. Probably, I shall send for the Koiralas and others after my return from Hyderabad, that is after the 22nd January.

I enclose copy of the letter I have written to the King. Please let me know immediately what your views are about the suggestions I have made above.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

## 6. To the King of Nepal<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
February 2, 1953

My dear friend,

...I was surprised to learn that Your Majesty had the impression that I wanted a ministry formed in Nepal with B.P. Koirala as the Prime Minister. First of all, I have no intention whatever of suggesting any procedure or any name to Your Majesty under pressure. It is always for Your Majesty to decide. I can only put forward suggestions or advice from time to time. I am not in a position here in Delhi to give final advice about a changing situation with which your Advisers in Nepal may be better acquainted. Secondly, I did not even advise the formation of a ministry with B.P. Koirala as Prime Minister. What I said was that conditions appeared to be deteriorating in Nepal and, in the event of a compromise between the different wings of the Nepali Congress, it would be desirable to think in terms of a composite ministry. Even so, I thought that before such a ministry could be formed, the proper course would

1. JN Collection. Extracts.



be to have a new set of Counsellors. If those Counsellors functioned properly, then they could later be converted into a ministry. Thus the question of anybody being Prime Minister did not arise at all, or even the names of any persons for the ministry did not come up before me. I thought that such a ministry or set of Counsellors, when formed, should represent various groups, including, of course, the two wings of the Nepali Congress.

This is past history. Subsequent to that, it became clear that there was no compromise between the different wings of the Nepali Congress. The tentative advice I had tendered, therefore, could not take effect and fell through. My information also is that at present there appears to be no possibility of any ministry functioning effectively. When that possibility arises, Your Majesty will no doubt take it into consideration and decide as you might think fit.

With all good wishes,

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

#### IV. MYANMAR

##### 1. To Thakin Nu<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
February 9, 1953

My dear Thakin Nu,

Thank you for your letter of the 9th February which has reached me this evening. I hasten to reply to it.

I have myself been concerned at the recent developments in the situation in north-east Burma.<sup>2</sup> My information is of course largely derived from the

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML. Extracts.
2. Myanmar faced a problem from the military operations of the Chinese Nationalist troops in the northern and eastern parts of the country. These were the remnants of Chiang Kai-shek's army who had fled from their own country in 1949. In addition to harassing the people of Myanmar, they trafficked in opium and other contraband goods, which they obtained from Thailand, an ally of Chiang's regime and the US Government. These troops were getting military supplies from other countries through Thailand, and Americans were helping them in operating their airfields. The Myanmar Government could neither succeed in persuading the Chinese to withdraw, nor the US Government to bring pressure on Chiang's Government to halt their support to them. As a protest, Myanmar did not accept any economic aid from the US and filed a complaint of aggression against the Formosa Government in the UN General Assembly in March 1953.

public press, but even this made it clear that the KMT troops were giving trouble and that they had sometimes associated themselves with the Karen rebels.<sup>3</sup>

I think you are perfectly right in coming to the decision that this matter should be referred by your Government to the United Nations. On two previous occasions you wrote to me about this subject and pointed out the difficulties and embarrassment caused to your Government by the presence of these KMT forces. It was, however, decided by you then that it would be better to take it up directly with the USA and the UK Governments before moving the United Nations. We also raised this question with the USA and the UK. They expressed their great concern, but no marked change occurred.<sup>4</sup>

It is perfectly clear that the KMT troops in Burma could not have continued as an organised force if they had not been kept supplied with arms, ammunition, etc. It is, I believe, also clear that these supplies were obtained by them via Siam and probably through some American officers or ex-officers and with the connivance of some Siamese Ministers. Whether the arms came from the Taipeh Government or not, I do not know, but the responsibility certainly rested with them. The Taipeh Government is carried on under the protection and with the help of the US Government. Therefore, some responsibility must be shared by the US Government.

You have been very patient in this matter and have tried and exhausted all other possible avenues of approach to this problem.

The United Nations does not inspire much hope today in any matter and it is wiser not to expect much from it. Nevertheless, I think you would be right to make this representation to the United Nations now.<sup>5</sup> That fact itself will bring considerable pressure on the other powers concerned. We shall of course give you all the help we can. I would be grateful if you could send us

3. After Myanmar attained independence, the Karens rose in rebellion in 1948 demanding a separate state in Lower Myanmar. They occupied Mandalay in 1949 in alliance with the Communists and tried to overthrow Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League headed by Thakin Nu.
4. On 23 January 1952, Dean Acheson, the US Secretary of State, and on 28 January 1952, H.B. Day, the acting US Charge' d' Affaires denied statements made by the Myanmar Ambassador in Beijing and the Myanmar press that the KMT forces were being supplied arms by the USA. But Day admitted that "American adventurers" might be assisting them. He further explained that the US had made representations to the Formosa Government "to the extent that it is possible for one sovereign Government to put pressure on another sovereign Government."
5. On 25 March 1953, the Myanmar Government had asked the United Nations to place on the agenda of the current session of the General Assembly, a complaint against the Chinese Nationalist Government in respect of aggression by KMT forces. Later, the UN Political Committee discussed the complaint on 17 April 1953 and the issue was brought before the General Assembly.



full particulars about the action you propose to take so that we could instruct our representatives at the UN.

President Eisenhower's indication of American policy, though rather vague, has also filled us with anxiety. Indeed, this same reaction has taken place in most countries. In the United Kingdom, there is a great deal of concern. When Dulles went to London<sup>6</sup> he tried to explain all this away by saying that it was largely meant for domestic consumption because of the China lobby and because President Eisenhower was committed to do something after his election speeches. That is rather a vague explanation of a vital step which might have very far-reaching consequences. We shall have to wait and see what further indications are given of US policy. It is possible that the US will tone down a little because of the opposition of other countries. I do not think anything big is likely to happen in the near future. Chiang Kai-shek has not got the capacity to do much harm.

Even from this point of view, I think it is desirable for you to approach the United Nations in regard to the KMT forces in Burma....

With best wishes,

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. John Foster Dulles, the US Secretary of State, was in London from 3 to 5 February 1953.

## 2. To Bisnuram Medhi<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
February 19, 1953

My dear Medhi,

...But I want to make it clear to you, to avoid any misunderstanding, that our relations with the Burmese Government are very friendly and cooperative. There is no question of the Burmese Government doing anything which might be considered as an intrigue against us. Indeed, they want our help in many ways. I think I told you that there is a possibility of my visiting the tribal areas in Burma, particularly the Naga areas, crossing over from the Indian side. I have been invited by the Burmese Prime Minister to go there with him and I have suggested that he might come across to our side, probably to Imphal and spend a day or so with me there. Then we can go together across the Burmese border. The provisional dates are the end of March. This will depend on weather conditions also and other factors.

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

As for the Anti-Fascist Peoples' Freedom League of Burma, this is the official government party and the Ministers, etc. are all members of it and leaders of it. It is in a sense like our Congress here. Therefore, to consider it as some secret organization is wrong. Of course, there may be individuals in it who may not act correctly.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

### 3. To Thakin Nu<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
March 3, 1953

My dear Thakin Nu,

I have just received your letter of the 26th February about the KMT troops in Burma informing me that your Cabinet has finally decided to report the matter to the United Nations. I think that you had no other course open. I have noticed a tendency for the US people, and some UK representatives also, to hint that perhaps the trouble in the North-East is caused by the Communists who have infiltrated and not so much by the KMT. This seems to me a very far-fetched idea and meant rather to cover up the indirect help that Americans have unofficially given to the KMT forces. It is, of course, possible and, indeed, probable that the Chinese Communists have sent some people to infiltrate into the KMT troops so that they might know what is happening and also perhaps to create disruption there. But it is obvious that essentially these forces are KMT and they have no business to be in Burma. From the information you sent me a year or two ago, it appeared to me clear that these KMT forces were being supplied with arms, ammunition, etc. via Thailand.

I appreciate the difficulty you have mentioned about the United Nations appointing a Commission for local inspection. I am glad you have informed us of this. We shall instruct our delegation at the UN about it. I think that you should take up a clear attitude that if there is a local inspection, the persons appointed for this purpose should be such as are approved of by your Government. Clearly, Americans wandering about those areas would lead to strong protest from the Chinese People's Government....

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. A copy was sent to Secretary General, MEA, together with the letter under reply. Extracts.



#### 4. Cable to Vijayalakshmi Pandit<sup>1</sup>

For the last two or three years the Burma Government has been greatly embarrassed by the presence of Kuomintang forces on their north-east border adjoining China. These forces have no business to be in Burma, but the Burmese Government had not been strong enough to disarm them and either intern them or send them away. About two years ago Burmese Government wanted to refer the matter to United Nations. According to their information Kuomintang forces were being supplied with arms and ammunition via Thailand unofficially through American officers or ex-officers as well as Thai officials or Ministers. Probably arms came from Formosa.

At that time we advised Burmese Government to take up matter directly with USA and UK Governments which they did. Nothing much came of it. Again last year this proposal to refer to United Nations was considered. But no further action was taken.

Situation has since deteriorated and Kuomintang forces are reported to be helping some Burmese rebels against Government. Burma Government has therefore decided to report this matter to United Nations. We should like you to keep in touch with Burmese Representative and to support him in this matter.

It seems unnecessary that United Nations should arrange to have local inspection. If however this is suggested it is clear that no one should go to inspect this border to whom Chinese People's Government object strongly. More specially Americans would lead to this reaction. In fact no one should be appointed without consent and approval of Burmese Government.

This is for your information and to keep you in touch with this new development.

1. New Delhi, 3 March 1953. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML.

## 5. To Thakin Nu<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
March 6, 1953

My dear Thakin Nu,  
Thank you for your letter of the 3rd March.<sup>2</sup>

I would welcome a pact of friendship and non-aggression between India, China and Burma. But the pact should be quite simple in its terms and merely refer to friendship and non-aggression. It should not refer to any other country. India has concluded such pacts of friendship with a number of neighbouring countries such as Indonesia, Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey, and also Switzerland. Sometimes these pacts contain clauses dealing with trade and commerce. I think this should be avoided as that would lead not only to long debate, but also to certain other complications. The term you have suggested, that is fifty years, is, I think, too long a one. I would even say ten years with option of renewal.

While I like this idea very much, and I think it will be good not only for the countries concerned, but for other countries also, I do not at all know what the reaction of the Chinese Government will be. Because of our Resolution on the Korean situation in the UN, there has been a certain coolness in China towards us. Now another development has taken place which might have some consequences either way. This is the death of Marshal Stalin. His removal from the scene of action makes Chairman Mao Tse-tung the dominant figure in the communist world. There is no one else of his stature there. What effect this will have on China's Government and their policies, I do not know.

I think we should proceed very cautiously in this matter. At present no question arises of our inviting Premier Chou En-lai or Madame Sun Yat-sen. Indeed, Madame Sun Yat-sen, though a great lady, does not play too active a part in Chinese politics and cannot be entrusted with this task. Chou En-lai cannot come here to discuss this matter unless much has been settled before hand.

A proper course appears to me to be for some informal approaches to be made and I think the best person to make these approaches would be your Ambassador in Peking. He should do this quite informally and I would suggest that he should say little about India except that he hopes that India would also

1. JN Collection.

2. In this letter, Thakin Nu suggested a 50-year friendship and non-aggression pact between India, China and Myanmar. For this purpose, he felt, Chou En-lai or Madam Sun Yat-sen might be invited to Delhi where he would also be present. He wrote that the scheme of a non-aggression pact would dispel the suspicion that forces had been at work "to involve us in a war with the People's Republic of China."



be agreeable to a pact of friendship and non-aggression. Indeed, such pacts are usually bilateral between two countries only. The proper procedure would thus be for Burma and China, Burma and India, and India and China to have bilateral pacts of this type.

This matter is obviously one of far-reaching importance. It would produce powerful effect in other countries, more especially the United States of America. We have, therefore, to proceed very cautiously.

There is another aspect to be borne in mind. The Chinese Government should not be made to think that we want this pact because of our weakness and therefore we want favour from them. They do not respect those who show weakness. We have to be both friendly and firm.<sup>3</sup>

Therefore, I suggest that your Ambassador might sound the Chinese Government informally on this issue in regard to a non-aggression pact between Burma and China, adding that he hopes that India would welcome similar pacts with Burma and China.

I have received the English translation of the note on KMT aggression in Burma which you laid before your Parliament. It seems to me more and more clear that it is desirable for you to go to the UN on this question. It might interest you to know that last night the American Ambassador<sup>4</sup> here (who is retiring soon) was speaking to me about this matter and he said that he thought you were perfectly justified in making this reference to the UN. I would add that the present American Ambassador here is much more liberal in outlook than his own Government.

You can rest assured that we shall try to help you in every way in the United Nations, diplomatically and otherwise, in regard to your reference on the KMT question. Our Congress here will, I am sure, support you fully.

I am looking forward to meeting you towards the end of this month.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Thakin Nu had written: "Especially to us who are a weak nation occupying a very low position in armed strength, it has been increasingly apparent that there are definite designs on the part of the western powers to implicate us in their contest with Communist China."

4. Chester Bowles.

## 6. To N. Raghavan<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
March 6, 1953

My dear Raghavan,

...I would welcome a simple pact of non-aggression and friendship, but we have to move wearily.<sup>2</sup> I have, therefore, suggested that the Burmese Ambassador in Peking might, on behalf of his government, make this suggestion to the Chinese Government. This should be done informally just to find out reactions. If the matter is mentioned to you by the Burmese Ambassador or by any Chinese Minister, you can tell them that you feel sure that your Government would view with favour any peaceful arrangement like this. In fact, we have got some such pacts of friendship and non-aggression with many countries round about us. I would not say much more. You may hint that if the Chinese Government is interested, you could refer the matter to your Government. Make no other commitment.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. See the previous item.

## 7. More Facilities to Myanmar<sup>1</sup>

The question has been approached in the past from a somewhat wrong point of view. Obviously there can be no reciprocal arrangement with a country like Burma, because they have no such facilities. To say that we want to keep something secret from Burma and not from Commonwealth Officers is to indicate a lack of political conception of our relations with different countries. Our relations with Burma are of the closest, closer in many ways than those even with Commonwealth countries. Among the Commonwealth countries are South Africa and Pakistan. Neither of them is likely to send anyone to us. But, that apart, it is clear that we would not encourage their being sent here in present circumstances. Therefore the division between Commonwealth countries

1. Note to the Secretary, MEA, 24 March 1953. File No 1402(13)-SD/60, MEA.



and non-Commonwealth countries does not exist, so far as we are concerned, in this matter. We deal with each country separately as we think best.

2. From this point of view, Burma should be given a high priority in our list. There is no reason why we should think that because we give a facility to Burma, we should also give it to other countries such as Indonesia, Thailand, Afghanistan, Iran, etc. I would have no hesitation whatever in not agreeing to give these facilities to a country with whom our relations were not quite so close. In the order of preference, after Burma, would come Indonesia. After that, Afghanistan. I rather doubt if we would encourage Iran at all, nor have I any desire to encourage Thailand, whose political outlook and policy are entirely opposed to ours. We cannot proceed in this matter on a geographical basis only.

3. I am, therefore, clearly of opinion that Burma should be given special treatment in this matter and further that there should be no condition of exclusion from any lecture or discussion. If any person from a Commonwealth country is allowed to attend that lecture or discussion, so can a person from Burma.

4. I do not know what secret or security matters are discussed there. They can hardly be very secret if they are discussed in a class. It may be possible for some very special matters to be considered secret from this point of view. If so, then every foreign student, whether he comes from a Commonwealth country or not, must be treated on the same basis. I suppose such occasions will be rare. We need not make a specific condition of this, but we may intimate that if such an occasion arises, the discussion or lecture will be confined to Indian students. Some such general rule would probably not give any offence.

5. I would repeat that we cannot treat Asian countries on the same basis and there is no point in giving each one of them a vacancy in turn. If possible, I would agree to two vacancies being given to Burma.

## 8. Cable to Vijayalakshmi Pandit<sup>1</sup>

Your telegram No. 84 dated March 24. I hope to meet U Nu on Sunday next at Imphal.<sup>2</sup> I shall speak to him and convey Bedell Smith's message. I do not know what more I can do.

1. New Delhi, 26 March 1953. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML.

2. Nehru and U Nu met at Imphal on 30 March 1953 for a joint tour of Indo-Myanmar tribal areas.

This matter has been repeatedly raised with United States Government during last two years. Assurances have repeatedly been given to Burmese Government that every effort will be made to remove KMT troops. But nothing has been done and situation has grown progressively worse, now endangering security of northern Burma, as KMT troops siding with some rebels.

U Nu has all along taken realistic attitude towards Karens and has promised them separate State. In fact because of this U Nu is referred as Karen Nu. I doubt information that State Department gets from Burma is wholly accurate.

I doubt very much if Burmese Government will agree to representatives of Formosa Government going officially to Burma.

It must be appreciated that Burmese Government have been very patient and long-suffering in this matter. They have been deeply hurt at the casual way their requests in this matter have been treated during last two years.

I shall discuss this matter with U Nu.

## 9. Complaint to the UN about Kuomintang Troops<sup>1</sup>

I have just received the attached letter from the Burmese Charge' d'Affaires. This is the complaint made by the Burmese Government to the United Nations about the Kuomintang troops in South-East Burma.

2. You will remember the message I received from Mrs Pandit on this subject and my reply to it. I shall speak to U Nu and inform him of the message which has come from the US Government to us. But the complaint has already been lodged. I do not know how and when it will come up for hearing. The Burmese Government has, no doubt, intentionally avoided any definitely unfriendly references to the USA, although on a previous occasion when they sent us a draft for the UN (this is a year or so ago) there were definite references to American officers helping the Kuomintang troops by sending them supplies.

3. I suppose that the US Government will not at all like the recommendation of the Security Council to condemn the Kuomintang Government of Formosa for aggression. Perhaps some slight variation could be made to this by merely calling upon them to withdraw their troops immediately. However, this is not for us to decide.

1. Note to the Secretary General, MEA, 27 March 1953. JN Collection.



4. I think you should send a cable to our Delegation in the United Nations informing them that we have received this complaint. I suppose that our Delegation can easily get a copy of it from the Burmese Government representative there. We should certainly support the Government of Burma. We may privately advise them to vary the recommendation. But it is for them to vary it or not. We should not ourselves propose any amendment.

5. You might mention that I intend discussing this matter with U Nu in the course of the next few days. But our Delegation should keep in close touch with the Burmese representative on this issue and generally support him.

## 10. India's Attitude to Myanmar's Complaint<sup>1</sup>

India's attitude regarding Burma's complaint to the United Nations will be, generally, to support the complaint. In fact, for the last two years or more, the Government of Burma kept us informed of these developments on the Chinese border and stated that the activities of the KMT troops were a nuisance to them.

Obviously, these troops have absolutely no justification for being in the Burmese territory, and their activities are an infringement of the sovereignty of the country.

The position has grown worse, as according to the Burmese complaint, some of these KMT troops actually helped the insurgents against the Government of Burma.

Obviously, they cannot tolerate this infringement of the sovereignty of their country and the presence of foreign troops in their territory actively helping the insurgents.

Who is responsible for the supply of arms and ammunitions to these troops, I cannot say; but the fact is, as has been stated in the complaint itself, these KMT troops were apparently supplied with arms and equipment presumably via Thailand from Formosa. Otherwise, the remnants of these troops could not have carried on so long.

1. Talk to the press at Dum Dum Airport, Calcutta, 28 March 1953. From the *National Herald*, 29 March 1953.

I may say that my present visit to the Indo-Burma border<sup>2</sup> and the forthcoming meeting with U Nu have nothing to do with the Burmese complaint against the Kuomintang troops.

2. From 30 March to 6 April 1953.

## 11. Cable to Vijayalakshmi Pandit<sup>1</sup>

Reference your telegram 84 dated 24 March.<sup>2</sup> Have discussed matter with U Nu. His first reaction was one of surprise and some resentment at US advising Burmese regarding Karens and Kachins. He said that Burmese Government have done everything possible for them and US Ambassador in Rangoon<sup>3</sup> has expressed appreciation of Burmese Government's attitude towards minorities. Both Kachins<sup>4</sup> and Karens have autonomous States. In addition there are two Karens and one Kachin in Burmese Cabinet. Part of Karen State is still under Karen insurgents, rest functioning as autonomous State.<sup>5</sup> As regards Kachins no difficulty whatever. All Kachins loyally supporting Burma Government.

U Nu said that this action was not at all meant to be anti-US and they attached great importance to US aid. As soon as KMT issue settled he hoped relations with US will be as cordial as before. But strong feeling and criticism in Burma, that Burmese Government were not taking adequate action regarding KMT issue because they were afraid of losing US technical aid. Hence it became necessary for them to ask for stoppage of that aid although that meant considerable loss to them.<sup>6</sup>

1. 31 March 1953. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML.

2. Not available.

3. William Sebald.

4. They belonged to the Tibeto-Myanmar family whose original home was in Central Asia. They arrived in Myanmar as a result of southward movements and established themselves to the north of Myanmar plain. Their movement was still in progress when the British arrived in Myanmar in 1885.

5. The Karen state had been created under legislation passed in October 1951. The setting up of the state administration had been delayed because of the rebellion in Karen areas.

6. On 17 March 1953, the Myanmar Government had informed the US Ambassador of its intentions to terminate by 30 June 1953 the technical cooperation agreement under which US aid had been supplied to Myanmar.



Not at all clear what US proposal for Tripartite Commission and offer to assist in protecting KMT troops on their way to sea coast means.<sup>7</sup> U Nu anxious that international law should be observed so as not to give any chance to Chinese Government to object. Under international law KMT troops must be interned unless they manage to escape out of Burma when Burmese responsibility ceases. Burma would not agree to any foreign troops coming in on ground of protection of KMT troops. No question of protecting them arises and it would be against well established conventions for them to be sent out from Burma with arms.

Any official Commission as suggested, more especially including Formosa, would not be accepted. Formosa Government is not recognized by Burma. In fact it has been charged before UN of committing aggression. If any steps to help are to be taken, this must be done unofficially through some organization like Ford Foundation.

Bedell-Smith's<sup>8</sup> assurance that State Department not helping KMT troops is accepted but others undoubtedly helping and creating intolerable situation. Probably simplest development would be if KMT troops quietly and without Burmese official cognizance left Burma and entered Thailand. That could relieve Burma Government of responsibility and would enable US to deal with the problem with the Thai Government.

U Nu repeated that he was anxious for US Burmese cooperation. He recognized that irresponsible statements had appeared in some Burmese newspapers. His Government could not control them and was not responsible for this. But fact remains that continuance of KMT troops in Burma has produced strong and serious reactions in Burma and Government were compelled to take action they have done. Otherwise other serious results would have followed.

These are U Nu's first reactions. I shall communicate further with him about his views.

7. In fact, a note of the US Government handed over to the Ministry of External Affairs on 30 March 1953 by the US Embassy in New Delhi, stated that every effort had been made to induce the Nationalist Government of Formosa (1) to order the KMT troops in Myanmar to cease their depredations; (2) to stop supplies to such forces from Formosa; and (3) to agree to the evacuation of such forces to the degree feasible.
8. General Walter Bedell-Smith (1895-1961); Chief of Staff Allied Forces during the campaign in North Africa, Sicily and Italy, 1942-44, and in Europe, 1944-45; US Ambassador to USSR, 1946-49; Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 1950-1953; Under Secretary of State, 1953-54.

## 12. US Aid to Kuomintang Guerillas<sup>1</sup>

I would be surprised if there is any direct United States Government aid to the Chinese Nationalist guerillas fighting the Burmese Government on the country's eastern frontiers. Indirectly, of course, many things can happen. I would be surprised if there is direct United States aid because that Government has positively denied it and I take their word. I do not know how United States can give direct help.

United States is a large supplier of arms and these arms are supplied to the Formosa Government. How they get distributed, I do not know. But there are plenty of adventurers around the place. Burmese Government's decision to terminate technical cooperation assistance is not directed against the aid itself nor is it intended not to have friendly relations with the United States. But in some people's minds aid is associated with the Chinese Nationalist issue and the Burmese Government wanted to clear it up.

Indian Government diplomatically took up the Chinese Nationalist issue with several governments including the United States and the United Kingdom. If the strength of the Chinese Nationalist troops in Burma grows considerably beyond its present strength it will create a new world situation. The question will then arise from where and how these men continue to come and it certainly is a world issue.

Burma's reference of the issue to the United States will help draw world attention to this important matter. The United States do not decide anything but keep things hanging. Our own experience with the United Nations has not been very happy. The United Nations is influenced very much by certain powers including America. I would not say United Nations is dancing to United States' tune.

1. Address at a Press Conference in Singkaling, 31 March 1953. From the *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, 1 April 1953.



## V. THE UNITED STATES

1. To G.L. Mehta<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
January 1, 1953

My dear Gaganvihari,<sup>2</sup>

I have your two letters of December 20...

...About your second letter regarding Indo-China. I am very reluctant to get entangled any further in any matter outside India and I would not advise you to raise this question with Dulles or anyone from the State Department. Of course, if he raises it, you can report to us. The Indo-Chinese situation<sup>3</sup> is quite as complicated as the Korean and the mere consent of the US to some action that we might take is not quite enough. China is partly involved. If we tied up with any US or French approach to it, our capacity for doing anything there will be lost completely. Of course if a real occasion offers itself, we should not hesitate to go ahead. But you must always remember that our own relations with France, vis-a-vis the French possessions in India, are not good. If France is not prepared to give up Pondicherry, much less will it give up Indo-China. There is no other way but to give up Indo-China and take the risk of what happens later.

Anyhow I do not think we should take any step.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Copy of this letter was sent to Secretary General and Foreign Secretary, MEA. Extracts.
2. Mehta was India's Ambassador to the United States at this time.
3. In Indo-China, France was engaged, with American aid, in military resistance to a movement for independence.

2. To Chester Bowles<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
February 6, 1953

My dear Ambassador,

I have received your letter of February 6 informing me that President Eisenhower has accepted your resignation as the United States Ambassador to

1. JN Collection. A copy of this letter was sent to Secretary General, MEA.

India.<sup>2</sup> I am sorry to learn that you will be leaving us soon. Your stay in India, brief as it has been, has been full of fresh developments in Indo-American relations. You have interpreted your great country in a manner which has been greatly appreciated not only by the Government but by large numbers of the people of India, who have increasingly looked up to you as a friend of India and as one wishing well to India. For those of us who have come into more intimate contact with you, your departure from India will be a matter for deep regret. We shall all miss you here greatly. But I am sure that the work you have done here will endure.

May I express my high regard for Mrs Bowles who has so ably helped you since both of you came here. I am sure that as we will remember you, you will also not forget India. I hope that we shall have many opportunities of meeting each other in the future.

Sincerely yours,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. George V. Allen succeeded Chester Bowles as US Ambassador to India.

### 3. To G.L. Mehta<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
March 3, 1953

My dear Gaganvihari,

Your letter of February 17th about Adlai Stevenson. We shall keep in mind what you have said about him.<sup>2</sup> We should like to know how long he is going to stay here before we can make his programme.<sup>3</sup>

1. JN Collection. Also available in File No. SI/53/5628/70, MEA. A copy of this letter was sent to Secretary General, MEA.
2. Mehta wrote that Adlai Stevenson came to meet him mainly to discuss his Indian programme. During the meeting, Stevenson said that he considered the policy of non-violence as "a passive thing and he wanted to know the constructive and positive sides." He also expressed doubt about his ability to make any "contribution to the Kashmir problem."
3. Adlai Stevenson, who was the Democratic Presidential candidate but lost to Eisenhower, visited India from 28 April to 14 May 1953 during his world tour.



I have noticed the hostile attitude of the *New York Times*.<sup>4</sup> The Americans do not realize how they injure their own cause by their activities. I am not much worried by this. You also mention the change in the British Mission.<sup>5</sup> You might speak about this to Vijayalakshmi giving such facts as you may have. Vijayalakshmi might refer to it casually to Eden when she meets him.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. For example, the *New York Times* in an editorial on 16 February stated: "Pakistan has referred to the UN Secretariat a complaint that India is diverting vital waters from the source of streams of the Indus river" and that Pakistan's "appeal" for arbitration "should be heard." It was however ascertained by the Indian delegation to the UN that the UN had received no such complaint from Pakistan.
5. Sir Roger Makins replaced Sir Oliver Franks as UK Ambassador to the USA in January 1953. G.L. Mehta wrote that "since the change of Ambassadorship in the British Mission, the British Embassy is all out for closer working with the Pakistan Embassy."

#### 4. Visit of John Foster Dulles<sup>1</sup>

... (2) I have noted the dates of Dulles's visit to India.<sup>2</sup> There is no occasion whatever for our Ambassador to come here at the time of Dulles's visit. I am really rather surprised at the suggestion. If I see Dulles once or twice, I shall see him by himself and nobody else will be present. The Ambassador cannot be of the slightest help to me in this matter. I attach no great importance to Dulles's visit here.

1. Note to Secretary General and Foreign Secretary, MEA, 13 March 1953. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. Dulles, the US Secretary of State, accompanied by Harold E. Stassen, Director, Foreign Operations Administration, visited India from 20 to 22 May 1953.

## 5. To G.L. Mehta<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
March 14, 1953

My dear Mehta,

...About MEDO, the less we say about it, the better. We should not show any great interest in it now.

I think probably it will be better for you, as our Ambassador, not to tour about and lecture too much. Normally, of course, in other countries, it is only very rarely that an Ambassador does this. In America, conditions are different and, to some extent, this should be done, but even there, I think it should not be overdone. The Ambassador should not become, in fact, a publicity or propaganda agent. Contacts with the State Department and other governmental departments should be close....

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. A copy of the letter was sent to Secretary General, MEA also. Extracts.

## VI. EAST AFRICA

### 1. To Chaman Lal<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
January 1, 1953

My dear Chaman Lal,<sup>2</sup>

...The situation in East Africa is an extraordinarily difficult one. If the Africans had the experience, discipline and good sense to carry on a non-violent movement, their success would be assured and nobody can stop them. But they have not that experience or discipline and some of them have taken to violence of a bad type. It is true that the British colonial authorities have reacted in a particularly bad way, which worsens the situation immensely. I can quite understand the African leaders, feeling somewhat frustrated, thinking

1. JN Collection. Extracts.  
2. Dewan Chaman Lal, a Member of the Council of States and a reputed lawyer, was in Nairobi on the invitation of some African associations to help them in the defence of cases against some of their members.



that a conference<sup>3</sup> in New Delhi will immediately yield results. But that is not so and ultimately results depend upon the situation in East Africa.

The proposed conference must necessarily have representatives of Nigeria and the Gold Coast. Both of these, though with a measure of self-government, are very much under the British Colonial Office. I doubt if they can easily participate in the conference.

I am very anxious to help the Africans because I attach the greatest importance to the future of Africa. I am not so much afraid of what the colonial authorities might do. That is after all a passing phase, although it is most disagreeable. I am much more afraid of the Africans going to pieces by violence and subsequent repression. That will make it difficult for them to pull up or do anything effective in the foreseeable future. I think the Africans should realize that, whatever the provocation, they will be playing into the hands of their opponents by encouraging violence. Even inaction will not harm them much, provided it is accompanied by a policy of non-surrender. That policy itself is a constant irritant and has certain dynamic qualities about it. In our non-cooperation movement, the real thing that counted was the conviction that grew in the minds of all that we would never bow our heads to British imperialism.

If we were to announce a conference in New Delhi, I rather doubt if even passports and visas or other travelling facilities would be forthcoming for most of the delegates. That might be a propaganda point. But it would not take us much further.

The more I think of it, the more I feel that probably the best course would be not to attempt to hold such a conference. If it could be held in Africa, of course this might be done, but even that appears rather doubtful. What might be done is for one or two or three representative African leaders to come to India, not for a conference but simply because they desire to consult us. That would be a simpler approach to the problem and would not raise quite so much obstruction, though even that might not be allowed. Thus, two or three persons from East Africa can come here for consultation. In the same way, possibly one or two representatives from the Gold Coast or Nigeria could come.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. An all-African Conference.

## 2. To Apa Pant<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
March 19, 1953

My dear Apa,<sup>2</sup>

I had an interview today with Murumbi,<sup>3</sup> General Secretary of the Kenya African Union, who has recently come here. I had a fairly long talk with him and he told me of the economic conditions in Kenya and elsewhere in Africa as affecting the African population, how they had been driven from their land by all kinds of trickery and compulsion. This was the background of the widespread dissatisfaction among them which had led to the Kikuyu movement, the Kikiyus being politically and educationally the most advanced. He told me a good deal about this movement and about the way the settlers as well as the Kenya Government are behaving. He gave a copy of the official Gazette containing the recent laws passed. I knew something about these laws, but it does give one a great shock to read them in full and to learn how they are being applied. Our newspapers also give us some information from time to time of the shooting at sight by the settlers that is going on. I am gravely disturbed at the developments in Kenya and round about and I feel sure that the policy of the UK colonial authorities, and more especially of the settlers there, is dangerously wrong as well as immoral. It can only lead to disaster on a big scale.


2. Possessing some historical sense, I tried to look at things in some perspective. The present by itself does not overwhelm me. For a number of years I have thought more and more of Africa and I have sensed the growth of new forces and urges there among the Africans. It was possible to control them and divert them into right channels. To some extent, this was done in the Gold Coast and Nigeria. But in Kenya, the reverse process has been applied, and applied with excessive stupidity. I feel sure that Africa is not going to be suppressed by colonial authorities or settlers. In the long run, even in South Africa it will be difficult to suppress them, though for some time this may be

1. JN Collection.
2. Commissioner for India in British East Africa at this time.
3. Joseph A. Murumbi (1911-1990); Kenyan politician; educated at Bangalore and Bellary; Assistant Secretary, Movement for Colonial Freedom, 1951-57; Press and Tourist Officer, Moroccan Embassy, London, 1957-62; Treasurer, Kenyan African National Union (KANU), 1962; member, Kenya House of Representatives, 1963; Minister of State in Kenyan Government, 1963-64; Minister of External Affairs, 1964-66; Vice-President of Kenya, May-December 1966.





RECEIVING C.R. ATTLEE AT SAFDARJANG AIRPORT, NEW DELHI, 4 JANUARY 1953



WITH INDIA'S AMBASSADORS IN WEST ASIA AND FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICIALS, NEW DELHI, 27 MARCH 1953



possible. But the situation in Central Africa<sup>4</sup> is much more difficult to control than in South Africa. The numbers of Europeans is much smaller. It is therefore likely to come to a head sooner in Central Africa or East Africa.

3. Because I sensed this growth of new forces in Africa, I have been anxious to develop Indo-African relations. This was not only good in theory and in conformity with our policy, but was the only course to adopt to protect Indians and India's interests in Africa. If there is any feeling of hostility against Indians in Africa, they cannot stay there, nor will they get any protection from any colonial authority. So far as we are concerned, we are neither capable nor desirous of intervening to protect them against the Africans.

4. I was happy to find that you have worked earnestly and effectively to promote good feelings between the Indians and Africans. Suddenly our policy was put to a severe test by recent developments in Kenya. I was surprised and distressed to learn some months ago that, generally speaking, the Indian community and its leaders remained quite aloof and Indian lawyers at first even refused to give their services to the Africans. The general impression I got was that the leading Indians were either afraid of doing anything or were just passive, and indeed that some of them tended to support the British authority in this matter. That seemed to me wrong. It just does not matter how much repression the colonial authorities may indulge in Kenya, they cannot continue in this way and the settlers will only settle their own doom by the policy they are pursuing. That does not mean that the Africans and the Kikiyus are not to blame or have not acted wrongly. Of course they may have done so. But we have to judge them as long-suffering immature people whose patience has been tried to the utmost and who have to be treated gently and won over. The reverse policy is being pursued by the Government there.

5. I am writing to you specially because of an uncomfortable feeling that I have had for some little time that Indo-African relations are not as good as they have been or as they ought to be. My talk with Murumbi confirmed this. Indeed some things he told me were definitely disturbing, even though they might not be wholly true. He said that many African leaders had ceased to have any faith in our Commission there and were keeping away from it. He mentioned your name in this connection. He said that they were afraid of discussing any confidential matter there because this was likely to reach the ears of the colonial authorities. He mentioned specially the name of Mangat, a

4. Central Africa had differences over British colonial policy. After four years of conferences and controversy, the UK Government approved the creation of a Central African Federation embracing Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The plan met with objections on the ground that African inhabitants of both Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland opposed a link with Southern Rhodesia where effective government was in the hands of white settlers.

lawyer, who, he said, was a shady person in close touch with the Attorney General and others there and who apparently was in your confidence also. In fact he hinted that Mangat had access to some of our files and secret papers.

6. Murumbi was also rather bitter against A.B. Patel and Puri who are presumed to be leaders of the Indian community and who, according to him, were stooges of the British.

7. Probably all this is greatly exaggerated and in the tense atmosphere of Kenya an objective appraisal is difficult. But, whatever the facts might be, this in itself is disturbing that the General Secretary of the Kenya African Union and others, including Odede, who was recently arrested, and Kenyatta<sup>5</sup> and others feel this way. If they think so, it is likely that many others also think so, and all our good work is undone.

8. This is a serious matter and has to be considered in all its aspects. I should like to know what your own views are on this subject.

9. As you must know, the UK Government have expressed a wish that Rahman<sup>6</sup> should be withdrawn from our Mission in Nairobi, because, according to them, he has dabbled in internal politics. Rahman anyhow was coming away and if the UK Government want us to withdraw him, we have no choice in the matter. But this incident has displeased me and I am having it pointed out to the UK High Commission here how much we disapprove of their entire policy in East Africa. It is quite likely that Rahman has gone further than he ought to have done in his relations with the Africans and has thus committed a breach of diplomatic behaviour. That may be due to his inexperience. The situation has been a very difficult one and I, for my part, am not prepared to blame Rahman at all if he exceeded certain normal limits in showing his sympathy for the Africans. If he erred, he erred in the right direction. I do not at all like the UK Government or their colonial authorities in Kenya asking a member of our Mission to withdraw in this way. If this kind of thing is likely to happen again, I shall consider withdrawing the whole Mission from there. There is no point in our functioning there passively and in fear of the British colonial authorities.

10. You will please write to me fully in answer to this letter.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. (1891-1978) President, Kenyan African Union, 1947-52; imprisoned by the British, 1952-61; Prime Minister, 1963-64; President of the Republic of Kenya, 1962-78.

6. M.A. Rahman (b. 1922); was later posted in Rangoon.



### 3. Talks with Oginga Odinga<sup>1</sup>

I had a talk last night with Mr Oginga Odinga,<sup>2</sup> the Kenya African leader, who is in Delhi. He began by saying that he was distressed to learn from Mr Murumbi that he (Murumbi) had criticized our Commissioner in East Africa, Shri Apa Pant. Mr Oginga Odinga spoke highly of Apa Pant and said he had done very good work in bringing Africans and Indians nearer to each other.

2. After that he discussed at some length the situation in Kenya. His views in regard to this situation were practically the same as those of Mr Murumbi, but he expressed himself in even stronger terms against the British Administration and the settlers. He referred to the land question and the way the Africans had been driven out progressively from their lands and were not even allowed to grow profitable crops on such lands as they possessed. Apart from the lands in the occupation of the White settlers, there were large tracts which had been reserved for them and which the Africans could not have. It was for these unutilized, but reserved areas that the Africans had made a demand. This demand had frightened and irritated the White settlers, who had long been wanting to teach the Africans, what they called a "lesson". These settlers wanted to get full possession of the governmental apparatus so as to be allowed to deal with the Africans as they liked. Recent happenings had given them this chance.

3. Mr Oginga Odinga said that he had never heard about the Mau Mau till some little time ago. In fact, Mau Mau was not an African word at all. According to him, it had been invented by the settlers. African labour in the farms had been so badly and inhumanly treated that some of these men, in despair, took revenge. These were individual cases and had nothing to do with an organized movement. But it was true that an organized movement on the land question and for other reforms had grown up. This was not Mau Mau. It was the general sentiment among the Africans. The Kikuyus took the lead, because they were the most educated and politically conscious. Others were equally sympathetic and would no doubt fall into line with the Kikuyus in this matter.

1. Note to Secretary General and Commonwealth Secretary, MEA, 25 March 1953. JN Collection.
2. A Oginga Odinga (b. 1911); Kenyan politician; member, Legislative Council, 1957, Vice-President, Kenya African National Union (KANU), 1960-66; Minister for Home Affairs, 1963-64; founded Kenya People's Union, 1966, (the party was banned in October 1969) Vice-President of Kenya, 1964-66; arrested October 1969 and released March 1971; launched National Democratic Party, 1990.

4. It was fear of this that led the Kenya Government to arrest Odebe, the President of the Kenya African Union. Odebe belonged to the Luo Tribe which lives on the banks of Victoria Nyanza. Mr Oginga Odinga was himself a Luo Chief from Nyanza.

5. Even the Masais, who used to be hereditary enemies of the Kikuyus, were sympathetic to the new demands, although they were backward in education.

6. Oginga Odinga praised Jomo Kenyatta highly as well as Peter Koynange, both of whom, according to him, were very popular and had great influence. The case against Jomo Kenyatta was a frame-up and there was no evidence at all. If he was convicted, as he was likely to be, this would produce strong reaction among the Africans.

7. Mr Odinga expects to be arrested himself when he goes back to Africa. I have an idea, but I am not sure, that he has been sent here by the Kenya Government.

#### 4. Policy towards East Africa<sup>1</sup>

I am not at all satisfied with Shri Apa Pant's letter. We are all for the multi-racial society, but I am getting a little tired of the repetition of this phrase when the African is being kicked, hounded and shot down and the average Indian prays for safety first.

2. Neither Murumbi nor Oginga Odinga said anything about independence to me. They spoke in the most moderate terms of getting some representation.

3. Murumbi is certainly anxious to see our community centres and has actually gone away for that purpose.

4. I have written fully and frankly to Apa Pant and we must await his reply.<sup>2</sup>

1. Note, 25 March 1953. JN Collection.

2. See *ante*, pp. 548-50.



## VII. UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

1. To Maharaj Singh<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
February 13, 1953

My dear Maharaj Singh,<sup>2</sup>

...I am greatly distressed at the turn events have taken in East Africa and in South Africa as well. We have tried hard to keep the Indians there out of this muddle and have advised them to keep up their friendly relations with the Africans. To some extent we have succeeded, but the situation is a very difficult one and the European planters there are behaving in a disgraceful way. Many Africans have acted wrongly, but I find it difficult to blame these poor people too much in view of the terrible repression they are suffering....

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. Maharaj Singh was earlier India's representative in South Africa.

2. Protest to the South African Government<sup>1</sup>

I agree with CS.<sup>2</sup> We should protest to the South African Government and inform the Commonwealth countries concerned.<sup>3</sup>

1. Note to the Commonwealth Secretary, MEA, 18 February 1953. File No AI/53/6436/28, MEA.

2. Badruddin Tyabji was Commonwealth Secretary.

3. South Africa was censured at the United Nations on the issue of treatment of the Union's Indian population. In 1952, the UN General Assembly had set up a three-man good offices commission to assist in negotiations between India, Pakistan and the Union. South Africa, however, had refused to cooperate with the commission, arguing that the UN's effort constituted an encroachment on its domestic jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the Assembly adopted a seventeen-nation resolution asking the commission to continue its work and make recommendations to bring about a peaceful settlement. Concurrently, South Africa was urged to refrain from applying its Group Areas Act, which provided the legal basis for segregating persons of Indian origin.

We should then wait for some time for the answers and can consider the next step then. It is quite possible that the South African Government might send us a reply fairly soon. If so, we can immediately think of the next step, which should be to inform the Commonwealth countries of the South African reply and our intention to raise this matter before the UN.

As for publicity, the newspapers have given some publicity to it. After sending our protest to the South African Government, (that is after two or three days of that) we might let the press know that we have sent such a protest without actually publishing the protest.

Copies of our note to the South African Government and to the Commonwealth Governments should be sent to our Delegation at the UN, who should be kept informed of developments.

### 3. South African Attitude towards Indians<sup>1</sup>

Please see attached telegram.

2. We had decided to send a protest to the Union Government of South Africa about their ending the old agreement relating to wives, etc., of Indians.<sup>2</sup> So far as I know, this has not been done yet. We should expedite this.

3. Regarding other steps being taken by the South African Government to enforce the Group Areas Act,<sup>3</sup> is it not desirable for us to bring this matter to the notice of the UN? These are important developments affecting very large

1. Note to the Secretary General, Foreign Secretary and Commonwealth Secretary, MEA, 1 March 1953. JN Collection.
2. On 10 February 1953, the Minister of the Interior, Danges announced that he would introduce a Bill to end the agreement concluded in 1913 between General Smuts and Mahatma Gandhi under which foreign-born wives and children of Indian residents in South Africa had been allowed to enter the country freely.
3. The Group Areas Act of 1950 gave the Government powers over the lives and property of the people including the power to evict people from their homes and places of business and compel them to dispose of their property at nominal rates, without any obligation on the part of the Government to provide alternative accommodation.



numbers of people and I think we should inform the Secretary-General<sup>4</sup> of the UN and, if possible, raise the matter in the General Assembly.<sup>5</sup>

4. Trygve Lie.
5. A communication of 9 March 1953 from the Permanent Representative of India addressed to the Secretary-General drew attention to the proposed early proclamation by the Government of the Union of South Africa, of Group Areas under the Group Areas Act, in deliberate disregard of the General Assembly's resolutions of 1950, 1951 and 1952 on the issue.

## VIII. CHINA AND TIBET

### 1. North-Eastern Frontier Situation<sup>1</sup>

I have read these papers with interest. It is clear that we should remain wide-awake about our North-Eastern frontier situation from Ladakh right upto Bhutan and Assam. Mr Sinha's<sup>2</sup> note is helpful in drawing our attention to various present and possible dangers.

2. But I find Mr Sinha's approach to be coloured very much by certain ideas and conceptions which prevent him from taking an objective view of the situation. The note starts by reference to the lust for conquest of the Chinese and is throughout based on this. Mr Sinha looks back with a certain nostalgia to the past when the British exercised a good deal of control over Tibet and he would have liked very much for India to take the place of the British of those days. As a matter of fact, the weakness of our position in Tibet has been that we are successors, to some extent, of an imperial power which had pushed its way into Tibet. When that imperial power has ceased to have any strength to function in the old way, it is patent that we cannot do so, even if we so wished. We do not, in fact, wish to do so in that particular way. What we are really interested in is our own security and the maintenance of our frontiers intact.

3. It serves little purpose to think regretfully of past days and past ways. That is only done by people who have been pushed aside by the advance of history and who can only think of the past when they played an important role

1. Note to the Secretary-General and Foreign Secretary, MEA, 5 March 1953. JN Collection. Extracts.
2. S. Sinha, who was officer in charge of the Indian Mission in Tibet in 1950, was Officer on Special Duty in the Ministry of External Affairs at this time.

in the historic process. The biggest event since the last War is the rise of Communist China. It is totally immaterial whether we like it or dislike it. It is a fact. It followed naturally that a strong Chinese Government would assert its claim on Tibet, which every previous Chinese Government had done with more or less success. It followed also that there was no power, however big, which could resist that claim in Tibet. Certainly we could not do so. To take up an attitude of resistance without the strength to follow it up would have been political folly of the first magnitude. Therefore, we had to accept the changes that took place. We shall have to accept any other changes internal to Tibet. But one thing we are not prepared to accept is any modification of or intrusion across our frontiers. Therefore, we must concentrate on that and not think vaguely of other matters.

4. While there is much in Mr Sinha's report that has a basis of truth, this is put forward in such an exaggerated and emotional way that it loses force. I am sorry that a representative of ours should allow his objective analysis to be affected in this way. That does not help in understanding a situation.

5. We live in a revolutionary period when the whole of Asia is in a state of turmoil and change. We have to keep up with that change and not merely regret the days of pre-change. In the ultimate analysis we have to build up our strength. That strength means not so much frontier outposts and the like but internal strength—political and economic. One of the biggest things in Asia today and in the future is the rate of progress of India and China. If India makes good, more especially on the economic front, in the course of the next five to ten years, then India's future is not only assured but is very promising. If we fail internally, then of course anything can happen on our frontiers or elsewhere.

6. We have, of course, to be alert and vigilant on our borders. This is not so much from the point of view of resisting any major incursion but rather to make clear to China and the world that we are going to stick to our frontier. Any challenge to our frontiers will have to be met. In fact, it means a challenge to the whole of India, and not merely to the frontiers.

7. As Mr Kapur<sup>3</sup> says, and many other reasons can be advanced also, no major challenge to these frontiers is likely in the near future. If we are alert, no challenge will take place within a reasonable time and possibly even later.

8. It must always be remembered that the strength of our position lies in certain geographical factors which cannot easily be changed or overcome—not so much to Himalayan mountains but the added and inhospitable land of Tibet on the other side which cannot support or logistically provide for any large forces. The weakness of our position on those borders lies in the fact that

3. B.K. Kapur, India's political officer in Gangtok, Sikkim.



Bhutanese etc., are closely allied culturally and socially to the Tibetans and naturally look towards Tibet from that point of view.

9. The weakest parts of the frontier are those lying between Bhutan and Sikkim. In a sense there is graver danger in Nepal, if that country goes to pieces.

10. The general policy we should pursue is:

- i) Strengthen our communication system with the border areas and have well-equipped check-posts there.
- ii) Strengthen our Intelligence system.
- iii) Develop these border areas economically and otherwise and thus bring them more and more within the orbit of India's economic and national life by making them feel that they are integral parts of India and profit by it.

11. In regard to Bhutan the difficulties arose because we do not function there at all or hardly at all. Nevertheless, as Mr Kapur pointed out, the position in Bhutan is not so bad, so far as we are concerned, as Mr Sinha seems to imagine. We should develop these relations and more particularly communications there. This has to be done with tact.

12. For the last year or possibly two years the UP Government has been writing to us about their border with Tibet and the difficulties of maintaining any check-posts there because of lack of communications and accommodation. In spite of urgent reminders from the UP Government, the matter has got stuck up either in the Home Ministry here or in the Finance Ministry. This should be looked into, as this is important.

13. We should like, of course, to have as full information as possible about Tibet. How exactly to do it is not clear to me. If Mr Sinha would apply his mind to this rather than indulging in fears and speculations, he would be much more helpful.

14. There is no question of our making India the main route of supplies to Tibet for the Chinese. We should not agree to this. But, on the whole, even from the larger political point of view, it seems desirable that a trickle of supplies should be allowed to go through and this type of contact maintained. That itself has a certain psychological significance, demonstrating the reliance of Tibet on India. Of course, trade should be encouraged where possible.

15. Whenever any incident takes place in Tibet involving any affront or discourtesy to Indians or India's interests, we should take a strong line. A strong line does not mean an offensive line, but it does mean that we do not intend to submit to such treatment. As I have said above, we can only remain in Tibet in any shape or form with China's acquiescence. But so long as we remain there, we must remain there with dignity.

16. There are references in Mr Sinha's note to Tibetans boasting about their claims to Bhutan or parts of North-East India. Whenever any such thing is said publicly or formally or semi-formally, we should take immediate objection to it and make it clear that we are not prepared to tolerate any such claim or language.

17. When Sardar Panikkar was in Peking, the question arose of our settling our frontier with Tibet, that is the MacMahon line, finally with the Chinese Government. Mr Panikkar was of opinion that we had made our position clear to the Chinese Government and that it will serve no useful purpose to raise that question formally at that stage.<sup>4</sup> We agreed at the time. Perhaps the present is not a suitable time to raise this question. But if occasion offers itself and especially if any challenge to that frontier is made, then we shall have to make this perfectly clear.

18. We have to deal directly in our Ministry with the North-East Frontier Agency. That is our responsibility and we should keep the development of those areas constantly in mind. Fortunately the Governor of Assam is deeply interested in this matter and has helped greatly by extensive tours. In a wider sense, it is our responsibility to look after the entire border even apart from the North-East Frontier Agency. External Affairs should keep itself in close touch with developments along this frontier in Kashmir, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and Assam so that a coordinated policy might be pursued in cooperation with the other Ministries or State Governments concerned.

4. In a cable to Nehru on 17 June 1952, K.M. Panikkar argued that India's position on the frontier with Tibet was well known to China, and as Chou En-lai had not raised the border issue in his interviews with him, his silence should be presumed to be acquiescence, if not acceptance.

## 2. Supply of Mica to China<sup>1</sup>

Some time ago the question of supplying mica to China and Indonesia came up before me. The view had been taken that, since we should not supply mica to China, we should not also supply mica to Indonesia. I did not agree with

1. Note to Secretary General, Foreign Secretary and Commonwealth Secretary, MEA, 19 March 1953. JN Collection.



this view. I suggested that we should certainly supply to Indonesia straightway and, in the case of China, we can consider the matter afresh a little later.

2. Will you please let me know what was done and what the position is now?

3. The reluctance to supply mica to China is presumably due to a fear that this might create complications with the US Government and their laws. I have previously stated that there is absolutely no reason why we should consider ourselves bound down by US laws or policy on this subject. We should certainly take that factor into consideration when examining a case. But it should not be the determining factor.

4. As is known, Ceylon supplied rubber to China in spite of the disapproval of the US. It is odd that Ceylon can function in this way and we should be apprehensive. I have just been reading in a report from our High Commission in Ceylon a quotation from a statement made by the Ceylon Government on this very issue of rubber. After announcing their adherence to the aspirations of the western democratic world, etc., and their opposition to communism, the Government goes on to say that: "It cannot be a party to any policies which sacrifice economic well-being for political expediencies and so are apt to produce just those undesirable consequences which are sought to be avoided or eliminated."

5. This statement, it is said, was widely welcomed not only in Ceylon but in the Press of the United Kingdom.

6. I think, therefore, that we should give up this attitude of fear and apprehension in our dealings with China. They should be governed solely by our national interest. If that interest requires it, we should certainly supply them with mica.

7. The Commerce Secretary, H.V.R. Iengar, happened to see me this afternoon and I had a talk with him on this and like subjects. He told me that it was the External Affairs Ministry that was coming in the way. He mentioned that their negotiations with the Czechoslovak Government had been held up because of mica. The Czech Government wanted mica to be included in the list of articles supplied by us to them. We had been reluctant to include this in the list, although, apparently, we were prepared to supply it to them. I do not see why we should be reluctant in this way. We should certainly supply mica to them if we can spare it, as I believe we can, and include it in any list of articles supplied to them.

## IX. FOREIGN POSSESSIONS IN INDIA

### 1. Future of French Settlements<sup>1</sup>

In the course of the last few days, I have had talks with some persons regarding the future of the French Settlements in India. Among these has been the head of the Protestant Churches in France, who apparently is greatly respected there. He gave me a message from the President of the French Republic conveying his greetings and said something about his desire to have a friendly settlement in regard to Pondicherry, etc.

2. Today I had a visit from an old friend who has been in a way connected with the Aurobindo Ashram in Pondicherry. He raised the same question with me and said he had been talking to the "Mother" about it. The "Mother" of course is the boss of the Ashram. At first the "Mother" said she would not interfere in any way in a political question. Later, when it was pointed out to her that the question was getting bad, etc., she agreed to put my friend in touch with a Frenchman who has some position in France and knows the Prime Minister there. I was given a paper which contains some kind of proposals made to this Frenchman by my friend. I enclose this paper.

3. I told him that I did not wish to deal with this matter in this way, nor did I wish to send any message indirectly to the French Government. This may well lead to misunderstandings. Our position is quite clear. I repeated what I had said to others. That is:

- (1) The French Government must accept the fact that their Settlements in India have to become parts of the Indian Union.
- (2) They should agree to hand over the de facto administration to us.
- (3) They might retain the de jure sovereignty till we take such other steps about the matter, both in India and in France as we may agree to.

4. This was the broad position and I have taken up this attitude with everyone who has seen me about this matter.

5. I was asked about a number of details, some of which are mentioned in the paper attached. I said that these details could easily be considered afterwards, i.e., after the main decision had been taken as indicated above. However, it seems to me worthwhile for us to think about some of these details so that we

1. Note to Secretary General, MEA, 11 January 1953. JN Collection.



might be clear in our own minds, such, for instance, having agreed to the de facto transfer, what steps have to be taken to give effect to it, keeping in view the assurances we have given in regard to the maintenance of the language, laws, culture, etc., of these areas. The area must be considered as an autonomous unit and the question will arise as to the position of the present elected bodies there. We may, of course, and we should, have some kind of a fresh election.

6. Another important question relates to the finances. The French Government gives them a subvention. I do not know what it is, but we can find this out. Presumably, we shall have to continue that.

7. I think we might try to get all the relevant facts from our representative in Pondicherry so that we can work out a scheme.

## 2. British Attitude to Portuguese Possessions<sup>1</sup>

You may certainly send a copy of Kewal Singh's<sup>2</sup> letter<sup>3</sup> to our High Commissioner in London. But it should be made perfectly clear that he should not say anything about it to the UK Foreign Office. The letter will be for his information only. You may further inform him that we are likely to withdraw our *Chargé d'Affaires* from Lisbon and close our Legation, though without formally cutting off diplomatic relations.

2. I think that we should take early steps to close our Legation in Lisbon. I think that as soon as the Portuguese Government's reply is received, we should take this step. Probably, the reply will come in a few days' time. So, the sooner we move in this matter the better.

1. Note to Secretary General and Foreign Secretary, MEA, 13 March 1953. File No/EI/53/1911/801, MEA.
2. Kewal Singh (1915-1991); First Secretary, Indian Embassy, Ankara, 1948-49; *Chargé d'affaires*, Lisbon, 1915-53; Consul-General, Pondicherry, 1953-54; Chief Commissioner, State of Pondicherry, Karaikal, Mahe and Yanam, 1955-57; Ambassador to Cambodia, 1957-58, Sweden, 1958-62, USSR, 1966-68, Federal Republic of Germany, 1970-72, USA, 1976-77; High Commissioner in Pakistan, 1965-66; Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs, 1968-70; Foreign Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs, 1972-76; awarded Padma Shri for distinguished services leading to merger of French Possessions with India.

## X. OTHER MATTERS

### 1. To Tara Chand<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
February 24, 1953

My dear Tara Chand,<sup>2</sup>

...But the real thing is that the Iranian Government, including their Prime Minister, is totally irresponsible and we do not propose to get entangled in any way with their rather adventurous activities. India functions on the international stage with some sense of responsibility. Iran has no position anywhere and no influence, except such as might reside in the minds of Dr. Mossadeq and Kashani,<sup>3</sup> who apparently have a very distorted idea of the world and of Asia. We have, therefore, while being perfectly friendly, to keep perfectly clear of any entanglements.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. JN Collection. A copy of this letter was sent to Secretary-General, MEA also. Extracts.
2. Indian Ambassador in Iran.
3. Ayatollah Sayed Abolghaseem Kashani, Speaker of the Majlis.

### 2. Cable to Vijayalakshmi Pandit<sup>1</sup>

Your telegram No 56 dated March 5.<sup>2</sup>

I should not like your name to be put forward for any office unless it is previously ascertained that there is a large measure of agreement, more especially between leaders of rival blocs. If, after private enquiry, you feel there is possibility of this agreement then you can proceed further in ascertaining views of people.

1. New Delhi, 6 March 1953. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML.
2. Vijayalakshmi cabled that her name was being mentioned as candidate for the post of UN Secretary-General acceptable to both blocs and Rajeshwar Dayal, India's Permanent Representative to the UN was sounded in this regard by the Soviet Delegation. She also suggested that at the forthcoming meeting of the Security Council alternative names would come up for consideration and India should be in a position to give some indication in this regard.



I might remind you that when B.N. Rau's name was considered for post of Secretary-General, Nationalist China's Representative told him that he would veto every Indian name because India did not recognize Formosa Government. This fact has to be borne in mind.

We have no objection, subject to other people's general agreement, to your name being put forward for Secretary-General's post or for Presidentship of General Assembly. Latter is not important and usually goes by rotation to smaller countries. But Secretary-General's post is undoubtedly far more important.

Suggest therefore your sounding leaders of principal countries of both groups. If response favourable, you can proceed further.<sup>3</sup>

3. The Security Council, meeting in a secret session on 13 March, rejected the first three candidates for the post of UN Secretary-General and asked that the Big 5 Powers meet privately in an effort to end the deadlock. Carlos P. Romulo of the Philippines received five of the required seven votes, Polish Foreign Minister Stanislaw Skzeszewski got one, Lester B. Pearson of Canada then received nine votes but his appointment was stopped by Russia's veto. In a conference on 18 March among the US, Soviet, British, French and Chinese Nationalist delegates, the Soviet Ambassador, U.A. Zorin said that the USSR would accept Vijayalakshmi Pandit or B.R. Rau of India as Secretary-General. Zorin formally nominated Vijayalakshmi Pandit in a secret meeting of the Security Council on 19 March, but she failed to win nomination. Voting as reported unofficially was: While Russia and Lebanon favoured her election. Nationalist China abstained.

### 3. To Vijayalakshmi Pandit<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
March 9, 1953

Nan dear,

...Much has happened during the last week or so and, of course, Stalin's death has, for the moment, rather shaken people all over. Stalin did symbolize an era and that era has ended. Undoubtedly, he was one of the men who made history. I spoke about him in both the Houses here and we adjourned for the day in tribute to his memory.<sup>2</sup> What I said about Stalin was, I understand, much appreciated even in Moscow. Indeed, I was given to understand that even his followers could not have said much more.

I am really surprised, in spite of getting used to it, at the extreme crudeness

1. JN Collection. Extracts.

2. See *post*, pp. 614-18.

and ungraciousness of some Americans in matters affecting human relations. Cabot's<sup>3</sup> refusal to shake hands with Vyshinsky was shocking.

We received a message from the Russian Embassy on Saturday night, that is day before yesterday, asking us if we were going to send a special delegation to Moscow to attend Stalin's funeral which is taking place today. It was, of course, physically impossible for us to send any one in a day and a half's time. Apart from this, we had no particular desire to send any one. Unfortunately K.P.S. Menon,<sup>3</sup> who was expected to be in Moscow, is lying ill in Budapest....

There appears to be nothing much doing in the United Nations except to wait and see. How long is this waiting business going to last?...

With love from,  
Jawahar

3. Henry Cabot Lodge (1902-1985); thrice elected US Senator from Massachusetts; Member, President's Cabinet and US Representative to UN, 1953-60; Republican nominee for Vice-Presidency, 1960; Director-General, Atlantic Institute, Paris, 1961-63; Ambassador to Vietnam, 1963-64, 1965-67, to Federal Republic of Germany, 1968-69; US Representative at Vietnam Peace Talks, Paris, January-November, 1969. Author of *The Storm Has Many Eyes*, (1973); *As It Was*, (1976).

#### 4. To Vijayalakshmi Pandit<sup>1</sup>

Your telegram No. 67 of March 14.<sup>2</sup>

I realize your difficulty. But I think that it would be improper at this stage to try to escape from responsibility. I would therefore allow events to take their course. You are not going out of your way to seek any office but if responsibility comes we cannot run away from it. Nobody knows about future developments or what will happen in the course of the next three years.<sup>3</sup>

1. New Delhi, 15 March 1953. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML.
2. Vijayalakshmi Pandit stated that her name might be proposed as a compromise candidate for the post of UN Secretary-General at the next meeting. She did not want to be tied down to a life abroad for three more years, and asked Nehru whether she should withdraw her name or let events take their own course.
3. Vijayalakshmi Pandit again cabled the same day to Nehru that her name should not be proposed unless British-American support was forthcoming. Nehru replied (not printed) that he agreed to the suggestion for which he was asking B.G. Kher, the Indian High Commissioner in the UK, to ascertain the views of Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary.



LETTERS TO CHIEF MINISTERS





New Delhi  
4 January, 1953

Mr dear Chief Minister,

After sending you my last fortnightly letter, I went to Travancore-Cochin and spent a week there.<sup>1</sup> Apart from participating in two important functions—the opening of a monazite processing factory<sup>2</sup> and starting the construction of a railway link joining north and south Travancore<sup>3</sup>—I spent two full days in the game sanctuary.<sup>4</sup> I enjoyed these two days very much in that secluded corner of India and felt a little envious of the wild animals that roamed about those forests. I wish we had more game sanctuaries in India. There are some already, but thus far not very much attention has been paid to them. Some wild animals, more particularly, the lion, have almost ceased to exist in India. There are a few lions still left in a forest in Saurashtra. We should have national parks, where all shooting of wild animals should be prohibited.

2. In Travancore, I saw again their famous boat race, which is an old established community sport. They have a special type of long boats called “snake boats”, which accommodate over a hundred persons. Apart from the rowers, some persons stand precariously in the middle of the boat just to encourage others. There is plenty of shouting and excitement, and generally, both the people in the boats and the spectators enjoy themselves greatly. I was glad to encourage this very interesting and worthwhile sport.

3. I passed through the lovely backwaters and canals and saw land being reclaimed from the sea. The people of Travancore-Cochin have not only a much higher standard of education than those in the rest of India, but are industrious. The state is rich in many ways and industry is developing there, especially roundabout Alwaye, where we have started a monazite processing factory. I have no doubt that the State will make rapid progress.

4. On my way back, I spent a few hours in Madras city and found considerable excitement there over the Andhra State issue. On the whole, I believe that our decision has been welcomed, but I was sorry to find some

1. File No 25(6)/53-PMS. The letters in this section have also been printed in G. Parthasarathi (ed), *Jawaharlal Nehru: Letters to Chief Ministers 1947-1964*, Vol. 3, pp. 224-40 and 247-72.
2. From 23 to 28 December 1952.
3. On 24 December, Nehru inaugurated the Indian Rare Earths Factory at Eloor near Alwaye. Production, with an annual capacity of 1,500 tons, commenced at the factory in July 1952.
4. The Ernakulam-Quilon railway was inaugurated by Nehru on 24 December 1952.
5. At the Periyar Game Sanctuary near Kottayam from 24 to 26 December 1952.

Andhra leaders protesting stoutly against the decision to keep Madras city out of the new Andhra State.<sup>6</sup> It is perfectly true that the Andhras have had an important share in building up that city and much of their cultural life has centered round it. But it is equally true that Madras city is the intellectual, cultural and nerve-centre of Tamil Nadu. If the Madras State could have continued jointly as now, everyone could have had their own share in it. But unhappily, this was not to be and the people of Andhra Desha felt strongly that they should have their own special province. Where there is such feeling, one should recognize it, for otherwise there is deep frustration and growth of ill will. We have recognized it and the Andhra State will come into existence before long, but I fear this will lead to many difficult problems especially in Andhra, and, to some extent, in the remaining parts of the Madras State. What is still more likely to add to our burdens is the demand for other so-called linguistic States. A blank "no" cannot be said where feeling is strong. I hope, however, that whatever other steps we might have to take will be after careful consideration. To start one new province will be difficult enough. It is better to wait a little before we take any other next step.

5. I have written to you previously about the organized attempts of certain opposition groups in the country, mainly communal, to create difficult law and order situations. This process is continuing and demands attention from us. There are many legitimate grievances of the people, in Jammu and elsewhere, and we have no right to object to attempts being made to remove them. But I have no doubt that these present agitations are something much more than that. They are essentially attempts by the most reactionary groups in the country to create trouble and disorder so that possibly they might profit by it. The surprising part is that in doing so even these opposition groups do not realize how they are injuring vital national interests as in Jammu. The whole of the Kashmir issue, so difficult and so delicate, is still with us, and yet, right near the ceasefire line, where two armies face each other, these violent agitations are carried on. In Delhi recently, a Jammu Day<sup>7</sup> was proclaimed and immediately violence was indulged in. A hartal was proclaimed and some shopkeepers were terrorized into closing their shops. Any such situation can of course be dealt with fairly easily from the law and order point of view, but it results in creating a feeling of insecurity and ill will all round and that is a bad background to work in. The Hindu and Sikh communal organizations have joined hands and the politics of both appear to be to aim at disorder. Master Tara Singh, the leader of the Akali Dal, is of course unique in his approach to political or other problems. He has done enough injury to the Sikh cause by his methods during the last

6. T. Prakasam, T. Vishwanatham and some other leaders had protested on 19 and 20 December against the exclusion of the city of Madras from the new Andhra State.

7. On 31 December 1952.



fifteen years or more. Recently, he has made some very extraordinary speeches.<sup>8</sup> He proclaims that he believes in the two-nation theory,<sup>9</sup> which has thus far been considered a monopoly of the Muslim League. Thus we have the Hindu and Sikh communalists following the lead of the old Muslim League and not even trying to learn from past experience. Both of them can neither think nor understand the big economic and other problems that confront the country. Their sole objective, apart from creating trouble, is to shout loudly for war with Pakistan. Apparently, they imagine that that will be a solvent for their difficulties. It is our misfortune to have to deal with this medieval thinking and action which trades in the name of religion and tries to rouse the basest passions of the people. Most people do not care to go deeply into these questions and are, therefore, often misled, and yet when these happenings are explained to them in their true context, they understand. We must try to do this.

6. Certain recent developments in the Patiala and East Punjab State Union, known as Pepsu, have deeply distressed me.<sup>10</sup> This is not because of any changes but because of the political aspect of it. It is because of the utter lowering of our public standards and the disgraceful way in which people in responsible positions have acted. There is little hope for us if that becomes the standard of behaviour in India. Fortunately, that is not so.

7. Recent political developments in India have brought out curious combinations between different groups. The Akalis support the Hindu Mahasabha and the Jan Sangh on one side, they support the Communists in another place. The Praja Socialist Party combines with the communal parties over some questions, they side with the Communists in regard to other matters. The Communists indulge in their own rather opportunist tactics. All this seems to indicate a deterioration in political standards and public life among these various groups.

8. At public meetings in Patna, Allahabad, Lucknow and Bhopal between 23 and 30 December, Master Tara Singh while warning against the impending danger of Pakistan's attack on Kashmir declared that "there could be no peace in India and Pakistan unless the two countries were reunited," because Pakistan "would always treat the Hindu minority as hostages and if they were left at the mercy of the majority community, before long they would be converted to Islam or liquidated."

9. In a speech at Lucknow on 27 December 1952, Tara Singh said that he was "a believer in the two-nation theory and ... wanted India to retain Kashmir in view of the property left by refugees in Pakistan." He also wanted that "Muslims be turned out of Kashmir."

10. In Pepsu the United Front Party Ministry led by Gian Singh Rarewala, surviving with the support of three Communist members, when faced with a no-confidence motion moved by the Congress in the Assembly, succeeded in gaining a temporary reprieve by winning over four Congress members to its side and by offering ministerships to two among them.

8. In Saurashtra, there has been an anti-sales-tax agitation which has led to a good deal of violence.<sup>11</sup> Here again, we see the petty shopkeeper element joining hands with the communal organizations and even with the Communists. What exactly are the principles on which any of these groups stand? It is difficult to find out. All this indicates a narrowness of mind, a parochial outlook, plus, perhaps, a sense of frustration. Just when we ought to go ahead in a united manner to implement the Five Year Plan, many of these people spend their energy in obstructing others.

9. No fresh developments have taken place in regard to the Korean situation. Marshal Stalin made a cryptic offer to meet Mr Eisenhower.<sup>12</sup> To this a cautious reply was given.<sup>13</sup> Mr Churchill is at present on his way to the United States to meet Mr Eisenhower.<sup>14</sup> Meanwhile, in Russia and in China, fierce attacks have been made on our Resolution on Korea. From such indications as we can obtain, it would appear that the Chinese Government is much closer to the Soviet Union than it was some time ago.

10. Reports of conflicts in the prisoners of war camps in Korea have been alarming.<sup>15</sup> It is difficult for any of us to say who is to blame there, but it is obvious that things are bad there. The Chinese have reacted very violently to these incidents in the prisoners of war camps.<sup>16</sup>

11. As you know, we have rejected the Anglo-American Resolution on Kashmir. Probably, Dr Graham will soon ask us formally to have talks with him. We propose to tell him that we cannot have any talks on the basis of that Resolution. Further, that no talks are likely to be fruitful unless he accepts some of the basic principles which we have pressed right from the beginning. One of these is that all Pakistan forces of any kind should get out of Kashmir State territory. Probably he will not be able to agree to this and there will, therefore, be no further talks with him. He will have to report accordingly to the Security

11. The police had to resort to lathi-charge and firing on several occasions, when the agitation organized by the Praja Parishad took a violent turn in Bhavnagar, Savarkundla, Mahuva and Palitana.
12. It was made on Christmas Day "in an endeavour to solve the Korean question."
13. While President Truman on 26 December welcomed the offer to reach an agreement, a State Department communique said that the Government "retained its view that until the Soviet Union had shown more evidence and good faith in its foreign policy, a personal meeting between the Chiefs of the two States—US and USSR—was more likely to fail than to succeed."
14. Churchill arrived in New York on 5 January 1953 to hold informal talks with both Truman and Eisenhower with a view to "make or renew the friendly contacts" between their countries.
15. During November and December 1952, stray incidents of attempts at escape from the pro-Communist prisoners of war camps were reported.
16. On 22 December, Chou En lai conveyed the Chinese protest to Lester Pearson, Chairman of the UN Assembly.



Council. I do not know what further steps the UK and the USA might wish to take at that stage or when the matter comes up before the Security Council sometime early in February. I imagine that they do not know themselves. They have got themselves into a difficult position. I have been a little surprised and much pained at the attitude of the UK and USA in this matter. I did not expect them to proceed with their Resolution in spite of our strong opposition. I think that this was definitely unfriendly and we propose to make this clear to them.

12. Vijayalakshmi Pandit, on her way back from the United Nations, has been visiting Cairo and Damascus. She has had very cordial welcome. It is evident that the Middle Eastern countries are looking towards India more and more.

13. In East Africa, the situation continues to deteriorate.<sup>17</sup> The UK Government has followed the lead given by their own colonial authorities and by the British residents there. The Africans are deeply resentful. I fear that unless the UK Government changes its policy, the situation will be very bad indeed. You may have seen that Dewan Chaman Lal, a Member of our Council of States, was invited by some East African organizations to help them in the trial of one of their leaders. He went there and his visit had at least one good result. The Africans were feeling that the local Indians had deserted them and there was much bitterness. With Dewan Chaman Lal's going there, they felt that India had not forgotten them. Dewan Chaman Lal went there not on behalf of the Government, but in his private capacity on the invitation of the East African organizations. Pritt,<sup>18</sup> the British QC, was also engaged by the defence. All kinds of difficulties were placed in the way of the defence by the Government. Pritt thereupon sent a cable to some MPs in London saying that justice was being denied.<sup>19</sup> The Magistrate trying the case considered this telegram a contempt of court.<sup>20</sup> Pritt's defence was that he had referred to the Government and not to the court. This defence was upheld by the Supreme Court there.<sup>21</sup> As a result, Pritt has become very popular, and indeed almost a hero, with the Africans. To some extent, Dewan Chaman Lal has also gained popularity. These East Africans are anxious for the help of India in various ways and it is possible that some of their representatives might come here to consult us.

17. On 5 January, the Kenyan Government issued new emergency regulations to check the Mau Mau uprising.

18. Denis Nowell Pritt (1887-1972); British lawyer; Labour MP, 1935-40, and Independent MP, 1940-50; President, British Peace Committee 1951; winner of Stalin Peace Prize, 1954.

19. On 14 December 1952.

20. Ransley Thacker, the Magistrate, said on 15 December that Pritt had accused the court of being a party to "denial of justice".

21. Pritt denied the Magistrate's charge on the same day and on 31 December, the Kenya Supreme Court declared him "not guilty of contempt of court".

14. In some parts of Bombay State, there are near famine conditions at present. This is more especially so in the Karnataka areas.<sup>22</sup> The Bombay Government is taking energetic steps to meet this situation.

15. The Education Ministry of the Government of India decided sometime ago to have a history written of our struggle for freedom. They have now appointed<sup>23</sup> a Board of historians and others for this purpose. This Board proposes first of all to collect all available material. This material includes everything that might have a possible bearing on our long struggle. I should like you and your Government to help in collecting this material.

16. The next meeting of Parliament will take place on February 11.

17. I shall be going on the 13th of January to Bombay and from there to Hyderabad for the Congress Session.<sup>24</sup> In Bombay I shall perform the opening ceremony of a machine tool factory which we are setting up at Ambernath. I am likely to stay in Hyderabad for at least a week. I shall thus not be able to send you my next fortnightly letter at the usual time.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

- 22. The worst-affected areas were the Kolar gold mine area and Pune, Sholapur, Nasik and Ahmadnagar districts. This was described by the Central Famine Investigation Committee as the worst famine in the Deccan region in thirty years.
- 23. On 2 January 1953, a board of editors was set up with Syed Mahmud as chairman.
- 24. Held from 14 to 18 January 1953.

II

New Delhi  
27 January, 1953

My dear Chief Minister,

I missed writing to you in the middle of the month. I was then away at Hyderabad attending the Congress Sessions. On my return on the afternoon of the 20th, I found a mass of work awaiting me, some urgent and requiring very early attention. Then came the preparations for Republic Day and the day itself. That day is now over, but our celebrations in connection with this great anniversary of ours still continue. You will, therefore, forgive me for this lapse on my part.

2. Republic Day was celebrated with the usual parade of Army, Navy and Air Force units as well as the Territorial Army, the National Cadet Corps and the Police. There were also a large number of school children in the procession



and a number of tableaux depicting various States in India as well as the Five Year Plan. The parade and the procession were an impressive sight and I think that the vast crowds that witnessed them were heartened by them. Our boys in the Army, Navy and Air Force bore themselves smartly and were cheered. The aircraft that flew over us were timed to perfection, more especially the jet planes that passed by at a great pace. Among the aircraft were some produced recently by the Hindustan Aircraft Ltd., at Bangalore. I am not a war-like person and I consider myself a man of peace. But I confess that it gave me pleasure to see the fine bearing and discipline of the youngmen in our defence forces. The boys and girls in the cadet corps also show much promise. I saw them separately also and was delighted with them. I wish that more of our young men and young women in colleges would join the National Cadet Corps. One new feature in the parade yesterday was a detachment of winter troops, as they are called. They carried their skis with them. I rather doubt if most people who saw them understood what they were or what the skis were meant for. They reminded us of the infinite variety of our country and of the possibility and indeed the actuality of warfare in the snowy regions of the Himalayas. These winter troops had been trained in the snow-fields above Gulmarg in Kashmir.

3. Every year an attempt is made on the civil aspect of this parade and pageant. There was more of this this year, and as you know, we had asked each State to have a representative tableau. All the States did not respond to this, but some did. The quality of these tableaux varied. Perhaps the most striking of them were from Travancore-Cochin, Himachal Pradesh and Orissa. I think that States should pay particular attention to this matter and try to have something really artistic and at the same time representative of their State. This Republic Day parade and procession is something much more than a mere show to amuse people for a while. It is symbolic of our country with its unity and variety. It is a pageant of India which, as it passes before our eyes, evokes strong emotions. It should, therefore, be dignified and artistic. It should really be representative of some aspect of this varied life of India and it should be dynamic in the sense that it looks ahead to the future that we are shaping. In it the past and the present and, to some extent, the future, must be combined.

4. I was particularly happy to see large numbers of school children take part in this memorable parade. They were of all ages from about six or seven to fifteen or so. It was pleasing to see their bright faces and straight-limbed bodies, and to think there was the India of tomorrow in the making. I hope that similar processions will be organized in future in all the States.

5. In these parades, we should pay particular attention to the Five Year Plan and all that it signifies. This can be made a powerful instrument of making our people plan-conscious and progress-minded. Each State can take up a particular type of work it is doing, agricultural or industrial or educational or health and bring that home to the people.

6. Some months ago, after my return from my tour in the North East Frontier Agency, I suggested that we should invite people from various distant parts of India to participate in the Republic Day celebrations. I am glad to say that my suggestion was adopted and more than 500 of these people, mostly tribal folk, have come here as our guests. Some of them are tribal chiefs from our border States, most of them are folk dancers. We are going to have these folk dances during the next two days and they have already attracted a great deal of attention. Indeed the demand is being made that they should stay on a little longer than was intended. I attach great value to this from the national point of view because it makes our people in Delhi more conscious of those of our countrymen who live in distant places, and it makes the latter more conscious of India as a whole. I want to produce in all of them a sensation that all this belongs to them and that they are equal partners in this great country and in our enterprises.

7. During the last month a large number of international conferences and seminars have been held in India—in Bombay,<sup>1</sup> Madras,<sup>2</sup> Lucknow<sup>3</sup> and Delhi.<sup>4</sup> We have received important guests and delegations from other countries.<sup>5</sup> India draws these people from abroad more and more and indeed, sometimes, it is a little embarrassing for us to have so many at one time. But we welcome them of course because we want them to see India as it is with all its virtues and its failings and we want our people also to come in contact with the wider world. We tend to be narrow in outlook and a dose of fresh air from outside is good for us. These visits of large numbers of foreigners to India and the holding of so many international conferences here, is some evidence of the growing importance of India in the general scheme of things. There can be no doubt that we are important in other people's eyes and there is a realization that India counts today and will count even more tomorrow in the affairs of the world. This is of course pleasing, but I confess that I am not too happy about this

1. These included the First International Study Conference on Child Welfare from 5 to 11 December, the Unesco Regional Conference on Free and Compulsory Education in South Asia and the Pacific between 12 and 23 December, and a meeting of the International Cancer Research Commission from 30 December to 2 January 1953.
2. The Sixth International Conference on Social Work was held from 21 to 27 December 1952.
3. The Central Committee of the World Council of Churches met in Lucknow from 31 December 1952 to 9 January 1953.
4. The Asian Students' Convention, the Unesco Seminar on Status of Women and the Unesco International Seminar on Gandhism were held in New Delhi between 20 December 1952 and 5 January 1953.
5. C.R. Attlee arrived on 5 January 1953; goodwill missions came from Japan and Yugoslavia, a press delegation from Iran was in India for a month and the visit of the Indonesian trade delegation was followed by the signing of a trade agreement between the two countries on 31 January 1953.



rapid increase in India's prestige all over the world. Politically speaking, we rank high in the world and what we say or do counts. But that thrusts additional responsibility upon us. I would have liked to keep free of foreign entanglements so that we might devote ourselves to our tasks at home. But there is no escaping the destiny that must pursue India as an independent country.

8. That destiny is inevitable, but it is a dangerous companion and it makes great demands upon us. If we do not live up to it, we fail and we fail badly, for the standards by which we shall be judged are those dictated by that destiny. There is always a danger of our feeling a little intoxicated by the high position that we are beginning to occupy in political affairs in the world and forgetting that ultimately a country's strength depends upon its economic position and the prosperity of its people. Just as military strength, divorced from strong economic foundations, cannot last and may well be a delusion so also political prestige cannot last long without that basic economic foundation. We come back therefore to the problem of dealing with our economic issues in such a way as to harness all our available energy in order to advance as rapidly as possible. There is the Five Year Plan which has been fashioned after much thought to organize and accelerate that advance. I have no doubt that it is within the framework of that Plan that we must work. That does not mean that we are tied down to it and cannot vary it, if we so choose, or go ahead even faster than it indicates. I think we can do this provided only we as a nation set our minds and hearts to it. Economic strength means greater production of national wealth. It means greater employment in these wealth-producing activities, greater consumption of what we produce. Production and consumption are tied up together just as employment and production must be tied up. I am concerned at some evidence of a lessening of purchasing power in the people. That means lesser capacity to consume and that must become a drag on production. That again would lead to more unemployment and less purchasing power. And so, we get into a vicious circle. If we employ more people gainfully and productively, we not only add to our production, but also add to the purchasing capacity of the people. Each helps the other and thus the wheels of industry go ever faster and faster. The snag is that if we do not take care, there may be a lag between the production and the consumption, or we may be unable to meet the demands of the consumer who has got additional purchasing power. That would lead to inflation, which, unless checked, might completely upset the apple cart in the long run. If we can effectively check inflation, then we can go ahead with some speed in providing more employment and more production.

9. More and more, I think of solving our national problem in terms of employment. Indeed the Welfare State, of which we talk so much, must necessarily mean gainful employment for all. We cannot produce this by magic or by some sleight of hand, but every policy that we pursue must keep the

question of employment in the forefront. The Welfare State is a partnership of all the people in the benefits as well as the responsibilities of the State and it must create that sensation of partnership also. People who are unemployed not only do not share in the benefits, but can have no sensation of partnership. They cannot be adjusted socially and become a drag on the community and sometimes even worse. It is no good blaming them. The fault lies with the community or with the social structure which the community adopts.

10. So long as we lived in some kind of static economy, and even so long as our minds were directed towards the achievement of independence, social forces were, to some extent, kept in check, but with the attainment of national independence these revolutionary social forces were unleashed. They cannot be ignored or otherwise disposed of so long as they do not find a new equilibrium and the people generally are not much better off economically. It is in terms of these people that we have always to think, both as producers and consumers. Often, our thinking is governed by past habit and the people become an abstract entity, who have to be looked after to some extent, because otherwise they might give trouble, but who are expected to function in their limited and restricted sphere. We hardly think of them as consumers, except of the basic and primary necessity of life. We think of them as some adjuncts in the process of production, playing a minor role in it. That outlook is no longer adequate. Indeed, unless these people have enough consuming power, even our production cannot go far and the rapid progress that we envisage will be checked.

11. Our Five Year Plan envisages an expenditure of over Rs 2,000 crores. After allowing for some foreign aid, and even for deficit financing upto Rs 290 crores, we have considerable sum, amounting to Rs 365 crores which is uncovered by our expectation of the finances available to us during this period. We can hardly get this money from external sources and we cannot possibly allow our Plan to shrink for lack of money. Thus, we have to face the difficult problem of filling this gap from internal resources, beyond those that we have already taken into consideration. Some part of it may come from taxation, though it is difficult to go far in that direction. If taxation decreases the purchasing power of our people too much, it will act as a drag on production and industrial activity. Therefore, we shall have largely to rely on borrowing internally for productive purposes. We have not had too much success in this in the past, because the old investing public has changed greatly and is partly not in a position to invest as it used to and partly is not in a mood to do it. If any programme of internal borrowing is to be pursued vigorously, we have to address ourselves to the smaller investor who was not taken into consideration previously. We have to give him inducements and add some new appeal other than purely financial.

12. We have recently had a long drawn out agitation in Saurashtra against



the sales tax there. The Saurashtra sales tax is probably the lightest and the simplest of sales tax in any State and yet, curiously enough, this has led to this persistent agitation. I have no doubt that that sales tax is justifiable and necessary. The old states in Saurashtra had a peculiar economy. They subsisted chiefly on their customs revenue derived from the rest of India, and on smuggling. Both these important sources have now dried up and the economy of Saurashtra has been badly hit. Unless something is done to add to its income, it will not be a viable State. These obvious facts are apparently not appreciated by some classes or groups in Saurashtra and they have given much trouble. All this shows that our people have not fully understood the problem before us and there are of course plenty of opposition groups who try to confuse them still further. I think that where an attempt is made to explain fully, that attempt succeeds. We have to take our people into our full confidence and not merely order them about. We live in a democratic set-up, and unless we gain the goodwill and approval of the people, we cannot carry through any policy.

13. The Jammu agitation about which I have written to you previously, is again a remarkable instance of folly or of mischief. A person of ordinary intelligence can see that this agitation must prove harmful to the interests of Jammu and India both and plays into the hands of Pakistan. And yet, outwardly it is carried on in the name of closer union with India. The whole question of Jammu and Kashmir State is, as you know, exceedingly intricate and is tied up today with international affairs. For any organization to start an agitation which must necessarily impinge on these international factors to our disadvantage is the height of unwisdom. And yet certain communal organizations in India, notably the Jan Sangh, the RSS, and the Akali Dal, have thrown their full weight in support of this agitation. It is clear that the objective of these organizations is not confined to Jammu and that they are aiming at bigger quarry. Their dislike of the Government of India and the secular policy that it pursues is so great that, in order to injure it, they are prepared presumably even to do harm to our relationship with Jammu and Kashmir State. You will remember that some months ago, after prolonged talks, we arrived at an agreement with the Jammu and Kashmir Government and this was ratified by Parliament. The purpose of this agitation is to upset that agreement. That is bad from the national point of view as well as the international. To ask for Jammu province to have a closer union with India is to encourage the disruption of the Jammu and Kashmir State with all the evil consequences that must flow from it. Indeed, Jammu province itself might disintegrate. Our position *vis-a-vis* Kashmir Valley inevitably weakens very greatly. Indeed, if that disruption takes place, we have hardly any position left in the Valley. Even now, the Jammu agitation is having an adverse effect in the Valley.<sup>6</sup>

6. Hartals in several towns in Jammu province affected business and normal life.

14. But, even apart from the effect on Jammu or Kashmir, this agitation is so basically communal and opposed to our policy that to surrender to it in any way would mean a complete reversal of the all-India policy that we have pursued. So long as the present Government of India is functioning, this cannot happen. Unfortunately, many people do not realize all these consequences. It is true that in a number of matters the Jammu and Kashmir State has a somewhat larger autonomy, by agreement with us, than other States. That is the result of certain historical, political and international factors which cannot be ignored, however much we may wish to do so. The way to a closer union is not by compulsion or by this kind of agitation, which is an attempt at compulsion, but by developing closer association in many ways, other than legal and constitutional, and by a feeling of confidence in and reliance on each other. It is this very feeling that is likely to be shaken by this agitation.

15. The land reforms in the Jammu and Kashmir State have naturally hit the old landlord element hard both in the Valley of Kashmir and in Jammu. Some people in Jammu have perhaps suffered more because land in the Valley is richer and more fertile than some of the land in Jammu province. Hence a uniform ceiling is somewhat more to the disadvantage of some of these people in Jammu. Then there is the fact of demobilization of part of the Kashmir State forces, as was done in the other old princely states in India. Naturally, this has caused some distress and, I am afraid we, in the Government of India, have been rather slow in dealing with the claims of this demobilized personnel. That is the responsibility of our Defence Ministry and not of the Jammu and Kashmir Government. We are trying to expedite this matter.

16. The basic fact is that under the Maharaja's rule in the Jammu and Kashmir State the people of Jammu had a sensation of being the ruling class in the State. They belonged to the Maharaja's clan. They were taken in the army, when no Kashmiri proper, whether Hindu or Muslim was admitted in the Kashmir State forces. Since the accession of the J&K state to India, this position has changed completely. Jammu is no longer the dominant partner in the State. In theory it is an equal partner, but it may be true that somewhat more attention has been paid to the development of the Kashmir Valley than of Jammu province. That matter can and no doubt will be remedied. The difficulty of course is that of finance. All kinds of unfounded charges are made, such as that Jammu people are not taken into the services. Most people imagine that this means that Hindus are deliberately kept out of the services of the State. This is demonstrably untrue and the number of Hindus occupying responsible positions in the State is very considerable. Indeed, apart from some changes, the old services continue. It is true that in Jammu some of the Hindu officials are from the Kashmir Valley. The reason for this previously, as now, was that



the Kashmir Hindus were peculiarly adaptable to service and educationally much more advanced. They prospered in other parts of India too including the other princely states. The Jammu people were partly the Rajputs, who looked down on the services and were either the business elements and partly the landlords or in the state forces. Educationally they were generally backward. The changes that have taken place in the J&K State have thus inevitably hit them. This is no fault of the State Government. I might mention that the State militia, which has been raised during the last five years, consists very largely of Jammu people, especially Rajputs. Kashmiris do not take kindly to the profession of arms in any shape. Again, it is interesting to note that since the trouble with Pakistan all trade with Kashmir goes through Jammu. Previously most of this went through the Rawalpindi route. Thus, the Jammu merchants occupy a much more important position now than they did previously. And yet they are among those who shout most in the course of this agitation. Jammu city has grown largely during the last few years and there is a considerable proportion of displaced persons there. There is difficulty of accommodation and even more so of water supply. There is unemployment. All these are common difficulties in other cities of India and we try our best to deal with them.

17. It is probable that the Indian communal organizations will endeavour to create as much trouble as possible when Parliament reopens, and have demonstrations, etc. I am greatly distressed at this exhibition of utter irresponsibility. One can only understand it if one realizes that all this has the larger objective of weakening the Government of India at whatever national cost. We cannot give in to this and we must face these communal developments, wherever they occur, with all our strength.

18. We are going to have another series of talks on the Kashmir issue with Dr Graham. We made it perfectly clear that we would not submit in any way to the last Resolution passed by the Security Council. Therefore, that Resolution has been put on the shelf and bypassed. We shall talk again on the basis of the two Resolutions passed by the UN Commission in August 1948 and January 1949. We have taken a somewhat unusual step to ask Shri Girja Shankar Bajpai, Governor of Bombay, to act as our representative during these talks. We felt that he ought to go as he was fully acquainted with the previous history of this case and more particularly with the conversations we had with the UN Commission when those Resolutions were passed. He will, therefore, leave for Geneva, where the talks are going to be held, on February 1. In his place we have requested Shri Mangaldas Pakvasa to undertake the duties of Governor during Shri Bajpai's absence.

19. The Hyderabad Session of the Congress was notable in many ways. Outwardly it was very well organized and was an obvious success. It was a success also in other ways and the Session exhibited considerable vitality. There were many new and young faces among the delegates. It is rather odd that the

Congress is often criticized from two opposite points of view. Some of our critics are never tired of saying that it is on the point of disintegration and that there is no unity of outlook in it. Others repeat that the Congress has no originality or vitality left in it and just says ditto to what Government does. Both of these criticisms cannot obviously be true. The fact is that the Congress, like any vital organization, contains within its fold people with somewhat varying opinions, although there is a basic unity of outlook. Also it is true that the Congress works on the whole in line with the governmental policy. This is inevitable as the Government are controlled by Congressmen.

20. I am sending you separately copies of my Presidential address to the Congress and of the resolutions passed there. I would draw your special attention to five of these resolutions. The one on Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan contains nothing new, but the fact that we have passed it now has a certain significance. We have avoided doing so in the past, because we felt that this might be exploited by Pakistan to the disadvantage of Badshah Khan. But we felt strongly that to remain silent any longer on this continuing outrage was improper.

21. The resolution on foreign policy and the world situation is necessarily a repetition of our old basic policy, though it is worded to meet recent developments. It is rather extraordinary how some of our critics complain that we go on repeating the same thing. When our President addresses Parliament the criticism is made that he has merely repeated what Government has been saying. It is not realized that the President can do nothing else and that he is the mouthpiece of Government. So also in the Congress our foreign policy is basic, whatever minor changes it may undergo from time to time. The Congress, therefore, has to repeat that basic policy. Of course, a foreign policy, apart from this basic approach, is not a single integrated policy but is really an aggregate of policies *vis-a-vis* a number of other countries. Our general approach is first of all to seek peace and to avoid war. Secondly, to help, in so far as we can, in the ending of colonialism and imperialism or any other form of domination by one country over another. Thirdly, to put an end to racial inequality. These are our objectives. We cannot give effect to them because the world is not under our control. But we try to do what we can to help somewhat in their realization.

22. We want peace in the world not only because it is obviously good in itself and is essential for any human progress, but also because war will bring terrible consequences in its train. It may destroy modern civilization and put an end to all thought of progress for a long time to come. For us, who are so intent on going ahead and building up new India, it will mean a terrible setback. If war comes on a big scale, the result is bound to be bad, regardless of victors and vanquished. War today is something very different from what it was even ten years ago. The atomic and hydrogen bombs have changed all previous conceptions of warfare. If we cannot have a real peace and cooperation between



nations in the world, the next best thing is to try to avoid the outbreak of war on a large scale in the hope that this may give the world an opportunity some time later of arriving at peaceful settlements. If again war breaks out, in spite of endeavours to the contrary, then we shall keep out of it and try to keep as many other countries as possible out of it also. It will be some gain if a part of the earth's surface is kept out of this terrific conflict between giants.

23. That is the reason why we have refused to align ourselves with either of the two great power blocs and why we are not agreeable to joining either the Middle East Defence organization<sup>7</sup> or the South East Asia one.<sup>8</sup> You must have read recently about the possibility of Pakistan joining the former. This has been denied,<sup>9</sup> but the terms of denial almost indicate a partial acceptance of the charge. There is no doubt in my mind that the Pakistan Government have been carrying on talks with other Governments in this matter, although they may have not come to any agreement.<sup>10</sup> Their main difficulty is that public opinion in Pakistan is definitely opposed to it. The Pakistan Government is not a strong Government and is full of internal discord. Probably, if they enter this MEDO, they will meet with very stiff opposition in their own country and will also fall out to some extent with the Arab countries. I made some reference to Pakistan joining the MEDO at Hyderabad. I made it clear that it was not our intention to interfere with Pakistan in this matter, but it was obvious that any such development would have far-reaching consequences for us. It would mean that the cold war had come right to our north-western frontiers. If a shooting war started, it would also mean its very near approach to India, because then

7. In October 1951, Britain, France, Turkey, and the USA proposed a plan for defence of the Middle East against the Soviet Union. The setting up of a new Allied Middle East Command was supported by Australia, New Zealand and South Africa in November 1951.
8. The plan of the Western Powers to defend South East Asia against "Communist aggression" was formalized by the signing of the South East Asia Defence Treaty on 8 September 1954 at Manila by USA, UK, France, Pakistan, Philippines and Thailand.
9. In London, on 19 November 1952, Ghulam Mohammad, the Governor-General of Pakistan, denied the reports.
10. Nehru said in Parliament on 30 November 1952 that the various statements although "somewhat contradictory" indicated that "this matter has been under discussion between the Governments of Pakistan and the USA for some time past."

Pakistan would be involved in it. Any entry of Pakistan into such a pact would affect the present equilibrium in Western Asia and we could not remain indifferent to it. Hence our concern.

24. So far as we know, the Arab countries have no present intention of joining MEDO. I cannot guarantee what the future may hold, but, in any event, Egypt will not join till its own conflicts and controversies with the UK are settled to its satisfaction. Such a settlement does not appear to be near at present.

25. In the past, Indian armies were used to garrison Middle-Eastern countries on behalf of the United Kingdom. If Pakistan joins MEDO, an attempt will, no doubt, be made to use Pakistan armies to garrison the Middle East. It is doubtful if this will be welcomed in any of these Arab countries. On the other hand, this pact may lead to foreign bases being established and foreign armies being planted, in the name of defence, in the Middle-Eastern countries as well as perhaps in Pakistan. All this has serious consequences and is a reversal of the process of withdrawal of foreign armies which took place at the end of the last War. It is in fact a going back to some extent to the old colonial times.

26. Another resolution of the Congress to which I would like to draw your attention is that on the Five Year Plan.<sup>11</sup> I need not say much about it or stress its importance. The next resolution deals with disapproval of communal activities about which I have already written and which I consider vital. The resolution on the Reorganization of States<sup>12</sup> touched on delicate matters which rouse much feeling in certain parts of the country. The Congress resolution was framed after long consultations and debate. The very description of this resolution as one relating to the Reorganization of States emphasizes a different approach to the problem and brings out certain other factors which are as important as a linguistic factor. There is no theoretical objection to such reorganization and to some extent it is bound to come, but we have emphasized that, first of all, it must be preceded by a full consideration of the problem in all its aspects, and, secondly, that it must not upset all our planning and progress or weaken India. Wisdom and expediency both require that we must go slow and for the present

11. The resolution passed on 18 January 1953 welcomed "the recommendations in the Plan in regard to land policy and the emphasis laid on the expansion and strengthening of village and small scale industries, and the building of the community on cooperative lines." The Congress invited "all the people of the country" to cooperate in "this great enterprise and magnificent adventure of building up new India."

12. Adopted on 18 January, the resolution reiterated the party's "faith in the way of peace and the methods of persuasion for the solution of outstanding problems, national and international", and condemned the "communal bitterness" roused in the country by some communal organizations, especially "in the affairs of Jammu and Kashmir State, which is fraught with grave evil... which can only lead to the disintegration of the State and most unfortunate consequences."



at least give a chance to our Five Year Plan. The Andhra State will no doubt come into existence fairly soon<sup>13</sup> and yet, even in this relatively simple matter, we are experiencing a great many difficulties.

27. We had a food conference in Delhi which was attended by Food Ministers from the States.<sup>14</sup> I was astonished to find that we are still in the habit of making almost impossible demands on the Centre. If these demands represent reality, then indeed the outlook is bleak. We cannot make any progress if this terrible burden of food imports continues. The more we reduce it, the more scope we get for industrial advance. I do hope that each State will realize this vital aspect of the question and reduce its reliance on imports.

28. It may interest you to know that the average daily figures of movement between East and West Bengal for the fortnight ending 31st December 1952 were as follows:-

From East to West Bengal ...	Hindus - 255
	Muslims - 103
From West to East Bengal ...	Hindus - 398
	Muslims - 189

These figures are much smaller than the previous ones, before the passport system was introduced. It is interesting to note, however, that there is a slight excess of people going to East Bengal from West Bengal. The passport regulations are causing a good deal of inconveniences. A conference is going to be held with Pakistan soon to try to remove these inconveniences.

29. General Cariappa, Commander-in-Chief, Army, retired after his full term some days ago<sup>15</sup> and General Rajendrasinhji<sup>16</sup> has been appointed in his place.<sup>17</sup> Just before General Cariappa's retirement I was happy to go to Ambarnath<sup>18</sup> to open a fine new factory for machine tools needed for defence.

30. The United Nations General Assembly will be meeting again at its adjourned session about the 24th of February. We are sending a smaller delegation this time. The leader will be, as before, Vijayalakshmi Pandit and the other delegate will be Shri V.K. Krishna Menon. The principal subjects are likely to be Korea and disarmament. It is difficult to say now what attitude we shall have to take up in regard to the Korean impasse. We shall have to wait and see. Much depends upon the attitude of the new US Government. As for

13. The Andhra State was formally inaugurated by Nehru on 1 October 1953.

14. On 8-9 January 1953.

15. On 14 January 1953.

16. General Maharaj Rajendrasinhji (1889-1964); joined the army in 1921; served in Egypt and North Africa, 1941; G.O.C.-in-C., East and South Command, 1948-1953; Chief of Staff, Indian Army, 1953-1955.

17. On 15 January 1953.

18. On 13 January 1953.

disarmament, we are no doubt all in favour of it, but to discuss it when the world is constantly thinking of preparing for war appears to be artificial in the extreme yet, it is better to discuss these matters than to break up and plunge into war. Some people think that certain recent statements by Marshal Stalin indicate that he might take some step towards a peaceful settlement of some of the outstanding problems.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

### III

New Delhi  
1 March, 1953

My dear Chief Minister,<sup>1</sup>

I am sending you a note<sup>2</sup> on the tribal people in Manipur. This deals more especially with the Nagas in those areas. The note has been drawn up by an expert<sup>3</sup> who went there at the instance of the Governor of Assam.<sup>4</sup>

This note<sup>5</sup> brings out some of the difficult problems we have to face in these areas. We are apt, too often, to forget that our country has a variety of people who differ from each other greatly and who have often to be dealt with separately. This applies to all tribal people in India, but more particularly to

1. A Special Letter in addition to the Fortnightly Letters.

2. Not printed

3. Verrier Elwin (1902-1964); English anthropologist who worked amongst the tribals in Central and North East India and became an Indian citizen in 1954; Deputy Director, Department of Anthropology, Government of India, 1946-49 and Adviser for Tribal Affairs, NEFA, 1954; member, Scheduled Tribes Commission, 1960-61; awarded Padma Bhushan, 1961; wrote *Folksongs of Chhatisgarh* (1944), *The Religion of an Indian Tribe* (1955), *Myths of North East Frontier* (1958) and *The Tribal World of Verrier Elwin* (1964).

4. Elwin visited Manipur and other areas for six weeks and submitted his report to Jairamdas Doulatram, the Governor of Assam, on 2 January 1953.

5. The note while stating that the people desired "a separate state and westernization", attributed the growing conditions of "stress and tension" to the persisting conflict between the Government and the people, the Nagas and the Kukis, the Christians and non-Christians and to the decay of the traditional arts. It suggested that the right kind of officials should be appointed, good literature about India be distributed among the Nagas, and a few sympathetic people be settled amongst them to "strengthen their love of their own culture."



those in the North-East Frontier, who have hardly had any contact with the political or cultural life of India in the past.

We have, therefore, to proceed not only cautiously in this matter, but with deep understanding and sympathy. Unfortunately, most of us have not given much thought to this matter and we treat these people in the same way as we would treat others. Often we try to impose our ways on them, imagining that we are doing them good. As a matter of fact, we merely alienate them and, at the same time, probably injure them in many ways. They lose their artistic way of life and become drab imitations of something else.

In the North-East Frontier Province, the problem is political also, apart from its social and economic aspect. It requires the most careful, sympathetic and understanding approach. Officers dealing with tribal people should always be very carefully chosen and should have this understanding. They should never try to impose themselves upon them. Their approach should be a friendly one. They should meet them on an equal level and try to participate in their life and their games as much as possible. Only thus can we win them over.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

#### IV

New Delhi  
3 March, 1953

My dear Chief Minister,

I am writing to you after a full month as I missed the middle of the month letter. I am very sorry for these repeated lapses on my part, but work has been very heavy and the passing of a valued colleague,<sup>1</sup> Shri Gopalaswami Ayyangar, has not only been a blow, but has added to that work. I have been functioning as Defence Minister in addition to my other duties. This, of course, is an unsatisfactory arrangement and cannot and should not last for long. I was anxious, however, to gain some insight into the working of our Defence Ministry and, therefore, decided to have charge of it for some time. The Defence Ministry is one of our most important Ministries. As a matter of fact, I have kept some touch with it right from the beginning, ever since I became the Prime Minister. Not only with the Ministry, but with our senior officers and even occasionally

1. On 10 February 1953.

the men in our Army, Navy and Air Force, I have tried to maintain personal contacts. I attached importance to this.

2. During this last month, a great deal has happened and I would have liked to write to you about many of these events, but I can hardly burden this letter with what happened a month ago. Parliament was opened on the 11th February by the President who delivered an Address on that occasion. You must have read that Address. It was, necessarily, a prosaic account of events and developments and yet it contained, I think, enough, to make us feel that we were making good progress. As usual, our opponents criticized it<sup>2</sup> and referred in eloquent terms to the poverty of India, to the distress in scarcity areas, to unemployment and the like. We are all aware of this and we have to battle against it. But, it seems to me singularly pointless and ineffective to lay continuous stress on this dark side of the picture in India and perhaps to expect some magic change. Nations do not progress by magical leaps. They have to build themselves up by their labours and the speed of that building up depends on many factors, chiefly the resources at our disposal and the energy and enthusiasm we put into our work. These resources have been carefully considered by the Planning Commission. Possibly, we might organize them better. Let us consider that by all means. But we cannot produce something like a juggler, out of nothing. So far as the energy and enthusiasm are concerned, our opponents and sometimes even our friends are never tired of bewailing the lack of them in the country and thus helping actively in producing an atmosphere of depression and frustration. I suppose each person is apt to find outside what he has inside himself.

3. I am very conscious of the difficulties we have to face, but I am equally conscious of the progress we are making. In a great country like India, one can pick out what one likes, both of good and ill. But I think there is little doubt that we are going ahead and laying strong foundations for future progress at a more rapid pace. Indeed, I am often filled with a sense of excitement at the things we are doing all over the country. The reports that reach me also point out to the fact that there is a fair degree of enthusiasm in our people. I should like it to be greater and less spasmodic, but it is there where work is done.

4. Recently, I went to the Damodar Valley to open the Tilaiya dam and the Bokaro thermal power station.<sup>3</sup> I also saw the other great dams built there. The sight of those works filled me, as it did others who were present, with a sense of great achievement. They are mighty works of which any country can be proud. And yet, how many of us, including our legislators, realize the greatness of these undertakings and what India is building today for the future?

2. The President's Address was debated in Parliament between 13 and 16 February 1953.

3. On 21 February 1953.



All our attention is directed to criticism about relatively petty matters. We do not see the wood for the trees.

5. It is no good my complaining, because it is our fault if we cannot put across to our people the magnitude of the work that is being done in India at present. The Planning Commission brings out some material which is usually bulky and heavy. I hope they will come out with something lighter and more easily read. I am anxious that we should reach our people in the villages as well as in the towns with some kind of a record of the work that has been done and that is going to be done. Ultimately, what counts is the approach to our rural millions. I have come to feel more and more that that approach should be visual and through documentary films. These will go much further and will create a much more vivid impression on our people than pamphlets and the like, though the latter are also necessary. We have not explored this avenue enough, although it is the obvious method of approach even in a literate community and much more so among people who are largely illiterate. I think our Films Division of the Central Government, our Planning Commission and our State Governments, should cooperate in putting about the numerous developmental activities that are going on all over the country. This will include not only great works like the Damodar Valley, Bhakra Nangal, Hirakud, etc., but also the community projects and the numerous smaller projects and instances of voluntary labour and the like in building canals, wells, roads, etc. It is not enough to give just a glimpse of something being done. It should be a longer and more educative picture and it should be taken in mobile vans to remote villages. Of course, it should be shown in our cinemas also, but I attach more importance to the approach to the villages. We should definitely aim now at educating our village folk through films. By this means also, we shall produce that understanding and enthusiasm that we wish to develop, and, at the same time, a certain unity of outlook in our national planning.

6. More and more it is being realized in other parts of the world that we in India are engaged in a mighty adventure. To build up this country and to solve the problems of poverty and unemployment in a democratic way on this scale is something that has not been done anywhere. The magnitude of the task and the difficulties we have to overcome may sometimes oppress us, but, at the same time, they should fill us with the enthusiasm that great undertakings bring with them. Probably the next five to ten years are the critical years for us. If we carry on during this period as a stable, progressive country, making good and advancing, then we have succeeded and we have little to fear in the future. Even if the pace is not quite so fast as we would like it to be, the mere fact of continuous progress on a stable basis would be a triumph for large-scale democratic working. There is danger in our becoming static and slow-moving; there is equally danger in trying to go faster than circumstances or our resources permit us to do. The middle course, the golden mean is always difficult.

7. We have set before us the ideal of the Welfare State. The President referred to this in his Address. The Welfare State means welfare for all and not for a section of the community only. It means productive and gainful employment for all and the removal of the grave disparities in incomes and methods of living that exist in India today. We get used to these, but every foreigner who comes here is struck even now by these great disparities. How are we to get rid of them? Some of our friends suggest, as if that was some magic remedy, nationalization all round or a reduction of higher salaries, etc. Except for a few, salaries are not high in India now. Where possible, we should try to reduce them. But merely to distribute poverty does not mean progress. In order to go ahead, we have to try to maintain some standards somewhere. That does not mean affluence for some and poverty for the rest, still less does it mean vulgar display which unfortunately is still rather common with a few of our people. As for nationalization, the real test is how far this adds to our productive capacity as well as to the smoother working of our Plan. Mere nationalization does not add to that productive capacity much, if at all. It might indeed mean a lessening of it. At the most it means a transfer of ownership with the same production and the available resources being utilized for compensation. It is far better to use our resources for new State enterprises, leaving the old ones to carry on as they are, subject to some kind of control by the State. Thus production grows and the public sector grows till it becomes the dominant sector.

8. The problems of today in India or elsewhere cannot be solved by some purely academic approach or by a dogmatic creed of yesterday. Most of us, I suppose, believe in a socialistic approach and in socialistic ideals. But when these are thought of in terms of some rigid formulae, developed in Europe in the nineteenth century, they need not necessarily apply to India in the middle of the twentieth century. Even economic science is not so static and conditions have changed greatly.

9. Thus far we see a full-blooded socialism, if that is the right term, working in Communist countries, together with an accompaniment of authoritarian control and an absence of the democratic approach. That is, practically everything is State-controlled and that develops bureaucracy in an extreme measure, apart from suppressing individual freedom. Certain economic results are undoubtedly obtained that way, but the price paid is heavy. In other countries which aim at socialism, though of a different variety, inevitably, there is some kind of a mixed economy, though the quality of the mixture may vary. Indeed, I am inclined to think that in a democratic society, a so-called mixed economy is inevitable, though the public sector may grow and be the dominant partner. The private sector however will continue to have an important place, but the major industries would tend to be in the public sector. We have laid down that in a planned economy the private sector has to conform to the national plan



and therefore has to be controlled to some extent. That appears to be obvious if we are to have any planning. But this leads to a difficulty. The private sector has a different outlook and approach and cannot easily function if there is too much control. It thus ceases to have the advantages attaching to the public sector as well as to the private sector. The other day some industrialists came to see me and said that they would be very happy to cooperate fully with the Five Year Plan. But it was becoming increasingly difficult for them to function effectively with so many restrictions and controls. It was better they said, that an industry was taken over by the public sector completely than left in a hamstrung condition in the private sector. These people exaggerated somewhat, but I think there was some truth in what they said. It is better to take over an industry in the public sector and organize it as such and to allow the industries left to the private sector some freedom of movement, subject of course to some basic considerations. I am mentioning these matters to you so that we might give thought to them.

10. As for our resources, it is clear that we have to depend essentially on our country and our own people. We can welcome help from abroad, but it cannot take us far. I have a feeling that we have enough in this country provided we can reach it. The difficulty is that it is spread out and not easily accessible. We have, of course, the small savings scheme and this is important and should be encouraged. But perhaps some additional approach would bring in larger resources at our disposal. If we had a large number of rural banks, they would not only serve as agencies for giving credit to the farmer, and thus replacing the old *bania*, but they would also attract small pools of money which, in the aggregate, may amount to a very big sum.

11. I should like to draw your attention to one aspect which somewhat distresses me. We appear to be forgetting the old swadeshi urge. Many of us, who have been bred up in the swadeshi tradition and have been taught to avoid foreign goods, are rather upset at the absence of this spirit of swadeshi in our people at present. Officially we restrict our imports, etc., but the whole psychology of our people appears to have changed or to have become passive in this matter. I think we should encourage the swadeshi spirit actively.

12. Parliament is going on from day to day and is now considering the budget.<sup>4</sup> Our budgets are likely to be more and more in line with the Five Year Plan and, therefore, nothing very new or extraordinary is likely to happen in regard to them. I hope you will agree with me that, considering everything, the budget is satisfactory and reveals a progressive economy. Nevertheless, the financial resources at our disposal grow less and we have to be very careful in the future. State Governments ask us for grants and loans and subsidies. I

4. The railway and general budgets were presented to Parliament on 18 and 27 February and the Finance Bill was passed on 18 April 1953.

realize that their need is often great. But where are these grants and loans, etc., to come from? We have to tighten our belts everywhere. In particular, we must concentrate on solving the food problem and reducing our food imports to nil.

13. I have written to you repeatedly at some length about the Jammu Praja Praja Parishad agitation. Much was said about this in the course of the debates in Parliament on the President's Address.<sup>5</sup> There has been a slight lull in this agitation, but this should not mislead us or make us complacent. Unfortunately, the Praja Parishad people and their sympathizers in the communal organizations in India feel that they have gone too far to withdraw and they still continue to think of giving trouble in a big way. I cannot imagine a greater folly or anything more harmful from the national as well as international points of view than this Jammu agitation. It is a symbol of that extremely narrow-minded and bigoted outlook which has been the curse of our country in the past. If this agitation is resumed in a big way anywhere, we shall have to meet it with our full force because we cannot submit to this kind of thing.

14. Master Tara Singh, the Akali leader, was arrested by the East Punjab Government some days ago for disobedience of an order under Section 144. An attempt is being made to rouse up the Sikhs on the plea of interference with their religious ceremonies. As a matter of fact, the District Magistrate was agreeable to giving permission for the particular meeting provided an assurance was given that it would deal with religious matters only. No such assurance was given so he refused permission.

15. In Pepsu, an extraordinary situation has arisen. Since the general election, the parties in the local Assembly have been rather evenly balanced and there have been some individuals there who are apparently always prepared to offer themselves to the highest bidder. Public life in the Pepsu has been a nasty affair. Recently a number of Members of the Assembly have been unseated by the election tribunals and a large number of election petitions are still pending. It is expected that out of sixty Members, twenty-five might be unseated. Among those unseated is the Chief Minister himself as well as some other Ministers. In these circumstances, it is obvious that the Chief Minister and other unseated Ministers cannot continue in their offices.<sup>6</sup> To have twenty-five

5. While Congress members feared that the Praja Parishad agitation portended danger for the State and the country, Opposition members like H.N. Kunzru, Acharya Narendra Deva, N.B. Khare and Nandlal Sharma characterized as repressive the Government measures to deal with the situation. When N.C. Chatterjee said that "Praja Parishad is fighting Muslim communalism in Jammu", Nehru retorted that "the agitation was being exploited by people with a communal outlook", and declared that its net effect would be to "give aid and comfort to the enemies of India."

6. The non-Congress Ministry headed by Gian Singh Rarewala resigned on 1 March 1953.



bye-elections and then possibly to have to face instability still in Government hardly appears desirable. We are, therefore, driven to the conclusion that there should be general elections in Pepsu<sup>7</sup> and we hope they will result in some party emerging with a majority. This means President's rule for the period before the new elections.<sup>8</sup> This has nothing to do with showing favour or disfavour to any party or group. It is the natural consequence of the present impasse. But no doubt it will be criticized as if it was meant to discriminate against a Sikh Ministry. This is completely untrue.

16. The Andhra State question is before us with Justice Wanchoo's report.<sup>9</sup> This report has not been published yet. But there is a great deal of excitement and speculation in Madras and elsewhere in regard to some of the issues, notably the capital issue. We hope to come to a decision about this matter in the course of the next two or three weeks.

17. Early in February there was the usual annual conference of Governors and Rajpramukhs. This is becoming a very interesting meeting where discussions are useful and helpful.<sup>10</sup>

18. In foreign affairs, there has been no positive development and yet the sense of apprehension has grown. This is largely due to certain announcements made by the new administration in the USA, more particularly the one relating to Formosa and China. As soon as this announcement was made, many people thought that it would result in an extension of war in the Far East.<sup>11</sup> The chance of this happening in the near future is not great, but the apprehension continues because of various statements continually being made in America, among them being a proposal to blockade China.<sup>12</sup> The new administration in the USA has not come out clearly with its policy. All that we know is that it has a certain

7. The elections were held in February 1954.
8. President's rule was imposed in Pepsu on 5 March 1953.
9. The report was submitted to the Union Home Minister on 7 February 1953.
10. The conference held discussions on 4 and 5 February 1953 on problems of law and order in various States, the linguistic reorganization of States, the Five Year Plan with special reference to its financial and administrative aspects, the community development projects, the system of education in the country, and the East Asian policy of the United States.
11. It was feared that the withdrawal of the Seventh Fleet would encourage the Chinese Nationalist forces to open a second front on the mainland, thus enlarging the conflict in Asia.
12. On 6 February, a Republican Conference called for a full naval blockade of People's China and believed that President Eisenhower was considering such a step. The press reported examination, in official circles, of the possibility of complete naval blockade of China and an atomic attack on her.

bent of mind<sup>13</sup> which does not take us towards peace. The General Assembly of the UN is meeting now again<sup>14</sup> and nobody there seems to know what to do with Korea.

19. In Egypt, General Neguib scored an outstanding victory in settling the Sudan question by an agreement with the United Kingdom,<sup>15</sup> as well as with the Sudanese leaders. In the course of the next four months, it is proposed to have elections in the Sudan.<sup>16</sup> Our Election Commissioner, Shri Sukumar Sen, has been lent by us to the Egyptian Government for this purpose. He will be the Chairman of the Election Commission there.<sup>17</sup>

20. In Iran, politics resemble more and more some kind of a comic opera. There appears now to be a conflict<sup>18</sup> between Premier Mossadeq and the Shah.<sup>19</sup> Meanwhile, all the outstanding questions there remain unsolved.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

13. Summing up his Government's approach, Eisenhower said: "We have learned that the free world cannot indefinitely remain in the posture of paralysed tension, leaving forever to the aggressor the choice of time and place and means to cause the greatest hurt to us at least cost to himself."
14. On 24 February 1953.
15. Anglo-Egyptian negotiations, in progress since 20 November 1952, ended in an agreement on 12 February 1953, which incorporated the Egyptian proposals to form a Governor-General's Commission, an electoral commission and a Sudanization Committee, and hold elections under the supervision of a neutral power.
16. The elections took place in November and December 1953.
17. He was nominated on 21 February to serve on the election commission in the Sudan.
18. Serious differences developed in January 1953 between the Majlis and the Government when Mossadeq sought extension of his plenary powers for another year. Differences between him and the Shah also became acute following the Government's decision to impose a tax on the royal estate and on the Shah's alleged involvement in security matters and his links with the Government's opponents. Clashes took place on 1 and 2 March between the supporters of the rival groups when the Shah's leaving the country on health grounds was suspected by his supporters to have been forced on him by the Government. Later, a committee of eight deputies was appointed by the Majlis to effect a reconciliation between Mossadeq and the Shah.
19. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (1919-1980); succeeded to the throne of Iran on the abdication of his father, Reza Shah Pahlavi in 1941; crowned himself on 26 October 1967; fled the country with his family in 1979 and died in Egypt on 27 July 1980.



## V

New Delhi  
18 March, 1953

My dear Chief Minister,

The time of the House of the People is being taken up almost entirely by debates on budget grants. These debates enable the House to discuss almost every aspect of the policy. It is not possible to discuss every budget head of every Ministry adequately. We have made a slight innovation this year and have decided to discuss only certain Ministries and leave out others. This gives more time for a proper discussion. The idea is that different Ministries might be taken in successive years and adequate time allotted to each discussion. Only a beginning has been made in this direction this year. I think it would be a good thing if provincial legislatures adopted the same practice, that is, concentrating discussion each year on some aspects of the administration and not all.

2. For the last two days, we had a debate on the External Affairs Ministry. Foreign affairs had been discussed a month earlier at the time of the debate on the President's Address. It seems to me that our Parliament spends more time in discussing foreign affairs than perhaps any Parliament elsewhere. That is all to the good, provided major policies and important matters are discussed. Unfortunately, whenever foreign affairs are mentioned, a good deal of time is taken up by Pakistan. Lately, the Jammu agitation has also figured rather prominently.<sup>1</sup> The Communist members repeat on each occasion their thesis in regard to the Soviets being the champions of peace. A frequent criticism is that our foreign policy is one of drift and that we have no friends anywhere.

3. To say that we have no friends anywhere, can only betray a woeful ignorance, unless by friends is meant some embattled nation standing by our sides. Yesterday, I wound up the debate on External Affairs. Although, I spoke for over an hour, I could only touch on some of the questions raised. I referred to our association with the Commonwealth. It is extraordinary how much misapprehension there is over this issue. It is not adequately realized that our association with the Commonwealth is completely different from that of the other Commonwealth countries. It has no legal or constitutional basis. There is nothing about it in our Constitution or in any enactment. We owe no allegiance

1. S.P. Mookerjee reiterated on 16 March that he would fight the Government's policy of repression against the Jammu agitation but assured his full support in the event of any danger to the country's integrity and security. Nehru, while welcoming Mookerjee's assurance, wondered whether it was realized that continuing the agitation and rendering "it more difficult to settle it, makes our international position more difficult."

to the British Crown and we can, if we so choose, put an end to that association whenever we so wish. We are there because we think that it is not only in no sense derogatory to our self-respect and independence, but is advantageous to us in many ways. It is a unique type of association without precedent in history. Perhaps this is the reason why people do not quite understand it and think of it in terms of the old Commonwealth bond before we became a Republic.

4. There is also some confusion about our being in the sterling area or having other economic contacts with the UK. This has nothing to do with our being in the Commonwealth. There are some countries which are not in the Commonwealth and which are yet in the sterling area. It is quite conceivable that we might not continue in the sterling area and yet be in the Commonwealth. The two are entirely separate and each has to be judged on the merits as to whether it is advantageous to us or not. Being in the Commonwealth puts no strain or obligation upon us. It gives us certain definite advantages and, in a sense, adds to our sphere of influence. The fact that countries like South Africa are also in the Commonwealth has no particular relevance in this connection. Indeed, it is South Africa that is much more embarrassed by our presence there than we are by South Africa's. It is rather an odd thing to say, but the fact is that our being in the Commonwealth gives us a certain additional freedom of action in foreign affairs.

5. The type of association which now exists between India and the UK through the Commonwealth is one which might well serve as an exemplar because it casts no obligation such as even a treaty or alliance might do. It means friendly consultation and, where possible and desirable, association in any activity. We follow that line with other countries, such as Burma, without any Commonwealth link. Indeed, we are gradually developing fairly close links with a number of Asian countries.

6. In the course of my speech in Parliament yesterday, I referred to the foreign pockets in India, which are a continuous source of irritation to all of us. I made it clear that any use of these pockets as bases in war by the colonial authority holding them or by any other foreign power would be considered an unfriendly act by us. We cannot tolerate any part of India to be used in this way. You will appreciate the importance of this declaration. I also pointed out that the gradual extension of the idea underlying NATO to the colonies of the NATO countries was dangerous and improper. It is none of our business to interfere with or object to any defence arrangement made by the NATO countries. But it does become our business to some extent if this idea of defence is extended to mean the protection of colonial domination in Asia or Africa. Unfortunately, there is this tendency and, under the guise of fighting or preparing to fight the Communist powers, colonialism is allowed to continue. This is very short-sighted policy even from the point of those colonial powers, because it means having a hostile population to deal with. That can be no help in war.



7. The General Assembly of the United Nations appears to be carrying on a rather dull and drab existence. Nobody seems to know there what active steps to take in regard to any important matter. There is a complete deadlock over the Korean issue. There is another deadlock over the election of the new Secretary-General.<sup>2</sup> I confess that this does not lead one to hope much for future of the UN. The initial blunder of not accepting the People's Government of China has led to a succession of blunders and no one knows how to get out of this impasse. Our representatives in the UN have also played a somewhat passive role. There was no point in their putting forward any new Resolution, unless that was generally acceptable. So far as our last Korean resolution was concerned, it is often said that we were against an immediate ceasefire, which Russia demanded.<sup>3</sup> That, of course, is completely untrue. Our Resolution included an immediate ceasefire. For our part, we would gladly accept this even without anything else. But it was clear that this would not be accepted unless the prisoners of war issue was also solved at the same time. Hence our attempts to solve that issue.

8. Marshal Stalin's death<sup>4</sup> has, of course, been a major event and there have been all kinds of speculations as to its consequences in the Soviet Union and elsewhere. Some people, giving way to wishful thinking, imagined that this must lead to disruptive tendencies in the Soviet Union. Nothing of the kind has happened or indeed was likely to happen. In fact, the new set-up in the Soviet Union appears to be as strong and united as any before. In Stalin's time recently there was a tendency to widen the top structure of Government. Under Malenkov,<sup>5</sup> they have gone back to a smaller authority at the top.<sup>6</sup>

2. The deadlock was resolved on 31 March when the Security Council elected Dag Hammarskjöld of Sweden as Secretary-General.
3. The Communist Powers suspected that the Resolution was inspired by the United States through Britain to use India against China. On 2 March, the Soviet delegate charged Lester Pearson, President of the General Assembly, with having sent copies of the Indian Resolution to China and claiming that the United Nations desired peace and end of the war when in fact the members of the Atlantic Pact had refused the Soviet demand for a ceasefire. Vyshinsky however reiterated that the Soviets were eager for the return of peace in Korea.
4. On 5 March 1953.
5. Georgi M. Malenkov (1903-1988); Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers in the Soviet Union, 1946-53 and 1955-57 and Chairman, 1953-55; member, Politbureau of the Communist Party, 1946-53; member, Presidium of the Central Committee, 1953-57; manager, Ustkamenogorsk Power Station, 1957-63.
6. Malenkov became the Premier, and L. Beria, the Minister of Internal Affairs, V. Molotov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and N. Bulganin, the Minister of War.

Malenkov has repeatedly laid stress on peace.<sup>7</sup> What this means is not clear. But one might legitimately conclude that the Soviet Government is prepared to talk about the various problems that afflict the world.

9. After Stalin's death, the leading personality in the Communist world is Chairman Mao Tse-tung of China. His prestige is great and he stands on his own merits. The successors of Stalin in Russia are not very well known and have certainly not great prestige attached to them outside the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, it seems clear that China depends greatly on the Soviet Union and that the two countries will pull together.

10. In domestic affairs, the Jammu agitation and its offshoots have attracted a good deal of attention. The agitation in Jammu itself has largely subsided. The attempts in Delhi and in the Punjab to further this agitation have also met with little local success. Even the arrests of Dr Shyama Prasad Mookerjee and other leading personalities,<sup>8</sup> created little excitement. I rather doubt if this agitation can continue for long. There is a general realization about its harmful character. There can be little doubt that this particular agitation represents the most reactionary and disruptive tendencies in India.

11. It was for this reason that I drew the attention of Members of Parliament as well as many others in Delhi to the menace of this type of narrow-minded communalism.<sup>9</sup> Communalism is bad enough in its home sphere, but when it enters the international sphere, it is doubly dangerous. We can see the awful picture of narrow-minded bigotry in action in Pakistan, more especially in West Punjab.<sup>10</sup> It is exactly that type of mind, in reverse, which functions in the communal organizations of India. There is no reason behind it, but there is the organized strength of the RSS, which does not directly enter into the fray but supplies the manpower for it. The Delhi agitation is being kept up largely by volunteers from other places, notably from Kanpur. This agitation, like others of its kind, will fade away. But we have to deal always with this basic narrow-minded bigotry which flourishes in communal organizations.

7. Addressing the specially summoned session of the Supreme Soviet on 15 March, Malenkov declared that "any country in the world which has the interests of peace at heart including the United States can rest assured of the firm peace policy of the Soviet Union."
8. On 6 March, S.P. Mookerjee, N.C. Chatterjee and Nandlal Sharma were arrested in Delhi for defying a ban on processions and meetings but were released on 12 March following the admission by the Supreme Court of a *habeas corpus* petition filed on their behalf.
9. In Delhi on 13 March, Nehru termed the activities of the communal bodies "a vulgarization of public life" and appealed to Congressmen to rouse public consciousness against them.
10. Anti-Ahmadiya riots in Lahore, Sialkot, Karachi, Lyallpur, Bahawalpur and Rawalpindi from 28 February led to imposition of martial law in Lahore on 6 March and at Lyallpur on 15 March.



12. Recent happenings in West Punjab have been very significant and revealing. We know little about them yet, but it is obvious that the upheaval there was on the biggest scale and it was only by the extreme rigours of martial law that it has ultimately been partly dealt with. Probably, over a thousand persons were killed in this upheaval. We have to take a warning from this and not allow like forces to come into play in India.

13. In East Punjab, Master Tara Singh, who had been arrested previously, has been released as a result of some agreement arrived at.<sup>11</sup> This whole incident of his arrest and release has not redounded to his credit and it has been demonstrated that the Government will not tolerate breaches of the law from anyone, however important he might consider himself to be. Master Tara Singh had become a law unto himself and his speeches were astonishingly violent and foolish.

14. Politics in East Punjab are greatly affected by what happens in Pepsu. As you know, the President has taken over the administration of Pepsu.<sup>12</sup> There was no other course left. An attempt has been made to rouse up the Sikhs against this by making them feel that our Government is unfair to them.<sup>13</sup> This is wholly untrue and the attempt has not succeeded to any appreciable extent. There will have to be an election in Pepsu, probably six months later or so. Meanwhile, I hope that under the new regime, there will be considerable improvement in the administration and possibly some good agrarian legislation will be passed. The administration in Pepsu has for long been in a deplorable state.

15. Delhi has now got the railway centenary exhibition.<sup>14</sup> I wish many people from the rest of India could have the opportunity of visiting this exhibition, which is a record of the growth of this great State undertaking. It might be possible to have a permanent railways exhibition here in Delhi.

11. The cases against Master Tara Singh and other Akali workers were withdrawn and they were released on 14 March 1953 following an understanding reached between the Government and the Akalis, which stipulated withdrawal by the Akalis of their call for satyagraha and the Government's assurance of non-interference in the religious affairs of any sect. The Akali grievance had been that the arrest of Tara Singh while addressing a meeting at Amritsar to celebrate the Nankana Sahib Martyrs Day was an interference in their religious affairs.

12. On 5 March 1953.

13. Eighty-two members of the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, belonging to the Akali Dal, in a statement on 8 March, said that the imposition of the President's rule in Pepsu was "gross misuse" of the emergency powers of the President and warned the Government of "the serious consequences of the action in the country and on the minds of Sikhs in particular."

14. The exhibition was inaugurated by Nehru on 7 March.

16. In Japan, the Government has fallen<sup>15</sup> and there is going to be an election.<sup>16</sup> It appears that the Government fell, *inter alia*, because of a feeling among the people that it was too much under American influence.

17. I should like to draw your attention to the establishment of a National Extension Organization<sup>17</sup> throughout the country on behalf of our Food and Agriculture Ministry. Such a widespread and well-trained organization is essential if we are to further effectively our Grow-More-Food Campaign. It has been suggested that a phased programme for the establishment of 4,000 extension blocks during the next eight years should be undertaken immediately. For manning these blocks, trained personnel consisting of village level workers will be needed on a large scale. The Ministry of Food and Agriculture has already addressed your Government officially on this subject. I should like you to take personal interest in this matter and give it high priority.

18. I have drawn your attention previously to what is called the Japanese method of paddy cultivation. This promises great results for us. The 15th March was fixed for starting a campaign for the promotion of this method and I understand that detailed directions have been issued in various languages. In order to give full effect to this campaign, Government have made a very considerable reduction in the price of ammonium sulphate as fertilizers are specially required for this method of paddy cultivation. I hope that your Government will do everything in its power to popularize this method of paddy cultivation among the farmers.

19. You might be interested to have a brief report about our community projects. Generally speaking, reports are good from the community projects of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Madras, Madhya Pradesh, the Punjab, Pepsu, Vindhya Pradesh, Assam, Coorg, Kutch, Tripura and Bilaspur. West Bengal is moving ahead, but rather cautiously. Bombay and Hyderabad had some administrative difficulties which have been removed and progress is likely to be faster now. Delhi, Himachal Pradesh, Ajmer and Manipur have been rather backward in this respect. In Delhi, a new Development Commissioner has been appointed and better results are now expected. Rajasthan, Travancore-Cochin and Saurashtra are making fairly good progress. In Mysore, work appears to be at a standstill.

15. The Government of the Liberal Party in Japan headed by Shigeru Yoshida was faced with the prospect of defeat after the passing of a no-confidence motion following the defection of twenty-two members of the party. Prime Minister Yoshida, on losing majority in the lower house, dissolved the Diet on 14 March.

16. On 19 April 1953.

17. The National Extension Service was started to provide trained workers for the implementation of the community development projects all over the country. During the first Five Year Plan, the extension work was expected to cover 900 blocks, each of which consisted of a hundred villages.



20. The work done in three out of the four projects areas in Assam has been particularly good. Hundred and twenty one miles of road have been built by the tribal people by their own voluntary labour and free gift of land in the course of 2½ months. The road is 25ft. wide with an average height of 2½ft. It opens up many villages for the first time to the outside world. *Mahila samities* have been organized by tribal women on an extensive scale and cottage industries and recreational programmes have made great progress.

21. In the Garo hills the tribal people have built 25 miles of road, cutting through hills and dense forest, which till now were only accessible to elephants and wild animals. A substantial number of school buildings are under construction. These are made by the tribal people with the bamboos from the jungle. Land has been reclaimed for rice crops.

22. In the Silchar area, it is interesting and exhilarating to notice the co-operation between the various sections of the people, among them being Manipuris, Muslims, tribal people and the local inhabitants. Youngmen, who till a few months ago were spending their time in shouting slogans and opposing every action of Government, have formed themselves into a *kisan sangh* and are planning the village programme of the community projects with energy and enthusiasm.

23. In Tripura also there is considerable enthusiasm in the people and road building, opening of schools, seed distribution, etc., have been in progress.

24. In Bilaspur, roads and school buildings have been built, thousands of compost pits made, seeds distributed and arrangements made for veterinary and medical aid. Among the Part C States, Bilaspur is far ahead of the others.

25. This very brief survey will indicate to you both the very good work being done in the community projects and also, unfortunately, that some States are lagging behind. It is very likely that the test of a State's progress in future might well be measured, to some extent, by the success of the community projects in the State. It is important that the District Magistrates or the Deputy Commissioners of the areas where community projects are functioning should take active interest in the implementation of this programme. Generally speaking, it has been found that the success of the programme is directly proportional to the ability of, and the active interest taken by the Deputy Commissioners.

26. This morning the President inaugurated the Backward Classes Commission under the chairmanship of Kakasaheb Kalelkar.<sup>18</sup> It is well to remember how many of our people are likely to be affected by the activities

18. (1885-1981); associate of Mahatma Gandhi; Chairman, Backward Classes Commission, 1953.

and the recommendations of this Commission. The following population figures are significant. They are for all-India:

Scheduled Castes ...	5,13,50,267
Scheduled Tribes ...	1,91,36,250
Unscheduled Backward Classes...	7,15,85,915
<hr/>	
Total	14,20,72,432
<hr/>	

Thus, about 14 crores or 142 millions of our people belong to the Scheduled Castes or Tribes and the unscheduled Backward Classes. This is a tremendous number. Even this is based on an empirical classification of Backward Classes. The Government of India has recognized certain castes as backward for the purpose of granting scholarships. It is astonishing to note that the number of these castes is 1,331.

27. This minute division of our people in castes and groups is a terrifying factor. Until we break down these barriers and, in effect, break down the caste system, we shall never wholly get over the difficulties which have faced us. Even so, of course, the economic problem will remain and is the most important. Indeed, from an economic point of view one might well say that about 80 per cent of our population is backward. Progress thus cannot come if we confine it to one group or other, but only if it is India-wide and comprises all.

28. Large numbers of foreigners come here and tour about India. Apart from the normal tourists, there are a good number of people who are especially, interested in seeing what is being done in building up the new India. I find that in the tour programmes made for them, quite a lot of time is given to sightseeing of our famous monuments, etc. This is, no doubt, interesting. But I heard complaints from them to the effect that they came to see the new India and have seen mostly relics of the old. I think we should concentrate more on their seeing our great developmental and construction works, and our community projects.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru



15

MISCELLANEOUS





## I. GENERAL

1. Film on the Ganga<sup>1</sup>

I am afraid I can recommend no person to Sir Alexander Korda<sup>2</sup> for writing the story of the Ganga.<sup>3</sup>

For Shri Chaudhuri's<sup>4</sup> benefit, I might indicate that my idea of this film, which I mentioned to Mr Edward Thompson<sup>5</sup> a dozen years ago,<sup>6</sup> was something very different from the scripts he has sent and something very ambitious. I made the Ganga the life stream of Indian history and culture. I started from the mythological descent of the Ganga on Shiva's head, went on to the coming of the Aryans and reaching the Ganga, Rigveda Hymns, Iqbal's<sup>7</sup> couplet from "Hindustan Hamara" about the caravan reaching the Ganga,<sup>8</sup> possible references to the Mahabharata period and the Krishna legends, Kashi, the Buddhist period, Sarnath, the Buddha, Pataliputra, Chandragupta and Asoka, Prayag, Hsuan Tsang's visit during King Harsha's period. Delhi and Agra might be brought in as being in the Gangetic plain, the Mughal period, the British period, growth of Calcutta, etc.

This is the briefest outline. It is tremendous story covering India's history, civilization and culture in different periods.

The background can be the geographical one of snow-capped mountains, glaciers, great fairs, Kumbh Mela etc.

1. Note to M.O. Mathai, 2 February 1953. File No 43(254)/52-PMS.
2. (1893-1956); Hungary-born leading British film producer; some of his well-known films are *The Private Life of Henry VIII*, *The Four Features*, *The Third Man*, *Seven Days to Noon* and *The Wooden Horse*.
3. In his letter of 17 January 1953, Alexander Korda, Chairman, London Film Production Ltd., requested Nehru to recommend a person to give the 'Indian point of view' regarding his intended film on the Ganga.
4. P.C. Chaudhuri was the Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting at this time.
5. A British novelist, historian and writer on public affairs, a friend of Nehru, and supporter of the cause of India's freedom.
6. Nehru's letter to Edward Thompson of 7 April 1940 is published in *A Bunch of Old Letters* (Bombay, 1960), pp. 438-40 and *Selected Works* (First Series), Vol. 11, pp. 382-84.
7. Sir Mohammed Iqbal was a well-known Indian poet who wrote chiefly in Persian and Urdu.
8. The famous two lines from Iqbal's poem "Sare Jahan se Achcha Hindostan Hamara" are:

*Ai ab-e-rod-e Ganga wah din hai yad tujh ko  
Utara tere kinare jab karvan hamara*

Translated, it reads:

Oh! Waters of Ganga, do you remember the day when our caravan landed on your banks.

## 2. Buddha and Indo-Thai Relations<sup>1</sup>

I am glad to learn that it is proposed to dedicate earth taken from four famous Buddhist pilgrim centres in India at the altar of the Chedi of the Wat Saeng Swang in Bangkok<sup>2</sup> to serve the cause of peace for humanity. There could not be a dedication for a better cause. The Lord Buddha has been for ages past a symbol of peace, and the great faith which drew its inspiration from him has been a link for ages past between India and Thailand. I trust that this dedication will help to revive the ancient cultural relations between our two countries.

1. Message on the occasion of dedicating sacred earth, collected from Buddhist pilgrim centres in India, in Thailand, New Delhi, 16 February 1953. JN Papers, NMML.

## 3. Children a Lesson for Adults<sup>1</sup>

I am glad that more than 13,000 children from all over the world have sent their entries for the competition<sup>2</sup> this year. That bears an eloquent testimony to the fact that the *Shankar's Weekly* Children Number is no longer merely an all-India feature but has become a world feature.

I want to tell you that you are psychologically one whether you belonged to different races, creeds or religions in India. I do not like any disparity between the rich and the poor children. Every child should regard himself equal to the other. Only this can pave the way for greater unity and cooperation among them when they grow up.

We grown-ups have a lot to learn from you. When you children fight, you always make up your differences sooner or later. But when grown-ups fight, they simply cannot reconcile with one another.

1. Address at the prize distribution function of the *Shankar's Weekly* Children Number 1952 Competition, New Delhi, 1 March 1953. From *The Hindu*, 2 March 1953. Nehru first spoke in Hindi and then in English.
2. More than 13,000 children between the ages of five and sixteen from India and thirty five other countries participated in the competition. About three hundred prizes were awarded to the children all over the world for the best drawing and literary works. S. Radhakrishnan donated a gold medal each to be awarded to the winner of the best drawing and literary works. Nehru also contributed twenty-two prizes.



I often wondered if the modern technological developments and rapid means of communication and transmission of news are doing any useful purpose to humanity. If there is any case of murder, or slight catastrophe in any part of the world, it is flashed in the press all over the world, while other events connected with the day-to-day life of the individuals are completely ignored.

Every minor thing is reported in the press which represents a very small section of the world life, simply because it is exciting or disastrous. We get a record of only a small section with the result that an entirely wrong impression is formed in our minds about the international events. It is therefore, essential as well as good, to enlighten the people on the better side of the world.

There should be equal opportunities for all the children. It is my desire that on such occasions when prizes are given to the children, all should get and no one should go empty-handed.

#### 4. To Chou En-lai<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
March 2, 1953

My dear Foreign Minister,

I have great pleasure in sending through you to the children of China one of India's elephants. We have named her "Asha" which means "Hope" and she is a fine animal. She is only fifteen years old and is well-behaved. I hope that this elephant will give pleasure to the children of China and make friends with them.<sup>2</sup>

Will all good wishes to you,

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No 2(504)/49-PMS.

2. In a message to the children of China on 2 March 1953 (not printed) Nehru stated: "This is a gift from the children of India to the children of China and it carries with it the affection and good wishes of India's children."

## 5. Centenary of Indian Railways<sup>1</sup>

In spite of the faults and mistakes that we have made and are likely to make in future, we are achieving great things and are changing the face of the country. Mother India is in labour today. This old mother of ours which has produced so much in the past is producing great things today and it is going to produce greater things tomorrow. The very thought of it gives the excitement—continuous and perpetual—and the people should share with me that excitement because it is a very pleasant sensation to realize what is being done.

I always experience some excitement in visiting such places which are not only records of past human endeavour and achievement but which give glimpses of what we are going to do in the future. I have travelled all over the country in search of this excitement because I find nothing more exciting than to see all over India mighty works growing up, changes taking place, and in fact new India of our dreams gradually taking shape. It is a matter of genuine satisfaction that so much has already been achieved and that a better and stronger India we can bequeath to the next generation.

Only the other day I had an experience which I am not likely to forget when I went to open the Tilaiya Dam and Bokaro power station in the Damodar Valley. It was inspiring to see that great dam being constructed and the magnitude of the works. Last year when I visited Chittaranjan and Sindri I had the same sensation.<sup>2</sup> My mind becomes afire to see changing India. The mere fact of our deciding to do something big itself makes us big, and when that thing gradually takes shape and finally is accomplished the sense of achievement brings us pride, strength and joy.

Many people in Delhi are responsible for taking important national decisions, but not all have personal knowledge of the places and people whose future they determine. Their knowledge is largely theoretical. They have not seen things for themselves. One's feeling after visiting the sites of India's great undertakings is altogether different from the anaemic sensation derived from a study of files.

At present while great things are happening in India, comparable with those in any other country, not many people yet realize how rapidly India is

1. Address at the inauguration of the Indian Railway Centenary Exhibition, New Delhi, 7 March 1953. From the *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, *The Hindustan Times*, *National Herald* and *The Statesman*. 8 March 1953.
2. Nehru visited Chittaranjan and Sindri on 2 and 3 March 1952. See *Selected Works* (second series), Vol. 17, pp. 245-46.



progressing. This progress is largely due to the labours of thousands of workers. We have only helped a little in clearing the way.

I recognize the services of the foreign experts rendered in organizing the exhibition. Now the Railways are owned by the people of India. They are operated by 900,000 workers each one of whom performs an important and responsible task—more difficult than that of politicians because a mistake can easily lead to a disaster. Railways have always served as a key to big changes. Wherever a railway line is laid economic and social changes follow, trade flourishes. There are many places in India where this key is still to be applied.

While I am satisfied with the story of hundred years, my mind is to the future. Where are we going and how fast are we going?

## 6. Buddha's Message of Peace<sup>1</sup>

On the occasion of the anniversary of the date of the enlightenment and death of the Lord Buddha. I send my greetings to the people of Ceylon. This day is a landmark in history and is not only of peculiar significance to the Buddhists all over the world, but to innumerable other people who think with reverence of the Buddha and his great teaching. India, which had the high privilege of being the scene of these great events, must necessarily think of them with humility and deep reverence.

Even apart from the purely religious or doctrinal aspects of Buddhism, the figure of the Buddha stands out for all of us as an inspiration and a warning. In the world today his message of peace is as true, if not more so, than it was two thousand five hundred years ago and so it is right that we pay heed to the essence of that message of peace and brotherhood and tolerance and gentleness, and try to consider the intricate problems of this tortured world in that spirit.

There are many things which bring the people of Ceylon and the people of India closer to each other. There is geography, which cannot change, there is the history of our long past and the traditions that have gathered round it, there are the common strands of our culture and there are the needs of today in this world which call for friendly cooperation. Above all, there is that great message of the Buddha which is common to both of us. May this message inspire all of us to tread the right path, not only in our personal lives but also

1. Message on the anniversary of the enlightenment and death of Lord Buddha, 20 March 1953. File No 30(33)/47-PMS.

in our national work, so that we may contribute, to the best of our strength and ability, to the service of our generation.

## 7. The National Museum<sup>1</sup>

Monsieur Le Corbusier is a genius of world reputation. Naturally he thinks that he can get things done in an abnormal way. That is not right and he should proceed normally. Otherwise there will be greater delay at some stage or other.

So far as the National Museum is concerned, it is obvious that we cannot hustle the Education Ministry. It is not merely a question of the Education Ministry but the Cabinet also will have to consider it. I would very much like Monsieur Le Corbusier to help us in building this museum because of his very high ability and original ideas. But we have to go through the normal course....

1. Note to Principal Private Secretary, 27 March 1953. JN Collection. Extracts.

## II. PERSONAL

### 1. To V.K. Krishna Menon<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi

February 17, 1953

My dear Krishna,

Your letter of the 12th February<sup>2</sup> reached me last evening. I have read it more than once, trying to understand what ails you. I realize of course that you wrote in some distress of mind and that you feel unhappy. You ask me what has come between us. I am not aware of anything having come between us in

1. JN Collection.
2. On 12 February, Krishna Menon had written: "...it is a fact that often times and far oftener than I like I feel almost at the end of my emotional and mental tether in regard to what I feel has, and in fact appears to have, come between us... Ours was not a relationship which is very usual and was sustained by ourselves alone... I have written to you because I know great realities subsist."



any real sense. I have the same affection and regard for you as I have ever had. Sometimes I do not understand or like what you might say or do. That happens with everyone. With our most intimate friends we have moments of distance or lack of understanding. That moment passes and the basic feeling remains. Does anyone know or understand another fully? It does not matter very much if one agrees always or not. One may agree with a person one dislikes or distrusts. The real thing is a basic affection and respect and a belief in the integrity of each other. Nothing has happened to shake that so far as I am concerned.

I was happy to have you here and loved the talks we had. I was glad to know that there was a possibility of your coming to India for good, for I wanted you not to be far from me.

So, please do not imagine something that is not there and do not distress yourself about it.

Yours affectionately,  
Jawaharlal

## 2. To V.K. Krishna Menon<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
March 10, 1953

My dear Krishna,

I have your letter of the 1st March.<sup>2</sup> In this you refer to Rajaji being able to find a seat for you in the Council of States. Rajaji was here the other day and I mentioned this to him. If it is possible, he will probably do so. But there are all heads of difficulties now because of the formation of the Andhra State. This has created a fluid situation in the Madras State.

You refer also to the delegation for the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference. I have no doubt that you will be of great use there. But, as far as I know, the actual delegation consists only of the Prime Minister. The High Commissioner is supposed to go also. For the rest, the Prime Minister might take someone with him, as I took Bajpai. But Bajpai had to play a passive role. There is thus hardly any team from India and I do not quite see in what

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, NMML.

2. Krishna Menon had sought Nehru's opinion on the possibility of his nomination to the Council of States and his inclusion in the delegation to the coming Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference.

capacity I could ask you to come there with me. Naturally, I would like your advice and would like to consult you when I am in London. But I do not wish to do anything which might place you in a somewhat embarrassing position.

I have no doubt whatever that you could be of great help to me in India. But it is not particularly easy to make a distant appointment of a person who is not in Parliament. If you were here for some time and an opportunity offered itself, that would be different. I am giving much thought to this matter, because I would like you to be here.

A proposal was made some little time ago about putting up your name for the vice-chancellorship of the Delhi University. Probably it is rather late to take any action in that matter now. But in case, the President has not already decided, on the recommendation of a Selection Committee, this matter might be considered.<sup>3</sup> Could you let me know if you would view it favourably.

Yours affectionately,  
Jawaharlal

3. G.S. Mahajani succeeded S.N. Sen as Vice-Chancellor of Delhi University.

### 3. To Karan Singh<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
March 21, 1953

My dear Yuvaraj,

I have your letter of March 16.<sup>2</sup> I also received your previous letter. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad was here for some days and I had some talks with him. He informed me of the discussions they were having in Jammu and the steps they propose to take, more especially in regard to the implementation of our Agreement.

I like the idea of your going to the Commonwealth Universities Congress to be held at Cambridge next July. This visit will be good for you in various ways and will give you a breath of fresh air. I do not think there is chance of a war in the near future.

1. JN Collection.

2. Karan Singh had written that the Syndicate of the University of Jammu and Kashmir had requested him to represent the University at the Quinquennial Congress of the Commonwealth Universities to be held in July 1953 in Cambridge. He also wished to visit London, Cannes, his birth place in France, and Switzerland.



When you draw up your programme, please send it to us so that we can send word to our missions abroad, that is to the places where you are likely to visit. In your letter you mention England of course and France and Switzerland. Is there any other country in Europe you are likely to visit?

Have you got a proper passport, etc.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

#### 4. To G.V. Mavalankar<sup>1</sup>

New Delhi  
March 26, 1953

My dear Mr. Mavalankar,

Thank you for your letter of the 25th March.

I appreciate the desire of Professor Phadke<sup>2</sup> that I should write a foreword to his Hindi book on Mahatma Gandhi. I fear, however, that it will be very difficult for me to do so. I have consistently avoided writing forewords. I get frequent requests for this. But the real reason is that I find it difficult to write about Gandhiji. I have of course written and spoken about him in various places. But it is always a very difficult matter. I do not like to write some banal phrase about him. I cannot treat him in a casual manner and so it becomes difficult to write. Apart from this, I can hardly write a foreword to a book which I have not read and I have no time to read books. Of course it is possible for someone else to read it and could find someone to do so.

Perhaps the best course would be for me not to write a foreword. But Professor Phadke can send me the book and I could have it read by someone who knows Hindi well and then I could write a brief letter to Professor Phadke about it.

Yours sincerely,  
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No 9(148)/53-PMS.

2. Yeshwant Dinkar Phadke (b. 1931); taught Politics and Public Administration in Bombay and Poona Universities; author of *Social Reformers of Maharashtra*, *Ketkar Lekhsangraha*, *Politics and Language* and *Portrait of a Revolutionary Senapati Bapat*.

## III. TRIBUTES

1. N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar<sup>1</sup>

It is my misfortune and an unpleasant duty from time to time to refer in this House to the passing away of a colleague. I bring no news to this House, because all of us are aware of the fact that early yesterday morning Shri Gopalaswami Ayyangar died in Madras. We have also learnt of his funeral, at which both the Government and the people showed all respect and honour. We have also just heard the views of the President on this unfortunate and deplorable occurrence.

All of us in Government have been connected closely with Shri Gopalaswami Ayyangar—some of us for a longer period than others. Ever since, a little over six years ago, some of us associated ourselves with the Government we were together. Some had a different background from others. Many of those who formed the Government then and now had been closely connected with the national movement and had been partners in the ups and downs of the movement for a number of decades. When we came into the Government naturally, it was our desire to have the association and help of others also, so that we might be able to serve the country to the best of our joint ability.

Shri Gopalaswami Ayyangar was among those who became associated with us in this arduous task. During all these years, he carried one of the heaviest burdens of any in the Government. Not only was he in charge of Ministries which required a very great deal of—if I may say so—wisdom and perseverance and tact, but more and more his colleagues relied upon him, relied upon his experience, and took advice from him in regard to many other matters which were not even connected with his Ministry. We came to think of him as an elder statesman who was very wise, very experienced, very tolerant, very understanding, and always willing to share any burden with others. So, whether it was the intricate problem of Kashmir or any other, he was the expert to whom we went. Indeed, as Members well know, some years back he was the Prime Minister of Kashmir for five years or more. Whether it was matters relating to Pakistan or whether it was the very difficult question of rehabilitation of our refugees it was to Shri Gopalaswami Ayyangar that we went for advice and it was he who came to us with his advice, and even when we had to send some kind of a messenger abroad for a special purpose to

1. Statement in Parliament, 11 February 1953. *Parliamentary Debates (House of the People)*, Official Report, Vol. I, Pt. II, cols. 24-6.



confer with others, we turned to him. I mention these matters because of the wide variety of ways in which he served the country and the Government.

But behind all that was this ripe wisdom, this tolerance of approach, this friendliness, this lack of hurry—if I may say so—in arriving at a decision and considering every factor, so that whatever advice he gave us was valuable and influenced us. When I think of all these five or six years, I realize how very greatly all of us depended upon him, and more especially I depended upon him. When he fell ill some months ago and gradually it became clear to us that it was unlikely that he will survive, we battled in our minds against that growing conviction, because we did not wish it to happen and because the consequences of it were most disagreeable to think of. So, we perhaps deluded ourselves into thinking that he would get over this illness and survive and come back to us to help us again in our work. But there was going to be no coming back and ultimately, a day and half ago, he passed away and in spite of long preparation that our minds had had about his illness, nevertheless when the final news came it was a blow to all of us.

To us in Government it means a very special burden and difficulty. I can hardly express to this House what a great difference it makes to me in many ways, for he was—apart from what I have said—a great colleague and wise person to go to in difficulty. He was a friend, whose friendship I had begun to value very much. He was dear to me and he had, if I may use the word, “grown” upon me as he had grown upon others, because our backgrounds were different. We had met after wandering along different pathways of life. We had no doubt heard of each other and occasionally seen each other from a distance, but we hardly knew each other. But fate and circumstances threw us together. It was not, if I may so put it, love at first sight but a gradual recognition of the growing up of a friendship, a friendship which grew deeper and sounder as time went by. So, this uprooting of all that had happened in this connection during the last six years creates a gap and almost a wound which one does not easily see how it will heal quickly. The burden on some of us grows, and together with that a certain feeling of loneliness also creeps in, because some of us more or less belong to that generation that is passing away. We have to shoulder the burden as best as we can and we shall try to do that to the utmost of our ability and strength. Nevertheless, time passes and generations pass and others take their place. So, all those factors come to mind and one looks back and one looks to the present and one looks to the future, and one thinks with regret of some of the giants who are no more. Nevertheless, we have to shoulder this burden and all of us together if we share it, it becomes a little lighter.

I hope, Sir, that you will be good enough to convey my feelings, not mine alone, but of the Government and of this House to the lady, his wife, and to the other relatives of the family, of our deep sorrow at his death and of the

great regard we had for him. I am quite sure that every Member of the House will join me in this.

## 2. Marshal Stalin<sup>1</sup>

Sir, I crave your indulgence at the commencement of the proceedings to refer to an event of which the House is no doubt aware. In the early hours of this morning Marshal Stalin passed away. Only two days ago, we had heard of his serious illness.<sup>2</sup> Only a fortnight or three weeks ago, our Ambassador in Moscow<sup>3</sup> had met him and it so happened that just a few hours before the news of Marshal Stalin's serious illness came to us, I was reading a long report from our Ambassador about his interview with him. When we think of Marshal Stalin, all kinds of thoughts come to our minds, at least to my mind, and the panorama of history for the last 35 years passes before our eyes. All of us here are children of this age and have been affected by it in many ways. We have grown up not only participating in our struggles in this country but participating in another way with the mighty struggles that have taken place in this world, and been affected by them. And so looking back at these 35 years or so, many figures stand out, but perhaps no single figure has moulded and affected and influenced the history of these years more than Marshal Stalin. He became gradually almost a legendary figure, sometimes a man of mystery, at other times a person who had an intimate bond not with a few but with vast numbers of persons. He proved himself great in peace and in war. He showed an indomitable will and courage which few possess, but perhaps when history comes to be written many things will be said about him and I do not know what opinions, what varying opinions, subsequent generations may record, but every one will agree that here was a man of giant stature, a man such as few who had moulded the destinies of his age, a man—although he succeeded greatly in war—who ultimately would be remembered by the way he built up his great country. Again, people may agree or disagree with many things that

1. Statement in House of the People, 6 March 1953. *Parliamentary Debates (House of the People)*, Official Report, Vol. I, Pt. II, cols. 1567-70.
2. In fact, Nehru sent a message to the Foreign Minister of the USSR on 5 March (not printed) expressing his deep anxiety and concern about Stalin's illness.
3. Indian Ambassador to Moscow, K.P.S. Menon, had half an hour talk with Stalin on 17 February 1953.



he did or said, but the fact remains of his building up that great country, which was a tremendous achievement, and in addition to that the remarkable fact, which can be said about very, very few persons is that he was not only famous in his generation but as I referred to, he was in a sense, 'intimate', if I may say so, with vast numbers of human beings, not only the vast numbers in the Soviet Union with whom he moved in an intimate way, in a friendly way, in an almost family way, if I may say so, but many others too outside who felt that way. I have known people who were associated with Marshal Stalin, who disagreed with him subsequently or who associated themselves with the work that Marshal Stalin did and then who subsequently disagreed with him and came and told me that while they disagreed with him, they felt a personal wrench because of a personal bond that had arisen between him and them, even though they had not come near him or had only seen him from a distance. So here was this man who created in his life-time this bond of affection and admiration among vast numbers of human beings, a man who has gone through this troubled period of history. He may in the opinion of some have made mistakes or succeeded—it is immaterial. But every one must necessarily agree about his giant stature and about his mighty achievements. So it is right that we should pay our tribute to him on this occasion because the occasion is not merely the passing away of a great figure but perhaps in a sense also a greater change. I mean in the sense of the ending of a certain era in history. Of course, history is continuous and it is rather absurd perhaps to divide it up in periods like this, as historians and others seek to do; it goes on and on. Nevertheless there are periods which seem to end and take a fresh lease of life and; undoubtedly, when a very great man passes away, who has embodied his age to a great extent, in a certain measure, there is the end of that particular period. I do not know what the future will hold, but undoubtedly even though Marshal Stalin has passed away, because of the great hold he had on peoples' minds and even hearts, his influence and memory will continue to exercise peoples' minds and inspire them. He has been described by many persons, including some who have been his great opponents in the world stage, and those descriptions vary and sometimes are contradictory. Some of them describe him as frank and even gentle person. Others describe him as hard and ruthless, and may be he had all these features in him. Anyhow a very great figure has passed away. He was, I believe, technically not the head of the Soviet State—we make reference to the passing of high dignitaries and especially Heads of State—but Marshal Stalin was something much more than the Head of a State. He was great in his own right way, whether he occupied the office or not. I believe that his influence was exercised generally in favour of peace. When war came he proved himself a very great warrior, but from all the information that we have had, his influence has been in favour of peace. Even in these present days of trouble and conflict, I earnestly hope that his

passing away will not mean that that influence which was exercised in favour of peace is no longer to be availed of. Perhaps, if I may express the hope, this event may loosen all our minds a little from their rigidity in all countries, and that we may view the present problems of the world not in that rigid way which develops when people are continually in conflict and argument with each other, but in a somewhat more responsive and understanding way, so that his death may serve to bring us more to think of this troubled world, and to endeavour even more than before to secure peace in this world and to prevent any further disasters and catastrophes from occurring.

In fact when our Ambassador saw Marshal Stalin three weeks ago or so, he expressed himself to him in favour of peace and his desire that peace might not be broken in the world. He expressed then also his goodwill for India and sent his good wishes to our country and to some of us. And it was interesting how he discussed with our Ambassador some of our cultural problems, showing a certain knowledge, which was slightly surprising. He discussed—and it may interest the House—the languages of India, their relationships, their parentage, their extent, and our Ambassador gave him such replies as he could on the subject.

So, I hope, Sir, while expressing our tribute on this occasion, we may also hope that the world will be excited by this event into thinking more in terms of peace. If I may suggest it to you, Sir, perhaps this tribute and our message of condolence might be conveyed by you, Sir, on behalf of the House to the Government of the Soviet Union. May I also suggest, Sir, that the House might adjourn in memory of Marshal Stalin?

\* \* \*

With your permission, Sir,<sup>4</sup> I should like to say a few words about the passing away of Marshal Stalin. The House learnt two days ago about his illness and early this morning we learnt of his death. We meet and make reference in this House when any high dignitary of our country or any Head of State of any other country passes away. In the present case, we refer not merely to a high dignitary, but a person who, by whatever standards one may judge him, and however much people may differ in their judgment of him, stands out high above his fellowmen of this generation as a person who has influenced vast numbers of human beings in his own country and also in other countries, a person whose life has been one of storm and stress and trouble—first trying to

4. Statement in the Council of States, 6 March 1953. *Parliamentary Debates (Council of States)*, *Official Report*, Vol. III, cols. 1953-55.



achieve the freedom of his country from the type of rule that they had then, then civil war in his country and later facing a great invasion in the last World War; in between in building up that country. And thus in the course of his life he came to be known not only as a great warrior with an indomitable will, but a great builder also. And probably his greatest achievement by which he will be remembered will be as a great builder, because there can be no doubt—whatever other opinions people may hold—that he has brought about an astonishing change in his country and built it up almost from scratch after the First World War and the civil wars that followed. That is a tremendous achievement and no doubt history will record it as such.

In our generation we have seen a few very great men of different moulds because greatness need not be uniform. In fact, greatness has a certain individuality. And so Marshal Stalin stands out as an individual of a particular type of greatness and also as a great leader who had that remarkable quality, which very great leaders possess, of winning the affection and confidence of large numbers of people. There is no doubt that the news of his death has come as, what might be called, a personal blow not only to his own people in his country but to vast numbers of others who have developed that almost, if I may say so, mystic bond with the great leader. So it is right that we pay a tribute to the memory of this great man.

You, Sir,<sup>5</sup> had occasion to meet him and for some time to live in that environment where he was supreme and you are perhaps in a better position to judge of him and his work than most of us here. A short while ago, our present Ambassador in Moscow also met him and only two or three days ago, I read a long report that he sent to us about this meeting—which was an interesting report and which showed the friendly feelings which Marshal Stalin had for our country and our people—and many of the questions he put, chiefly relating to our cultural background, also show his peculiar interest in India's culture. I believe it is right to say that Marshal Stalin's weight and influence had been cast in favour of peace. He was not a pacifist; he was a man—a stout warrior—who would not bend and who would be, if I may say so, ruthless in the pursuit of his objectives. But I believe that it was perhaps largely due to him that a number of crises, that might have developed into war, were prevented from doing so.

I should like to express the hope that now that he has passed away, perhaps this event might turn people's minds in the direction of peace, because sometimes we grow rigid—countries and those who are responsible for their destinies grow rigid in their ways of thinking and it becomes a little bit difficult

5. S. Radhakrishnan, Vice-President of India was also Chairman, Council of States. Earlier, he had been India's Ambassador to USSR.

for one of them to respond to the other. But if something happens to shake them up a little, to make them think afresh, they may grow less rigid and may grow more responsive because obviously the world cries for peace. So, perhaps we may think that this event, sad as it is, may lead people to come to open their minds a little more to each other, to grow less rigid and cooperate in the work of peace.

I hope, Sir, that you would be good enough to convey the feelings of this House to the Government of the Soviet Union and if I may suggest, Sir, as a tribute to his memory, this House might adjourn later on.



## GLOSSARY

' adivasis	original inhabitants (of India)
Akhand Bharat	United India
Bania	a merchant or shopkeeper
bazaar	a traditional Indian market
Bhoodan	literally, a gift of land. Refers to a movement initiated by Vinoba Bhave
chappals	slippers
charkha	a spinning wheel
dharna	picketing
dhoti	a long piece of garment worn round the waist, down to the feet
goonda	a hooligan
gur	jaggery
hartal	strike
holi	the festival of spring
inam	a reward, gratuity
jatha	a group of individuals
jehad	the concept of a war against evil in Islam
kanal	a land measure in use in Jammu and Kashmir
khadi	hand-woven cloth of handspun yarn
khandsari	unrefined sugar
kisan sangh	an association of peasants
mahant	head of a monastery
mahila samitis	an association of women
mansab	designated office
mantra	invocation
rabi	the crop reaped in the spring season
rashtra	nation
samadhi	a place of cremation of a great leader or a saintly personage
sanchalak	organiser
satyagraha/satyagrahis	truth force or soul force; practitioners of soul force
seva dal	service corps
swadeshi	indigenously produced
taluka	a territorial sub-division
thana	a police station
vihara	a Buddhist or a Jain temple
yagna	religious sacrifice and oblation
youmia	daily allowance
yuvaraj	crown prince





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The first quarter of 1953, covered by this volume of the *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru*, witnessed several national and international developments with far-reaching implications for society and politics in India.

Within India, the foundations were being laid, at this juncture, of a modern industrial and agrarian economy... The First Five Year Plan was thus the manifesto of a new era of national reconstruction and social regeneration, which would rest upon the creative energies of a united nation. Further, the concept of a mixed economy, so Nehru believed, would draw equally upon the strengths of the public and the private sectors for the common good of the people.

In the task of transforming society in India, Nehru sought the cooperation of Jayaprakash Narayan and his socialist colleagues. But the talks Nehru held with Jayaprakash in March 1953 failed since the terms put forth by the socialist leadership were difficult to accept...

Not surprisingly, foreign policy continued to be a major arena of interest for Jawaharlal Nehru in the period under review... His response to the question as to how wars could be prevented was deeply principled. "There are only two ways of approaching the problem of international relations. One is the conviction that even though we try to avoid war, it is bound to come. Therefore, we should prepare for it, and when it comes, join this party or that. The other way starts with the feeling that war can be avoided." India could best serve peace by remaining independent of the two power blocs, yet try to bring these power blocs closer to each other by suggesting ways in which contentious issues could be resolved.

Nehru's concern for peace was fully compatible with an activist policy towards potentially disturbing factors in the Asian region, in particular. When the US changed its stance of neutrality towards Taiwan, and attempted to constitute a Middle East Defence Organization with Pakistan as a member, Nehru feared that the risk of a world war had moved "right up to our door." To meet this situation, he proposed the formation of "an area of peace" for the non-aligned nations with South Asia as its pivot.

Despite Nehru's unhappiness at Britain's stance in the UN on the Kashmir issue, he defended India's association with the Commonwealth. Yet Indo-British relations underwent a severe strain due to British policy in East Africa....

